

HEARTH & SOUL: PARTIES, SOCIAL POLICIES, & IDEOLOGIES OF THE
FAMILY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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HEARTH & SOUL: POLITICAL PARTIES, FAMILY IDEOLOGIES & THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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Although the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s may be long passed, contemporary American politics continues to be infused with struggles to define the soul of America; issues of morality, culture, and family rising to the fore of national attention alongside ongoing concern over the economy. This dissertation documents and analyzes the contemporary phenomenon of the rightward turn in American politics in the last three decades towards the revival of traditional family ideals, despite the ongoing dramatic liberalization of gender, family and social relations on the ground. It demonstrates that traditional family revivalism in social policies is part of an enduring dynamic in American politics in which one set of traditional (Soul) family ideals, emphasizing a family’s character, morality and spiritual attitude, have long rivaled a more materialist (Hearth) set, focused on families’ material conditions. The current salience of the traditional, Soul family ideal within public policy is one such phase in the ongoing competition between the two family ideals. An old song but sung with new lyrics, it now represents the current, ongoing, Southernization of American Politics: a configuration of party realignment, shifting constituencies, the rising salience of the South and its unique cultural concerns, combined with the Republican’s Party’s

accommodation of (southern) social conservative values within its more long-standing economic conservatism. This complex empirical story is told in the context of two previous periods in American history: the Progressive era (1900-1920) and the postwar period (1945-1956), in which similar contestations over family ideals engendered different policy outcomes, depending on the political and social factors of the time. The case studies of the three periods (Progressive, postwar and contemporary) reveal both the continuities in, and the evolution of, the competition over family policy ideals, suggesting that while the story of Hearth and Soul is an old one, it is now being played out in new ways. Regional electoral conditions now institutionalize this ideational battle in ways which embed it even more deeply in American politics than ever before, elevating family from its previously minor place on the national agenda to now being a major center of partisan contestation and policy conflict.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Gwendoline Alphonso received an undergraduate and law degree (B.A. LL.B (Hons.)) at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India; read law and received the Bachelor of Civil Laws (B.C.L.) degree at Lincoln College, Oxford University; completing her law studies with a doctorate in law (JSD) under the auspices of Martha Fineman and the Feminism and Legal Theory Project at Cornell Law School. Her PhD in Government (Richard Bense as chair) cements her long-standing interest in state-society relations and in the historical mechanisms which connect cultural forces with policy development. She is currently an Assistant Professor in the Politics Department at Fairfield University and resides near the water in Black Rock, CT, with her spouse, young son, and cat adopted from the Ithaca, S.P.C.A

To Ted, my dearest; Nate, my most precious little boy;
and to my beloved parents, June & Pius
– for helping me live my family ideal everyday.

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My most humble thanks to Ted Lowi, whose stature within American politics belies his keen interest in his students; right from our first meeting, he continually inspires me to ‘fight the good fight’ and undertake what I hope is still a worthwhile approach to the study of politics: induction, classification and description. The comments of Suzanne Mettler and her contribution in framing the dissertation at crucial points were invaluable to my thinking and to my attempts at expanding its reach among political science audiences. My learning experience at the Department of Government, Cornell University, was greatly shaped by Elizabeth Sanders, whose generosity and commitment to her students I strive to emulate. I am also most grateful to Tina Slater, Department of Government, Graduate Students Coordinator, for the innumerable times she helped me keep one step ahead of graduate school paperwork. Thanks also to Suzanne Schwartz, Olin Library, Cornell University, for giving me my

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This dissertation and the many years of its research would not have been possible without the unwavering encouragement, forbearance and insight of my husband, Ted Arnold. During its writing, we found each other, got married, adopted two cats, and had our wonderful son, Nathaniel; my ongoing interest in the family, and the relevance of policies to its success, is reinforced by my daily wonderment at just how meaningful our life together has been.

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INTRODUCTION

“We must first discuss household management, for every city-state is constituted from households.”

- Aristototle¹

Although the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s may be long passed, contemporary American politics continues to be infused with struggles to define the soul of America; issues of morality, culture, and family rising to the fore of national attention alongside ongoing concern over the economy. Same-sex marriage, abortion rights and funding, and creation v. evolution in school curricula are some of the controversies that continue to serve as rallying points for various electoral groups despite the prominence of the recession and related economic issues such as unemployment, bailouts, rising health care costs etc.

This dissertation both documents and analyzes the contemporary phenomenon of the rightward turn in American politics in the last three decades towards the revival of traditional family ideals, despite the ongoing dramatic liberalization of gender, family and social relations on the ground. In a nutshell, it claims that the current prominence of family issues and traditional family revivalism in social policies form part of a long-term, enduring dynamic in American politics, partisan divergence over ideas of family being both deep and long lasting. Traditional family ideals emphasizing a family’s character, morality and spiritual attitude have long existed in policy debate, rivaling a more material set of family ideals that have instead focused on the centrality of economic conditions for family well-being. ‘Soul’ family ideology refers to the first set of family policy ideals, those that assign primary significance to moral and attitudinal

¹ Aristotle (1998) Politics, Translated by C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company) p. 5.

qualities, while ‘Hearth’ family ideology denotes the second, those family policy ideals more concerned instead with families’ economic, not moral, conditions (such as a well-stocked, warm hearth). The current salience of the traditional, Soul family ideal within public policy is one such phase in the enduring competition between the two family ideals. An old song but sung with new lyrics, it now represents the current, ongoing, Southernization of American Politics: a configuration of party realignment, shifting constituencies, the rising salience of the South and its unique cultural concerns, combined with the Republican’s Party’s accommodation of (southern) social conservative values within its more long-standing economic conservatism. Regional political, demographic, and economic changes have thus interacted with state institutions to produce the contemporary revival of Soul social policies, with both parties now integrating their cultural concerns into more durable differences over economic interests.²

This complex empirical story is told in the context of two previous periods in American history: the Progressive era and the postwar period, in which similar contestations over family ideals engendered different policy outcomes, depending on the political and social factors of the time. The case studies of the three periods (Progressive, Postwar and Contemporary) reveal both the continuities in, and the evolution of, the competition over family policy ideals. Through the 20th century the family has increasingly gained prominence as an issue of national policy, now dividing the parties more deeply than ever before in American history.

In documenting the above, the dissertation makes two sets of theoretical claims regarding the significance of families to American politics: the first concerning its relevance to party

² Much of this story, particularly the late-century developments, could parallel that of race within American politics, raising an interesting question of whether race or family is the master narrative of American political development. It is not, however, the purpose of this project to evaluate that claim. I need note though that the contestation over Hearth and Soul family ideals extends back to the Progressive era and beyond, their durability suggesting their own separate dynamic, worthy of independent investigation.

ideologies: illuminating where they come from, how they develop, and how they affect policies; and the second, pertaining to how we understand the very nature of party competition itself.

Prominent scholars have effectively demonstrated the effect of Democratic and Republican ideological divergence over the economy to the voting behavior of their members in Congress.³ American party competition is understood as operating along a liberal-conservative dimension,⁴ where liberalism implies an ideology of an activist state, positively intervening into the economy for redistributive and other regulatory purposes, and conservatism a negative state philosophy, privileging free enterprise and individualism. The two political parties are viewed as falling on either side of the liberal-conservative divide and the history of party competition is described in terms of their varying support for a liberal or conservative ideology. Yet, as recent works along with many of the historical treatments of political parties demonstrate, American politics has also long involved struggles over social, moral and cultural ideologies, how and why the state should intervene into society, morals and social relations.⁵ In our current age, often still

³ Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll-Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press); Also (2007) Ideology and Congress (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers). Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2006) Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); Jeffrey Stonecash, Mark Brewer and Mack Mariani (2003) Diverging Parties: Realignment, Social Change, and Political Polarization (Boulder, CO: Westview Press); Larry M. Bartels (2005) 'What's the Matter with *What's the Matter with Kansas?*' Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, Aug 31-September 3, 2005, also: (2008) Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation). For a contrary third position, asserting the absence of current partisan polarization, see Morris Fiorina, Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope (2005) Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New York: Pearson Longman).

⁴ McCarty et al (2006) Polarized America Figs. 1.2, 1.3, 8,9

⁵ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield (2008) 'The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S.," Perspectives on Politics 6:433-50; Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash (2006) Split: Class and Cultural Divisions in American Politics (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press); Robert H. Wiebe (1967) The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Richard Hofstadter (1955) Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A Knopf). On the persistence of cultural battles within American political history, including but not limited to the Progressive Era see: James A. Morone (2003), Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press); also Geoffrey Layman (2001) The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press); and Michael P. Young (2006) Bearing Witness Against Sin: The Evangelical Birth of the American Social Movement (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press); specifically on previous partisan conflict over family, see: Rebecca Edwards (1997) Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American Party Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

defined by its so-called ‘culture wars,’ the relevance of cultural conflict to contemporary politics is inescapable.⁶


As a first set of theoretical objectives, this dissertation aims to reconcile the two perspectives by demonstrating how the two, economic and cultural ideologies, have both been deeply imbricated within American party ideologies, each set complementing and reinforcing each other. Through an investigation of the historical development of partisan family ideologies and social policy in the 20th century, I uncover the deep connections between ideologies of state, of family, and of economy.⁷ The dissertation demonstrates how the two parties have continually diverged in their conceptions of family and that this divergence has underpinned their divergent ideals of state and its normative role into the economy. My focus of family policy evolution describes the ongoing interplay between the social and economic dimensions in American party politics through the 20th century. I hope to show that American party ideological development is much more than a story of dueling ideals of state and its role in the economy, it is also, instead, a competition between dual ideals of the American family and of the very social fabric that it embodies.⁸ This inter-connectedness of ideals of state with ideals of family is summarized in the following figure.⁹

⁶ Thomas Frank (2004) What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Metropolitan Books); Ben Wattenberg (1995) Values Matter Most: How Republicans or Democrats or A Third Party Can Win and Renew the American Way of Life (New York: Free Press); Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall (1992) Chain Reaction: the Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: Norton); the term ‘culture wars’ was first used by sociologist, James D Hunter (1991) Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York, NY: Basic Books) who asserts the presence of a new cultural division between (religious) ‘orthodox’ and ‘progressive’ political and social elites; on the overall trend towards ‘postmaterialism’ see: Ronald Inglehart (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson (1999) “Measuring Postmaterialism” American Political Science Review 93(1999): 665-677.

⁷ George Lakoff has shown how differing family ideals organize cognitive ideation, thus engendering variation in what we even imagine is possible through policy intervention [George Lakoff (2001) Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think 2nd ed (Chicago: University Press of Chicago)]. I similarly argue that alternative ideals of family and of society centrally frame partisan policy agendas and the policy ideals of Hearth and Soul members of Congress.

⁸ The term “ideology” is used throughout in its conventional sense: ‘a *systematic scheme of ideas, usu. relating to politics or society, or to the conduct of a class or group, and regarded as justifying actions*’ [OED (1989) 2nd Ed

Figure i: Liberal and Conservative Ideologies of Family, State and Economy



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Definition §4] its key elements being ‘systematic’ and ‘ideas’. Ideals of family therefore form the units of an aggregate, systematized, family ideology. Policy ideologies are similarly an aggregation of systematic policy ideas that together cohere into a larger scheme, containing normative ideas about the state and when and how it should intervene in society and in the economy.

⁹ David McCandless (2009) The Visual Miscellaneum: A Colorful Guide to the World's Most Consequential Trivia (New York: Collins Design)

As we see in the diagram, beliefs regarding the family align with other beliefs regarding the economy and the role of the state. Thus conservatives whose family goal is to raise self-reliant adults see a limited role for government, in turn embracing other ideals of an un-regulated economy, free enterprise and a society based on individual freedoms. In contrast, liberals whose family goal is to raise self-nurturing adults, privilege personal fulfillment over self-reliance, and do not view government intervention antagonistically. They instead believe in an activist role of government, as creating the conditions in which more adults can find personal fulfillment; this, in turn, is related to their beliefs regarding regulated economies, redistribution and greater social equality. As I will show, Democratic and Republican party competition has long involved these imbricated, overlapping ideals of family, state and economy; the parties at various times highlighting one set of ideals over the other in order to gain constituencies in their quest for electoral success.

A second set of objectives pertains to the very understanding of partisan ideology itself. Conventionally, party ideology is approached as a constellation of ideas and values, rhetorical tools or abstract principles devised for electoral gain, that are unconnected to materiality or to lived practice and experience.¹⁰ In this dissertation, I present an alternative picture of party ideology – as grounded in the lives and material realities of real-life American families.¹¹ Party

¹⁰ On Ideology as abstract principle see: John Gerring (1998) Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press); Vernon Van Dyke (1995) Ideology and Political Choice: The Search for Freedom, Justice, and Virtue (Chatham, N.J. : Chatham House); Isaac Kramnick and Frederick Mundell Watkins (1979) The Age of Ideology: Political Thought, 1750 to Present (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall); Louis Hartz (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace).

¹¹ Among political scientists, Barry Burden has come closest to this approach to the extent that situates legislators' policy preferences in their personal experiences [Barry C. Burden (2007) Personal Roots of Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)]. In other disciplines, theorists have connected ideation and material experience more thoroughly, arguing for the spontaneous, organic nature of human cognition in which idea and material experience interact continually and non-deliberately to produce a constant, seemingly coherent, generation of ideas and knowledge.[See: Pierre Bourdieu (1990) The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press); Friedrich Hayek (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, Vol. 1: Rules and Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press); James C Scott (1998) Seeing like a State:


ideology is shown to be a product of both top-down and bottom-up dynamics, reflecting a party's internal dynamics, its inexorable drive to achieve electoral success, as well the actual lives, travails and triumphs of the families they represent. The real-life families described by members of Congress during committee hearings that form the core of my research, allows us to go into the lives of everyday American families and view the family practices and experiences that are assigned political value, in the generation of policy ideas by legislators.¹² By analyzing the characteristics of these families, the regional patterns of where they live, and the policy ideals they are used to illustrate, I am able to link partisan family ideals to specific material and cultural conditions on the ground, suggesting that a party's family ideology and its social policy agenda articulate the experiences and ideation of the dominant faction among their constituents. Shifts in

How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press)]. The correlation between timing of ideas and material structures has also been recognized in the literature on social movements. Here concepts such as 'transvaluation', 'cognitive liberation' and others are developed to capture cognitive or ideational shifts among social movement participants whose perception of hopelessness changes to one of hope and it is the very idea that 'racial equality', for instance, will come to fruition that enables them to form and participate in protest movements. These cognitive shifts are shown to be embedded in the changing material conditions and lives of potential participants. Cognition, ideation, and material structures hence appear intertwined in influential works on social movements. See, for example, the 'cognitive liberation' element in Doug McAdam's political process model of the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement, that occurs only in context of favorable material circumstances such as the establishment of black churches and colleges, black migration to the north, the emergence of black leaders and organizations such as SCLC and SNCC. [See: Doug McAdam (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 pp.48-51; Also see 'transvaluation' as the transformation from values/ideas of fatalism to those of hope in Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward (1979) Poor People's Movement: Why They Succeed and How They Fail, chapter 1.]

¹² The use of stories ('narratives with heroes and villains'), as a mechanism by which political actors define policy problems and contextualize (and justify) preferred policy actions, has been identified as a key strategy of political decision-making [Deborah Stone (1997) Policy Paradox: the Art of Political Decision Making (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Co.) 138-145]. Stone argues that the underlying model of reasoning in political decision-making is 'reasoning by metaphor and analogy'... 'it is trying to get others to see a situation as one thing rather than another' (Ibid, 9); within this framework, anecdotal family narratives present concrete analogous situations through which political participants engage in the strategic process of political reasoning, ultimately for the sake of making (or persuading) policy decisions. The model of policy making developed by Stone (and followed here) asserts that 'the essence of policy making [is] the struggle over ideas. Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money and votes and guns. Shared meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action. Ideas are at the center of all political conflict. Policy making, in turn, is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideas that guide the way people behave.' [Stone, "Policy Paradox," 11] Family stories are such means through which political actors engage in this struggle over ideas which define the category of the 'family', as policy subject.

party ideologies occur in conjunction with shifts in the lives of their constituent families. This model of partisan ideological development is represented in the following figure.

Figure ii: Social Change Model of Partisan Policy Development



Overview

The first chapter of the dissertation uses party platforms and bill sponsorship data to construct the Hearth and Soul policy frameworks. It documents their development across the 20th century, identifying critical periods and demonstrating the explosion of family issues in current American

politics compared to any other period in history. The following three chapters are each case studies of one significant period in the development of family ideals and social policies; covering the Progressive Era (1900-1920), the early Postwar Era (1945-1956), and the Contemporary period (1980-2005). Using data from transcripts of congressional committee hearings, policy debates recorded in the congressional record, and demographic data, the chapters show how in each era social and demographic changes in families' lives and practices interacted with changes in party competition to produce specific configurations of partisan interests, ideas and institutions, which, in turn, engendered Hearth and Soul constellations. The fifth chapter discusses contemporary party developments, the greater-than-ever prominence of family issues and the revivalism of the traditional, Soul family ideal in social policy. The final chapter draws conclusions about the future direction of American politics, suggesting that while the story of Hearth and Soul is an old one, it is now being played out in new ways. Regional electoral conditions now institutionalize this ideational battle in ways which embed it even more deeply in American politics than ever before.

CHAPTER I

PARTIES, IDEOLOGIES, FAMILIES: DEVELOPMENT ACROSS THE 20TH CENTURY

Introduction

During the 1984 Vice-Presidential debate between Democrat Geraldine Ferraro and Republican George H.W. Bush, Ferraro in her closing statement recounted the stories of two families she had met on the campaign trail. The father of the Dyhouse family in Kentucky worked for a car dealer and worried about the effects of mounting deficits and high interest rates on the job which provided for his family. The Allen family in Dayton, Ohio, lived next door to a toxic dump, and expressed grave concerns over the toxins in the water that they, and their neighbors, were now forced to drink. “Those people” said Ferraro, “love their country and are patriotic...Their patriotism is not only a pride in the country *as it is*, but a pride in this country that is *strong enough to meet the challenges of the future*.”¹ She went on to describe the Democratic agenda of reducing deficits, cutting interest rates, increasing affordable housing and educational standards and stopping the arms race, as ‘pro-family’ and thus ‘patriotic.’

Ferraro’s statement is a pithy summary of the current approach of her party to issues relating to the American family. Democrats, particularly in the aftermath of Reagan, have emphasized the changing, intensifying needs of families caused by economic-structural transformations and (Republican) government neglect; they call for increased state responsibility to assist vulnerable families through these changes. In its platforms, Democrats have therefore repeatedly drawn attention to the increased partnership role government must play in the light of

¹ The Bush-Ferraro Vice Presidential Debate, October 11, 1984, available on the world wide web at: <http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-1984-debate-transcript> (last accessed 06/01/2011)

radical changes faced by families. ‘Strong, healthy families build a strong America,’² since 1996 they have repeatedly acknowledged, “[g]overnment does not raise children, families do.”³ However, by ‘putting families first’ government must “help make the hardest job in the world - being a parent - a little easier. Today, families come in all different shapes and sizes, but they all face similar challenges. Government should be on the side of parents - making it easier for them to raise their children and pass down their values.”⁴

1980 marked another change. In that year the Republican Party switched its 40-year long position of support for the Equal Rights Amendment and has since opposed its enactment.⁵ This remarkable change over gender and women’s rights was symptomatic of a larger shift in the party’s ideology. In the ‘new’ Republican ideology, expressed most clearly in its 1980 platform, the party rediscovered local institutions – such as the family, neighborhood, and community – and extolled their virtues as *alternative*, more effective, mechanisms to combat social problems than government. This broad shift towards a concrete ideology of deregulation, small government, and greater reliance on social and civic (voluntary) institutions, not only marked the party’s reversal of their longstanding position on women’s rights but also posited a new ideology of family. The family soon became a cornerstone of Republican ideology and ‘family values’ has attained an almost iconic status in contemporary Republican political and policy rhetoric.⁶

² Democratic Party Platform of 2004, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php> (29) [Note: More than 2 sentences separated from the rest of the text by a hard return are counted as paragraphs/line numbers]

³ Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (25)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Christina Wolbrecht (2000) The Politics of Women’s Rights: Parties, Positions, Change (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press)

⁶ See John Gerring (1998) Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 147-148, especially Fig. 10 on p. 148 (showing support for family, as measured by the percentage of sentences within Whig-Republican nomination acceptance addresses devoted to the family or the home; demonstrating the spike in family-related sentences since 1980.)

Unlike Democratic ideology in which government must respond to, and assist, the family in meeting its economic needs, the Republican conception of the family emphasizes its traditional (or ‘natural’) autonomy. The expansion of the liberal (Democratic) welfare state into the lives of families is seen as stripping parents and family members of their traditional roles, thus emasculating the family. Government far from being capable of directly assisting families has instead eroded the family’s traditional function of responsible child rearing. Republican agenda therefore calls for a revival of the traditional family – and community – as the primary providers of economic, moral, and social support to individuals. By fortifying the traditional family, the party now attempts to recreate the traditional buffer to ongoing economic-structural change - the family must return to its original function of being a ‘permanent haven when everything is changing.’⁷

The conception of the family as a natural, self-regulating system that autonomously transcends economic disadvantages, even poverty, has become the central bone of contention between the two parties. Democrats claim that Republican pro-family policies are all ‘family-values talk and no action,’ and that their focus on family values, self-reliance and autonomy is a diversionary tactic that masks inaction and neglect. In contrast, the Democratic conception of the family focuses more on families’ evolving material needs. The family is viewed as facing new challenges, with increasing needs that must be addressed and/or provided for by the government.

These two alternate ideological conceptions of the family – that I call *Hearth* and *Soul* – are neither new nor confined to the contemporary period. Instead, the need-based, progressive *Hearth* and, self-regulation-oriented, *Soul* family ideations have deep historical roots; their origins can be traced, at least, as far back as the Progressive era. In that early period, although the family was more rigidly within the jurisdiction of the states’ police powers, the national

⁷ Republican Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (62)

government was beginning to address issues that had thus been considered purely ‘private’ or local. Child labor and public schooling, contraception, maternal and prenatal health and hygiene, relief and compensation of dependent families of veterans, legal standards of marriage and divorce, treatment of women, minors and orphans – these and other issues increasingly came to national attention. The family, directly and indirectly, was at the center of many of the new issues which emerged as part of the national agenda in the Progressive Era. Members of Congress when addressing these issues offered similar conceptual variants of the family, Hearth and Soul, which they fit within the existing ideational framework of their party’s political philosophy.

Similarly in the postwar era, following the second constitutional Founding of the New Deal, partisan factional debates regarding the capacity and normative role of the national government also engendered dualistic conceptions of the family. The continuation of New Deal housing, fair labor, work, social security, health and welfare programs were justified as the appropriate (evolving) national government response to families and their new postwar needs. Opponents, however, decried the increased (national) government intervention into people’s lives and stressed liberty-based Soul values, they claimed that ‘the fate of the nation will depend, not so much on the wisdom and power of government, as on the character and virtue, self-reliance, industry and thrift of the people and on their willingness to meet the responsibilities essential to the preservation of a free society.’⁸ Self-regulation versus evolving needs-based intervention again underpinned partisan approaches to the family and its relationship with the national state.

Finally in the contemporary period, Republicans condemned the legacies of Great Society and War on Poverty programs as increasing social dependency and civic disorder. They revived

⁸ Republican Party Platform of 1936, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (231)

the Soul conception of family with a greater enthusiasm than before and decried the erosion of the family unit. The Reagan Republican mantra of limited government and personal responsibility came alive in the conception of the traditional family and the virtues of a self-regulating, self-monitoring family were extolled with a fervor never seen before. Democratic opponents to Reaganomics and scaled-back social programs instead emphasized the growing needs of families who were increasingly falling behind, particularly when faced with an unresponsive, neglectful (Republican) government. However, in the final decades Democrats have acquiesced to the Soul vision and now stress family personal responsibility as much as government responsibility to provide for family need. This partisan ideological contest over the family as a traditional, self-regulating or an evolving, needs-based institution continues today with few alterations.

Thus, this chapter will show that the two partisan conceptions of the family – the Hearth and Soul – have endured in some form through much of the 20th century, implicitly or explicitly they have underpinned numerous family-related policy debates.

At the same time, the chapter (and the dissertation) also suggests that the two conceptions of family have been not been static in terms of adherents or content. While the fundamental, core/defining principle for each has prevailed, the evolutionary increase in state capacity, changes in family demographic patterns, and modernization of economic-structural forces have altered *how* these ideologies translate into policy applications. During particular historical periods, one family ideology gains ascendance over the other and imbues the content of the latter, less-dominant, conception with new principles; this process is reversed when the other conception becomes dominant in another period. Thus there is much give-and-take between the two partisan family ideologies through their evolution across the 20th century.

I demonstrate that the two parties have not uniformly embraced one ideology through time. Instead, the Republican Party in the Progressive period was the pioneer of the Hearth family conception; however, beginning in the postwar period Republicans began to revive and fervently champion the Soul idea of the family. In contrast, the Progressive-era Democratic Party had a strong (southern) element that challenged the emerging, Hearth family conception by stressing the importance of the self-regulating, patriarchal family; however since the New Deal and postwar period and through the civil and women's rights movements, liberal Democrats now firmly advocate the Hearth family conception.

The historical development of the two parties' ideologies or conceptions of the family is important for at least three reasons. Firstly, it enables us to situate the contemporary family values debate within a larger historical context and determine its ideological origins and antecedents. Secondly, the parties' positions and ideological reversal on the issue of the family has gone largely unnoticed in political science literature and the description and classification of this empirical puzzle is therefore, in and of itself, a worthwhile undertaking. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the phenomenon of partisan family ideological development illustrates a broader mechanism in the development and polarization of party ideologies themselves. By investigating the causes and conditions under which distinct and polarized party family ideologies emerge and develop, we are able to begin to partly address the larger substantive question of *why* parties' adopt the ideologies they do and *what are some of the causes* that impel parties to change, and sometimes reverse, their ideologies on crucial issues. Moreover, the mechanism of party ideological polarization will also reveal the factors under which parties tend to converge or diverge in their policy positions; this has direct implications on the social policy content to be expected in such periods of convergence and divergence.

This chapter provides an overview of the development of partisan ideological conceptions of the family across the 20th century. It inductively constructs the Hearth and Soul conceptual frameworks from party platforms, presidential speeches, and tests this with bill sponsorship and cosponsorship data from congresses in three periods: (a) the Progressive era (1900-1920); (b) the Postwar period (1945-1954) and (c) the Contemporary period (1989-2004). The objective here is to classify, trace, and evaluate the evolutionary trajectories of the two parties' ideologies of the family. Thus in this initial chapter I address the 'what' and 'how' questions: 'what' the parties' ideologies of the family were in the three examined periods and 'how' those developed across the 20th century. The following three chapters will chronologically address each period separately and examine the second, more analytical 'why' layer of questions i.e. *why* have the parties' differed, and often polarized, in their ideologies of family.

§1— Party Platforms, 1900-2004:

A party platform is an umbrella-like statement of abstract principles that states the beliefs and policy positions (planks) of the party, as a collective.⁹ It also contains the rationale behind policy pledges by explaining *why* the party supports its stated positions. Parties are sometimes self-reflective of the ideological role of platforms, for example the 1988 Republican Platform stated: 'We have learned that ideas do indeed have consequences. Thus, our words are important

⁹ Platforms conventionally preface most statements with categorical references to their members' beliefs as a monolithic body: 'We, as Democrats believe...' or 'Republicans pledge that...' Thus scholars of party platforms have acknowledged that the platform 'is the only statement of policy made with authority on behalf of the whole party'; unlike, for instance, addresses and letters by individual party leaders which illustrate that members' subjective interpretation of the party's stances and position. [Ian Budge & Dennis Farlie (1977) Voting and Party Competition (London, New York: Wiley) ; also Adam Silver (2008) "The Prevalence of Economic Issues Versus Cultural Issues in 19th Century American State and National Party Platforms" Policy History Convention, St. Louis 2008 Paper]

not for their prose but for what they reveal about the thinking of our President and our Party.’¹⁰

At other times, parties have acknowledged a more instrumental function of platforms as the means to ‘make their case...to the American people,’¹¹ showing ‘how [they] propose to represent [the people],’¹² and functioning as the ‘party’s contract with the people’.¹³

Party platforms are thus not merely a laundry list of principles or policy planks; they are also ideological exercises by which the party justifies its policy proposals and fits them into its larger philosophy. The platform is thus substantively valuable to discern a party’s historical treatment of a policy subject, such as the family. This may be determined directly from explicit platform statements as well as indirectly, by the rationales and reasons offered for policy preferences.

In this section, I analyze the parties’ platforms across the 20th century (1900-2004), examining (a) the level of attention given to the family, and (b) the underlying rationale proffered when addressing the family in policy pledges. The platform paragraph is my unit of analysis. For the most part, each paragraph concisely focuses on a central idea or policy; thus the paragraph has been used by many as a substantively appropriate unit of analysis in examining parties’ ideological positions.¹⁴ Paragraphs can be as short as one to two sentences or as long as numerous sentences. In each case, however, it is coded as a single case if it addresses the family

¹⁰ Republican Party Platform of 1988, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (30)

¹¹ Democratic Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (31); platforms are also held up as illustrative of the *process* of Party decision-making that the party adheres to, who gets to determine what goes into the platform and how. For instance, in their 2000 Platform, Democrats proudly claimed: ‘This platform was not written in a dark backroom, but in the light of day; in an open, democratic process that was interactive and inclusive. It was developed both with the guidance of the brightest Democratic leaders and with the voices of thousands of ordinary American around the country who contributed their thoughts, ideas, beliefs, and dreams to this platform....a people’s platform for the people’s party.’ [Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (21)]. Also on platforms as political process, See: Ronald W. Walters (1990) ‘Party Platforms as Political Process’ PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Sep., 1990), pp. 436-438.

¹² Preamble, Republican Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”]


¹³ Id

¹⁴ See: Gerring (1998) “Party Ideologies”; Wolbrecht (2000) “Politics of Women’s Rights”; and Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson (1989) Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press)

through a coherent, single and discernable policy issue. To qualify as a ‘family paragraph’, the policy discussed must clearly relate to the family *as a family or as a series of familial relationships* i.e. pertain to either the family as a unit, or to parents, children, spouses *as members of a family*. Thus all planks that address women or children as individuals and not in their familial capacity, relation, or role are not included. For example, paragraphs involving youth and adolescent drug use or job training are excluded if the youth/ children/ adolescents addressed are not connected directly to their families, parents or siblings. Similarly, paragraphs that address women as women (e.g. as wage-earners, their (non-reproductive) health, employment, discrimination etc.) and do not address women in their capacity/role as parents or spouses are also not included or coded. The purpose behind this conservative coding scheme is to focus the measurement on family as a unit or as a set of dependent/familial relationships and not on individuals who only incidentally belong to a family.

Figure 1.1 shows the total number of paragraphs that explicitly address the family, as defined, in the parties’ platforms across the 20th century, controlling for the total number of paragraphs in each platform.

Figure 1.1



From the above figure, four periods with distinct patterns may be highlighted:

- (i) The pre-Depression early decades (1900-1932) during which both parties, on average, rarely invoked the family in their pledges and had comparably low platform percentages devoted to the family (Democratic average being 2.4% and Republican 2.2%).
- (ii) The Depression and Postwar mid-century period (1936-1956) when both parties began to focus more on the family as a subject of their policies; the Democratic Party had an average of 6.2% of their platform addressing the family and was double the Republican average (3.1%).
- (iii) A transition period (1960-1976) between the mid-decades and the contemporary era in which the Republican Party comparably matched the Democrats in the number of paragraphs directed at the family in their platforms (on an average, 4.0 % of Republican platforms addressed the family compared to the Democratic average of 5.5%).
- (iv) The contemporary period (1980-2004), during which the percentage of both parties' platforms pertaining to family policies increased manifold (16.8% of Democratic platforms on an average addressed the family, as did 13.1% of Republican platforms.) The family became very salient in Republican platforms in the 1980s and 1990s, while the Democratic Party caught up and again outdid Republican percentage of family paragraphs by the late 1990s.

Contrary to conventional expectations the Democratic Party, and not Republican, has consistently devoted *more* platform paragraphs to policies directed at the American family. The only two periods in which Republican platforms paid more attention to the family were the earliest and latest decades of the 20th century. The early Progressive era (1900-1912) and again the late 20th century (1980s and 90s) formed the two periods in which Republican platforms outdid Democratic in policy paragraphs addressing the family. As we shall see in the following

content analysis, the two parties have conceptualized the family in various and distinct ways through the 20th century; often borrowing from one another and, in separate periods, either leading or following the other party's ideological approach to the family.

§1(a): The Early Years – 1900-1932:

During the early Progressive period, from 1900 to 1920, veterans' pension was by far the most recurrent policy through which the parties addressed families in platforms.¹⁵ However, the parties conceptualized that policy, and its implicit understanding of the relationship between family and government, differently. Republicans focused on the national government's responsibility to provide for the dependent families of fallen veterans.¹⁶ The veteran's family, as an appropriate subject of government relief, was centrally addressed in Republican platforms:

The Nation owes a debt of profound gratitude to the soldiers and sailors who have fought its battles, and it is the Government's duty to provide for the survivors and for the widows and orphans of those who have fallen in the country's wars. The pension laws, founded in this just sentiment, should be liberally administered, and preference should be given wherever practicable with respect to employment in the public service, to soldiers and sailors and to their widows and orphans.¹⁷

Democratic platforms were more equivocal in their position and often called for reform in the disbursement of veteran's pensions.¹⁸ Democrats advocated widow's pensions more

¹⁵ On the salience of veteran's pensions in the formation of the early American welfare state up to the Progressive Era, see: Theda Skocpol (1992) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA; London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) p. 102-151.

¹⁶ The principle of providing for dependent families was also raised in policies concerning other employees of the Federal government, such as federal judges and postal workers. (See William H. Taft, 2nd Annual Message, Dec 6th, 1910, Woolley & Peters, "The American Presidency Project [online] available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>).

¹⁷ Republican Party Platform of 1900, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project" (23)

¹⁸ Democratic Party Platform of 1904, Ibid, (124-127)

instrumentally, as a matter of justice and for its larger effect on military policy, rather than as a policy illustrating the principle of national government responsibility for dependent families.¹⁹

Figure 1.1 also shows that despite the low percentages for both parties, until 1912 Republicans devoted comparatively more of their platforms to families than Democrats. At this time Republican platforms, more so than Democratic, supported a Hearth conception of family and government, in which the national government had a responsibility to provide for (certain types of) families, such as those of injured or killed veterans.²⁰

The provision of public Western lands to homesteader families was also a repeated family policy issue featured by both parties in their platforms in this early period.²¹ On this issue as well similar partisan ideological variance may be observed. Republicans qualified their support as part of ‘the constant policy of the Republican party to provide free homes on the

¹⁹ See, for example: ‘We favor a generous pension policy, both as a matter of justice to the surviving veterans and their dependents, and because it tends to relieve the country of the necessity of maintaining a large standing army’ [Democratic Party Platform of 1908, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (129); same plank renewed in Democratic Platform 1912, *Ibid.* (222)]. It bears noting that here (veterans’) dependents benefits like mother’s pensions were tied to the progressive impulse of nation building. Both were seen as responsibilities of the nation (i.e. the national state) to either compensate the morally deserving (veterans and their dependants) or else to alleviate the hardships of the economically deserving (widowed, poor mothers). Republican platforms also endorsed mother’s pensions in this way [Republican Party Platform of 1916, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)”]

²⁰ The Hearth conception of family, as used in this dissertation, corresponds to the progressive family ideology in social policies that addresses families through the provision of material and other services by the national government. In the Progressive era, this ideology often invoked themes of nation building, such as providing for veteran’s dependents or destitute children to further the nation’s reputation/ future prosperity etc. This attention to ‘nation’ is mirrored in the party ideology of Republicans at this time, the primary proponents of Hearth ideologies in the Progressive era, described as ‘National Republicans’ favoring statism and social order over the individualism and anti-statism of latter day Republicans [Gerring (1998) [Party Ideologies](#), Chapter 3] A fuller description of this ideology, along with the competing Soul ideology, follows on page 31-32 of this Chapter.

²¹ On the importance of self-sufficient (yeoman) farmer and rancher families in the West to national development – and the centrality of the homestead family to national prosperity – see: Theodore Roosevelt, 2nd Annual Message, Dec 2nd 1902, Woolley & Peters, [The American Presidency Project](#), available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29543> (‘...the sound and steady development of the West depends upon the building up of homes therein. Much of our prosperity as a nation has been due to the operation of the homestead law. On the other hand, we should recognize the fact that in the grazing region the man who corresponds to the homesteader may be unable to settle permanently if only allowed to use the same amount of pasture land that his brother, the homesteader, is allowed to use of arable land. One hundred and sixty acres of fairly rich and well-watered soil, or a much smaller amount of irrigated land, may keep a family in plenty, whereas no one could get a living from one hundred and sixty acres of dry pasture land capable of supporting at the outside only one head of cattle to every ten acres.’)

public domain’²² whereas Democrats emphasized the independence/size of homesteads as an illustration of their commitment to anti-monopolistic development.²³ Thus while both parties approached arid land reclamation and homestead disbursements as part of national economic strategies, only Republican platforms addressed it as part of the national state’s largesse, necessary for social (and familial) welfare.

From 1920 to 1932, however, Democratic platforms devoted more attention than they had previously and invoked the family in many more policies. In their 1920 platform for example, Democrats began to characterize their labor policy positions as protecting the ‘worker and his family;’ this was in marked contrast to previous platforms when similar labor policies (such as 8-hour working day, child labor laws, workmen’s compensation etc.) were discussed only in terms of the *individual* ‘wage-earner.’ In 1920 however the Democratic platform advocated limited working hours as creating ‘conditions under which life must be lived to attain the highest development and happiness’ and family life was recognized as a condition for workers’ welfare and happiness:

Labor is not a commodity; it is human. Those who labor have rights, and the national security and safety depend upon a just recognition of those rights and the conservation of the strength of the workers and their families in the interest of sound-hearted and sound-headed men, women and children.²⁴

²² Republican Party Platform of 1900, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (33)

²³ Democratic Party Platform of 1904, Ibid (79) : We call attention to this great Democratic measure, broad and comprehensive as it is, working automatically throughout all time without further action of Congress, until the reclamation of all the lands in the arid West capable of reclamation, is accomplished, *reserving the lands reclaimed for homeseekers in small tracts and rigidly guarding against land monopoly*, as an evidence of the policy of domestic development contemplated by the Democratic party, should it be placed in power.

²⁴ Democratic Party Platform of 1920, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (115) Similar acknowledgement of the ‘well-being’ of workers and their families, as a rationale for labor policy positions, is mentioned in the Socialist Party Platform of 1916 [The Socialist Party Platform of 1916 is found appended to the Republican Party Platform of 1916 at Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (123-261) 243]. Democratic Platforms had also previously invoked family status to justify their support for liberal labor policies, but only in relation to female (federal) employees, stating: ‘Such provisions for decency, comfort and health in the employment of women as should be accorded the mothers of the race’ [Democratic Party Platform of 1916, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (89)]

During this period (1920-1932) Republican Platforms as well began to further incorporate mention of family lives. They cited the standard of living of the average American working family as a justification of their protective tariff policies, defining living wages in terms of familial impact: ‘a "real wage" [is one] which allows comfort for himself and his dependents, and an opportunity and leisure for advancement.’²⁵ Thus both parties now acknowledged the familial environment in which workers lived and began to justify policies in its name.

At this time, both parties’ platforms further recognized the special significance of family ties when calling for the lifting of immigration restrictions, seen as imposing ‘undue hardships’ on immigrant families, ‘by separat[ing] husbands from wives and parents from infant children’ and so ‘depriv[ing] the immigrant of the comfort and society of those bound by close family ties.’²⁶ Family separation was thus now acknowledged as a distinct harm in evaluating the impact of even those regulatory laws which were otherwise considered necessary for national interest.

The early 20th century can therefore be subdivided into two: (a) an initial period (1900-1912) when the parties were divergent, albeit weakly, and the Republican party led with a Hearth conceptualization of family and government responsibility in their support of veterans’ pensions and public land disbursement and (b) the following period (1916-1932) when both parties began to converge in their invocation of the importance of family life to justify more numerous policy positions – such as labor, tariff and immigration. The family however, in comparison to later periods, was relatively ignored as an explicit policy subject in the national platforms of both parties for this period.

²⁵ Republican Party Platform of 1928, *Ibid* (143); also see: Republican Platform of 1924, *Id* (65).

²⁶ Republican Party Platform of 1924 (241); Democratic Party Platform of 1928 (199); Republican Party Platform of 1928 (255)[Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project.”].

§1(b): Midcentury - Depression and Postwar Platforms (1936-1956)

With the onset of the Depression in the 1930s, the parties began to incorporate the American family more fully into their pledges. As seen in Figure 1.1 (previous, page 18), Democratic platforms now firmly exceeded Republican in addressing the family. In their 1936 platform, for example, Democrats elevated the protection of the family as the first of three grounds that justified the New Deal's expanded-government policies:

We hold this truth to be self-evident—that government in a modern civilization has certain inescapable obligations to its citizens, among which are:

- (1) Protection of the family and the home.
- (2) Establishment of a democracy of opportunity for all the people.
- (3) Aid to those overtaken by disaster.²⁷

Several economic and social policies such as protection of savings and investment, old age and social security programs, consumer protection, and housing were pledged as part of support for this 'protection of family and home.'²⁸

Along with increased attention, the 1930s and 40s also witnessed increasing partisan contention over the family during the mounting ideological struggle over the expansion of the federal government.²⁹ Democrats now invoked the protection and relief of afflicted families as justification for expansive welfare and regulatory programs. In contrast to their initial Hearsh (interventionist) approach at the start of the 20th century, Republicans of this period now began emphasizing self-reliance of American families, best sustained under a system of free enterprise and limited government intervention:

Real security will be possible only when our productive capacity is sufficient to furnish a decent standard of living for all American families and to provide a surplus for future needs and contingencies. For the attainment of that ultimate objective, we look to the energy, self-reliance and character of our people, and to our system of free enterprise.³⁰

²⁷Democratic Platform of 1936, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(13)

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ At this time, Republican party ideology was metamorphosed, from a previously statist philosophy during its "National" phase to its anti-statist, individual-oriented philosophy that we associate now with the Republican Party in what is termed its reigning "Neoliberal" phase since 1924. [Gerring, [Party Ideologies](#)]

³⁰ Republican Party Platform of 1936, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(79)

The family farm was repeatedly held up as an illustration of family self-sufficiency, through which Republican platforms highlighted their criticism of Democratic interventionist (agricultural) policies.³¹ On their part, Democratic platforms focused on the importance of addressing the suffering and providing for the needs of farm families directly through government programs.³² Democratic platforms also highlighted *family needs* when justifying other new programs such as the Food Lunch and Food Stamp Programs³³ and child welfare programs and services;³⁴ consistently stressing the need for national government intervention when parents were unable to provide for their families.

However at this time, in other respects Democratic and Republican platforms also evidenced some consensus over the family. Although Democrats were the initiators and were more unequivocal in their support, both parties advocated social welfare programs for families in certain situations, such as: maternity and child health,³⁵ public assistance of dependent children³⁶ and provision of decent low-cost and low-rent housing.³⁷ Both parties also acknowledged

³¹ Republican Party Platform of 1936 (109-139); Republican Party Platform of 1944 (89-113) [*Ibid*]

³² Democratic platforms emphasized the successful 'rehabilitation of thousands of impoverished farm families' to evidence the ongoing success of their interventionist agricultural policies [Democratic Party Platform of 1940, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project" (65)].

³³ 'To ensure no needy family shall be denied an adequate and wholesome diet because of low income' [Democratic Party Platform of 1956, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project" (355)].

³⁴ '... the future of America depends on adequate provision by Government for the needs of those of our children who cannot be cared for by their parents or private social agencies' [Democratic Party Platform of 1952, *Ibid* (509)].

³⁵ Democratic Party Platform of 1940, (216); Republican Party Platform of 1944, (057); Democratic Party Platform of 1948(113); Republican Party Platform of 1948 (129); Democratic Party Platform of 1952(512-513) [*Ibid* for all]

³⁶ 1944 Democratic Party Platform of 1944 (017); Republican Party Platform of 1944 (057); Democratic Party Platform of 1952 (447); Democratic Party Platform of 1956(427) [Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project"]

³⁷ Democratic Party Platform of 1936 (041); Democratic Party Platform of 1940 (226); Republican Party Platform of 1944 (061); Democratic Party Platform of 1948 (085); Republican Party Platform of 1948 (127); Democratic Party Platform of 1952 (481); Republican Party Platform of 1952 (151); Democratic Party Platform of 1956 (251, 447); Republican Party Platform of 1956 (024) [*Ibid*]

changing family needs in the light of wars (World War II, the Cold War) as justifying new policy proposals.³⁸


Further, during this period, both parties adopted a new conceptualization of family, which had great significance lasting through the policy debates of today. Beginning in 1936, the Democratic Party began to use income to classify types of families and focused policy agendas on the low-income family.³⁹ This was in contrast to the Progressive Era when both parties used the occupation or ascriptive (ethnic, foreign) identity of the male family member to classify families. During that earlier period the family was seen solely as *dependents* of specific (male) groups – such as dependent families of veterans, immigrants, workers etc. By classifying families now on the basis of income, Democratic platforms began to address the needs of a family *as a unit* albeit still revolving around the (assumed) male breadwinner.

In figure 1.2 below we find that prior to 1936 neither of the two parties referred to family income when discussing the family in their platforms. However, following the New Deal, the Democratic Party began using income to address, and classify, family issues. On an average, approximately 30% of all paragraphs directed at the family in Democratic platforms from 1936 to 1956 made references to families by income. This trend continued through later decades.

³⁸ Republican Party Platform of 1944 (089-091): ‘We commend the American farmers, their wives and families for their magnificent job of wartime production and their contribution to the war effort, without which victory could not be assured...Abundant production is the best security against inflation. Governmental policies in war and in peace must be practical and efficient with freedom from regimentation by an impractical Washington bureaucracy ...[e]ducational progress and the social and economic stability and well-being of the farm family must be a prime national purpose’; 1952 Democratic Platform (521): ‘Since several million mothers must now be away from their children during the day, because they are engaged in defense work, facilities for adequate day care of these children should be provided and adequately financed.’ [Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project.” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25835>]

³⁹ Democratic Party Platform of 1940 (225): ‘Slum-Clearance and Low-Rent Housing - We have launched a soundly conceived plan of loans and contributions to rid America of overcrowded slum dwellings that breed disease and crime, and to replace them by low-cost housing projects within the means of low-income families.’ [Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29597>]

Figure 1.2: Family Income Paragraphs as percentage of all Family Paragraphs, Democratic and Republican Platforms, 1900-2004



As seen in the above figure, Republican platforms were slower to follow the Democratic lead and only in 1956 did they first address families by income.⁴⁰ Since then however, income has become a persistent basis of classification of families in both parties' platforms and, on average, 15 to 40% of the parties' platforms devoted to family issues do so by classifying families on the basis of their income.

In sum, the midcentury decades of the 1930s, 40s and 50s were therefore significant in many ways for the development of partisan ideologies of the family. On the one hand, under the pall of the Great Depression and World War II, Democratic Platforms made the family a lynchpin of relief and welfare programs. The division between Democratic Hearth family ideology, focused on families' needs, and nascent Republican Soul ideology that stressed family self-reliance, first became visible in the parties' platforms of this period. These partisan differences were especially salient in the parties' agricultural policy pledges regarding farm families and evident in the Democratic platforms' increasing use of income to classify families

⁴⁰ Republican Party Platform of 1956, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)" (108): "Dynamic Economy- Free Labor: Taxation and Fiscal Policy...Further reduction in taxes with particular consideration for low and middle income families."

and family needs. On the other hand, the period also marked an overarching consensus in the accepted, expanded role of the national state and saw both parties' paying greater attention to the family as a legitimate target of select national social programs. Partisan consensus can be observed across a significant number of Hearsh policies regarding the provision of low-cost, low-rent housing and encouragement of home ownership, assistance to families with dependent children and protection of maternity and child health.

Further, the period also marked the start of a shift in the very conceptualization of the family. Democratic platforms of this era first began using income to determine and classify families. This was followed (albeit 2 decades later) in Republican platforms. Policies aimed at low-income and moderate-income families as distinct targets illustrated this conceptual development,⁴¹ away from the idea of the family as a dependent appendage of the male and towards the new conceptualization of family as a unit with coherent needs and interests.

§1 (c): Period of Transition – 1960s and 1970s:

The conceptualization of the family as a unit with internally coherent needs (for which the national state had a responsibility) continued in party platforms during the 1960s and 70s. Once again, the Democratic Party led the way in this progressive Hearsh ideation; however, the Republican Party also acquiesced. The period further finds a fuller exposition of a Soul ideology of family and government in Republican platforms; one which was more explicitly critical of expanded government programs as eroding family self-reliance and autonomy, parental choice and responsibility. This Soul family ideology coexisted in Republican platforms of this period

⁴¹ Previously classification of families by income for policy purposes would have been central only to local and individual state programs, insofar as they were wholly responsible for the administration and regulation of relief programs to lower-income families. However, with the expansion of the national state through the New Deal and its increasing presence in erstwhile local or state matters, family income now assumed salience as a basis of delineating national, not only state, programs.

alongside the more prominent Hearth ideology, but then exploded in the following decades with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. In many ways therefore the 1960s and 1970s marked a period of transition – from the dominance of the postwar Hearth family ideology to the widespread revival of Soul family ideology in the contemporary period.

In their 1960 platform, the Democratic Party adopted the Second Bill of (Economic) Rights, first enumerated by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1944 State of the Union address. The list of proposed economic rights included ‘the right to a useful and remunerative job,’ the right to earn a minimum wage sufficient for families basic needs (clothing, shelter, recreation), right of every farmer to a return on his produce ‘which will give him and his family a decent living,’ and ‘right of every family to a decent home.’⁴² These rights and their continued centrality in Democratic policy pledges emphasized the party’s wholehearted embrace of the Hearth approach to family, centered on the necessity of meeting families material needs,⁴³ underscoring that economics was essential to every family’s (and individual citizen’s) wellbeing.⁴⁴ Through the 1960s and 1970s, Democratic platforms continued to stress the human significance of economics, and reiterated the principle of active (national) government responsibility in meeting the needs of the people.⁴⁵

⁴² Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, January 11, 1944 [Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”, available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518>] and the Democratic Party Platform of 1960 (370) [*Ibid*]

⁴³ Democratic Party Platform of 1960, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (732): ‘The pledges contained in this Economic Bill of Rights point the way to a better life for every family in America.’

⁴⁴ In his 1944 State of the Union address, FDR claimed that in the current, industrial modern economy political freedoms and rights were not feasible without economic freedoms: ‘This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty....As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however—as our industrial economy expanded—these political rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness. We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.’ [Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”, available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518>]

⁴⁵ See Democratic Party Platform of 1968, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (030, 031) [‘Economics...involves people and it means people’]; and Democratic Party Platform of 1964, *Ibid* (0307) [‘the care of human life and happiness is the first and only legitimate object of good government’].

Family needs continued to be addressed through various Great Society pledges in the Economic Opportunity Act; establishment of further programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, Job Corps, WIC, Headstart; expansion of public assistance to families with dependent children; urban renewal, national park and recreational development, and prenatal and postnatal health programs.

Figure 1.3: Percentage of 'Family Needs' Paragraphs in Party Platforms, 1900-2004




Figure 1.3 above illustrates the growth and development of paragraphs discussing family ‘needs’ in party platforms.⁴⁶ As seen above, in the early pre-Depression period, attention to family ‘need’ was uncommon; however the Republican Party (in 1908 and 1920) began to do so first, intermittently addressing family need in their national platforms. In conjunction with its reversed ideology initiated by the New Deal, and beginning in 1940, the Democratic Party also steadily referred to family need through the 40s and 50s and has since far outdone the Republican Party in this regard. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, Republican platforms began to follow the Democratic Hearth trend and, except for 1972, they generally

⁴⁶ Only those paragraphs that made reference to ‘needs’ in the context of families and presented as an object (legitimate or not) of government programs and proposals were included in the count.

matched the attention paid to family need across this period – a trend which then abruptly ended in 1980.

Since 1980 the Democratic Party has resumed its status as the primary party to address family need and the percentage of its platforms devoted to this is much more than the Republican. With the exception of the Progressive Era, the Democratic Party has therefore been more unequivocal in its policy focus on family material need. Nonetheless Figure 1.3 also shows that the parties were the most comparable in their attention to family need in the 1960s and 70s (with the exception of 1972), as compared to any other period in the 20th century.

Commensurate with the attention to family economic need, through the 60s and 70s Democratic platforms expanded the use of income to classify their family pledges. Income was no longer confined to its original policy domain (welfare)⁴⁷; instead it was used as the basis for classifying/addressing families in other policies as well, such as in education, housing, agriculture, rural development, and urban renewal.⁴⁸ Family income itself, its increase or decrease, was also used more frequently to broadly gauge the success or failure of a variety of economic policies.⁴⁹

Even so, notwithstanding its extended use in other Democratic policy planks, family income continued to be especially salient in the Democratic project of developing further, more complicated, welfare programs. In 1972, for example, the Democratic Platform called for a ‘program of (comprehensive) economic security based on earned income’ to replace the extant

⁴⁷ ‘Every American family *whose income* is not sufficient to enable its members to live in decency should receive assistance free of the indignities and uncertainties that still too often mar our present programs’ [Democratic Party Platform of 1968, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”(618)]

⁴⁸ For example, on family’s housing needs see: Democratic Party Platform of 1968 (448, 456); on agricultural family’s credit needs, see: Republican Party Platform of 1968 (338); on families’ need for quality education, see: Republican Party Platform of 1972 (547; 555-559); on families’ need for daycare, see: Ibid (1125-1127). [Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”]

⁴⁹ Such as economic policies that controlled inflation, stabilized prices on family consumer goods and therefore increased the ‘average after-tax family income’ at a rate faster than the increase in prices (Democratic Party Platform of 1964, Ibid, (0743-0753)).

piecemeal welfare system, so as to cumulatively ‘ensure each family an income substantially more than the poverty level ensuring standards of decency and health.’⁵⁰ The prosperity of the postwar years and the growth in national wealth was seen to have expanded government capacity (and duty) to provide for the needy, and to ‘eradicate poverty.’⁵¹ However, low-income families were not the only families addressed by Democratic platforms; the material needs of middle-income families were also invoked when addressing homeownership, property taxes, and higher education. In sum, family need, as determined by family income, was a key illustration of the dominance of Hearst Democratic family ideology in this period.

Republican platforms of the period (as seen in Figure 1.3 on page 30) also largely followed the (economic) needs-based approach to families and addressed families more directly through the rubric of income than in previous periods; often outdoing Democratic platforms in the percentage of family paragraphs using income to determine appropriate policy.⁵² In so doing, they modified the principle of limited government and extended national government’s normative responsibility to ‘supplement[ing] individual initiative.’⁵³ Their national platforms called for strong government programs ‘supplementing not supplanting private initiatives’ in various policies addressing the family, that were not unlike Democratic proposals. These

⁵⁰ Democratic Party Platform of 1972, *Id.* (0115).

⁵¹ Democratic Party Platform of 1964, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (506-510) : ‘Opportunity for All: We of the Democratic Party believe that a nation wealthy beyond the dreams of most of mankind—a nation with a twentieth of the world’s population, possessing half the world’s manufactured goods—has the capacity and the duty to assure to all its citizens the opportunity to enjoy the full measure of the blessings of American life.

For the first time in the history of the world, it is within the power of a nation to eradicate from within its borders the age-old curse of poverty.’

⁵² See Fig. 1.2, page 27.

⁵³ For example, see Republican Party Platform of 1960, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (450): “Government’s primary role is to help provide the environment within which the individual can seek his own goals. In some areas this requires federal action to supplement individual, local and state initiative. The Republican Party has acted and will act decisively, compassionately, and with deep human understanding in approaching such problems as those of the aged, the infirm, the mentally ill, and the needy.”

included special education programs for pre-school children from poor families,⁵⁴ programs to ‘help’ low-income farm families⁵⁵ and encourage low-income family homeownership.⁵⁶

Republicans – more so than Democrats – relied on monetary and fiscal policies, rather than solely entitlement programs, to attain the goal of assisting families in need. For example, in the case of housing for lower-income families, they proposed a system of economic incentives to attract private industry to the low-cost housing market.⁵⁷ They also proposed child care exemptions and other tax reductions to assist families in child care and child rearing costs.⁵⁸ Although the two parties often relied on varied policy *methods*, the *Hearth principle* of government responsiveness to family material need and the national state’s duty to help and assist families in their economic circumstances was comparably present in both parties’ platforms during this period.⁵⁹

However unlike Democrats, Republican platforms did not elevate the alleviation of family need to the level of an economic *right* and consistently acknowledged that ‘there are many things a free government cannot do for its people as they can do them [and] [t]here are some things no government should promise or attempt to do.’⁶⁰ When addressing the family, Republican platforms during these two decades thus alternated between a moderate progressivism that was focused on family economic need and national state responsibility, and a

⁵⁴ Republican Party Platform of 1968, *Ibid* (174).

⁵⁵ Republican Party Platform of 1960, *Id* (252).

⁵⁶ Republican Party Platform of 1968, *Id* (092).

⁵⁷ Republican Party Platform of 1968, Woolley & Peters, “*American Presidency Project*” (92) [‘By reducing interest rates through responsible fiscal and monetary policy we propose to lower the costs of home-ownership’]

⁵⁸ 1972 Republican Party Platform of 1972, *Ibid* (425; 431; 437)

⁵⁹ For example in the case of homeownership – Republicans, by way of a rationale of their housing policy initiatives stated: ‘Skyrocketing building costs and interest rates have crippled home building and threaten a housing crisis in the nation, endangering the prospect of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every family’ [Republican Party Platform of 1968, Woolley & Peters, “*American Presidency Project*” (92)] – thus implying the necessity for government action/policy in preserving the ‘prospect of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every family.’

⁶⁰ Republican Party Platform of 1960, *Ibid* (644).

more traditional, Soul, ideology emphasizing individual and family self-reliance and limited government involvement in the family.

For instance, during the campaign of Barry Goldwater in 1964, the Republican platform strongly reiterated their belief in individual and family self-reliance and autonomy,⁶¹ warning against the illusory ‘benevolence’ of expanded Federal government programs and, instead, stressing the onerous burden of government-produced inflation on needy families, also diminishing an individual’s capacity to provide for his own family.⁶² In contrast to family need ideology which conceived of the family as a coherent unit; Republican Soul family ideology of this period centered more around the ‘individual’, *his* self-reliance and autonomy; the family here being seen solely as an extension of the individual.

Yet in two policy areas, welfare and education, the Republican emphasis on self reliance/autonomy also implied a conceptualization of family as a unit. Firstly, starting in the 1960s, Republican platforms began to link welfare programs to the increasing instability of family units and the rising presence of social problems such as crime and juvenile delinquency.⁶³ Welfare and poverty programs were seen as ‘erod[ing] self-respect and discourag[ing] family unity and responsibility;’⁶⁴ and ‘existing programs [needed to] be revised so that they [would] encourage and protect strong family units.’⁶⁵

⁶¹ Republican Party Platform of 1964, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (256) [‘We Republicans shall first rely on the individual’s right and capacity to advance his own economic well-being, to control the fruits of his efforts and to plan his own and his family’s future; and, where government is rightly involved, we shall assist the individual in surmounting urgent problems beyond his own power and responsibility to control.’]

⁶² Ibid (300)

⁶³ Republican Party Platform of 1960, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (492): ‘The Federal Government can and should help state and local communities combat juvenile delinquency by inaugurating a grant program for research, demonstration, and training projects and *by placing greater emphasis on strengthening family life* in all welfare programs for which it shares responsibility.’ (emphasis added)

⁶⁴ Republican Platform of 1968 (198); also see Republican Party Platform of 1972 (617-621)[Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”]

⁶⁵ Id.

In the case of the poor therefore, Republican policy proposals began to emphasize the protection of family unity and the encouragement of family self-reliance.⁶⁶ Notably, in all other types of (non-poor) families however (such as farm families, middle-class and lower-income families, families of immigrants and veterans) Republican platforms of this time continued to adopt the Hearth approach and supported a ‘partnership’ role for the national state in meeting family need. Thus the period marks the emergence of a *bifurcated* Republican family ideology based on family *type* – in the case of poor families, they adopted the Soul ideology emphasizing self-reliance, responsibility and family unity; in all other types of families, the Hearth ideology stressing the national state’s responsibility to family’s material need continued to dominate.

The dualism in Republican family ideology may be observed in their increasingly bifurcated attention to middle-class and lower-income families in their platforms for this period. Democratic platforms continued to address low-income families more than Republican, in contrast the median percentage of paragraphs directed at *middle*-income families in Republican platforms of this period was *greater* than in Democratic (7.1% of Republican vs. 4.2 % of Democratic platforms made reference to middle-class families, see Fig. 1.4 below). However compared to other periods, Republican platforms were now also the most matched with Democratic in the level of attention paid to *low*-income families (median percentage of family paragraphs addressing low income families in Republican platforms was 23.5%, similar to the Democratic median percent of 24.5%). Thus Republican platforms during this period were more attentive than they had been in the past, to both poor and middle-class families and in so doing

⁶⁶ Amendments limiting the number of eligible dependents and creating work requirements were proposed by Republicans; these were strongly contested and opposed by Democratic platforms of this time (in contrast to the 1990s) which claimed that these were ‘not humane’ and ‘perpetuate[d] the coercion of forced work requirements’ [Democratic Party Platform of 1972, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (117)]. Instead, Democrats proposed the carrot to the stick method and claimed that ‘federal-state program[s] should provide for financial incentives and needed services to enable and encourage adults on welfare to seek employment *to the extent they are able to do so*’ [Democratic Party Platform of 1968, *Ibid* (626) (emphasis added)].

adopted a dualistic family ideology – stressing needs in the case of more affluent families and self-reliance for poorer families.

Table 1.1 : Low Income & Middle Income Family Paragraphs as Percent of all Family Paragraphs, Democratic and Republican Platforms, 1900-2004

Party	Eras	Median Percent of Low Income Family Paragraphs	Median Percent of Middle Income Family Paragraphs
Democratic	1900-1932	0.0	0.0
	1936-1956	18.3	0.0
	1960-1976	24.5	4.4
	1980-2004	11.5	3.9
Republican	1900-1932	0.0	0.0
	1936-1956	0.0	0.0
	1960-1976	23.5	7.4
	1980-2004	7.0	1.2

Following the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision and the increasing federal government involvement in schools, Republican platforms (starting in 1960) began to emphasize family responsibility in the second policy area of education. Parental responsibility in the education of children was part of the Party’s preference for local, not federal, control over schools:

In the words of President Eisenhower, "Education best fulfills its high purpose *when responsibility for education is kept close to the people it serves—when it is rooted in the homes*, nurtured in the community and sustained by a rich variety of public, private and individual resources. The bond linking home and school and community—the responsiveness of each to the needs of the others—is a precious asset of American education."⁶⁷

By 1972, the Republican platform used the ‘neighborhood school concept’ to justify its anti-busing position.⁶⁸ Republicans also began to stress the role played by ‘non-public schools, both church-oriented and non-sectarian’ in terms of ‘the competition and diversity they help to

⁶⁷ Republican Party Platform of 1960, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (420)

⁶⁸ Republican Party Platform of 1972, Ibid., (565): ‘...we are irrevocably opposed to busing for racial balance. Busing fails its stated objective-improved learning opportunities -while it achieves results no one wants-division within communities and hostility between classes and races.’

maintain in American education, and the values they help to teach.’⁶⁹ In this regard, they proposed the use of tax credits ‘to support the education of all children in schools of their parents’ choice, non-public as well as public.’⁷⁰

Parental responsibility (and choice) in the area of children’s education was therefore a second policy domain in which a revised Soul Republican approach to family began to emerge. Unlike the case of poor families on welfare, however, the *absence* of parental responsibility in education was not used as a justification for punitive regulation; instead here ‘parental choice’ was approached positively, as something that needed to be encouraged and protected through tax and other incentives.

The 1960s and 70s thus saw the widespread dominance of the Hearth, economic needs-based, conceptualization of families – in which the national state played a role (either supplementary or partnership) in meeting family need. However, this was also a period when the Soul anti-statist ideology was explicitly applied for the first time to the specific subject of the family; and certain federal social programs were now presented as eroding family self-reliance and parental responsibility, to the detriment of social order and progress. Soul family ideology therefore fully emerged, co-extant with the dominant Hearth family ideology. Different family ideologies were applied to different *types* of families: for poor families on welfare, Republican platforms used the Soul family ideology, emphasizing self-reliance and autonomy; for all other families, they continued to use the dominant Hearth ideology, acknowledging a legitimate role for the national state in addressing these families’ needs. Income therefore became a basis, not only for classifying family need, but also as a basis to distinguish ‘deserving’ from ‘undeserving’ family need – or which families needed self-reliance and which, national state support.

⁶⁹ Republican Party Platform of 1972, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (603)

⁷⁰ Ibid (605)

§1 (d): Contemporary Era (1980-2004)

As seen in Fig. 1.1 the contemporary period has witnessed a heightened attention to family in party platforms. The family has emerged in platforms as a central organizing theme of policies for both parties. In the light of its historical genesis, this development is neither novel nor unprecedented. As seen, the previous period of economic upheaval (in the 1930s and 40s) was also accompanied by the elevation of the family, as a subject and justification for the parties' policy solutions. Following the Depression and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Party as the party of realignment, initiated this trend and explicitly acknowledged the family and its needs as a rationale for economic and expanded social relief programs. The ensuing period since then through the 1970s saw the growing acceptance of this needs-based Hearth family ideology by both parties, and its incorporation into more and more policies, targeted to address family's ever-changing needs.

Although the Republican Party acquiesced in this Hearth ideation of family and of state we also found that during the transition period, and culminating in the 70s, the Party also espoused a counter-ideology of the Soul family, based on family self-reliance, parental choice/responsibility instead of government intervention, and the importance of a unified, stable family structure. The contemporary period is distinctive in that it witnessed an explosion, as it were, of this Soul counter-ideology of the family and its growing incorporation into more diverse policies *in addition* to its conventional application as an alternative to Democratic social welfare policy. Further, unlike previous periods when the Democratic Party led the way in incorporating the family into party philosophy, in this period it was the Republican Party who 'rediscovered' the family and, much like the Democratic Party following the Depression, invoked the family as

a lynchpin to launch its new ideology, repudiating the previously dominant (Democratic, Hearth) ideology.

At the dawn of the ‘new’ Republican era in 1980 there were thus two existing ideological frameworks of family and national state, presented in national party platforms – the Hearth and the Soul. Figure 1.4 below summarizes the key features of the two ideologies.


Figure 1.4: Two Conceptual Frameworks of the Family and Government

Hearth Framework
<p><i>Ideological Principle:</i> Humanity, fairness, equality, justice</p> <p><i>Conception of the Family and Government:</i> Family life, health and happiness, is primarily determined by its socio-economic condition. The government has both a responsibility and duty to assist vulnerable/disadvantaged families in meeting their economic needs. Prosperity and welfare of the nation requires aiding and assisting families in need.</p> <p><i>Policy Focus:</i> Direct social and economic relief programs.</p> <p><i>Policies & Primary Proponents, by era:</i></p> <p><u>Early Period (1900-1932):</u> Veteran’s Pensions, Provision of Public Lands to Homesteading families. (Republicans)</p> <p><u>Depression/Postwar Period (1936-1956):</u> Assistance to Families with Dependent Children, Food assistance, provision of affordable housing, adequate health care, subsidies and protection of family farms and family businesses. (Democrats and Republicans)</p> <p><u>Transition Period (1960s, 70s):</u> urban renewal and slum clearance, anti-poverty community programs, child care programs, education assistance and loan programs, expanded health care and social security programs. (Democrats, Republicans less so)</p>
Soul Framework
<p><i>Ideological Principle:</i> Liberty, autonomy, individualism</p> <p><i>Conception of the Family and Government:</i> The family is the natural foundation of society and so precedes the formation and significance of government. Government- through policies – must encourage and never limit family autonomy, particularly its ability to solve problems independently. The family possesses innate moral agency, largely independent of socio-economic conditions; the institution of the family is vital to social cohesion insofar as it transmits the values of self-sufficiency, self-reliance, civic duty, voluntarism and private charity across generations.</p> <p><i>Policy Focus:</i> Family autonomy should be preserved and would be undercut by direct government relief programs. Direct government intervention into the family’s economic condition is often counterproductive.</p> <p><i>Policies & Primary Proponents, by era:</i></p> <p><u>Early Period (1900-1932):</u> Racial intermarriage, child labor (Southern Democrats)</p> <p><u>Depression/Postwar Period (1936-1956):</u> Assistance of farm families, critique of agricultural policies (Republicans)</p> <p><u>Transition Period (1960s, 70s):</u> welfare reform, parent-focused education policies critiquing federal intervention into schools (through busing etc.). (Republicans)</p>

By coding family paragraphs in the parties' platforms, using the two Hearth and Soul frameworks, we can observe the ebb and flow of these two ideologies through the 20th century and find that the contemporary period was indeed distinctive in the explosion of paragraphs invoking the Soul family ideological frame.


Figures 1.5a and b (see below) present the percentages of paragraphs that made reference to the Hearth and Soul frameworks of family.⁷¹

Figure 1.5a: Hearth Paragraphs as Percent of Total Paragraphs, Democratic and Republican Platforms, 1900-2004



⁷¹ All paragraphs that make some reference to government responsibility to assist families in need, or to aid disadvantaged or economically vulnerable families are coded as progressive 'Hearth'; and those that mentioned family autonomy, independent agency, or personal responsibility (with or without government intervention) are coded as traditional "Soul". These paragraphs included statements regarding specific policies as well as abstract, broad statements that did not invoke policy specifics. Unlike family paragraphs that were limited to policy-specific statements, this looser coding scheme was chosen to highlight the ideological content of the platforms. The rationale used was that ideological statements – describing, for instance, Hearth or Soul family ideologies – extended to policy pledges as well as non-policy statements of party ideology. Accordingly, the number of Hearth and Soul paragraphs in platforms for some years exceeded the number of family paragraphs, as evidenced in Figure 1.1 (p.18).

Figure 1.5b: Soul Paragraphs as Percent of Total Paragraphs, Democratic and Republican Platforms, 1900-2004



Republican platforms in the Progressive Era initially invoked the Hearth framework more than Democratic. Democratic platforms instead, as seen in Fig. 1.5b, used the Soul framework during the early period. However, following the New Deal, Democratic platforms have focused on the Hearth framework to the exclusion of Soul. From 1936 to 1984, Republican platforms alone made references to the Soul ideology; however up to the early 1970s they also had comparable percentages of Hearth references (see Fig. 1.5a). This changed markedly in the contemporary period, starting in 1980, when Republican platforms shifted sharply towards Soul references of family, to the exclusion of Hearth ones; and Democratic platforms too embraced Soul ideological references when referring to family although (in their case) this was balanced with references to the Hearth framework.

Overall, paragraphs expressing the Hearth ideology have exceeded those invoking the Soul framework of family and (national) state in the case of both parties. However, starting in 1980 the Republican Party has dramatically increased references to the Soul ideology and almost completely has eschewed Hearth references. Further, even though the Democratic Party

continues to express a Hearsh ideology now as before, Democratic platforms acquiesce and appear to have also embraced the new Soul vision of family and state.

In its 1980 platform, the Republican Party put forth the boldest repudiation of Democratic Hearsh family ideology. The family was no longer a source of critique of specific Democratic policies and programs (such as welfare and education) but was elevated to an organizing principle of Republican contemporary philosophy. Family became the rubric through which the party illustrated its renewed commitment to minimal government and free enterprise. While the principles of liberty, free enterprise and limited government were not new for the Republican Party and had defined the party at least since Mckinley,⁷² its 1980 platform was ideologically exceptional in that it marked the beginning of a comprehensive *positive* or *dynamic* ideology of limited government. The ideological commitment to less government now not only meant dismantling and *opposing* national state intervention but implied *positive* national state intervention – through policies – to boost, encourage, and support *alternatives* to government.⁷³ The family was extolled as an example of such vital alternatives to government and its independent role in promoting individual liberty, private and local self-reliance was championed:

“For too many years, the political debate in America has been conducted in terms set by the Democrats. They believe that everytime new problems arise beyond the power of men and women to solve, it becomes the duty of the government to solve them, *as if there were never any alternative*. Republicans disagree and

⁷² It bears noting that far from a monolithic, unfaltering embrace, the tone and quality of Republican principles of individualism and liberty have changed over time. Prior to the early 20th century, Republican espousal of these values was more hierarchical and statist (a distinct brand of “mugwumpery”), emphasizing the ‘limits and duties of the individual rather than his or her unfettered freedom of action’ [Gerring, *Party Ideologies*, 101]. However since the 1920s, Republicans have embraced ‘individualism’ and ‘liberty’ in its anti-statist contemporary form, as a means to limit government action.

⁷³ Since the 1920s but prior to the contemporary period, the concern over the integrity of local and civic institutions, such as the family and community, did not extend to perceiving them as having lost their capacity to function independently of government. The goal of liberty, used to preserve these institutions, was thus a *negative* one, implying a restraint on the national state. In contrast in the contemporary period the very integrity of family and local institutions is seen as besieged, their very capacity for independence viewed as having been eroded. Hence pledges for *positive* intervention on behalf of principles of liberty, revitalizing and rejuvenating family independence are invoked. On the revised traditional ideology more generally, from laissez faire to interventionist, see Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (1999) ‘Introduction: Progressivism, Then and Now’ in Sidney M Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (eds) Progressivism and the New Democracy (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press) 1-39.

have always taken the side of the individual, whose freedoms are threatened by big government that Democratic idea spawned... we will *redefine* and broaden the debate by transcending the narrow terms of government and the individual...we will *reemphasize* the vital communities like the family, the neighborhood, the workplace and others which are found at the center of society between government and the individual. We will *restore* and strengthen their ability to solve problems in the places where people spend their daily lives and can turn to each other for support and help.”⁷⁴

Words such as ‘re-define,’ ‘re-emphasize,’ and ‘re-store,’ were used repeatedly in the platform, stressing the Party’s repudiation of the dominant Democratic ideology.⁷⁵ Unlike earlier references to the Soul framework of family in which family independence was used to *critique* ever-expanding national state intervention found in the New Deal and Great Society programs, the preservation of family autonomy now became a *positive* goal of public policy requiring not merely the dismantle of existing social programs but also the creation of new policies to enhance and support family independence.

“The family is the foundation of our social order. Its daily lessons are fundamental to the order and progress of our Republic...unlike the Democrats, we do not advocate new federal bureaucracies with ominous power to shape a national family order. Rather, we insist that all domestic policies, from child care and schooling to social security and the tax code must be formulated with the family in mind.”⁷⁶

The revised Republican Soul family framework therefore demanded that the family be placed front and center of all domestic policies. Indeed, Republican platforms of the contemporary era began to invoke the protection of family autonomy and unified, nuclear structure in diverse policy areas such as eldercare, small business, energy and environment,

⁷⁴ Republican Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (0026, 0028) (emphasis added).

⁷⁵ The election of Ronald Reagan is seen by many to mark a new phase in Republican ideology and in the party’s political significance. On Ronald Reagan as a ‘repudiator’ of the previous Democratic regime and reconstructor of the new Republican regime see Stephen Skowronek (1997) Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) chapter 8. On Reagan’s ‘narrative of American rebirth and regeneration’ and its appropriation of family as a unifying symbol, in response to/as a solution of the perceived crises and loss of trust in (Democratic) government of the 1970s see: Natasha Zaretsky (2007) No Direction Home : the American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press) p. 23.

⁷⁶ Republican Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (0236)

macroeconomic and tax policies; as well as the more conventional policies of housing and homeownership, healthcare, education, childcare and welfare.⁷⁷

The Soul family framework invoked by the Republican Party in the contemporary era has at least two variants, each of which emphasizes different ideological principles embraced by factions of contemporary Republicans. These are what may be called the libertarian and moral variants of Soul family ideology. The libertarian variant champions the family as an *alternative* to national government and, as seen above, is enlisted mainly in the battle for individual liberty against big government. A key characteristic that makes the family so appealing to this perspective is its claimed natural-ness or unplanned-ness. Since Herbert Hoover, central planning had been presented as a threat to individual liberty and an inevitable producer of social disharmony and chaos.⁷⁸ The family as a social formation is seen to represent the opposite of central planning and national state omniscience.

Platforms throughout the period have made references to the limits of the federal government's capacity to comprehend, and tailor, programs to individual family circumstances; instead a more useful approach is to 'get government out of people's pocketbooks,' and allow them greater opportunity to make independent decisions regarding their own well-being. These decisions range from participation of school-age children in surveys and sex education classes, availability of contraception to minors, school choice, school prayer, choice of long-term eldercare and child care options, as well as in low-income housing. Towards these policy goals, Republican platforms have advocated the use of specific vouchers, tax credits and deductions as

⁷⁷ The centrality of family to Republican public policies in the late 20th century was highlighted in Reagan's Executive Order No. 12606, issued September 2, 1987. In that order, Reagan required executive agencies to develop 'family impact statements' prior to the implementation and formulation of any policies and regulations that 'may have a significant impact on family formation,' assessing various criteria such as impact on family stability, marital relations, parental rights and authority, and family self-sufficiency. [Available from the World Wide Web: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2719486/posts>]

⁷⁸ Gerring (1998) "Party Ideologies" Chapter 4:125-158

the means to boost the autonomous capacities of individual families and reduce dependence on direct state programs (handouts).

The libertarian idea of the family as a natural alternative to big government is predicated on an empirical argument that the family has been independent of the state, traditionally or ‘naturally.’⁷⁹ Its rediscovery of the autonomous family thus validates a social experience that it claims has been forgotten in political debate dominated by the Democratic statist philosophy. This libertarian variant of Soul family ideology thus exemplifies what has been described as a central dichotomy in current, Neoliberal Republican ideology: the ‘state versus the individual.’⁸⁰ In as much as this conception empirically assumes a social reality, it complements the moralist variant, which has also co-existed within the contemporary-Republican Soul ideology of family and government.

The moralist variant stresses family independence in terms of the family’s unique moral function: the family is an irreplaceable social formation because it alone transmits *values* to children and so reproduces American morality from one generation to the next. This ideological vision was first articulated in the 1976 Republican platform in the context of concern over the explosion of juvenile crime. The family’s failure to perform its duty of ‘instill(ing) proper values’ in children was addressed in that platform as a central cause of rising crime and lawlessness.⁸¹ In the 1980 platform as well, the Party stressed the function of the family in terms

⁷⁹ “Our society consists of more than that; so should the political debate...vital communities like the family, the neighborhood, the workplace, and others ... are found at the center of society, between government and the individual...[these are] where people spend their daily lives and can turn to each other for support and help”[Republican Party Platform of 1980, Preamble, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”].

⁸⁰ Gerring (1998) “Party Ideologies” Chapter 4:125-158.

⁸¹ Republican Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”(paragraph 202): “Juveniles now account for almost half the arrests for serious crimes—murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. The cost of school violence and vandalism is estimated at \$600 million annually, about what is spent on textbooks. *Primary responsibility for raising our children, instilling proper values* and thus preventing juvenile delinquency *lies with the family*, not the government. Yet when families fail, local law enforcement authorities must respond. Law

of transmission of moral values: ‘[the family’s] daily lessons—cooperation, tolerance, mutual concern, responsibility, industry—are fundamental to the order and progress of our Republic.’⁸² Education has been a leading and enduring policy area in the ideological project of restoring family/parental agency, as ‘[n]ext to religious training and the home, education is the most important means by which families hand down to each new generation their ideals and beliefs.’⁸³

By 1984, along with family autonomy/agency the preservation of the family’s moral function became a policy goal to be pursued in diverse policies – housing, welfare, tax, and poverty, in addition to its more conventional application: education and juvenile crime. In a major section, entitled ‘Family Protection,’ the platform emphasized the social reality in which the family played an indispensable role in reproducing values.⁸⁴ Transmission of moral values was extolled as crucial to social and individual well-being, as it was only ‘in the community of individuals and families’ [that] ‘every generation has learned the art of self-government.’⁸⁵

Within the moralist variant, Democratic interventionist programs not only threaten individual liberty but the very fabric and structure of the traditional American value system.⁸⁶

enforcement block grant funds can be used by states in correcting and preventing juvenile delinquency. The LEAA should promote additional research in this area. The structure of the family must be strengthened.” [emphasis added]

⁸² Republican Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”(236).

⁸³ Ibid (244); Education is also a policy area which has been continually singled out by the Republican Party as one in which traditional values (such as prayer in schools, abstinence and character education) must abide alongside the demands of a modernizing, globalizing, society. For example, Republican Platform (576): ‘Because education is the key to opportunity, we must make America a nation of learners, ready to compete in the rapidly changing world of the future. Our goal is to combine traditional values and enduring truths with the most modern techniques and technology for teaching and learning.’

⁸⁴ “Republicans affirm the family as the natural and indispensable institution for human development: “A society is only as strong as its families, for they nurture those qualities necessary to maintain and advance civilization. Healthy families inculcate values—integrity, responsibility, concern for others—in our youth and build social cohesion. We give high priority to their well-being.” [Republican Party Platform of 1984, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project”(726)].

⁸⁵ Ibid (320)/ Also see: Republican Party Platform of 1996, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (78): ‘...because a good society rests on an ethical foundation, we believe families, communities and religious institutions can best teach ...American values.’

⁸⁶ However it need be noted that the value of liberty itself, is one of the main ‘family values’ that the family is seen to inculcate in its children. [Ibid (0577)]

Worst of all, they ['liberal experimenters'] tried to build their brave new world by assaulting our basic values. They mocked the work ethic. They scorned frugality. They attacked the integrity of the family and parental rights. They ignored traditional morality. And they still do. Our 1980 Republican platform offered a renewed vision. We based it upon home, family, and community as the surest guarantees of both individual rights and national greatness. We asserted, as we do now, the ethical dimension of public policy: the need to return to enduring principles of conduct and firm standards of judgment.⁸⁷

The theme of values, especially *family* values, has become a consistent feature of Republican platforms; and the 1992 platform had the greatest mention of values and morality than any other.⁸⁸ Through the economic turmoil of the 1980s and '90s, as well numerous other alterations such as the end of the Cold War, terrorist attacks, and increasing economic globalization, the party has repeatedly presented a message of social conservatism, a protection or conservation of 'basic values,' in which an assumed traditional morality is used as a guide for American progress in uncertain times.⁸⁹ The family, by transmitting moral principles to future generations, is entrusted with the timeless task of guiding change and acting as a moral compass: "Our national renewal starts with the family. It is where each new generation gains its moral anchor. It is the school of citizenship, the engine of economic growth progress, a permanent haven when everything changes."⁹⁰

Furthermore, the moralist conception of the American family invokes a specific form of family (nuclear, two-parent, opposite-sex) as the only family structure that is capable of transmitting cherished values across generations. Unlike the libertarian variant in which the form of the family is immaterial (as all forms of family are seen as alternatives to the state) the

⁸⁷ Republican Party Platform of 1984, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(0320) and (0322)

⁸⁸ See Table 1.2a forthcoming on page 49, computing percent of "values" in Republican Platforms, 1972-2004.

⁸⁹ "An election is about the future, about change. But it is also about the values we carry with us we journey into tomorrow and about continuity with the best from our past" [Republican Party Platform of 1988, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(0010)]; see also *Ibid* (0014): 'Americans want leadership to direct the forces of change; on America's terms, guided by American values;' also, Republican Party Platform of 2004, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(53): 'Protecting our Families...because we respect the family's role as a touchstone of stability and strength in an ever-changing world.' In the past, similar impulses have been documented in which traditional (familial) revivalism was perceived as a bulwark against ongoing or future social stress.

⁹⁰ Republican Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)"(062): 'Family the Home of Freedom.'

moralist conception emphasizes the traditional structure of the nuclear, two-gendered family.

Repeatedly, the party's platforms (1992, 1996 and 2000) have used some variant (often verbatim copies) of the following prose, which first appeared in its 1992 platform and which illustrates the

Moralist preoccupation with traditional family structure:

Republicans recognize the importance of having fathers and mothers in the home. The two-parent family still provides the best environment of stability, discipline, responsibility and character. Documentation shows that where the father has deserted his family, children are more likely to commit a crime, to drop out of school, to become violent, to become teen parents, to take illegal drugs, to become enmired in poverty, or to have emotional or behavioral problems.⁹¹

Increasing references in Republican platforms to tradition and social-conservative values coincides with an initial decrease in Democratic emphasis on traditional values. During the '80s and the early '90s, there was a marked decline in the frequency of adjectives such as 'enduring', 'traditional' or 'timeless' when describing values in Democratic platforms; this is in contrast to the increase of such descriptors in Republican platforms for the same period (See following Figure 1.7a and b).⁹² However, since the late 1990s, the Democratic Party has altered this course and has since embraced the language of conservative morality with greater frequency in its platforms. This coincides with the earlier Figure (1.5b, p. 41) showing the 1990s as the period when Democratic platforms first began to follow the Republican lead and embrace Soul family ideology in addition to its Hearth legacy.

⁹¹ *Ibid* (078) .

⁹² Democratic use of 'timeless'/traditional values referred mostly to values such as citizenship, democratic principles, pluralism etc.; whereas Republican platforms used these adjectives to describe principles of community, volunteerism, liberty, Judeo-Christianity, 'sanctity of innocent life', and 'traditional military culture'. Since the above attempts to capture the salience of social *conservatism* i.e. protection of *social* principle *because* of its traditional/past character, therefore whenever 'traditional' was invoked to describe a social principle or practice (regardless of its character), it was included in the count; other uses of tradition (such as party tradition) were not included.

Table 1.2a – Social Conservative 'Values' Phrases in Republican Platforms, 1972-2004¹

		Timeless Principles	Family Values	Prayer	God	Traditional Values	TOTAL - Social Conservative 'Values' words
Year	1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1976	1	2	1	3	0	7
	1980	2	1	1	1	9	14
	1984	1	2	1	3	7	14
	1988	2	3	3	4	9	21
	1992	3	7	1	4	9	24
	1996	2	2	1	4	3	12
	2000	4	2	1	1	6	14
	2004	2	3	3	3	6	17

¹ References to Traditional Principles in Platforms, measured by frequency of use of adjectives such as enduring, timeless, traditional to describe social principles; and family values, prayer and God in platforms, 1972-2004

Table 1.2b – Social Conservative 'Values' phrases in Democratic Platforms, 1972-2004^a

		Timeless Principles	Family Values	Prayer	God	Traditional Values	TOTAL - Social Conservative 'Values' words
Year	1972	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1976	0	0	0	0	3	3
	1980	1	0	0	0	2	3
	1984	0	0	0	0	1	1
	1988	0	0	0	0	1	1
	1992	1	0	0	0	0	1
	1996	2	0	0	5	0	7
	2000	0	0	0	4	2	6
	2004	0	0	0	7	4	11

^a References to Traditional Principles in Platforms, measured by frequency of use of adjectives such as enduring, timeless, traditional, to describe social principles; and family values, prayer, and God in platforms, 1972-2004

Although Republican platforms since 1980 have the greatest use of the language of values, this by no means implies that Democratic platforms have eschewed references to ‘values’ and ethics. On the contrary, for this period, Democratic platforms have also used ‘values’ with comparable frequency in their platforms and have similarly invoked American shared values to justify policy pledges. However, as is perhaps unsurprising, the substantive content of ‘values’ for both parties

have been extremely divergent. Democratic platforms refer to values of inclusion and cultural diversity in democratic participation – values self-described as ‘progressive’.⁹³ In contrast, as seen in the previous tables, Republican values are conservative and stress past social traditions and uniformity of past practices. For example, in the below table (Table 1.3) we find that Republican Platforms have used ‘values’ more often in the context of ‘sex or religion’ in justifying policy agendas than have Democrats.⁹⁴ Similarly, Democratic Platforms make more references to diversity, as an American ‘value’ that guides their policy positions. It is important to note the broad differences in how ‘values’ is used in the two parties’ ideologies.

Table 1.3: Mention of Values, Sex/Religion and Diversity in Party Platforms, 1972-2004

		Values		Sex or Religion		Diversity	
		Democratic	Republican	Democratic	Republican	Democratic	Republican
Year	1972	1	4	2	2	4	2
	1976	2	7	2	3	0	1
	1980	10	16	2	6	8	4
	1984	7	6	0	10	7	2
	1988	3	21	0	13	0	1
	1992	10	18	3	17	1	1
	1996	26	18	3	16	6	0
	2000	33	13	6	9	2	0
	2004	18	27	4	12	6	0
	Average per year	12	14	2	10	4	1

⁹³ See, for example: Democratic Party Platform of 1984, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (24): “We believe in the inspiration of American dreams, and the power of progressive ideals. We believe in the dignity of the individual and the enormous potential of collective action... We believe in bridging our differences, not deepening them. We believe in a fair society for working Americans of average income: an opportunity society for enterprising Americans; a caring society for Americans in need through no fault of their own—the sick, the disabled, the hungry, the elderly, the unemployed: and a safe, decent and prosperous society for all Americans. We are the Party of American values—the worth of every human being; the striving toward excellence; the freedom to innovate; the inviolability of law; the sharing of sacrifice; the struggle toward justice; the pursuit of happiness. We are the Party of American progress...’ Note – although described as ‘progressive’ it must be noted that often, particularly for the last three platforms (1996, 2000, 2004), the Democratic Party has also begun to describe its values as traditional. Furthermore, ‘traditions’ when used by Democratic platforms often refers to *political* (not social) traditions and typically encompasses traditions of the Democratic Party itself as well as traditions of political participation.

⁹⁴ ‘Values’ paragraphs were coded as those that used the terms ‘values,’ ‘principles’ or ‘traditional concerns’; ‘sex’ paragraphs were coded as including all references to sex, sexuality, reproduction, promiscuity, and ‘diversity’ paragraphs coded all references to ‘diversity’ and racial or same-sex ‘inclusion.’

The above data indicates that for the period from 1980 to 1992 when the Republican platforms increasingly turned to the language of values and moral conservatism, Democratic platforms were shying away from the language of traditional morality and increasingly adopting ‘progressive’ values, chiefly diversity, when discussing policy objectives regarding the family. However, since then and coincident with the recent espousal of Soul family ideology by Democratic platforms, Democrats appear to have altered course and now embrace traditional morality/values as well as more progressive formulations.

Moreover we also find that ‘family values,’ the cornerstone of the current Republican moralist variant of the Soul family framework, has had divergent meanings and has been used as the rationale for diverse policy positions. Nevertheless, all references to family values within the Moralism framework commonly privilege the nuclear-two-parent, opposite-sex family structure as the most stable family form and emphasize the moral function of the family (transmission of values) as its most unique, irreplaceable characteristic. The objective of public policy is to protect this type/structure of family.

Thus the Republican Soul family ideology that has emerged in the contemporary era has two variants: the Libertarian, in which the positive goal of public policy is boosting family autonomy as a viable alternative to national programs; and the Moralism, which emphasizes the protection of family’s moral function and its traditional structure as policy objectives.

On their part, Democratic contemporary platforms (1980-2004) continue to subscribe to the Hearth framework of family and state; however – as shown in Fig 1.6b, on p. 24 – the platforms have also made increasing references to family themes from the Soul framework. In the case of Republicans, the elevation of family to the status of unifying ideological principle during this time has been accompanied by an increasingly complex Soul family ideology that

possesses at least two variants, libertarian and moralist. In the case of Democrats, the contemporary period has witnessed also a development of the Hearth family ideology into at least two further coherent formulations: the Egalitarian and Inclusionary variants, which shall be discussed following a description of the general development of Democratic Hearth ideation.

Overall, the Democratic avowal of Hearth family ideology has continued, and even expanded, from the 1980s through today. Responding to the economic and social upheavals of the 1970s – increasing inflation/stagflation, rampant unemployment, and diminution of family purchasing power alongside civil disorder and social breakdown– Democratic platforms in the 1970s blamed Republican administrations’ ‘policies of neglect’; and pointed to families’ increasing needs to reiterate Hearth principles, stressing the importance of re-fortified, expanded national programs.⁹⁵ The duty of the national state to respond to family need now also extended to *social* needs, common *across* family income groups and not confined to the basic (economic) needs of poor families, which had been the prior focus of welfare policies, such as Great Society:

“The Nixon-Ford administration would limit eligibility for federally-subsidized social services to the very poor. Social services can make significant changes in the lives of the non-poor, as well. The problems of alcoholism, drug abuse, mental retardation, child abuse or neglect, and mental illness arise at every income level, and quality day-care has become increasingly urgent for low- and middle-income families.”⁹⁶

Moreover, alongside the reiteration and expansion of family needs, platforms of this early contemporary time also began to emphasize *unmet* family need. Unlike the midcentury platforms in which responsiveness to family need had been advocated as a matter of humanity and justice; during the 70s and 80s Democratic Hearth advocates began to link unmet family need with social disorder and consequently warned of disastrous social consequences that would follow from government *inaction*. Thus in direct contrast to Soul family ideology that pointed to increasing family dependence on the State as the primary cause of the social disorders rampant in the late

⁹⁵ Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)”(384).

⁹⁶ Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)”(348).

1960s; Democratic platforms instead stressed unmet family need and the causal role played by state unresponsiveness.⁹⁷ For example, the 1972 Democratic Platform reproduced the testimony of a private family man named Robert Coleman at a platform hearing in Pittsburg:

I went to school here and I had some training for truck driver school and I go to different places and put in applications for truck driving but they say, "We can't hire you without the experience", Now, I don't have the experience. I don't get the experience without the job first. I have four kids, you know, and I'm on unemployment. And when my unemployment runs out, I'll probably be on relief, like a lot of other people. But, being that I have so many kids, relief is just not going to be enough money. I'm looking for maybe the next year or two, if I don't get a job, they'll probably find me down at the county jail, because I have to do something."⁹⁸

The Democratic Party thus claimed that (national) state assistance to families during harsh economic periods was not merely humane policy (as they had argued during the Great Depression) but also a 'sound investment' in the future well-being and prosperity of the country.⁹⁹

By the 1980s Democratic platforms followed the Republican Soul lead and acknowledged the significance of national policy that 'strengthens' the family.¹⁰⁰ However, up until the Clinton platform of 1992, this engendered a recommitment or *strengthening* of federal social welfare programs and not reduction. The national state was not only still seen as capable of enhancing family welfare (a claim that was vehemently opposed by the Soul, Republican libertarian framework) but, now more than ever, it was essential to it. Democratic platforms thus fundamentally challenged the Republican description of social reality, in which families could

⁹⁷ See Reference to Report of Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders of the 1960s, 'that were caused by the deteriorating conditions of life in our urban centers- abject poverty, widespread unemployment, uninhabitable housing, declining services, rampant crime and disintegrating families.....little has been done by the Republican administrations to deal with the fundamental challenges to our society.' [Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project"(384)].

⁹⁸ Robert Coleman, Pittsburg Hearing, June 2, 1972 c/.f. Democratic Party Platform of 1972, *Ibid* (49)

⁹⁹ Democratic Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project"(686) ['When the needs of families and children are ignored that nation as a whole ultimately suffers. It is not only morally right, but also far less expensive for government to assist children in growing up whole, strong and able, than to pay the bill later for children and adults with health, social and educational problems'].

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid* ['Government cannot and should not attempt to displace the responsibilities of the family: to the contrary, the challenge is to formulate policies which will strengthen the family'].

only achieve their own interests through autonomy and separateness from state intervention. In the ‘real’ world, they claimed, most American families had a variety of common material needs (such as housing, health, child care) which in many cases could be met only through the ‘partnership’ of state and family.

“In Ronald Reagan’s vision of America, there are no single parents, women only stay at home and care for children. Reagan’s families do not worry about the effects of unemployment on family stability: they do not worry about decent housing and health care: they do not need child care. *But in the real world*, most Americans do. Providing adequate child care for the millions of American children who *need* it, and for their parents, is surely not a responsibility which belongs solely to the federal government. *But, like the responsibility for decent housing and health care, it is one where federal leadership and support are essential.*”¹⁰¹

Thus Democratic platforms in the 70s and 80s reiterated their Hearth family framework and modified it in the light of changing family realities and the growing Republican Soul counter-ideology. The public policy goal of family autonomy, crucial to Republican libertarian formulations was challenged as unrealistic, a diversion from the focus on many families’ economic circumstances and increasingly dire social realities. Policy instead needed to keep apace with families’ growing needs, as well as the increasing number and type of families who now needed assistance. In contrast to ‘liberty,’ the cherished family principle of the libertarian Soul ideology, Democratic platforms at this time began a forceful invocation of the principle of ‘equity’ or ‘equality’ as the normative guide of family policy.

The ideational turn to equality as the key guiding principle of family policy underpins the development of, what may be termed, the ‘egalitarian’ variant in (Democratic) Hearth family ideology during the contemporary period. The egalitarian strain emphasizes the equitable treatment – through social programs – of different classes and various types of families. For instance, as noted previously, families of all incomes are now seen to have certain common needs, which national and state governments can and must assist them with. The egalitarian

¹⁰¹Democratic Party Platform of 1984, *Ibid* (140) (emphasis added).

variant of progressive family ideology thus decouples the previous close association between ‘family need’ and ‘(low) family income’; instead, the platforms now make repeated references to educational, mental health, child care, domestic violence, child abuse prevention and health needs (among others) that beset all families, ‘*regardless of income.*’¹⁰² For instance, in welfare pledges Democratic platforms have addressed intact families, as requiring economic assistance as much as (if not more than) broken families.

Equality of opportunity and equity in the distribution of resources has become central in guiding the current Hearst Democratic position on diverse policies affecting families. Thus, on the one hand they severely criticized the Reagan economic recovery and tax policies for inequitably distributing economic prosperity to affluent families and reserving the burdens of economic change for the non-affluent.¹⁰³ On the other hand, the ideal of equal opportunity was used to reaffirm national state action and creation of enhanced educational, training, jobs and other programs attuned to the ‘special needs’ of minority, female-headed, and other disadvantaged types of families.¹⁰⁴ The two tropes of ‘families being left behind’ and ‘the diminishing American Dream for a vast majority of families’ were reiterated through the 80s, calling instead for strong action to ‘reverse regressive Reagan policies’ and address various

¹⁰² “The Nixon-Ford administration would limit eligibility for federally-subsidized social services to the very poor. Social services can make significant changes in the lives of the non-poor, as well. The problems of alcoholism, drug abuse, mental retardation, child abuse or neglect, and mental illness arise at every income level, and quality day-care has become increasingly urgent for low- and middle-income families.” [Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (348)].

¹⁰³ See, for example – Democratic Party Platform of 1972, Ibid (175): “The last ten years have seen a massive shift in the tax burden from the rich to the working people of America... major reform of the nation's tax structure is required to achieve a more equitable distribution of income and to raise the funds needed by government”.

¹⁰⁴ For example, for support of ‘equal pay for equal work’ and creation of job opportunities, especially for women, see: Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Ibid (148).

growing family needs such as hunger, poverty, lack of affordable housing and also crime, teenage pregnancy, inadequate prenatal and quality healthcare.¹⁰⁵

As is usually the case, this development of egalitarian Hearth family ideology (embrace of ‘equality’ as a first principle) can be best observed in Democratic discussions of welfare reform. At least since 1976, Democratic platforms acknowledged that ‘existing welfare programs encourage family instability.’¹⁰⁶ Despite this recognition, they claimed that state intervention itself is not corrosive to family stability, instead welfare programs needed to be reformed to the extent that they are made more *equitable* to both ‘broken’ and ‘intact’ families. In other words, the policy goal of ‘strengthening’ family stability was imagined to be facilitated by *expanding* government programs to also cover intact families, and not just single-parent ones.

“Government should not encourage the break-up of intact families. On the contrary, we must provide the help a family needs to survive a crisis together. In 1962, American took an action which has been one of the greater contributors to family stability in the history of federal policy. For the first time, states were permitted to provide assistance to families with both parents, and still be eligible for general reimbursement....we must treat stable and broken families equally.”¹⁰⁷

Here we find an illustration of the fundamental divergence between the Soul, libertarian position of the Republican Party and the Hearth, egalitarian position of the Democratic. Both lament the growing empirical phenomenon of ‘family disintegration’ and its concordant social effects; however they approach this in diametrically opposite ways. Since Reagan and the 1980 platform, libertarian Republicans have viewed the loss of family autonomy as the primary cause of the declining economic and social value of the family – this, in turn, they relate to interventionist state action, such as public assistance programs.¹⁰⁸ The egalitarian Democratic

¹⁰⁵ Democratic Party Platform of 1984, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (885); Democratic Party Platform of 1988, *Ibid* (12,16).

¹⁰⁶ Democratic Party Platform of 1976, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (284).

¹⁰⁷ Democratic Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (564); also Democratic Party Platform of 1988, *Ibid* (16).

¹⁰⁸ See, for example: “The Republican agenda for welfare reform...central to it is the preservation of the families the system is designed to serve. The current system does not do this. Neither would guaranteed annual income schemes. By supplanting parental responsibility and by denying children parental guidance and economic support, they

position on the other hand, emphasizes the link between unequal and unavailable government programs for stable families as contributing to family instability. Thus while the policy solution for libertarians is to *withdraw* state intervention into the family, for egalitarians it is to *extend* such intervention to even those (stable) families that had been previously unassisted. Thus within egalitarian Democratic ideology, all families in need, regardless of form, income, or race, are equally deserving of state help and assistance. This illustrates the most liberal, expansive interpretation of Hearth family ideology to date, evident most clearly in Democratic platforms of the late 70s and 80s.

Since the 90s however, the egalitarian formulation in Democratic platforms has become less expansive and more qualifying in its criteria for families deserving of government assistance. Starting from 1992, Democratic platforms have tied eligibility for several social programs to employment, exhibiting what is otherwise a core libertarian value: '*personal responsibility*;' thus 'working' families are now at the center of Democratic family policies. For instance, in its preamble the 1992 platform called for a "Revolution of 1992" to 'restore America's economic greatness' by 'abandoning the something-for-nothing ethic of the last decade.'¹⁰⁹

'The Revolution of 1992 is about putting government back on the side of *working* men and women – *to help those who work hard, pay their bills, play by the rules, don't lobby for tax breaks, do their best to give their kids a good education and to keep them away from drugs*, who want a safe neighborhood for their families, the security of decent, productive jobs for themselves, and a dignified life for their parents.'¹¹⁰

encourage and reward the fragmentation of families. This is unconscionable. The values and strengths of the family provide a vital element in breaking the bonds of poverty." (Republican Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project" (340)); also: Republican Party Platform of 1984, Ibid (362): 'Welfare's indirect effects were equally as bad. It became a substitute for urgently needed economic reforms to create more entry-level jobs. Government created a hellish cycle of dependency. Family cohesion was shattered, both by providing economic incentives to set up maternal households and by usurping the breadwinner's economic role in intact families'.

¹⁰⁹ Democratic Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project" (19).

¹¹⁰ Ibid (21) – Also, Id (152): Both Republican neglect and traditional spending programs have proven unequal to these challenges. Democrats will pursue a new course that stresses work, family and individual responsibility, and that empowers Americans to liberate themselves from poverty and dependence.

Personal responsibility now began to feature prominently in Democratic platforms. Prior to 1988 the term ‘personal responsibility’ was never used in Democratic Platforms. In contrast, beginning from 1980, Republican platforms have made consistent such references (2 to 6 mentions per platform), linking families and personal responsibility. However, since 1992 Democratic platforms too on an average make 4 to 5 references to the value of ‘personal responsibility’ when discussing the family. In their 1996 platform, in a whole section entitled ‘Responsibility’ Democrats explicitly acknowledged that “[t]oday's Democratic Party knows that the era of big government is over...Government's job should give people the tools they need to make the most of their own lives...Americans must take the responsibility to use them, to build good lives for themselves and their families. Personal responsibility is the most powerful force we have to meet our challenges and shape the future we want.’¹¹¹

In conjunction with the embrace of family personal responsibility, Democratic policy pledges have shifted their focus from poor families to working families. For instance, from 1960 to 1988 Democratic platforms on an average devoted about 4 paragraphs, referencing policies specifically directed at ‘poor families’ and made almost no mention whatsoever of ‘working families’ (mean of 0.25 paragraphs for this period). However, starting from 1992, the number of policy paragraphs that discussed policies related to poor families fell to half its original (2 paragraphs), and paragraphs devoted to policies addressing ‘working families’ increased 6 times (on an average now, 6 paragraphs per platform). Thus *working* families are now a central target of Democratic family policy and personal responsibility features more prominently in Democratic policy pledges and rationales. ‘Family need’ to which government must respond is therefore qualified by whether or not the families, themselves, exhibit personal responsibility by working and trying to be self-sufficient. This is reflected in numerous revised Democratic policy

¹¹¹ Democratic Party Platform of 1996, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (120).

proposals that now focus on parental responsibility in *addition* to state responsibility.¹¹² For example, education, long the focus of proponents of the Soul family ideology, is now also acknowledged by Democrats as ‘a cooperative enterprise,’ one in which students and parents have as much responsibility as do teachers, school administrators and government:

‘Education is a cooperative enterprise that can only succeed if everyone accepts and exercises personal responsibility. Students must stay in school and do their best; parents must get involved in their children's education; teachers must attain, maintain, and demonstrate classroom competency; school administrators must enforce discipline and high standards of educational attainment; governments must end the inequalities that create educational ghettos among school districts and provide equal educational opportunity for all.’¹¹³

Reform of welfare policy was another notable illustration of revised Democratic Hearth ideology, in which Democrats pledged ‘to make work and responsibility the law of the land.’¹¹⁴ The failed welfare system was charged with undermining the values of ‘work, family, and personal responsibility... that it should promote,’ and needed to be reformed so that it could ‘help (those) people who want to help themselves and their children.’¹¹⁵ Similarly entertainment policy mandating a ratings system for television programs, was embraced as facilitating parental supervision of children;¹¹⁶ and Americans were encouraged to ‘take responsibility to meet the important goal’ of reducing the number of abortions and unintended pregnancies.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Republicans in 1980 first used the term ‘personal responsibility’ when referring to preventive health care and Americans ‘personal responsibility in maintaining their own good health’ and advocating assistance only for ‘catastrophic illness’ [Republican Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (294); see also Ibid 394]. Since then, personal responsibility has also been used to indict Democratic education policy, spending on public schools that have ‘lost sight of their traditional task of developing good character and moral discernment’...the ‘result’ of which ‘[i]s a decline in personal responsibility’ and the need for parents to ‘resume the exercise of their responsibility for the basic education, discipline, and moral guidance of their children’ [Republican Party Platform of 1984, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” 294, 296]. Further, as discussed in text welfare became the lynchpin of Republican attack of Democratic policies that fostered family dependence and loss of personal responsibility (‘The key to welfare reform is restoring personal responsibility and encouraging two-parent households’: Republican Party Platform of 1996, Ibid 705).

¹¹³ Democratic Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (123).

¹¹⁴ Democratic Party Platform of 1996, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (168).

¹¹⁵ Ibid (166).

¹¹⁶ Id (292) [‘...when parents control the remote, it is not censorship, it is personal responsibility for their children's upbringing’].

¹¹⁷ Id (188); also, Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (401).

The emphasis on personal responsibility and work not only qualifies families for state assistance (makes them ‘deserving’ of relief) but also disqualifies other families, who instead become targets of more punitive or regulatory policy. This bifurcation of families, their needs, and worthiness for public assistance has been part of the Soul framework as we have seen, at least as early as the 1960s. Alongside programs that provide for the family needs of working parents, such as FMLA, child care, and job training for parents with dependent children on welfare, Democratic Platforms have now also advocated strong regulatory measures against parents who seemingly shirk in their responsibility toward their children, as seen in their positions on stringent child support enforcement measures and crackdown on deadbeat dads.¹¹⁸ In this regard, Democrats have adopted a punitive tone towards ‘undeserving’ families that is not unlike that found in Republican platforms that have stressed family’s own independence and autonomy and the responsibility of government in facilitating this.

However, Democratic platforms inasmuch as they have adapted the language, tenor, and policy positions of Republican Soul family ideology have, nevertheless, held onto Hearth principles insofar as they advocate expanded social programs for some families (those who are responsible) who are still seen to warrant active state partnership in assisting them ‘when in crisis.’ Further, even through the 1990s Democrats have continued to highlight vulnerable members within families – such as battered wives, abused children, infants, the sick and ailing etc. – for whom need itself has continued to dominate the rationale for interventionist policies.

Thus the Hearth family ideology based on need has been substantially contracted since the last decade of the 20th century. Personal responsibility and work now feature more

¹¹⁸ Democratic Party Platform of 1992, Woolley & Peters, “American Presidency Project” (109) [‘People who bring children into this world have a responsibility to care for them and give them values, motivation and discipline. Children should not have children. We need a national crackdown on deadbeat parents, an effective system of child support enforcement nationwide, and a systematic effort to establish paternity for every child.’].

prominently in qualifying which family's needs deserve state assistance and which requires regulation/punishment. However, even so family need itself is still an active policy rationale in cases of vulnerable family members and in the case of deserving families. Contemporary Hearth ideology followed by Democratic platforms continues to differ from the Soul family ideology insofar as it claims that family autonomy and self-sufficiency are *insufficient* in many cases to alleviate family suffering/need. To this extent the policy targets of egalitarian Hearth Democrats has been somewhat narrowed (to deserving, responsible families) but continues to be wider, and still based on family need, than that found in Republican Soul family ideology.

Finally, the inclusionary variant is a second, albeit secondary, ideological strain in Hearth family policy. It counters, most directly, the moralist unified family ideal. Inclusionary family ideology places value on 'diversity,' as a guiding ideal of family policy. During the 70s and 80s, as seen previously, the expansive egalitarian Hearth ideology advocated in Democratic platforms was inclusionary in that state responsibility was extended to the needs of *all* families, 'regardless of race, color, religion or income.'¹¹⁹ In welfare policy as well, Democrats advocated the equal assistance of both, intact *and* broken families. 'Family need' as a policy ideal thus superseded any differences based on family type, within this formulation. In the 1980 Democratic Platform the only sentence/plank in its 'Families' section succinctly therefore stated: The Democratic Party supports efforts to make federal programs more sensitive to the *needs* of the family, *in all its diverse forms*.¹²⁰

However, starting in 2000 recent Democratic platforms have now embraced 'inclusion of diverse families' as a family policy rationale independent of need. This is most evident in Democratic policy statements regarding gay and lesbian families:

¹¹⁹ Democratic Party Platform of 1972, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)" (683, 517): Also Democratic Party Platform of 1984, *Ibid* (449).

¹²⁰ Democratic Party Platform of 1980, Woolley & Peters, "[American Presidency Project](#)" (698).

‘We support the full inclusion of gay and lesbian families in the life of the nation. This would include an equitable alignment of benefits. We recognize the importance of new battles against forms of discrimination and disadvantage that stand as barriers to communities and families, such as environmental injustices and predatory lending practices.’¹²¹

The Democratic espousal of ‘diversity’ as a family policy ideal and the inclusion of diverse family forms into equitable family policies reveals a pragmatic but optimistic interpretation of modern social reality. Democratic platforms, like Republican, recognize the phenomenon of changing family relations and family form. Similarly both embrace the moral function performed by families in transmitting values across generations. However, the inclusionary ideology sees such change as inevitable and views diverse family forms (including gay and lesbian families) as equally capable of transmitting American cherished values.¹²²

America will become much more diverse in the coming century. But while much is changing, much remains. Our common civic culture – one grounded in the values most Americans share: work, family, personal responsibility, individual liberty, and faith – ties us together....In the years to come, we must celebrate diversity and focus on strengthening the common values and beliefs that make us one America.¹²³

In contrast, the moralist (Republican) variant of Soul family ideology maintains that only the two-parent, heterosexual, nuclear family form can transmit appropriate ‘family values’ and

¹²¹ Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (454); in their 2004 platform, Democrats support of the ‘full inclusion of gay and lesbian families’ for which they pledged to ‘seek equal responsibilities, benefits and protections’ extended to the repudiation of the Republican effort for a Federal Marriage Amendment that confined marriage to heterosexuals; as a justification, Democrats stated “ [o]ur goal is to bring Americans together, not drive them apart’, [Democratic Party Platform of 2004, [Ibid](#) (477)].

¹²² It need be noted that the Inclusionary Hearth ideology of contemporary Democratic platforms is less important when it comes to poor families. For instance, respect of diverse family structures, as seen in the case of same-sex families, is advocated alongside planks that implicitly try to reduce the incidence of poor, single-mother families and instead encourage ‘responsible fatherhood’ among the poor (see, for example: Fatherhood- Promoting responsible fatherhood is the critical next phase of welfare reform and one of the most important things we can do to reduce child poverty. Three times more men acknowledged paternity in 1998 than in 1993. This is a first step toward giving to a child the emotional and financial support a father must give to merit the name...Democrats support helping those men who want to reconnect with their families and who want to become a positive force in the lives of their children. [Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (349)]. However the two seemingly opposite positions may be reconciled to the extent that the contemporary Hearth family ideology privileges family ‘personal responsibility’ above family diversity and to the extent that diverse families (such as gay and lesbian ones) *are* responsible in economically providing for their families their diversity is encouraged in policy. Thus ‘responsible fatherhood’ is not advocated for non-poor, single-mother families and do not *need* child support (for example professional single-mothers (such as Murphy Brown) or even self-inseminating lesbian mothers). In this regard, the Inclusionary variant of progressive family ideology espoused by contemporary Democrats seemingly applies only to non-poor families and is less coherent than the modified Egalitarian variant which stresses equal address of the needs of equally responsible families.

¹²³ Democratic Party Platform of 2000, Woolley & Peters, “[American Presidency Project](#)” (461).

that the phenomenon of diverse family structures is neither inevitable nor irreversible; instead, they advocate the use of policy to reverse this trend and ‘preserve’ the nuclear, opposite-sex family as the sole American family ideal.¹²⁴

Thus during the contemporary period we find two developments each within Soul and Hearth family ideologies. During this time, Soul ideologies were in ascendance and unlike previous periods the Republican-led Soul ideology has held sway. As we have seen, however, this did not mean a complete abdication of family need-based Hearth ideology by contemporary Democrats; instead, they have tempered their ideology by absorbing the Soul ideological principle of ‘family personal responsibility.’ Democrats now claim that social programs must address family needs of a subsection of families, namely those who are themselves responsible and hard working. To this extent contemporary Hearth ideology has acquiesced to Soul ideals.

In contrast, the greatest divergence in Hearth and Soul contemporary ideologies is now illustrated in the clash over gay and lesbian families, and the policy ideals contained in the inclusionary and moralist variants. ‘Inclusion of diverse family structures’ directly opposes the moralist insistence on ‘preservation of the traditional family structure’. In this regard the inclusionary and moralist variants of Hearth and Soul ideologies, respectively, appear to be more divergent than their modified-egalitarian and libertarian formulations.

¹²⁴ For example: “Republicans recognize the importance of having a father and a mother in the home. The two-parent family still provides the best environment of stability, discipline, responsibility, and character. Documentation shows that where the father has deserted his family, children are more likely to commit a crime, drop out of school, become violent, become teen parents, take illegal drugs, become mired in poverty, or have emotional or behavioral problems.” [Republican Party Platform of 2000, *Ibid* 251] Also: ‘Because many youngsters fall into poverty as a result of divorce, we also encourage states to review their divorce laws and to support projects that strengthen marriage, promote successful parenting, bolster the stability of the home, and protect the economic rights of the innocent spouse and children. Finally, because so many social ills plaguing America are fueled by the absence of fathers, we support initiatives that strengthen marriage rates and promote committed fatherhood.’ [*Id* 254] .

§2 – *Heath & Soul Family Support in Congress*

A party platform is the most overarching statement of a party's ideology. As seen previously, platforms contain direct statements of the party's philosophy as well as indirect statements, in the form of justifications for policy pledges. However, in order to analyze partisan ideologies more fully, other sources must also be examined. This is so since party organizations produce platforms only every four years and the number of paragraphs that may be coded and analyzed are therefore limited. Also, due to their overarching nature, platforms cannot be used to determine the extent of partisan support among rank-and-file for any particular issue.

For this reason, congressional data documenting the position of 535 members of Congress is more appropriate. Conventionally, research on Congressional behavior focuses on members' roll call voting patterns. Roll call votes produce quantifiable outputs and are readily available through print and digital sources. However, numerous bills do not make it to the roll call stage; while many are introduced, only a few are reported out to the floor by committees/subcommittees and many languish there, still others are killed through a variety of procedural maneuvers which may or may not require unrecorded voice, not roll call, votes.¹²⁵

In contrast, bill sponsorship and cosponsorship provides more extensive data on party ideology, as they take into account *all* bills introduced, irrespective of their final outcome. Also, members of Congress who sponsor or add their names to (i.e. cosponsor) specific bills may be seen to have a greater preference for that policy issue and position than those who vote yea-or-nay in floor votes.¹²⁶ Yet, members are often also willing to sign onto bills as symbolic measures

¹²⁵ For the constraints on members related to roll call voting and its unrepresentative character in terms of the member's revealed preferences, see: Richard L. Hall (1996) *Participation in Congress* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 177-178.

¹²⁶ *Ibid* p. 178: 'Any participation beyond the simple act of voting requires considerably more effort. To become a serious and significant player in the floor action in a bill requires a substantial mobilization of staff and a serious

of support and not expect them to pass or involve any further effort. In this sense, sponsorship and cosponsorship is much less consequential than roll call voting.

However, for my purposes the difference between sincere and weak legislators' preferences is not significant, I am also not concerned with the strength of the link between co/sponsorship data and actual policy outcome. Instead, my objective is to determine the ideology contained in the types of bills that members from the two parties choose to be associated with.¹²⁷ Bill co/sponsorship is similar in this way to party platforms: 'both can be conceived of as representing positions with which an individual or party wishes to be identified, even if in neither case does the member or party necessarily follow through by devoting energy or resources to making the bill or pledge a reality.'¹²⁸ Thus the introduction and cosponsorship of family bills are approached as statements of substantive (and quantitative) partisan ideological positions and less as measures of preference intensity.

§2(a): Method, Family Bill Sponsorships & Co-sponsorships

Using party platforms, the previous section of this chapter identified four periods of partisan ideological development on the family: (i) early decades preceding the New Deal (1900-1932); (ii) midcentury (1936-1956); (iii) a transitory period (1960-1976) and;(iv) the current, contemporary era (1980-2004). We found that while Hearth and Soul conceptions of family have

commitment of time and energy.' See also: Wendy J. Schiller (1995) "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas" *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 186-203, 186-187.

¹²⁷ Cosponsorship is found to be not unlike other forms of legislative behavior, being motivated by some of the same factors – ideology of member and his/her policy position being a prominent one. [Keith Krehbiel (1995) "Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z" *American Journal of Political Science* 39:906-923].

¹²⁸ Wolbrecht (2000) "The Politics of Women's Rights" p. 77.

been dually present in each of the four periods, the significance of the family to partisan national ideology has cumulatively grown across the twentieth century.

From platform data, the parties appear to have been least polarized in their family ideologies during the midcentury period, particularly during the postwar decades during which public responsibility for family need became the guiding, Hearth policy objective. Beginning with the New Deal and the Economic Bill of Rights, through the Cold War, Great Society, and War on Poverty, the Democratic Party led the development of a dominant Hearth family ideology which continues to persist (albeit in a modified form) in its platforms to this day. The Republican Party during the midcentury also appears to have embraced this ideology alongside a Soul family conception, focused more on self-regulation and less on national state intervention.

In contrast, since the late 70's the counter-ideology of the Soul family has gained widespread ascendance in Republican platforms to the exclusion of more Hearth positions. Democratic platforms since the early 1990s have similarly modified their previous expansive Hearth family ideology in favor of a more Soul one, acknowledging that the encouragement of family self-reliance is, at least, as significant a policy goal as the public assistance of family need. Hearth family ideology was similarly less dominant in the first two decades of the 20th century. Despite the scarcity of family-related federal policies in that early period, the early platforms of the two parties evidenced a greater divergence in underlying family ideologies than the ensuing midcentury period.

Thus three broad periods of partisan ideological competition over the family may be discerned from platforms: two periods (the earliest and latest decades) in which the Hearth family ideology was comparatively less dominant and partisan ideology was more polarized; and the midcentury period, when it was by far the most dominant and the parties appear to be less

polarized in their national policy ideologies. I have therefore examined bills from Congresses in each of these three periods to test these findings; the distribution of which is as follows:

Table 1.4 – Distribution of Family Bills Examined

Era	Congresses	Years	Avg. Bills per Congress	Total Number of Bills
Progressive	56 th – 66 th	1899-1920	49	538
Postwar	79 th – 83 rd	1945-1954	91	457
Contemporary	101 st – 108 th	1989-2004	125	1009

The bills were identified by examining each year's Congressional Record Index, by searching under index headings meaningful to each historical period. The headings chosen correspond to keywords found in that era's platform paragraphs addressing the family. For instance, both parties' platforms discussed the family in the early 20th century in pledges on veterans' pensions and homestead policies and thus 'pensions' and 'public lands' headings were consulted in the Congressional Record Indexes for the relevant periods. Table 1.5 lists the index headings examined for each of the three periods.

Table 1.5: Headings Examined in Congressional Record Indexes by Era

Period	Headings Examined
<u>Progressive Era</u> 1899-1920	Aliens, Child/Children, Dependents, District of Columbia,* Domestic, Father, House/wife/ves, Infant, Marriage, Maternity, Mother, Negro, Pensions, Public lands (homesteads), Widows, and Women.
<u>Postwar Era</u> 1945-1954	Aliens/Immigration, Child/Children, Crime, District of Columbia,* Family, Father, Housing, Juvenile Delinquency, Marriage and Divorce, Mother, Negro, Public Health, School, Social Security, States, Taxation, Veterans, Women.
<u>Contemporary Era</u> 1989-2004	Family**

* the District of Columbia was administered directly by Congress during these periods, thus its heading yielded national bills pertaining to what would have otherwise been solely state police powers, such as miscegenation, juvenile institutions, child support, not all of which appeared under the other headings examined.

** The contemporary era is unlike the others insofar as the 'family' is now a separate heading in the annual Congressional Record Index listings; yielding family-related numerous bills and supporting my overarching contention that family policy has become a much more salient, independent issue in recent decades than before.

I need note that all bills listed under the aforementioned headings were not selected. Instead, using the same definition of ‘family’ used to code platform paragraphs, only those bills were included whose titles invoked a family relation (spouse, parents, dependents) or an aspect of family life (such as marriage, pregnancy, family property). Thus, for instance, bills whose titles and synopses referred to ‘women’ or ‘children’ only generally and without mention of their family role/context were also excluded. Thus many more bills related to, or impinged on the family, than were selected. It also should be noted that in the vast majority of the bills the actual text of the bill was not consulted, only its title (and available synopsis in the case of contemporary bills). For the most part however, the titles were explanatory of the main object of the bill and revealed an underlying Hearth or Soul family ideology (See below Table 1.6 for examples of bill titles).¹²⁹ Thus the purpose behind my coding scheme was to limit the sample to those bills in which the family is addressed more-or-less directly *as a family* and not merely as an indirect or implied context. Further, my objective is not to be exhaustive but to generate a representative sample of family bills for each era which can be then be analyzed for partisanship and family ideology.

In coding the family ideology of bills as Hearth or Soul I followed the definitions of the two family ideological frameworks determined from party platforms: ‘Hearth bills’ were coded as those that supported direct (national) state programs and intervention into the family, such as: providing for a family’s economic welfare (such as through relief, housing, child care etc.), providing patronage resources such as birth/marriage registrations, immigration admissions, or parental educational resources, or regulating family behavior (such as in cases of domestic

¹²⁹ Bills merely designating special days (such as Mothers Day) or amending specific family legislation without mentioning a position in favor or against the policy were excluded. Thus I included bills to ‘increase’ or ‘limit’ widows pensions but excluded those that purported to ‘amend’ such pension legislation without expressing a preference in favor or against.

violence, child abuse, child abandonment, child support enforcement etc); and ‘Soul’ bills were those that were ‘anti – Hearth,’ instead supporting family self-regulation, parental autonomy/choice, or traditional family morality and structure.

Table 1.6: Samples of Application of Coding Criteria to Family Bills

Index Heading/Subheading	Title/Abstract	Category
<i>Progressive Era</i>		
Pensions, Orphans	A bill to pensions orphans for soldiers and sailors of the Civil War	Hearth
Marriage& Divorce	A joint resolution for amendment to Constitution prohibiting intermarriage of whites and negroes	Soul
DC, Abandonment of Wife and Minor	A bill to make the abandonment of wife and minor a misdemeanor	Hearth
<i>Postwar Era</i>		
Aliens	Bills to admit spouses and children of members of Armed Forces	Hearth
Housing	A bill to authorize a program for moderate income families	Hearth
Veterans, Dependents	A bill to limit the eligibility of a stepchild and a stepparent for servicemen's indemnity awards	Soul
<i>Contemporary Era</i>		
Family	A bill to amend title X of the Public Health Service Act to establish in the program for family planning projects a requirement relating to parental notifications	Soul
Family	A bill to amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to apply the act to a greater percentage of the U.S. workforce and to allow employees to take parental involvement leave to participate in or attend their children's educational activities, and for other purposes.	Hearth
Family	A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to revise the estate and gift tax in order to preserve American family enterprises, and for other purposes.	Soul

§2(b): Description of Data & Findings

For the three periods 2,004 family bills were identified and coded as bills supporting a Hearth or Soul family ideology. The distribution of bills in the examined periods corroborates the general findings of platform data. As we see in below Figures (1. 6 (a) – (c)) in all of the

three periods more Hearth family bills were introduced than Soul, however in the mid-century, postwar era, members introduced Hearth family bills in much larger proportions than in either of the other two periods.

Figure 1.6 (a): Hearth & Soul Family Bills Introduced by Congress, Progressive Era, 1899-1920




Figure 1.6 (b): Hearth & Soul Family Bills Introduced in Congress, Postwar Era, 1946-54





Figure 1.6(c): Hearth and Soul Family Bills Introduced by Congress, Contemporary Era, 1989-2004



In the Postwar era a full 96.7% of bills examined were Hearth, much higher than the 86.4% or 60.9% of Hearth bills in the Progressive and Contemporary periods, respectively.¹³⁰ The Progressive and Contemporary periods are thus unlike the Postwar era to the extent that in both a sizeable proportion of family bills invoked a Soul ideology. However, the contemporary period stands apart in its strikingly large proportion of Soul family bills, particularly during the 104th (1994-1995) and 105th (1996-1997) Congresses. For those Congresses, for the first time the proportion of Soul family bills introduced exceeded the proportion of Hearth (56.5% and 52.8% of family bills introduced in the 104th and 105th Congresses, respectively, were Soul), a phenomenon that was unmatched in any of the other Congresses investigated.¹³¹

¹³⁰ See following Tables 1.7-1.9 on pages 72-73.

¹³¹ At this juncture it is inexpedient to discuss the changes in the (generic) *types* of policies engendered in Hearth and Soul family bills across the three periods. For instance, the Hearth family bills of the midcentury predominantly focused on social welfare, whereas those of the contemporary era pay much greater attention to regulatory policies. Similarly, Soul family bills of the contemporary era contain much higher proportions of moral policies and those of earlier periods were, instead, more preoccupied with policies concerning family property. While I have made this distinction (of policy type) in the coding of family bills, a full discussion and implications of changes/developments in Hearth and Soul policy *types* will occur only in the later chapters.

Whereas scarce mention of Soul family ideology was found in the national platforms of both parties in the Progressive era, coding of family bills for that period reveals that several Soul bills, challenging the growing Hearth family conception, were in fact introduced in Progressive Congresses, particularly the 61st-63rd Congresses (1909-1910 to 1913-1914/5) (Table 1.7). Many of these were related to the morality of the white family structure, evidenced

Table 1.7: Progressive Era Family Bills					
		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		N	Row %	N	Row %
Congress	1899-00	1	4.2%	23	95.8%
	1901-02	1	4.3	22	95.7
	1903-04	3	14.3	18	85.7
	1905-06	2	6.1	31	93.9
	1907-08	3	3.6	80	96.4
	1909-10	27	38.6	43	61.4
	1911-12	10	20.4	39	79.6
	1913-14	10	15.6	54	84.4
	1915-16	5	7.8	59	92.2
	1917-18	5	8.8	52	91.2
	1919-20	6	12.0	44	88.0
	Total	73	13.6	465	86.4

in bills condemning and criminalizing white slave traffic and intermarriage.¹³² Since the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the proportion of family bills containing the Hearth family ideology grew: on an average 17 Hearth family bills were introduced for each congress from 1899-1909, compared to approximately 30 for those during the second Progressive decade (1910-1920). Similar to what was found in platforms, veterans pension policies – particularly relief to widows, children and dependents – yielded the greatest proportion of Hearth family bills for this period. However other Hearth bills, advocating active national state intervention into families involved regulation and standardization of marriage and divorce practices, care of abandoned children, provision of public lands/homesteads to families, and child support; these did not find mention in party platforms.

¹³² See, for example: (Bills regarding) ‘White slave traffic, illegal importation or interstate transportation of alien women or girls for prostitution’ S 4008, S 4009, S 4514, HR 12315, HR 14517, HR 14518, HR 15431, HR 15816, HR 20379, HR 21484, HR 21584, HR 21588 61st Cong 2nd Sess. (1910); Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caueusian [sic] or any other character of persons 62nd Cong 3rd Sess. H.J. Res. 368 (1912); To prohibit the intermarriage of persons of the white and negro races within the United States of America; to declare such contracts of marriage null and void; to prescribe punishments for violations and attempts to violate its provisions, HR 20779, 63rd Cong. 3rd sess. (1915).

In the immediate postwar period after 1945, an overwhelming majority of family bills were Hearth-based (Table 1.8). Most concerned the welfare of returning and fallen veteran's families and proposed the expansion of housing, educational, social security, insurance and pension benefits for them. Several Hearth bills also advocated liberalization of restrictions on immigration and citizenship, to provide for the

Table 1.8. Postwar Family Bills					
		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		N	Row %	N	Row %
Congress	1945-46	0	.0%	78	100.0%
	1947-48	2	1.9	104	98.1
	1949-50	4	3.9	98	96.1
	1951-52	2	3.0	64	97.0
	1953-54	7	6.7	98	93.3
	Total	15	3.3	442	96.7

admission and naturalization of war brides and families of war veterans, while others addressed the growing phenomena of women in the workforce and provided for tax and social security changes to accommodate them and their families. Similar to party platforms, the small proportion of Soul bills of the period addressed the integrity of family farms and called for reduction of estate and other taxes on the transference and inheritance of these and other family estates.

In the contemporary period (Table 1.9), we find a much greater proportion of Soul family bills than ever before, and this trend is especially marked following the Republican landslide into the 104th Congress. Also, corroborating the platforms of the two parties, despite this recent proliferation

Table 1.9 Contemporary Family Bills					
		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		N	Row %	N	Row %
Congress	1989-90	15	16.0%	79	84.0%
	1991-92	14	16.1	73	83.9
	1993-94	15	20.5	58	79.5
	1995-96	52	56.5	40	43.5
	1997-98	85	52.8	76	47.2
	1999-00	83	46.4	96	53.6
	2001-02	75	40.5	110	59.5
	2003-04	56	40.6	82	59.4
	Total	395	39.1	614	60.9

of Soul bills, Hearth bills continue to be introduced in greater comparative proportion. However, it need be noted that the *ratio* of Hearth to Soul bills introduced has diminished since the 104th

Congress, in part due to the resurgence of traditional family advocates in response to same-sex marriage and gay and lesbian family rights, a policy issue that has risen to prominence (among bills introduced) since the late 1990s.¹³³


Unlike sponsorship or bill introduction, cosponsorship data is available only for Senate bills of the Postwar Congresses and all contemporary era (Senate and House) bills. This is because the House allowed members to cosponsor bills only in 1967 (Rule 22) and had previously, in 1909, explicitly prohibited it. In the Senate, members have cosponsored bills since the 1930's.¹³⁴ Despite this limitation, cosponsorship of bills gives evidences which types of bills – Hearth or Soul – were prominent particularly in the contemporary period, clustering support and attracting cosponsors in greater numbers than others.

Postwar cosponsorship data is not illuminative in that only 17 of the family bills examined (N=547) were cosponsored. In the contemporary era however, more extensive cosponsorship reveals a distinct picture of Hearth and Soul support among members of Congress, by and large evincing the increasing cluster of members around Soul bills. Of 1009 family bills examined in the contemporary period, Soul bills were as likely to attract cosponsors as Hearth, with almost identical proportions of Hearth and Soul bills being cosponsored: 71.4% of all Soul bills were cosponsored, compared to 71.8% of all Hearth bills.

¹³³ A fuller discussion of this occurs in Chapter 4 of this text. Note: abortion bills are somewhat less prominent in the period investigated than in the 1980s.

¹³⁴ Gregory Koger (2003) 'Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House' Legislative Studies Quarterly 28(2): 225-246, 227; Rick K. Wilson & Cheryl D. Young (1997) 'Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress' Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(1): 25- 43, 26.

Figure 1.7: Mean Number of Cosponsors, Hearth and Soul Bills, 1989-2004



By analyzing the number of cosponsors attached to either Hearth or Soul bills (Fig. 1.7, above), we see the increasing purchase of Soul bills in the contemporary period: across the Congresses examined, Soul bills had a sizably higher average number of cosponsors (32.2 cosponsors per bill) than Hearth ones (22.9 cosponsors). Prior to the 104th Congress (1995-96) the mean number of cosponsors for Hearth bills was higher than that of Soul ones; thereafter, following a sharp increase in mean cosponsorship in the 104th Congress (37.7), Soul bills have continued to attract more cosponsors than Hearth on an average. This corroborates Figure 1.6 (c) (on page 71) showing the timing of increase of Soul bills in Contemporary Congresses. Thus the most recent period is distinctive not only in terms of the increase in the proportion of Soul to Hearth bills but also because Soul bills now attract a larger number of cosponsors than Hearth ones.

§2 (c): *Partisanship and Family Ideology*

In this subsection, I use bill sponsorship/cosponsorship of Hearth and Soul family bills to measure support for those two types of family ideologies by individual members of Congress.

Each member has a partisan identity and therefore members are assumed to collectively represent their party. By aggregating the level of legislative activity of individual members, my object is to discern general trends in partisan support of family ideologies.

In two of the three periods examined, the Progressive and Contemporary, we find that partisanship is a significant indicator of the kind of bill a member would support. In these two eras ‘*ideology of family bill*’ and ‘*partisan affiliation of bill sponsor*’ are significantly correlated (see Table 2.7, below).

Table 1.10: Correlation between Ideology of Family Bill and Party Membership of Sponsor			
Correlation of Family Ideology of Bill*Party of Bill Sponsor			
Era	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Progressive (1899-1920)	.197**	.000	583
Postwar (1945-1954)	-.072	.122	457
Contemporary (1989-2004)	-.495**	.000	723

**Correlation is significant at the .01 level, 2-tailed

Moreover the directionality of that correlation in the two periods is of even greater interest.

Partisan affiliation is coded as a nominal dummy variable, taking the values of 0 or 1 for Democratic or Republican respectively.¹³⁵ ‘Family Ideology’ (of bill) is similarly coded as a dummy: 0 for Hearth and 1 for Soul. In the Progressive Era, the correlation coefficient has a *positive* sign indicating a positive correlation between partisan affiliation on introducing member and the bill’s family ideology, meaning a move in partisanship, from Democratic (0) to Republican (1)), is correlated with an increasing likelihood of sponsorship of a Hearth (1), over a Soul (0), bill. Thus Republican members and the introduction of Hearth family bills are

¹³⁵ In the Progressive era, for the sake of simplicity, the rare third-party sponsoring members were conflated into the closest major party. Thus Populists were coded as Democrats, and Silver-Republicans, Prohibitionists and Progressives were coded as Republicans. Despite possible contention over the classification of “Progressives” as Republicans, I have followed those scholars who have identified ‘Progressivism’ as more aligned with the Republican, rather than Democratic, Party up until 1912, i.e. the majority of the Progressive Era examined [Milkis & Mileur (1999) ‘*Progressivism and the New Democracy*’ 1-39].

correlated, as are Democratic affiliation and Soul bills in the Progressive era; supporting evidence from platforms which had showed Republican platforms as being slightly more Hearth-oriented in their family policy planks than Democrats for this period.

The lack of a significant correlation between partisanship of bill sponsor and family ideology of bill in the postwar era also bolsters a previous inference that Hearth and Soul ideologies did not have a clear party line during this period. Partisanship and bill's family ideology were (statistically) independent of each other, indicating that members from both parties could introduce either type of family bills, although we know that they invariably introduced Hearth ones.

Partisanship of bill sponsor and the bill's family ideology are once again statistically correlated in the Contemporary Era. However, in this period in contrast to the Progressive era, the *sign* of the correlation coefficient is now *reversed* and the two are no longer positively but *negatively correlated*. In other words, an *increase* in partisan affiliation towards the Republican Party is likely to result in a *decrease* of family ideology of the bill introduced towards a Soul ideology. Republican Party affiliation and Soul family bills are thus now statistically related, as are Democratic affiliation and Hearth bills. The reversal in the direction of correlation supports the claim that Republicans in the Progressive Era advocated a more Hearth family ideology, while they now cohesively embrace a Soul one – and Democrats, who were more likely to be Soul in their family ideology in the early period, are now much more strongly Hearth.

This is further borne out when we examine the data on bill sponsorship in the congresses of the three eras. By and large it may be observed (Table 1.11, below) that Republican members

of Congress introduced many more family bills than Democrats for all of the Progressive congresses, except the 63rd (1913-1914) during which both introduced an equal number of family bills. When divided by family ideology, Democrats introduced a higher proportion of Soul family bills than Republicans. 57.4% of Soul family bills introduced during this period were introduced by Democratic members and 69.7% of Hearth family bills were introduced by Republicans.¹³⁶

In the postwar era, the party affiliation of introducing member and ideology of the bill was *not* significantly related for any of the five Congresses investigated over the 10-year period (Table 1.12, below).

Table 1.11: Democratic and Republican Sponsorship of Family Bills in Congress, Progressive Era, 1899-1920

Congress	Chi-Square, Exact Sig. *p≤0.10,**p≤ 0.05	Ideology of Family Bills			
			Soul	Hearth	Total
56th (1899-00)	.208	Democratic	1	4	5
		Republican	0	19	19
57th (1901-02)	1.000	Democratic	0	6	6
		Republican	1	16	17
58th (1903-04)	1.000	Democratic	1	4	5
		Republican	2	14	16
59th (1905-06)	.053*	Democratic	2	6	8
		Republican	0	25	25
60th (1907-08)	.009**	Democratic	3	15	18
		Republican	0	65	65
61st (1909-10)	.035**	Democratic	9	5	14
		Republican	18	38	56
62 nd (1911-12)	.090*	Democratic	7	15	22
		Republican	3	24	27
63rd (1913-14)	1.000	Democratic	5	27	32
		Republican	5	27	32
64th (1915-16)	.011**	Democratic	5	22	27
		Republican	0	37	37
65th (1917-18)	.194	Democratic	4	24	28
		Republican	1	28	29
66 th (1919-20)	.018**	Democratic	5	13	18
		Republican	1	31	32

This is consistent with the finding of an absence of any significance in the overall relationship between partisanship and bill family ideology for the entire period (Table 1.11, p. 76).

¹³⁶ Chi-Square tests of independence/ correlation as well as z-tests of column proportions at the .01 and .05 levels identify the 60th (1907-08), 61st (1909-10), 64th (1915-16) and 66th (1919-1920) Congresses as the four Congresses in this period when partisan affiliation of the bill sponsor and ideology of family were significantly correlated with each other. Thus the mid-Progressive era, the height of the white slave and child labor debates, and the late Progressive period, prior to and leading up to the 19th Amendment and women's suffrage, had the most significant relationships between partisan affiliation and bill family ideology.

Table 1.12: Democratic and Republican Sponsorship of Family Bills in Congress, Postwar Era, 1945-1954

Congress	Chi-Square, Exact Sig. (2-Sided)	Party of Sponsor	Ideology of Family Bills	
			Soul	Hearth
79 th (1945-46)		Democratic	0	55
		Republican	0	23
80 th (1947-48)	.541	Democratic	0	37
		Republican	2	67
81 st (1949-50)	.570	Democratic	2	74
		Republican	2	24
82 nd (1951-52)	1.000	Democratic	1	46
		Republican	1	18
83 rd (1953-54)	.703	Democratic	3	53
		Republican	4	45

Table 1.13: Democratic and Republican Sponsorship of Family Bills in Congress, Contemporary Era, 1989-2004

Congress	Chi-Square, Exact Sig., (2-tailed)	Party of Sponsor	Ideology of Family Bill	
			Soul	Hearth
101 st (1989-90)	.001**	Democratic	2	47
		Republican	13	32
102 nd (1991-92)	.000**	Democratic	2	52
		Republican	12	21
103 rd (1993-94)	.001**	Democratic	3	41
		Republican	12	17
104 th (1995-96)	.000**	Democratic	9	32
		Republican	43	8
105 th (1997-98)	.000**	Democratic	17	54
		Republican	68	22
106 th (1999-00)	.000**	Democratic	20	60
		Republican	63	36
107 th (2001-02)	.000**	Democratic	15	81
		Republican	60	29
108 th (2003-04)	.000**	Democratic	9	55
		Republican	47	27

In contemporary Congresses, Republican members disproportionately introduced Soul bills over Hearth ones, and Democrats introduced Hearth bills. Republicans introduced a vast majority of

Soul bills (80.5%) and Democrats introduced more Hearth ones (68.7%). Further, testing the partisan affiliation of introducing member and the ideology of bill were statistically significant at the highest (.01) level for all of the 8 Congresses of the period – from the 101st to the 108th Congress (Table 1.13). Partisanship and the bill’s family ideology are therefore strongly correlated in recent Congresses.

Bill *cosponsorship* data further illuminates the strength of partisanship and family ideology in contemporary legislative activity. Controlling for the size of Republican and Democratic delegations in the House and Senate for each congress, I computed the percentage of both parties’ delegations cosponsoring bills. Of the 1009 family bills examined, 723 were cosponsored. On an average, a Soul family bill attracted 17.1% of the congressional Republican delegation but only 3.29% of the Democratic delegation (see last rows of Table 1.14). In contrast, on average, a Hearth family bill introduced in the 101st to 108th congresses was cosponsored by 12.8% of the congressional Democratic delegation and 4.3% of the Republican.

By running t-tests of column means for 2 pairs of variables, per Congress: (i) ‘percentage of Republicans cosponsoring’ and ‘ideology of family bills’ cosponsored, and a second pair: (ii) ‘percentage of Democratic cosponsoring’ and ‘ideology of family bills’ – I test the significance of the relationship between partisan affiliation of cosponsors and ideology of cosponsored family bills for each of the eight Congresses. Table 1.14 reveals that the relationship between size (percentage) of Democrats cosponsoring a bill and the ideology of the bill was statistically significant (at the .05 level) for Democratic delegations for last four Congresses: the 105th (1997-98), 106th (1999-2000), 107th (2001-02), and 108th (2003-04). For Republican congressional

delegations, cosponsorship percentage and bill family ideology bore a statistically significant relationship (at the .05 level) starting from the 104th Congress (1995-96).

Table 1.14: Percentage of Democratic and Republican Delegations Cosponsoring Family Bills in Congress, 1989-2004

			Ideology of Family Bills	
			Soul	Hearth
Congress 101st (1989-90)	Mean Percentage of Republicans Cosponsoring		15.75	7.95
	Mean Percentage of Democrats cosponsoring		2.55	9.97
	N (Bills)		(9)	(57)
102nd (1991-92)	Republican		6.86	7.21
	Democratic		.91	15.83*
			(10)	(47)
103rd (1993-94)	Republican		14.36	6.49
	Democratic		5.90	10.59
			(12)	(42)
104th (1995-96)	Republican		21.15**	1.48
	Democratic		4.58	8.85
			(37)	(20)
105th (1997-98)	Republican		14.03**	2.35
	Democratic		2.51	11.30**
			(63)	(50)
106th (1999-00)	Republican		16.42**	3.73
	Democratic		3.75	12.66**
			(54)	(69)
107th (2001-02)	Republican		16.29**	2.79
	Democratic		3.39	13.71**
			(52)	(90)
108th (2003-04)	Republican		23.11**	2.75
	Democratic		2.64	11.56**
			(45)	(66)
Total (101st-108th)	Republican		17.10	4.31
	Democratic		3.29	12.18
			(282)	(441)


*p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01.

Thus bill cosponsorship data further substantiates the finding that the 104th congress was decisive to the relationship between partisanship and family ideology in legislative activity. Republican victory in the election of 1994 was followed by a dramatic overall increase in the proportion of Soul family bills introduced in Congress; this coincided with the sharp rise in the percentage of the Republican delegation that now cosponsors Soul bills, and also temporally corresponds with the recent *significant* relation between bill family ideology and cosponsorship proportion among Republicans. Table 1.14 also suggests that the trend of significant connection between cosponsorship proportion and a bill's family ideology is also evident in recent Democratic cosponsorship behavior – while the relationship between cosponsorship percentage and bill's family ideology was *not* significant for Democrats in the 104th congress, since then – starting from the 105th congress – this relationship has now become statistically significant. Legislative behavior on the family is thus now strongly correlated with family ideology for both parties.

In closing, we find that there have been three historical periods of partisan ideological development on the family. Bill sponsorship and party platform data both suggest Republican sponsorship of Hearth family ideology dominated the Progressive Era, to be followed by a midcentury period in which the Hearth ideology was dominant, the Soul ideology now being aligned with the Republican party and the Hearth with Democratic, although the division between Hearth and Soul did not have a clear party line; however, in the contemporary period the Republican Party has championed the Soul ideology as never before. The period since the 104th Congress has been especially significant because of the strong partisan character evidenced in the introduction and cosponsorship of Hearth and Soul family bills: sponsorship and cosponsorship of Hearth bills are now much more strongly correlated with Democratic members

of Congress, while bills espousing the Soul family conception are more correlated with Republicans. The polarization in family ideology, as evidenced in bill sponsor/cosponsorship data as well as party platforms is thus both a recent phenomenon as well as one reminiscent of an earlier (albeit more muted) period at the start of the 20th century; while the midcentury period was less partisan. The figures below encapsulate these partisan developments cumulatively for the three periods.

Figure 1.8: Democratic and Republican Sponsorship of Family Bills by Ideology, across Progressive, Postwar, and Contemporary Congresses



Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter of aggregate platform and bill sponsorship data reveals both endurances and shifts in the Parties' policy conceptions of the family. In accordance with the literature on polarization, partisan ideological divergence over the family occurred both in the current and Progressive eras. Further, also supporting the polarization literature, the Parties are found to have been the least polarized in their (family) ideologies during the postwar period, in the aftermath of the New Deal. Despite these expected chronological patterns, the data in this chapter also points to an aspect of party ideological polarization that has been hitherto missed. By finding the endurance of both, Hearth and Soul understandings of the family across the 20th century, it suggests that economics and culture have been durable and coexistent dimensions of party competition. By tracing the two conceptions of the family underpinning the parties' policy positions, we find that far from being separate, independent dimensions, the two Parties have borrowed, and absorbed, each other's economic and cultural concepts and adapted them to fit their own overarching ideologies. For example, following the New Deal and the Democratic espousal of income as primary classification of family policies, the Republican traditional family ideology similarly used income to bifurcate its policy agenda. For low-income families, Republican platforms stressed family self-reliance and autonomy and thus called for scaled-back social programs, and for middle and upper-income families they followed the dominant Democratic Hearth position, albeit more equivocally, in advocating public assistance.

Similarly, the Democratic Hearth family ideal has undergone a substantial revision in the Contemporary Era. With the explosion of Republican-led Soul family ideology, the Democratic Party has modified its family-need principle, in which state intervention is necessitated by family need; instead, Democrats – not unlike Republican Soul advocates – have

now included ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘work’ as qualifying criteria for family need. Both parties have thus borrowed from each other’s conceptualizations over time, while maintaining the basic integrity and coherence of the Hearth and Soul family conceptions.

In addition, the data reveal other interesting empirical findings that provide a more accurate picture of the parties’ treatment of the family than is conventionally assumed. Firstly, despite the current spotlight on traditional family values, the Hearth ideal focused on family’s economic conditions has been the more dominant family conception across the 20th century. Both parties have devoted more paragraphs and sponsored more bills based on progressive, Hearth concerns such as family material need than on Soul ones, such as family self-reliance and parental autonomy. Second, also contrary to current perception, the Democratic Party, and not the Republican, has devoted larger proportions of its platforms to the family in their policy pledges.

Like the better known partisan realignment on race and women’s rights, we also find patterns of partisan reversal on the issue of the family. In the first decade of the Progressive Era, the Republican Party evidenced a progressive, Hearth family ideology, while the Democratic Party put forth a traditional, Soul one; these conceptions are now switched with the Democrats advocating a material need-based Hearth family understanding and the Republicans championing family values, parental rights, and family self-regulation. Content analysis of platform data points to the mid-century, starting with the New Deal, as first marking this reversal. However, unlike the literature documenting the parties’ reversal on race and women rights, in which parties’ positions are presented as ‘either/or’ i.e. as either ‘for’ or ‘against,’ the chapter has assembled the substance and content of partisan (family) ideologies; such that even Hearth and

Soul family ideologies while sustaining common core principles are nevertheless shown to have evinced substantive change over time.

Finally we find distinctions in the conceptualization of the family among factions within the two parties. For example, in the contemporary period, the Republican Party may be seen to alternate between two variants which I have categorized as Libertarian and Moralistic variants of Soul family ideology, stressing family autonomy and family moral function respectively. In contrast, the Democratic Party has espoused an expansive Egalitarian and a more narrow Inclusionary conception of the family, the former focusing on need-based equality for all families, despite other differences; and the latter emphasizing the importance of ‘inclusion’ of all families, especially same-sex families, as a distinct policy ideal.

In sum, the assembly of the ebb and flow of the partisan Hearth and Soul conceptions of family through the 20th century presents a more complex or ‘layered’ picture of American politics than is usually portrayed. In the following chapters we find that one set of interests, ideas and institutions have been in tension with a competing set; and, as we see here, one dominates in one period, informing and altering the other, while the reverse occurs in another period when the second family ideological framework ascends and dominates the first. Further, ideas, interests and institutions from past epochs are found layered alongside ‘new’ and recent ones within each of the two frameworks. This suggests that political order and change are mutually constitutive and exist in organic relation to each other. The following chapters will explore some of the reasons, why and how, this has occurred in terms of the parties’ treatment of the family in the Progressive, Postwar, and Contemporary eras.

CHAPTER II

THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Introduction

The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a profound upheaval in family life across all segments in American society. The home was no longer central to the family household economy; instead several members of working-class families were employed outside their homes, in various factories, canneries and textile mills of the Industrial North and Cotton South. Burgeoning labor markets as well as the transitory fortunes of many establishments resulted in the low and sporadic wages of working-class fathers, insufficient for the survival of his family. The mother therefore supplemented the family income either by home work (such as piecework, taking in laundry, boarders etc.) or increasingly through her own wage-labor outside the home, working as a domestic and charwoman in private homes, office buildings, railroad cars, or by working in laundries, garment, textile, or cigar factories.¹ Children often worked too - boys as messengers, newsboys or factory hands and girls in department stores and textile factories.

Dangerous and harsh industrial conditions took a toll on the physical health of the laboring class, leading to high incidences of industrial-related accidents and injuries, and rising mortality and disability at younger ages than before. Further, crowded living and unsanitary urban conditions, all meant that most working-class families could expect to lose at least a few members to disease or debilitation, further endangering the family's precarious economic condition.²

¹ Carl N. Degler (1980) At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present (Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press) pp. 376-377.

² Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg (1988) Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life (New York: The Free Press) pp. 84-85, 89-90; Susan Householder Van Horn (1988) Women, Work, and Fertility, 1900-

Middle and upper-class family life also underwent transformation. Women increasingly moved out of Victorian home life, received higher education in growing numbers, and began challenging gender expectations by joining social clubs, engaging in voluntary and/or professional work, and becoming more politically active.³ Children were no longer treated as young adults, instead through movements for compulsory schools, playground creation, and child labor regulation, childhood was beginning to be valued as a time of innocence, play, and leisure, a phase of life separate from the demands of adulthood. Coupled with increasing monetary opportunities for upper classes in a prosperous country, the gendered demarcation of separate-spheres separated the father (physically and figuratively) from the home and family. Aided by technological advancements in transportation, the father often traveled great distances to work and spent many more hours outside of the home. He was associated more with his breadwinning function and the task of childrearing was relegated more fully to the sphere of the mother.⁴ A family wage could be actualized only in the case of more affluent families, while among the working-class there was no single breadwinner and survival required the employment of numerous family members.

The above changes in family life for families of upper, middle, and working-classes were accompanied by alterations in the form, ideals and expectations assigned to families. For families of the upper classes (affluent and middle), gendered separate-sphere ideology, continuing from the 19th century, had led to the recognition of the superior moral role and agency of mothers and

1986 (New York, London: New York University Press) pp. 21-22, 24-25; Robyn Muncy (1991) Creating a Female Dominion In American Reform, 1890 -1935 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 4-5.

³ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions" pp. 110-111, Van Horn (1988) "Women, Work and Fertility" pp. 10-11.

⁴ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions" pp.117-118, 120-121; Van Horn (1988) "Women, Work and Fertility" pp. 11-12.

wives in child-rearing.⁵ The separation of work from home glorified private family life as a ‘refuge;’ family was considered separate from the demands of the more public spheres of work, as well as separate from extended kinship networks. During this period, the responsibilities of middle-class families in the education, health, and care of aged, poor, and mentally ill family members were increasingly assumed by specialists and public institutions outside of the family. Instead the family was now assigned the primary responsibility of fulfilling the emotional and psychological needs of its immediate members.⁶ This ideal of family began to be referred to as the ‘companionate family’, originating in the Progressive era and extending to our own contemporary time.⁷

The companionate family was nuclear in form and emerged from the more hierarchical, extended family structure of the Victorian era; in contrast to earlier familial responsibilities, the modern companionate family was now expected to provide romance, sexual fulfillment, companionship, and emotional satisfaction in addition to economic security.⁸ By the end of the Progressive Era, the middle-class family had thus shifted from a cooperative family economy whose primary function was economic security and wealth/skills reproduction, to the (isolated) modern nuclear family built on ideals of companionship and emotional fulfillment of family members.

⁵ Degler (1980) “At Odds” pp. 73-74; Indeed in the Progressive Era the moral superiority of women, cultivated in the domestic sphere, was seen to equip them with the unique ability to apply their domestic skills beyond that sphere and to engage outside of the home in the public tasks of ‘civic housekeeping.’ [Gwendolyn Mink (1995) Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) p. 11].

⁶ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” pp.107-108.

⁷ ‘Companionate’ was initially used to describe a marriage ideal (‘companionate marriage’), but is now extended to the affective family ideal that is circumscribed by such a marriage [See: Ibid., p. xvi, 107-131; Degler (1980) “At Odds” p. 196;]. The term ‘companionate marriage’ first came to public attention in the influential 1925 book, Revolt of Modern Youth by progressive Denver Juvenile Court Judge, Ben B. Lindsay and Wainwright Evans cited in Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. 115.

⁸ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p.108.

However, working-class families – particularly ethnic and immigrant urban families – continued to rely on extended kinship networks for their economic and social survival. ‘The marginal economic situation of urban working-class families was often a source of conflict and insecurity, but it also produced a strong sense of cohesiveness and family loyalty. [Here] each family member was (still) expected to subordinate his or her personal ambitions and contribute to the family’s support. Familial values, not individualistic values, [thus continued to lie] at the heart of working-class family life.’⁹

Widespread structural and economic changes were thus accompanied by alterations in family behavior, ideologies, and values amongst almost all types of families; however change assumed various forms depending on the class, ethnic, and occupational composition of the family. Furthermore family practices such as sexual behavior (use of contraception, sexual activity etc.), child-rearing practices, and gendered division of labor all underwent substantial change such that at the start of the twentieth century ‘newspapers and magazines brimmed with speculation about the crisis of marriage and family.’¹⁰ Four developments in family life during the Progressive period are noted to have caused the greatest alarm: (i) the rising divorce rate, (ii) falling birthrate among the ‘better sort of people’, (iii) the changing position of women, and (iv) a so-called revolution in morals.¹¹ These social trends occurred disparately across families.

Policymakers from both political parties were not impervious to these family changes and addressed them in numerous policies. However, they were divided in their beliefs regarding the appropriate relationship between government and family and these differences informed their varied policy preferences. As discussed in the previous chapter, two sets of distinct family ideologies ran through party platforms across the 20th century, the Hearth and the Soul. In brief,

⁹ *Ibid* p.94.

¹⁰ Christopher Lasch (1977) *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged*, (New York: Basic Books) p. 8.

¹¹ *Ibid*; Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “*Domestic Revolutions*” pp. 108-113.

Hearth advocates proposed active government intervention into the family, while Soul proponents privileged self-regulation and separateness of family from government.¹² In this chapter, I supplement overarching partisan statements in platforms with more detailed data from the legislative level to investigate how members of Congress with these divergent ideologies addressed the family changes in the Progressive Era through policy; thus investigating the partisan presence of these two ideational systems during this time.

My first-set of objectives are three-fold: (a) to inductively assemble the ideational principles of the two ideologies as found in the Progressive Era; (b) to determine their partisan affiliation; and (c) to identify the specific types of policies, if any, that were associated with each of the two ideological approaches during that period. Secondly, I hope to investigate the relationship between constituents and party preferences by examining the significance of demographic family patterns in this era to the family ideology espoused by members from the two parties.

I suggest that the family ideation of Hearth proponents in the early 20th century generated two sets of beliefs that have had a lasting effect on family policy: (a) faith in the power of scientism, professionalism and expert knowledge (over family local knowledge)¹³ to address family issues, and (b) a companionate family ideal guiding social policy, focused on the well-being of individuals within the family as opposed to a composite family ideal. Child welfare and rescue was pivotal to Hearth family ideation during this period. Hearth progressives considered

¹² For summary of two frameworks, see Figure 1.4 on page 39..

¹³ The term ‘local knowledge’ is used to extend to individualized, subjective knowledge acquired by individual families through their own unique, personal experiences; ‘localized’ in so far as families within small geographical areas are assumed to have a greater similarity of experience and hence common systems of familial knowledge. In so doing, I am drawing on James C. Scott’s exemplary work that conceptualizes the term ‘metis,’ defined as forms of knowledge embedded in local, practical experience, and distinguished from ‘the more general, abstract (professional) knowledge deployed by the state’ [James C Scott (1998) Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press) p. 311-316].

government intervention the appropriate means to efficiently protect marginal family populations, dependent children and women, in order to ‘help families adapt to modern conditions.’¹⁴ By expanding the reach of the public sphere into the private, Hearsh advocates hoped to remold ‘defective,’ ignorant, or simply outdated family practices, in the interests of building a modern society and nation.¹⁵

I demonstrate how Hearsh family ideology engendered two types of policies in this era. Firstly, numerous *social welfare* programs were designed to apply the methods of science to familial problems caused by economic and structural change. These included: programs of instruction in the new sciences of parenting and home economics; provisions for the medicalization of childbirth, prenatal nutrition and maternity care; and urban planning programs for more healthful living in tenements, playgrounds, recreational areas.¹⁶ Hearsh welfare policy engendered the principle of government as (necessary) ‘surrogate breadwinner’ in cases of needy

¹⁴ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. 119; fundamental to progressive reform during this era was the belief in efficient government and scientific principles to solve societal ills and political corruption [See: Stephen Skowronek (1991) Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 12]; for a classic and sophisticated account of the Progressive Era as a epoch search for organizing principles of social order amidst widespread economic, sociological, and technological, change See Robert H. Wiebe (1967) The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang).

¹⁵ Some have argued that the increasing encroachment of the public sphere into the private marked the start of the ‘besiegement’ of the family and the demise of its separate, autonomous sphere of influence (Lasch (1977) “Haven in a Heartless World”); the distinction between public and private since being rendered meaningless. A more conventional account posits that the increasing assumption of family responsibilities by outside public agencies during this period merely renegotiated the content of public and private responsibilities. The private, modern family’s responsibilities/functions were now limited to the ‘socialization of children and the provision of emotional support and affection’ (Mintz & Kellogg, (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. xv) and economic security, education, health, care of elderly, mentally disabled etc became more and more an external, public matter assumed by professionals and in some cases by the government. In this account I support the latter interpretation.

¹⁶ As late as the 1890s there prevailed the assumption that children would inevitably grow into responsible adults if they had a mother as a proper model to emulate, the emphasis then being on the child’s moral character and maternal example as a means to instill values of honesty, orderliness, industriousness, self-discipline and courtesy. In contrast by the turn of the century, inspired by the growth of child psychology as a an academic discipline, the emphasis on character development was being replaced by the new ideal of ‘scientific mothering’ which rejected the notion of the child as a passive recipient of maternal example and instead posited the child as an active entity with his/her own special needs, requiring special nurture and a stimulating environment. Thus modern methods of child rearing required the replacement of thoughtless, individuated (perhaps, haphazard) methods of child rearing with more of a systematic and scientific approach to child care. [Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. 121].

and dependent families and expert ‘partner’ to mothers for efficient child care and housekeeping.¹⁷

The chapter finds a second type of Hearst policies, more moralistic in tone, seeking to protect society against family failures and curtail ‘defective’ reproduction. These were *regulatory* policies, devised by Hearst legislators toward the ends of punishing family desertion and abandonment, compelling family support, sequestering undesirable populations such as the feeble-minded and extending institutional control over others such as juvenile delinquents, homeless, and neglected children.¹⁸

Hearst family ideation further underpinned policy preferences of legislators in Congress in a third way. The faith in scientific method entailed a belief in the standardization of family and other social practices, this was often proffered as the rationale for the creation of federal bureaucracies, such as the Children’s and Women’s Bureaus, to collect, coordinate and disseminate information on various aspects of families from across numerous states. The value of uniformity and standard family practices also impelled recurrent movements among members of Congress for constitutional amendments, such as those granting Congress the power to enact uniform marriage and divorce laws across the states.

However, the chapter also demonstrates that not all policymakers shared this Hearst family ideology, its implicit faith in the curative power of government intervention, or in scientific method and standardized family practices. Instead many members of Congress, particularly from the South, were alarmed at the growing encroachment of the central government into the lives of local families. These anti-progressives embraced a Soul ideology,

¹⁷ *Ibid* p. 130: ‘[In the Progressive era] the state had begun to acknowledge its obligation to care for disadvantages children and in doing so had become a partner in the raising of America’s children and the stabilizing of its families.’ See also: Steven Schlossman (1977) Love and the American Delinquent: The Theory and Practice of “Progressive” Juvenile Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

¹⁸ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. 126-129.

emphasizing the innate capacity of families to successfully adapt to changing circumstances; they cherished family self-regulation, local knowledge, community practices, and familial agency over central planning and expansion of the public sphere into the private. In essence, during this period Soul advocates varied from Hearth ones in their conception of the following aspects of family and state: (a) the appropriate role of government in family, they sought rigid boundaries between the domestic and public spheres and (b) in their conception of family as a hierarchical, paternalistic structure that was self-regulating and capable of independent adaptation to modern economic conditions.

Soul family ideation was not laissez-faire-ist inasmuch as it did not view *all* government intervention into the family as undesirable. Soul traditionalists widely accepted (individual state) government intervention in the form of policies *protecting* the traditional home and the patriarchal structure of the family. Unlike Hearth proponents who espoused a companionate ideal of family with contractual/consensual and mutually-satisfying domestic relations, Soul traditionalists were more concerned with maintaining the structural edifice of the family, as a unit, and with preserving the traditional place of the home within the political economy; this entailed a strict interpretation of rigid boundaries between men and women, whites and non-whites, and other ascriptive stratifications.

Much of the Soul wariness of government intervention and their preoccupation with the maintenance of the traditional private domain of domesticity, as we shall see in the following sections, was a Southern phenomenon; the outgrowth of the peculiar interaction between race, sexuality, and gender in nineteenth-century Southern slave society.¹⁹ Like Hearth adherents,

¹⁹ Peter Bardaglio (1995) Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century South (Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press). Bardaglio describes the distinctiveness of the southern organic ideal of family (or 'household') from the Northern, contractually-based view of domestic relations, tracing its roots to slavery and private and political significance of patriarchal authority within the southern family-

those who espoused the Soul ideology were concerned with disruptions to families in the Progressive Era, caused by large-scale economic and structural changes; however, they viewed this change in very different terms.

Soul members of Congress were more likely to be concerned with changes in the sexuality and reproductive practices of the family. The preservation of reproductive practices within the family and of traditional family structures was inexorably linked to race and the maintenance of the racial (homogenous) structure of families. As we shall see in the remarks of members recorded in the Congressional Record and in hearings transcripts, the Soul preoccupation with marriage, race and reproductive practices were evident in their preferences for various policies pertaining to miscegenation, immigration, white sexual traffic, rising divorce rates, and increasing incidences of illegitimate births. In these and other policies, Soul adherents stated their policy preferences in terms of controlling reproduction between members of different races and protecting the integrity of white families from inter-mixing. The chapter therefore identifies a third set of policies, *ascriptive* policies i.e. policies targeting ascriptive identities in families (such as gender, race etc.) as a type of family policy observable during this era and chiefly attributable to Soul traditionalists in Congress.

Through content analysis of debates in Congress on women suffrage, the chapter also demonstrates that the Soul preoccupation with maintaining the (white) family structure also entailed a commitment to gendered hierarchies in the family. While Hearst progressives were moving towards the more egalitarian model of the companionate family, Soul policymakers

owning family: "...the sexual access of slaveholders to their wives and bondswomen provided the undergirding of patriarchy as a system that shaped both race and gender relations... important as the household was as a private institution in the Victorian South, it was even more important as a political institution in the broadest sense: it not only constituted the chief vehicle for the exercise of power in southern society but also served as the foundation of southern public beliefs and values. A distinctive variation of republicanism developed in the household of the Old South, one based more on hierarchy and dependence than on egalitarianism and consent'. (p. xi). Thus the patriarchal, organic family was the edifice on which the very system of southern slave society rested; the significance of that ideal outliving the institution of slavery itself.

supported policies preserving the traditional role of women as *subordinate* to the male (father/husband) household member. As we shall see, the Soul belief in women's subordinate status in the family was evident in their positions on various policies such as women's suffrage, anti-prohibition (upholding men's prerogative to drink) and domestic violence; it also led them to espouse a fourth set of policies termed *autonomy policies* that opposed the creation of government institutions such as federal agencies. These were perceived as destructive of the traditional domestic sphere and women's roles within it. Autonomy policy positions were those whose common objective was to limit government intervention into the family and maintain family self-regulation. Like ascriptive policies, autonomy-based policies championed the local family over the standardized, central government; both policy types relied on Soul family ideologies to mount their attacks on Hearth policies.

Finally, the last section of this chapter links each of the two sets of political family ideologies – Hearth and Soul – to distinct regional family demographic conditions. It suggests that the interests and positions of political parties on family policies were derived from the regional bases of their constituents, their ideas of family reflecting the demographic family conditions and social trends of the regions they represented. Thus Democratic members from the South were more likely to support a Soul family ideology; and Republican members from the Midwest and North were more likely to support a Hearth family ideology. Thus a foundational claim through the chapter (and the dissertation) is that partisan family ideologies develop from the family demographic conditions and accompanying family values of their constituents; also, that parties support those types of policies that reflect the family values/conditions of their constituent bases and oppose those that are either extraneous or oppositional to them. Changes in partisan preference of family policy do not occur in isolation of demographic family conditions.

Instead, society- centered forces and social trends are at least as important as state-centered ones, when explaining the development of partisan family ideology and family policy positions in the Progressive Era.

Hearth and Soul family ideologies may thus be examined as part of encompassing *family political orders* or approaches to social policy; defined as ‘constellations of ideas, policies, institutions, and practices regarding the family that hang together, exhibiting a coherence and predictability’²⁰ and analogous to constitutional orders, party regimes, etc. The chapter investigates the characteristics, causes and conditions of the two family systems in the Progressive Era. It is divided into four sections, corresponding to its four components (a) the underlying *ideas* or conceptions of family; (b) the types of *policies* used to address the family; (c) the partisan (regional) *interests* underpinning each order’s family conceptions and preferred policies; and (d) the demographic conditions under which the ideas, policies, and interests of the two family orders came together in the Progressive Era.

§ 1 Ideas of Family

§1(a) – Method and Introduction –

Through systematic analysis of two primary sources, congressional debates and committee hearings, this section assembles the ideational principles underpinning the Hearth and Soul family systems (or orders) in the Progressive Era. Firstly, by searching through annual Congressional Record Indexes I obtained relevant debates, documents, and extended remarks by members of Congress for all sessions of the 56th through the 66th Congress (1900-1920). The

²⁰ Adapted from definition of ‘political order’ taken from Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (2004) Search for American Political Development (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press) pp.14-15.

keywords used to find these entries were the same as those used in the previous chapter when selecting family bills and cosponsorship data; the search terms thus matched the language used in contemporaneous party platforms. As Congressional Record index entries for this early period were not digitized at the time of research, both search and examination were conducted manually.

Secondly, I relied on transcripts of congressional hearings. Published committee hearings since 1817 are digitally indexed (and searchable) in the Congressional Universe database. Using a set of keywords comparable to those used in selecting relevant debates, referring to family and domestic relations,²¹ I obtained the titles of 206 family-related hearings from 1900-1920; whose original (microfiche) copies were then extensively examined. In the Progressive Era, hearings were conducted differently from the contemporary period. In some hearings, members of Congress themselves took an active part in inviting witnesses to present testimony; although this practice is now common, such instances were rare in that period. More often, unaffiliated social and civil reform groups (such as the Anti Saloon League, Women's Christian Temperance Union, pro and anti suffrage groups, the International Reform Bureau etc.) petitioned to present their position to the committee, typically for the purpose of advancing or challenging a pending legislative bill.²² When committees allowed such groups to testify, members of the committee

²¹ I used the GPO (OCLC FirstSearch) and Lexis Congressional Universe databases to generate a list of all committee and subcommittee hearings for the years 1910-1920 that contained the search words - Family" OR "Families" OR "Wife" OR "Husband" OR "Wives" OR "Housewives" OR "Infant" OR "Child" OR "Children" OR "Orphan" OR "Widow" OR "Parent" OR "Maternity" OR "Maternal" OR "Father" OR "Mother" OR "Marriage" OR "Morals" in "All fields except full text" and obtained 151 published and serial set hearings for the 61st to 66th Congress. My objective was to obtain hearings that would address family, and policies related to families, so as to isolate partisan ideological patterns if any.

²² As an excellent example of the use of Congressional Committee Hearings starting in the Progressive Era, and the recurrent impact of interest group lobbies and institutional structures, on policy agendas, see: John Mark Hansen, (1991) *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981* (Chicago: Chicago University Press). Also, for the use of committee hearings to study the significance of women's lobby groups on policy through the 20th century, see: Kristin Goss, "The Language of Citizenship: From Responsibility to Rights in Women's Policy Claims" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug 30, 2007 (paper accessed with permission of author).

actively interrogated sets of witnesses for and against the pending legislation. Each member had his own beliefs and interests, which would often be expressed explicitly in his statements during the course of his interrogation and in response to witness testimony.

In the course of hearings, witnesses would frequently recount anecdotes describing the situation and circumstances of actual families. At other times, members of Congress (MCs) themselves would narrate personal stories about their own families or the families with which they had come in contact.²³ Thus actual, real-life families appear in the pages of hearings transcripts, either as personal anecdotes told by witnesses and MCs or else as second-hand reports. In both instances, members of Congress would address these family narratives to highlight or further investigate a conception of family and a family issue of significance to public policy. Stories of actual families are an invaluable window, an immediate, firsthand account of the types of family conceptions and policy preferences of members of Congress. These form the primary research source for the current and following chapters of this dissertation.

I have compiled a dataset of 421 such references/remarks by members of Congress to *anecdotes of real families* described in testimony at these hearings (viz. 145 hearings on diverse bills affecting the family, 61st to 66th Congress). Each interaction of a member of Congress with the family narrative by way of questions or comments, in which he/she raises a policy issue, is coded as one event and is one case in the dataset. Each event provides a window through which MCs express their ideas and beliefs regarding families and the types of policy issues involving the family that are of interest to them. I code these events for characteristics of the family addressed by MCs, the party, and region of the MC, as well the policy issues addressed by him/her. In this way I am able to connect specific MCs (coded as ‘active member’ i.e. ‘active’ in

²³ On the relevance of stories in the formulation of policy ideas and actions, see: Deborah Stone (1997) Policy Paradox: the Art of Political Decision Making (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Co.), 138-145; described more fully in note 12, page 7.

relation to the family narrative) to specific ideas of family, as well as types of family policy issues, illustrated in their remarks during hearings on real life family cases. In some aspects proponents of both ideologies overlapped and exhibited some shared beliefs. However, the overarching internal coherence of each set of ideological principles suggests that the two ideational systems were distinct during this period.

Previous scholarship on '*Gender in American Party Politics*' has suggested that partisan ideological divisions over the family can be traced, at least, as far back as the 19th century. Historians have demonstrated that 'deeply held beliefs about the nature of family and state' lay at the root of the Republican and Democratic agenda during the volatile partisan climate of the nineteenth-century: 'Over and over, Americans argued that the fundamental unit of society was the family; government's first duty was to preserve proper relations within the home. Exactly what this meant was a fiercely disputed question.'²⁴ Variation in family ideologies was also apparent in the early decades of the twentieth century, at which time ideological partisans clashed over the content of specific policies devised to address family conditions.

In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt invited over 200 experts in social and child welfare to participate in the first-ever White House Conference, held from January 25-26th in Washington D.C. Entitled, 'Conference on the Care of Dependent Children,' the gathering was attended by luminaries of social progressivism²⁵ from across the nation, representing the various

²⁴ Rebecca Edwards (1997) *Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American Party Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.4; on Northern v. Southern ideals of households, families, and domestic relations in the nineteenth-century, see: Bardaglio (1995) "*Reconstructing the Household*" p. 82, 84, 117-119.

²⁵ Social progressivism' refers to social movements and ideologies in the Progressive era 'that worked not primarily for structural reforms in civil service and the parties but mainly for new public measures to improve working conditions, to help families and children, and to ensure better products, services, and environmental conditions for consumers.' Theda Skocpol (1995) *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) p. 265; as a source of this definition of 'social

institutions and professions involved in social welfare: Boards of Charities, private philanthropy, settlement houses, religious associations, as well as academia (sociologists, psychologists, criminologists etc.)²⁶ The President summarized the conference keynote in the following way: “Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization. Children should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling reasons.”²⁷ The conference was a signature event, marking the growing recognition of the importance of the ‘home’ to state- and national-level public policy; it also reflected the Hearst commitment to scientific inquiry and to finding centralized, expert-driven solutions to social problems.

The case of one family recounted by noted social reformer, Judge Ben Lindsey,²⁸ elaborated family problems and the policy solutions that attracted Hearst progressives during this period:

The child is born ...with the Divine heritage of a natural father’s firm and guiding hand and a natural mother’s love’ and yet we know there are hundreds of thousands bereft of both, through no fault of their own. Let us examine this case from one family: Mother and five children; oldest boy, 11, brought in for delinquency – robbing the box car – the younger children for dependency because of the questionable “boarder” living in the shack down near the railroad tracks. Mother becomes alarmed at threatened proceedings and marries the boarder. The mother loves her children; she threatens suicide lest they be taken away from her. According to her testimony, the father is recently deceased. While in life he really saw little of this (delinquent) boy. He arose not later than 6 o’clock in the morning, worked all day amidst the poisonous fumes and gases of a great industry, returned home by 7 in the evening tired and worn out. Now, perhaps he took to drink because he was miserable, and he may have deserted the mother, as tens of thousands of mothers in this country are deserted every year and forced into the double burden of home maker and breadwinner. He might have died from tuberculosis because of breathing the kind of dust described last week in court to me by a mother...., or his life may have been shortened through weakening

progressivism’ Skocpol cites Irwin Yellowitz (1965) Labor and the Progressive Movement in New York State, 1897-1916 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). In this dissertation, reference to progressivism is used in the context of *social* progressive ideology and not, civil reform ideology. It may be noted that “social justice” or “social welfare” is conventionally mentioned in the literature as one aim of the broader progressive reform agenda alongside civil reform and direct democracy [see: Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (1999) ‘Introduction: Progressivism, Then and Now’ in Sidney M Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (eds) Progressivism and the New Democracy (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press) pp 8-10; also John Whiteclay Chambers II (2000) The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (London, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press) pp. 141-142].

²⁶ For list of invitees and attendees, see Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children held at Washington, D.C., January 25, 26, 1909, S.Doc. 721, 60th Congress (2nd Session) Serial Set, pp. 20-31.

²⁷ Ibid p. 5.

²⁸ Judge Lindsey Juvenile Court Judge, Denver, Colorado, was a pioneer of the juvenile court movement in the United States and a leading proponent for the establishment of the Children’s Bureau [See: D’ann Campbell (1976) ‘Judge Ben Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 1901-1904’ Arizona and the West Vol. 18(1): 5-20].

of the nervous system through the speeding of machines, or his life made worthless through seeking solace from the results in drugs or drink, all causes of broken homes within my experience: but in this particular case the husband was blown up in the slag pile of the great industry. The mother says the railroad company paid her a few hundred dollars on condition that she would sign a paper. That paper she did not understand. But there had been a long struggle for an eight-hour law to protect just such fathers of possible dependent children. It finally emerged a half reality...the man, who was working on the slag pile, it was explained, had been transferred from the pay roll of the great industry to the pay roll of the railroad company. The eight-hour law applied to one and not the other. Now, I want to ask you if the salvation of the dependent child from a home life that is ever going to come merely through putting children in an institution or is in the best of family homes...we may well rejoice to be with those who pick up the appealing child who has been thrown in the path of the juggernaut, but what shall be said of us if we do nothing to cripple or destroy the offending monster?²⁹

As seen in Lindsey's narration of the family, Hearth social reformers assumed children to be entitled to a domestic ideal built on gendered notions of nurturing parenthood. They viewed the harsh socioeconomic conditions accompanying industrialization as impediments to the realization of this ideal in the typical working-class family: long hours and adverse labor conditions were presumed to take a toll on the physical and mental well-being of the male breadwinner, causing him to despair and possibly abuse alcohol/drugs, or desert/abandon his wife and children, or suffer premature death or debilitating injury – all of which they imagined, prevented him from assuming his fatherhood role and responsibilities. Also, they pointed to the widespread ignorance among families, highlighting their potential for exploitation by employers despite legislative protections. Lacking a breadwinner, these families were imagined to quickly succumb to the social problems of dependency and delinquency. Within the Hearth framework during the Progressive era, the role of public policy vis-à-vis families was thus twofold: to combat the larger economic conditions of poverty, deprivation, and industrial scourge facing many families; and to replicate through public policy and programs, the ideal of home life among affected families.

The above vignette thus illustrates broad themes in Hearth conceptions of family policy during this period, regarding the omnipotent quality of public policy to engender the welfare of

²⁹ Address of Judge Ben B. Lindsey, Judge of the Juvenile Court, Denver, Colorado, "Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children," pp. 218-219.

families, by regulating the economic conditions in which they lived; and the assumption that impoverished economic condition was the primary cause of family problems. Soul proponents challenged both the feasibility and normativity of these ideas; they disputed the capacity of public policy and centralized planning to improve individual family welfare and instead highlighted declining family morals as a more immediate cause of family problems. In both cases, divergent ideas regarding family *policy* were founded on competing *family ideals* regarding: (i) ideals of gendered relations within the family, as well as (ii) contrasting ideals of family structure. In this section, I demonstrate how these two contrasting sets of ideals regarding family structure and gendered relations impelled key ideological differences over family policy.

§1(b) - Conceptions of Gender, Conceptions of the Family

Both Hearth and Soul members of Congress shared a belief in gender-based separate spheres. Separate-spheres ideology bi-furcated physical spaces, as well as human qualities, roles, and functions by gender. Women were extolled for their moral qualities, purity, and nurturing abilities, all of which were viewed as suited for the domestic home or private sphere; while men were admired for physical qualities, aggressiveness and firmness, necessary in the public spheres of work and politics.³⁰ However, members of Congress were divided in their ideals of gender and family structure despite sharing the belief in separate spheres.

Separate-spheres ideology linked women to the domestic sphere and associated that sphere with high morality and purity, as opposed to the morally-bereft masculine public sphere

³⁰ Separate sphere literature is vast, some of the more influential works on this are: Barbara Welter (1966) 'The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,' 18 American Quarterly, (Summer 1966): 151-174; Nancy Cott (1977) The Bonds of Womanhood: "Women's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1835 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press); Mary P. Ryan (1983) Womanhood in American: From Colonial Times to the Present (3rd Ed.) (New York: F. Watts).

of politics, in which corruption and vice were rampant. In the case of woman suffrage, those members of Congress in favor of female franchise often drew on separate-spheres ideology to emphasize the curative, purifying potential of giving women the vote. They argued that far from eroding the domestic sphere as claimed by their opponents, woman suffrage would ‘elevat[e] home life’³¹ and lead to the enactment of policies instantiating overlooked domestic concerns.³²

Like all Hearst progressives who believed in active government, suffrage supporters did not view the domestic sphere as isolated from government - instead they recognized an intertwined relationship between government and home, in which laws actively intervened in home life. For instance, in the 56th to 66th Congresses, many Hearst members advocated legislation and the establishment of bureaucratic agencies to ‘preserve’ and ‘foster’ the ‘family entity and [its] dignity.’³³ Table 2.1 below lists the various policy issues raised by Hearst advocates, when they addressed real-life family cases in committee hearings, in which they highlighted the necessity of government programs (coded as ‘unavailable government programs’); note that members espousing Hearst ideologies addressed the unavailability of government programs (in relation to the family) in greater proportion than they applauded (coded as ‘good government program’) or challenged (‘bad government program’) extant programs.

³¹ Senator Chamberlain (D-OR) 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 4, 1914) p.4277

³² See, for example, the list of social legislation enacted in Colorado, cited by Senator Owen to illustrate ‘the immediate and prompt response to the feminine sentiment in passing laws more favorable to the protection of child life’ ‘where women have been given the suffrage’ [Senator Robert Owen (D-OK) Ibid p. 4275: ...there sprang in that State the most highly perfected school system that any State in the Union has...there followed...the juvenile-court law;... laws establishing the curfew to prevent children being exposed to temptation at night; laws raiding the age of consent; laws taking care of defective children; laws punishing those who contributed to the delinquency of a child; laws taking care of the weaker elements of society, of the deaf and dumb, the blind, the insane, the poor; laws beautifying the cities and improving many other conditions of life....Women can not be persuaded to favor the liquor traffic, the white-slave traffic, gambling, or others evils of society”].

³³ See, for example, Julia Lathrop, Children’s Bureau, Chief, on the special qualification of the Children’s Bureau to administer the proposed Sheppard-Towner Act: ‘The bureau which recognizes...the social and economic and the family side, *which recognizes that it is the family entity and dignity which must be preserved and fostered in all social legislation.*’ (emphasis added). [House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Protection of Maternity and Infancy, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1920, p. 18.]

**Table 2.1: Type of Government Intervention by Policy Issue, Hearth MCs,
56th-66th Congress**

		Type of Government Intervention			Total
		Unavailable Government Program	Bad Government Program	Good Government Program	
Family Issue	Health/Living Conditions	19	3	11	33
	Education	5	1	4	10
	Juvenile Institutions	7	0	6	13
	Child Labor	25	2	0	27
	Wages	6	0	0	6
	Immigration	1	0	1	2
	Americanization	5	0	1	6
	Women's Equality	15	0	0	15
	Uniform Marriage/Divorce	9	0	0	9
	Liquor/Gambling	8	0	1	9
	Law and Order	2	0	4	6
	Housing	2	1	0	3
	Veterans' Pensions	3	0	0	3
	Total	107	8	28	143

Source: Compiled by author, references to family case examples in comments by members during Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)

During hearings Hearth members disproportionately addressed the examples of actual families to highlight family dysfunction (negative family) i.e. cases of actual family conditions in need of correction/solution through public policy. On the other hand, Soul advocates approached family case examples more positively (positive family), as positive illustrations of what they hoped to preserve about families (see Table 2.2 below). Unlike Soul members, Hearth proponents viewed the extension of government into the family as a necessary solution for social problems.

Table 2.2: Family Cases used as positive or negative illustrations of Family Life by Ideology of Active MC, 56th-66th Congress

		Ideology of MC			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Appraisal of Family Example	Positive Family	65	60.7	132	42.0
	Negative Family	42	39.3	182	58.0
	Total	107	100.0	314	100.0

Source: Compiled by author, references to family case examples in comments by members during Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)

Pro-suffrage members thus did not view the inter-relationship between government and family as antagonistic, but instead celebrated it and advocated its enhancement:³⁴

Woman's place is the home...but what about the home? Does not the law vitally affect the women's home and her happiness and her children and her health and her protection from crime? Does not the law...take charge of the teaching of her children....say when, where, and how the children – her children – shall attend the schools, the books her children shall use, the desks where her children shall sit, the water her children shall drink, the towels with which they may affect their eyes or their health if sanitary or unsanitary? Does not the law...permit or refuse to permit the seduction of the open saloon to allure her sons to destruction...the brothel which may destroy the chastity, the honor, and the physical powers of her sons...the actual practice of white slavery to steal away the virtue of the daughters of the poor? Does not the law permit or refuse to permit impure food and drugs to be sold to her home, affecting the health and the happiness of her home...whether the streets in front of her home...shall be clean or unclean...affecting the health of her home....determine whether there shall be adequate police protection of her home against trespass, nuisances, assault or burglary... [control] water...gas supply...electric lights...telephone service... *No thoughtful man will deny that the powers of the law over the home are the powers which vitally affect the health of the home, the safety of the home, ...the happiness of the home, the economy of the home; that it vitally affects the life of children, the health of children, the happiness of children, the protection of children from vice; and to say that the woman who is charged with the duty of making the home safe, pleasant, and happy shall be denied any voice in selecting men who shall wisely write the law and efficiently...administer the law that is necessary to the happiness of her children is to deny the obvious.*³⁵

³⁴ This conceptualization reflected a growing acceptance of (educated, affluent) women's involvement in the 'public sphere,' participating in social reform and in local government. Jane Addams, for example, a prominent progressive female reformer, founder of the Hull House settlement in Chicago, put forward the theory of 'civic housekeeping' as the new basis for female participation in public affairs. She argued that the city ought to be conceived as a household needing continuous housekeeping, cleanliness and caring, to rectify its social problems; for which women were especially suited. [See: Patricia M. Fields (2006) 'Democracy and the Social Feminist Ethics of Jane Addams: A Vision for Public Administration' *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 28(3): 418-443, p. 423; also, more generally on female participation in reform in the Progressive era, see: Muncy (1991) "Creating a Female Dominion" pp.3- 37] Thus the inter-relationship between government and family/home within Hearth progressive conceptualization revolved around the changing position of women, within and beyond the home.

³⁵ Senator Owen (D-OK) 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* (March 4, 1914) p. 4275-4276 (emphasis added).

Suffrage supporters painted an optimistic picture in which the domestic sphere would exert a palliative, moral influence on the otherwise vice-ridden political sphere. For example, members pointed to the physical transformation of polling places in equal-suffrage states, illustrating the ‘domesticization’ effect of women on politics: “The polling places have been moved from barns and livery stables to the public halls, churches, schoolhouses, and other decent and respectable places, and instead of wading in tobacco juice and breathing the foul smoke from cigars and pipes you now walk upon carpets and breathe the fragrance from flowers appropriately placed in the polling places.”³⁶ The newly domesticized polling spaces were purported to be of such high moral quality that Senator Chamberlain (D-OR) entrusted them wholeheartedly with the virtue of his own daughters : ‘I am the father of four daughters and I would not hesitate to let anyone of them walk unattended to the polls in any place in the city of Portland, with its 300,000 people, and I would feel that she could return from the polling place to my home or to the home of her husband just as pure and just as refined as the moment she left her home to go there to vote.’³⁷

The Hearth argument favoring the extension of the domestic sphere was not only one of gender but also of family, since women’s moral capacities (demonstrating their eligibility for political participation) were imagined to flow from their roles, interests, and qualities as *mothers, wives and daughters*.³⁸ This endorsement of renegotiated boundaries cannot be seen as a

³⁶ Senator William Thompson (D-KS) *Ibid* p. 4271. See Richard F. Biesel (2004) The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) for a rich account of polling places in the 19th century, the only such full-length work.

³⁷ Senator Chamberlain (D-OR) 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 4, 1914) p. 4277.

³⁸ The phenomenon of extending the female domestic/moral sphere to politics is termed as the influence of ‘maternalism’ in Progressive Era politics. Maternalism was a political phenomenon in which women and their allies used the ideal of motherhood as a reformist argument for the political inclusion of women – as bureaucrats, administrators and voters – in order to combat a variety of social problems that they claimed were related to the modernization of the family and nation, these included : increasing poverty, eroding citizenship , labor unrest, runaway crime , high levels of child mortality , and public health issues such as increasing workplace injuries and spread of epidemic diseases. On poverty in the Progressive Era and the influence of maternalist ideology see:

repudiation of separate spheres ideology— instead it was an argument in favor of extending that domestic sphere into the political *based on* separate spheres reasoning viz. the moral superiority of feminine domestic virtue.³⁹

In contrast, anti-suffrage members presented a pessimistic scenario in which the marriage of the masculine-political sphere to the feminine- domestic one would result in the negative impact of the political on the domestic sphere (rather than the other way around), debasing it and encouraging the degradation of mothers and wives. For instance, Senators from the South asserted ‘the fact...that in all the equal-suffrage States the percentage of divorce is in excess of the average in the United States.’⁴⁰ Senator Nathan Bryan (D-FL) raised the claim that ‘pretty soon after woman suffrage came, divorce would be as respectable as marriage.’⁴¹ The opposition to woman suffrage was to *preserve* the (high moral) character of the feminine sphere, by maintaining the rigidity of the traditional boundary between the domestic and public spheres.⁴²

Members opposed to woman suffrage illustrate the South distrust of active government intervention in most family matters. South members (as defined) advocated the separateness of the

Michael B. Katz (1983) Poverty and Policy in American History (New York: Academic Press); for maternalist ideology and the changes to ideals of citizenship see: Gwendolyn Mink (1995) Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); on maternalist-influenced child welfare policies see: Molly Ladd-Taylor (1993) “My Work Came Out of Agony and Grief”: Mothers and the Making of the Sheppard-Towner Act in Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (eds.) Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of the Welfare States (New York: Routledge) pp. 321-342; and on the relationship between maternalism and workplace and public health reform, see: Skocpol (1992) “Protecting Soldiers and Mothers” pp. 302-304, also pp. 509-511.

³⁹ The Hearth concept of an extended domestic sphere, into the political, and the elevated status of women’s roles as mothers/wives also played out practically, in concrete Hearth policy proposals. Proponents targeted mothers and housewives in numerous policies for the encouragement of certain dietary, food and clothes consumption, Americanization, and family health-related practices. Mothers were seen as central in guiding family behavior and Hearth policies hoping to ‘improve’ family practices were expressly directed at them. See for instance, House Committee on Appropriations, First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1921, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1921, p. 713; Also ‘American Woman, World’s Greatest Purchasing Agent, Expends 10 Billion Dollars a Year to Run the Home’ in House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Regulation of Prices, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., 1916, pp. 620-623; Also Mink (1995) “Wages of Motherhood”.

⁴⁰ Bryan (D-FL) 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914) p. 4207.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 4209.

⁴² For example, Senator Bryan (D-FL) characterized the anti-suffragette as ‘the woman who yet believes that the home and the child are her sphere and that politics and business are the sphere of the man.’ (Id, p. 4203).

domestic from the public sphere in numerous policies calling for limited government and parental autonomy; this is also seen in the data from committee hearings (Table 2.3 below). Of the family narratives referencing participation (or not) of families in government programs, Soul members mostly emphasized the undesirability ('bad government program') of family participation in government programs; they advocated the necessity of programmatic government expansion ('unavailable government program') more limitedly, only in select moral policy areas, to be discussed later.

Table 2.3: Type of Government Intervention by Policy Issue, Soul MCs, 56th-66th Congress

		Type of Government Intervention		
		Unavailable Government Program	Bad Government Program	Total
Family Issue	Limited Government	6	3	9
	Property/Wealth	0	2	2
	Sexuality/Reproduction	10	3	13
	Parental Rights	2	10	12
	Family Lineage	2	4	6
	Race	2	7	9
	Traditional Gender/Protectionism	2	1	3
	Total	24	30	54

Source: Compiled by author, references to family case examples in comments by members during Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)

Note: None of the family cases referenced by Soul MCs were cited as examples of 'good government programs' (empty category).

Thus while pro-suffrage-Hearth and anti-suffrage-Soul members both upheld gendered, separate-spheres as the domestic ideal, they differed in their beliefs regarding the inter-relationship of that ideal and the state. Hearth proponents welcomed intertwined spheres, while Soul-based traditionalists opposed all policies, such as woman suffrage, that did not preserve distinct boundaries between the two.

Policy debates on woman suffrage also evidence variations in beliefs regarding gender relations among family members. Suffrage supporters viewed modern gender relations in terms

of increasing *equality* between the genders,⁴³ whereas opponents of suffrage embraced more *paternalistic* beliefs regarding women in families, claiming that women's interests were best accommodated by rigid hierarchies between male and female members in the family. In the following exchange between two Senators from Colorado and Florida, the differences in this conceptualization are clearly evident:

Mr. Bryan (D-FL): Women opposing the forcing of suffrage by the United States upon them and upon the States say they have *more political influence now, as the wives and the sisters and the mothers and the daughters of men, than they will have when they become politicians...*

Mr. Thomas (D-CO): ...I should like to ask the Senator right there whether he disputes the truth and correctness of that suggestion?

...Mr. Bryan (D-FL): The women I know would not help the President of the United States by filling an office in the Cabinet half as well as they would serve this country in their homes...

Mr. Thomas (D-CO): I merely wanted to get the opinion of the Senator on that point.

Mr. Bryan (D-FL): Does the Senator believe that a woman ought to be a member of the Cabinet?

Mr. Thomas (D-CO): I should be very glad to see a woman in the Cabinet of the President of the United States.

Mr. Bryan (D-FL): I should not.⁴⁴

Patterned variation in idealized gender relations is also found in the references to family cases made by members of Congress during committee hearings. Both Hearth and Soul members mostly referenced traditional gender relations when addressing real-life family examples (15 out of 20 Soul family references that discussed gender and 21 of 35 Hearth references, see Table 2.4a and b below). This finding reflects their shared belief in separate-spheres ideology. However, we also find that Hearth members used *more* family cases to illustrate *equal* gender relations, (14 'equal role' references to families out of a total of 35 in which gender was discussed; versus 5 out of 20 for Soul members). Soul members were more likely to emphasize

⁴³ For example, statement of Senator Wesley L Jones (R-WA): 'The demand of woman suffrage is but another step in the progress of women to an equality with man that has been going on through the centuries and which we can no more stop than we can prevent the ebbing and flowing of the tides. It *will* be consummated just as surely as time rolls on.' [63rd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, (September 18, 1913) p. 5120] (emphasis added).

⁴⁴ 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914) p. 4209.

traditional gender relations and had more negative appraisals when addressing family cases with equal gender roles.⁴⁵

Table 2.4a: Appraisal of Gender Relations in Family Examples. Soul Members, 56th-66th Congress

		Appraisal of Family		
		Positive Family	Negative Family	Total
		Count	Count	Count
Gendered nature of Caregivers	Traditional Roles	13	2	15
	Equal Roles	2	3	5
	Total	15	5	20

Source: Compiled by Author, Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congresses (1900-1920)

Table 2.4b: Appraisal of Gender Relations in Family Examples, Hearth Members, 56th-66th Congress

		Appraisal of Family		
		Positive Family	Negative Family	Total
		Count	Count	Count
Gendered nature of Caregivers	Traditional Roles	12	9	21
	Equal Roles	14	0	14
	Total	26	9	35

Source: Compiled by Author, Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congresses (1900-1920)

Ideational differences regarding gendered relations were also accompanied by distinct conceptions of normative familial structures. Hearth members embraced an ideal of *companionate* family structures, in which female family members were equal partners or companions to male members. As seen in the remarks of suffrage supporters, they assumed this family ideal could be realized if women were granted suffrage:

I began (my remarks) with the thought of equal companionship, the ideal of a home where human nature can develop to the full. You, whose mothers and wives are strong, able, loving women, have you never felt the thrill of real fellowship, have you never added to the tenderly loyal affection you feel for them as women, the handclasp which you give to the man who is your closest friend? You who have never enjoyed the privilege of going to the polls, our most sacred shrine, in company with your mother and your wife, as I

⁴⁵ Exact chi-square tests may be used to test the correlation between the positive and negative assessment of family cases, and the gendered nature of their caregivers. Exact tests are used instead of Monte Carlo due to the small size of cases in some of the cells (< 5). The tests for correlation reveal a positive correlation (Pearson's standardized statistic = 2.304, at the significance level $p \leq .05$) between positive/negative family evaluation and traditional/equal roles for *Soul* family cases ; in order words Soul family cases tending toward equal roles also tend toward a negative assessment. For *Hearth* family cases, there is a negative correlation (Pearson's standardized statistic = -2.801, at $p \leq .05$), such that *Hearth* family cases tending toward equal roles, tend toward a positive assessment and vice versa.

have done, can not realize the supreme pleasure of sharing with your nearest and dearest the highest of privileges, that of full American citizenship. I...quote from Whitman:

Where women walk in public processions in the streets, the same as the men,
Where they enter the public assembly and take places the same as the men;
Where the city of the faithfulest friends stands;
Where the city of the cleanliness of the sexes stands;
Where the city of the healthiest fathers stands;
Where the city of the best-bodied mothers stands;
There the great city stands.⁴⁶

Soul members, on the other hand, upheld the ideal of a *patriarchal* family in which women's best interests lay in their reliance on men in public affairs. They posited that the chivalrous attitude of men towards female family members was *endemic* to the (southern) patriarchal familial structure, such that women could exercise greater power *indirectly* through men rather than directly and/or independently, as practiced in more egalitarian family structures. As Senator John Williams (D-MS) averred:

I will make this assertion here, and I believe my colleague [Mr. James Vardaman (D-MS)] and other Senators from the cotton States, will bear me out in the statement that *women have more influence with regard to public measures in Mississippi and those States to-day than they have in any suffrage State in this Union*. I do not care what the women put themselves behind in the State of Mississippi, that thing the men vote for, and the politician who dares oppose it gets defeated by the other men. Let it be prohibition; let it be anything else; *if the women of Mississippi say to the men of Mississippi in sufficient tones, so that the men can understand them, "we want this thing," the men give it to them*; and I have never seen a public man in Mississippi brave enough – if you call it courage; *unchivalrous* enough, I would rather call it...to refuse them what they wanted.⁴⁷

Opponents of women's suffrage thus made their case in the name of 'protecting the (patriarchal) home' and preserving women's elevated position within it. They charged suffragettes with the ulterior motive of seeking to upstage the very familial structure of the 'indissoluble Christian

⁴⁶ Extension of Remarks of Representative Everis Hayes (R-CA) in speech of Representative William Kent (I-CA), 63rd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, (September 3, 1913) p. 263; also Senator Wesley L Jones (R-WA), 63rd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, (September 13, 1913) p. 5121: 'Another objection [to suffrage] is that it will break up the home...As a matter of fact it strengthens home ties and makes more of a community of interest between the mother and son, brother and sister, and husband and wife, and develops...a sweeter companionship in both'.

⁴⁷ 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914) p. 4214.

marriage’, ‘which they look[ed] upon as a slave union;’⁴⁸ this, they warned, would lead to ‘a state of society where man will not figure except as the father of her child.’⁴⁹

It need be noted that both Hearth and Soul members assumed the familial experience of upper-class, educated women (and men) as the standard for idealized gender relations and family structures.⁵⁰ For instance the pro-suffrage argument in favor of extending the moral influence of women in politics often used class to make a distinction between the ‘good women that vote’ and the ‘bad women [who] will not vote unless they are almost compelled to go to the polls.’⁵¹ Similarly, the Soul ideal of a patriarchal family espoused by opponents of suffrage also reflected the family structures of more ‘aristocratic classes’ and did not conform to the experience of the masses.⁵²

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4211 [Bryan (D-FL)].

⁴⁹ *Id.* Hearth members of Congress in favor of suffrage often noted this ideological difference in ideals. Other Hearth advocates viewed Southern patriarchal ideas more as an innate regional, cultural phenomenon of prejudice against women, one which could be easily overcome, as seen in the remarks of Senator Chamberlain (D-OR): ‘I was born and reared in a Southern State and went to the western country with a feeling which many southern men had of antagonism to the propriety of enfranchising women. I soon overcame the *prejudice, which was inborn in me, and which still lurks in the bosom of nearly every southern man, I am sure*, and I became an ardent supporter of the doctrine of equal suffrage.’ (emphasis added) [Senator Chamberlain (D-OR) 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 4, 1914) p. 4276].

⁵⁰ Mink (1995) “Wages of Motherhood”; on the upper-class character of female progressive reformers see: Muncy (1991) “Creating a Female Dominion” p. xiii-xv.

⁵¹ See 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 4, 1914) p. 4271; Thompson (R-KS): “The opponents of woman suffrage insist that the lower classes freely exercise the franchise while the higher classes generally refrain from voting....I take the [record of women registered in the] seventeenth voting precinct of Kansas as a typical one ...if the opponents of woman suffrage use the term “lower classes” ... the example given above would be a complete refutation. If by “lower classes” they mean the immoral and dissolute, the refutation appears to be still more complete, for the woman electorate [registered] in the seventeenth precinct is particularly free of those characters.” John Shafroth (D-CO): “...the slum districts of the city of Denver do not poll the voters of that district unless some one in authority forces them out by sending a police force for the purpose of telling them that they must get to the polls. In that way, and somewhat in terror, they do vote, but left to themselves the immoral women will not vote, while the good women will vote. That is the experience in the State of Colorado.” [Note the conflation of ‘immoral’ women with women in the ‘slum districts’.]

⁵² See, for instance, the description of the ‘Southern doctrine’ by pro-suffrage member, Everis Hayes (R-CA): as ‘carrying with it the idea of man’s possession of woman, with its inevitable concomitant of seclusion...the ideal of woman purring by the fireside’; he argued that this domestic ideal was limited to aristocratic classes and ‘did not represent the...traditions which persisted among the middle classes and the common folk’; it was ‘not the ideal that inspired the pioneers of the ages or any of our race who had had the stern work of the world to do.’ [Extension of Remarks of Representative Everis Hayes (R-CA) from speech of Representative William Kent (I-CA), Congressional Record, 63rd Congress (1st Session), Sept 3, 1913, p. 263].

The analysis of family examples, referenced by Hearth and Soul members of Congress during committee hearings, reveals another interesting pattern with respect to class. As seen in Table 4.5 below, ‘lower-class families’ constituted the majority of actual family examples raised in testimony and interrogation by *both* Hearth and Soul members. However, Soul members disproportionately used more upper-income family examples (almost 50% of all Soul family cases indicating income were from the middle and upper income brackets); and Hearth advocates instead used lower-income family illustrations in greater proportion (68% of all Hearth family cases that indicated income were ‘lower-income’, in comparison to roughly 50% of all Soul families).⁵³

Table 2.5: Income Status of Hearth and Soul Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

			Family Ideology of MC		
			Soul	Hearth	Total
Income Status of Family Example	Lower Income	Count	43	187	230
		% within Family Order	51.2	68.0	64.1
	Middle Income	Count	22	63	85
		% within Family Order	26.2	22.9	23.7
	Upper Income	Count	19	25	44
		% within Family Order	22.6	9.1	12.3
	Total	Count	84	275	359
		% within Family Order	100.0	100.0	100.0

Thus although both Hearth and Soul members based their domestic ideal on upper-class families; however, in their quest to develop policy solutions, Hearth proponents – much more than Soul – appear to have been more concerned with lower-income families and their problems.

In sum, the arguments of supporters and opponents of woman suffrage in Congress contain some of the fundamental gender and family beliefs of Hearth and Soul advocates

⁵³ Exact Chi-square tests find a negative correlation between ‘Family ideology of MC’ and ‘Income’ (at the significance level $p \leq .05$, Pearson’s standardized statistic = -3.455); such that Soul family cases tend to upper incomes, and Hearth family cases to lower incomes.

respectively. Both shared baseline assumptions of separate-spheres for female and male family members, and both had ideals of family mostly realized among upper-classes. However Hearth members espoused ideals of equality among the genders and aspired to companionate family structures, in which men and women shared companionship and camaraderie rather than spousal obedience and paternalistic obligation. To this extent they welcomed the inter-relationship between the domestic and public spheres and advocated the extension of women's moral responsibilities to formal political participation. In contrast, Soul advocates hoped to preserve the ideal of hierarchical gender relations in the family contained within the patriarchal family structure. In so doing, they sought the protection of rigid boundaries separating the domestic sphere from the political.

In the next sub-section, I discuss the extent to which these divisions in foundational ideas of gender relations and family structures informed clashes over family *policy*. In so doing, I continue to use the arguments of pro and anti-suffrage members of congress as illustrations of Hearth and Soul policy beliefs; additionally I use debates on intermarriage and other policy issues more fully and supplement this data with the analysis of MC's references to actual families during congressional committee hearings through the Progressive period.

§1(c) - Conceptions of Government, Conceptions of Family Policy

Variations in idealized gendered relations and family structures informed Hearth and Soul disagreements over the content of preferred social policies. Hearth members viewed public policy sanguinely and advocated a wide variety of social legislation targeting the economic condition of vulnerable families, perceived as the cause of family dysfunction. On the other

hand, Soul members were skeptical about the power of public policy to effect positive family change through the alteration of economic conditions and instead looked towards policy more as a means to preserve and protect family structure and its perceived morality; for them morality – not economics – was the foundation of good home life.

Members opposed to woman suffrage condemned the campaign as part of a broader ideological movement privileging (naïve) faith in government and policy as cures for social ills. They viewed the reformist attack on poverty and deprivation as impeding the role of individual agency and ridiculed what they perceived as overambitious positions of those members who linked specific policy questions, such as suffrage, to realizing structural change, such as the abolishment of poverty. One such example of Soul ridicule of Hearst member's naiveté can be found in the characterization of suffragist Senator Henry Ashurst (D-AZ) as claiming that 'just so surely as at midnight there is a centrifugal force which in due time will whirl the world into the gladsome presence of the morning, just that surely in the fullness of time will poverty be abolished. Sweatshops, crowded slums, and starving children will be only a horrid memory...the extension of the ballot to women will be a helpful influence in assisting to solve this great problem in the future'. In such colorful language, anti-suffragist Senator Bryan (D-FL) responded: 'politicians who promised the negroes of the South, immediately after the war, that they, each one, should have 40 acres and a mule were pikers alongside the Senator from Arizona.'⁵⁴ He pointed out that 'much support has been given to this movement (for suffrage) because people have actually believed that the Government will fix the wage they shall receive; that the independent, upstanding citizen, who has heretofore relied upon his own intelligence and

⁵⁴ 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914) p. 4203

brawn and muscle, and asked no favors of the Government or of anybody, will pass away, and, instead, the State will support everybody and will fix the wages by law.’⁵⁵

Anti-suffragist members and their constituents highlighted instead the belief in the time-honored significance of family self-regulation and personal responsibility in place of government intervention. Their opposition to woman suffrage was a part of the larger Soul opposition to viewing government as a panacea of social problems and trivializing the role of individual responsibility and community initiatives.⁵⁶

Notwithstanding structural conditions, they thus often emphasized the personal choice of women to abandon the hearth as a leading cause of declining home life. In so doing, they challenged the underlying Hearth assumption that neutral structural change was the paramount cause of familial shifts or that it necessitated an increase in government assistance of the family. Much of this is revealed in the statements and interrogation questions posed by Soul members of Congress in the conduct of committee hearings on various family policy issues. For instance, Representative Jerome Donovan asserted the following, when questioning witness Lillian Williamson (representative of the National Federation of Women’s Clubs), who was testifying before the Committee on Education in favor of ‘Federal Aid for Home Economics’:

Mr. Donovan (D-NY): How was it that the mothers whom you have so pictured, and gloriously pictured, and whom we all revere, that were the ideal mothers and were the ideal home builders, how was it that they did not have the advantage of these things: and yet that they attained a great strength of attainment which they did as home builders and mothers?

...Ms. Williamson (witness): They had traditions handed down to them from mother to daughter to enrich their life....the mother that trained her children 200 years ago had different processes to deal with...[t]here was no great number of things that engaged her outside of the home. All the household tasks were in the home.

Mr. Donovan (D-NY): In other words, her life was concentrated upon her home duties, was it not? Her life and duties were concentrated upon her home, were they not?

Ms. Williamson (witness): They were because there were no other ways in which it could be concentrated.

Mr. Donovan (D-NY): That is because...she attended to what was her business.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ See Senator Williams (D-MS), 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914), p. 4214.

⁵⁷ House Committee on Education, Federal Aid for Home Economics, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1921, p. 28-29.

Soul members mounted attacks of ‘paternalism in government’ and the ‘usurpation of a supergovernment’ against several Hearst policies, such as the Sheppard-Towner Act which proposed ‘public protection of maternity and infancy.’ State intervention enshrined in policies such as this, was seen to diminish ‘self respect’ and ‘enervat[e]’ families:

“Surely you break down the self-respect of any nation if its people feel that their intimate personal affairs can be directed by any government, and how can we know that when we have gotten these enervated people to a point where they and their children are given a good start that when they reach the school age they will not fail to feed and clothe them as they ought to? Are we going to take over all these little things? Are we going to let someone in Washington do everything of that sort?”⁵⁸

Much like their late-twentieth century counterparts, Soul advocates in the Progressive Era instead valued independent, self-regulating families, in which parental responsibility, individual agency and personal choices were paramount. Reliance on government for effective child rearing and other family matters was seen as both counter-productive as well as impossible to realize in actuality. In several committee hearings, particularly on regulatory issues such as vaccination and disease control, child labor, compulsory schooling and the establishment of juvenile courts and other child-saving institutions, Soul witnesses and members of Congress argued that ‘no one has such vital interest and concern in the welfare of the child as the parents themselves’ and that the ‘State is the servant and not the parent of the people.’⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Statement of Mrs. Rufus M. Gibbs, President of Maryland Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, in, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Protection of Maternity and Infancy, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1920, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁹ Statements of William G. Sullivan, Esq. and G.O. Nations, Esq., Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on District of Columbia, Juvenile Court in D.C., 64th Cong., 1st sess., (1916), p. 61 and 35-36, respectively. Also see Table 2.3 (p. 109) with data on the proportion of Soul family cases used to illustrate ‘bad government programs’, as opposed to Table 2.1 (p. 105) on the disproportionate number of Hearst family cases evidencing the inadequacies or ‘unavailability of government programs’. Soul advocates claimed that parental autonomy was essential to the independence and self-sufficiency of a family, failing which a family would be thrown on public relief and/or charity. [For example, Edward J. Maginnis, an open letter to the legislators of Pennsylvania, material submitted in Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Interstate Commerce in Products of Child Labor, Part 1, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, 82; also Statement of Mr. S.F. Patterson, treasurer and general manager of Roanoke Mills, Roanoke, N.C., House Committee on Labor, Child-Labor Bill, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, 62. It need be noted witnesses espousing the Soul ideology of parental autonomy and responsibility often testified in favor of business and industries that were opposed to government regulation. For example, witnesses against Federal Censorship of the Motion Picture Industry chided parents for shirking their responsibilities and placing an ‘impossible undertaking’ on the Federal Government ‘by having it attempt to look after the proper upbringing of their own and everybody else’s

Hearth members countered this position squarely, on grounds that the state had a legitimate responsibility in child welfare, particularly when parents were unable or neglectful of their duties; state interest in child welfare was especially used to justify regulatory measures directed at delinquent and dependent families.⁶⁰ The Hearth assumption that socio-economic conditions were crucial causes of family dysfunction is also borne out in the data from committee hearings during this period. In contrast to Soul member family references, a much greater proportion of family examples used by Hearth members belonged to lower rather than higher income classes (See previous Table 2.5). Also, a larger proportion of Hearth family case references were of single-mother families (widow or separated with no male member present) (Table 2.6a) and families where children were employed (Table 2.6b).

Table 2.6a: Marital Status of Hearth and Soul Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

			Ideology of MC		Total
			Soul	Hearth	
Marital Status of Family Example	Single	Count	1	5	6
		% within Ideology of MC	1.1	1.8	1.6
	Unmarried	Count	2	5	7
		% within Ideology of MC	2.1	1.8	1.9

children and grandchildren...The Federal Government would not only be required to keep the children from all contamination while the parents allowed them to wander about the community but it would have to come closer home and take up the matter of the wearing of Indian suits by children and the playing with toy pistols and pop guns.' [Statement of John D Bradley, President of the Washington D.C. Secular League, Federal Motion Picture Commission, Hearing before the Committee on Education, House of Representatives (1916) 64th Congress, p 209]; Also for position of managers of Cotton Mills of the South, as representing the Soul position in favor of parental autonomy see: Gwendoline Alphonso (2010) 'Hearth and Soul: Economic and Cultural Conceptions of the Family in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920' Studies in American Political Development 24: 206-232, pp. 19-21. The compatibility of business interest and family self-regulation should not detract attention away from the presence of this distinct theme in Soul family ideology.

⁶⁰ Senator Lawrence Sherman (R-IL) in Senate Subcommittee of Committee on the District of Columbia, Juvenile Court in D.C., 64th Cong., 1st Sess., (1916) p. 36; Also, Statement of Julia C. Lathrop, Children's Bureau, Chief, Department of Labor, in House Committee on the District of Columbia, School and Home for Feeble-Minded Persons, 64th Cong., 1st sess., (1916) p. 7: 'We are in this country past the time when we need to argue as to whether the public should take care of those who can neither take care of themselves or remain uncared for, without a fearful menace to society as a whole.' On this point, as on others, Hearth advocates often used structural changes in the family and modern socio-economic change as the primary rationale for the increased role of the government in the family: 'We are getting away from the old family life, where other members of the family took care of those who were not so well able to take care of themselves' [Statement of Thomas Crago (R-PA), in Senate Committee on Pensions, Widows of Soldiers of War with Spain, 62nd Cong., 3rd sess., (1913), p.5].

Married	Count	80	211	291
	% within Ideology of MC	84.2	77.0	78.9
Widowed	Count	7	37	44
	% within Ideology of MC	7.4	13.5	11.9
Separated	Count	5	16	21
	% within Ideology of MC	5.3	5.8	5.7
Total	Count	95	274	369
	% within Ideology of MC	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.6b: Child Labor Status in Hearth and Soul Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

			Ideology of MC		
			Soul	Hearth	Total
Child's Employment in Family Example	Not attending school	Count	1	27	28
		% within Ideology of MC	6.7	19.3	18.1
	In school	Count	9	35	44
		% within Ideology of MC	60.0	25.0	28.4
	Farm/Summer Employment	Count	2	10	12
		% within Ideology of MC	13.3	7.1	7.7
	Factory Employment	Count	2	43	45
		% within Ideology of MC	13.3	30.7	29.0
	Street Employment	Count	1	20	21
		% within Ideology of MC	6.7	14.3	13.5
	Dept Store	Count	0	5	5
		% within Ideology of MC	.0	3.6	3.2
	Total	Count	15	140	155
		% within Ideology of MC	100.0	100.0	100.0

As seen in the family case anecdote recounted by Ben Lindsey,⁶¹ Hearth advocates, more than Soul, used actual family cases to illustrate those family arrangements – such as single-parent and child-labor families – in which adverse socio-economic circumstances were perceived as negatively affecting family life.

Hearth advocates claimed that unlike individual parents, local communities, and even state governments, the Federal Government was in the unique position to conduct large scale

⁶¹ pp. 101-102.

investigations, gather data, coordinate policy efforts and thereby ‘stimulate state action’ on several issues, critical to the welfare of families and to the Nation.⁶² For them, the effectiveness of social legislation was dependant on the *process* of its formulation, requiring systematic inquiry, large-scale data collection, and widespread dissemination of information.⁶³ To the extent that policies were viewed as outputs of a process of ‘intelligent’ expert deliberation, *uniform* laws and uniform policy principles were often valued over local variation. For instance, Hearsh progressives pushed for government funds and policies to ensure greater collection and parity in statistics on birth, marriage, divorce and other family processes. They used these statistics to advocate a variety of uniform laws, such as uniform laws on marriage and divorce across the United States.⁶⁴ This is evident in one of many statements to Congress made by President Theodore Roosevelt, outlining the importance of collecting statistical evidence and formulating ‘intelligent’ family policies:

I call the attention of the Congress to the fact that no statistics have been collected by the Federal Government upon the subject of marriage and divorce since 1886...The institution of marriage is, of course, at the very foundation of our social organization, and all influences that affect that institution are of

⁶² See, for instance: House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, “Public Protection of Maternity” (1920) p. 12.

⁶³ The use of scientific, systematic approaches to social problems is especially evident in the hearings concerning the Children’s Bureau. For example in 1916 the Bureau asked for a large increase in their annual appropriation to hire ‘experts on hygiene,’ doctors who, in addition to the statistical experts already on their rolls, would go into communities to hold ‘children’s health conferences,’ to advise parents on the ‘modern way...[by] which their [children’s] development could be improved.’ [Julia Lathrop, Children’s Bureau, Chief in House Committee on Appropriations, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Bill, 1917, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, 1053-1056, 1053] and, House Committee on Expenditures in Interior Department, Hearings on H.R. 24148, Establishment of Children’s Bureau in the Interior Department 60th Cong., 2nd sess., 1909, especially pp. 32-35(statement of National Child Labor Committee, regarding the need for a standardized, systematic approach to children’s welfare) and remarks of Andrew Peters (D-MA) in support of the establishment of the Children’s Bureau: ‘The problem of our children is one that can no longer be treated by guesswork, or by casual movements inspired by local feeling and directed perhaps by warm hearts, but too often by untrained vision. The study of children is becoming a science, and its students need information and data for analysis...It is therefore proposed to establish...a children’s bureau.’ [60th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (February 19, 1909) p. 2705]]. See also, Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Study of the Criminal, Pauper and Defective Classes 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1908 (supporting bill (S. 3066) whose purpose was ‘to study crime, pauperism and other social evils... by the best methods known to science and sociology, with the idea of preventing or lessening such evils.’ Ibid, 5).

⁶⁴ See, for example, the following hearings: House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916; House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., 1918; House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920; Senate Committee on Judiciary, Marriage and Divorce Laws, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1920.

vital concern to the people of the whole country. There is a widespread conviction that the divorce laws are dangerously lax and indifferently administered in some of the States, resulting in a diminishing regard for the sanctity of the marriage relation. *The hope is entertained that cooperation amongst the several States can be secured to the end that there may be enacted upon the subject of marriage and divorce uniform laws....intelligent and prudent action in that direction will be greatly promoted by securing reliable and trustworthy statistics upon marriage and divorce.*⁶⁵

Soul proponents who were focused on family self-regulation and independent parental autonomy were openly critical of the Hearst faith in centralized planning, scientific inquiry and uniformity of standards in public policy; and instead valued local knowledge and community mores: ‘...You are too much losing sight of local self-government and...the right of communities to regulate themselves. You are undertaking too much every day to put the American people into a dull uniform caste. There are parts of this Union which differ from each other just as much in traditions, ideals, daily life, thought, sympathies, and sentiment as Alsace-Lorraine from a county in Norway...’⁶⁶ Soul members argued that micro-level social formations such as family, locality and community determined real-world social behavior, not macro-level policies which were based on artificial assumptions of human nature.⁶⁷

Within the Soul framework, family morality, not economics, was the key determinant of human behavior; and policies, in turn, could only flow from (and not lead) family morals.⁶⁸ The centrality of family morality to Soul policies is evinced in their legislative preoccupation

⁶⁵ Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message to Congress, January 30, 1905, in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara, CA) available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69532> (emphasis added).

⁶⁶ Senator Williams (D-MS), 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914) 4214

⁶⁷ Ibid (‘The line of cleavage, moral and mental, in society is not a sex line at all...When you get into a bad population the women are bad with the men – and when you get into a good population the women are good with the men....it depends on the family, the population, and not the sex.’).

⁶⁸ See, for example, Senator Bryan (D-FL), 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, (March 3, 1914) p. 4200, when alluding to the policy justification behind the common political exclusion of disparate non-white groups: “The answer...is to be found in the history in the case both of the negro and of the Asiatic. The Asiatic is bright, educated, intelligent, industrious; the negro, good-natured, lazy, without much ambition. *They have one element in common, and that is they have loose morals in the home. They do not know what home life is as we understand it....American civilization is what the American home has made it.*” (emphasis added).

targeting sexuality and reproductive practices.⁶⁹ The propriety (or lack thereof) of the sexual activity of populations was seen to have an inordinate impact on morals and family structure. Government intervention through public policies, controlling and preserving Soul family morals, was therefore seen as appropriate, in contrast to those actively providing for the economic well-being of the family. Here too, however, Soul members framed their policy advocacy in preservationist terms, rather than as proactive interventions instigating active change.

For example, Soul members of congress viewed non-traditional marriage practices as illustrations of declining morality and decried its adverse impact on the traditional family, the historical bedrock of society.⁷⁰ They extolled marriage as ‘more than a civil contract’, it was a ‘public institution established by God himself...recognized in all Christian and civilized nations...essential to the peace, happiness, and well-being of society; for society could not exist without the institution of marriage, for upon it all the social and domestic relations are based.’⁷¹

The significance of marriage – much like that of the family itself – extended beyond the individual welfare of its members but was seen to have numerous ‘public’ effects, impacting the structure of social relations as a whole. In this regard, Soul members were also concerned with changing practices in dating, the precursors to marriage and reproduction. Dating was

⁶⁹ Peter Bardaglio has demonstrated the link between concern with sexuality, race, and patriarchal family relations within the Southern household in the nineteenth century (Bardaglio (1995) “Reconstructing the Household”; see note 18 of this text, for description of his argument).

⁷⁰ For example, alternative marriage practices among *non*-white families were used as illustrations of their defective moral character, threatening to American society. Thus members advocating immigration restrictions on Japanese families in California, repeatedly expressed horror at the practice of picture-bride marriages among Japanese farmers, in which marriages were solemnized in Japan between a bride and the picture of a man, residing in America (unable to travel without risk to re-entry). Such practices of marriage, sight unseen, and its consummation with a surrogate in Japan were cited as abhorrent to the standards of civilized morality. Similarly Soul members used other family practices, such as the treatment of wives by husbands, childbirth, and household division of labor within minority families to illustrate the dubious standards of family morality of those racial groups, in order to exclude them from political and social participation. [See Senator James D. Phelan (D-CA) and Representative Raker (D-CA) positions : ‘Japanese are an immoral people...[they have] no home life’ in House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Japanese Immigration, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, p. 20, 198; on picture brides see: Ibid pp. 228-229; on Japanese family (defective) gender relations, see: Id pp.472-473).

⁷¹ Senator William Milton (D-FL), 60th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, (March 1, 1909) p. 3481.

increasingly moving beyond the confines of home parlors and parental supervision, to dance halls and social clubs among lesser-affluent, urban families.⁷² Unlike Hearth proponents who viewed government provision of such recreational facilities benignly, as ‘reaching a class of our people that are unable to provide for themselves,’ Soul advocates expressed alarm over the evolving rituals between the genders and eschewed proposals for government monies providing for spaces that could facilitate such extra-familial interaction between the sexes.⁷³

Nowhere else was the Soul policy concern with the social effects of evolving family practices more visible than in the case of interracial marriage practices. Miscegenation was particularly noisome to Soul members from the South. By 1909, 28 states and territories had laws proscribing and punishing intermarriage between whites and non-whites, most often blacks. However, Southern congressional delegations were alarmed by what they saw as a growing incidence of intermarriage in cities such as the District of Columbia, where such marriages were not illegal;⁷⁴ they also condemned the practice more generally in the permitting states of the North. Starting from the 59th Congress in 1906 and for every examined Congress thereafter (up to the 66th Congress, 1919-1920), Southern members introduced anti-miscegenation bills for the District of Columbia and occasionally offered general constitutional amendments banning the

⁷² Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions” p. 108.

⁷³ See, for instance, Thomas Sisson (D-MS): “The population of Washington is a rather peculiar population in that...there are perhaps more people here without family populations than in any other community in the United States... When Mr. Gardner was commissioner...there [were] a number of very questionable dance halls throughout the city, and Mr. Gardner was extremely anxious to eliminate those dance halls because girls were not properly supervised, and many young ladies and girls were attending the dances there, which was not for their good nor the good of the community.” [House Subcommittee on D.C. Appropriations of Committee on Appropriations, D.C. Appropriation Bill, 1922, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1920, p. 315].

⁷⁴ Senator Milton (D-FL): “The danger (of intermarriage) grows greater...and the most immediate danger is growing out of the District of Columbia. A recent account of a marriage between a white soldier cook and a negress stated that five mixed marriages had been solemnized between whites and negroes in this District within less than that number of months. A short walk through the principal streets of this city will disclose by the many shades of complexion and other characteristics that there is now and here much more danger than I have mentioned. The mulatto element is greater in proportion than in any other part of the Union.” [60th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, (March 1, 1909) p. 3482].

practice of intermarriage.⁷⁵ Their remarks on intermarriage illustrate Soul beliefs on family moral practices and the normative centrality of morality within Soul family policy in the Progressive era, thus warranting a closer analysis.

Firstly, anti-miscegenation proponents expressed the Soul belief in the *universality* of certain fundamental standards of American morality; they claimed that ‘[i]nter-marriage between whites and blacks is repulsive and averse to *every* sentiment of pure American spirit. It is abhorrent and repugnant. It is subversive to social peace. It is destructive of moral supremacy.’⁷⁶ They cited the widespread extent of state legislation and judicial decisions upholding proscriptions against intermarriage as evidence of the universal character of its repugnance. Legislators from ‘recreant states’ such as Illinois, that permitted incidences such as the highly-publicized intermarriage between ‘negro pugilist’ Jack Johnson and ‘unfortunate white woman’ Lucille Cameron, were urged ‘in the name of girlhood and womanhood...to take action.’⁷⁷ Failing action by state legislatures, the assumed universal nature of sentiment against intermarriage was used as a basis to demand across-the-board constitutional amendments ‘prohibiting forever the marriage of whites and negroes.’⁷⁸

⁷⁵ For example, Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caueusian [sic] or any other character of persons 62nd Cong 3rd Sess. H.J. Res. 368 (1912); To prohibit the intermarriage of persons of the white and negro races within the United States of America; to declare such contracts of marriage null and void; to prescribe punishments for violations and attempts to violate its provisions, HR 20779, 63rd Cong. 3rd sess. (1915).

⁷⁶ [Italics added] Seaborn Roddenbery (D-GA) remarks when introducing H.J. Res. 368 “Marr & Divorce - joint resolution for amendment to Constitution prohibiting intermarriage of whites and negroes.” 62nd Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record, p. 503.

⁷⁷ Roddenbery (D-GA), 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 2312; On the case of Jack Johnson and Lucille Cameron and impact on race relations and ideologies in Progressive era society, see: Al-Tony Gilmore (1973) ‘Jack Johnson and White Women: The National Impact,’ Journal of Negro History 58(1): 18-38; also Randy Roberts (1983) Papa Jack: Jack Johnson and the Era of White Hopes (New York: Free Press).

⁷⁸ ‘My God, [what] laws of *any* civilized State will permit a bestial brute to invade the home of a poor and defenseless widow and, in defiance to her, to have sanctioned by law his wedlock to such a pitiable child!...How long will the legislators of these States remain recreant to *public* duty?’ (emphasis added) [Roddenbery (D-GA), 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 2312].

Secondly, members’ arguments against intermarriage also illustrated the Soul belief that the biological reproduction of social relations was a fundamental function of families. Society was viewed in hierarchical terms, based on ascriptive identities such as gender, race, age etc. and epitomized in the southern patriarchal family and southern stratified race relations.⁷⁹ Sexual activity was especially crucial insofar as it alone could reproduce an intact, traditional, society – its structure and social relations. Soul preoccupation with race and the ‘threat’ of non-white and mixed families to the traditional white patriarchal family structure is evident in the data from committee hearings. As seen in Table 2.7 below, 41.1% of all family case references raised by Soul members of Congress pertained to non-white families, as opposed to a mere 11.8% of all Hearth family references.

Table 2.7: Race of Hearth and Soul Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

			Ideology of MC		Total
			Soul	Hearth	
Race of Family Example	White	Count	63	277	340
		% within Ideology of MC	58.9	88.2	80.8
	Non-White	Count	44	37	81
		% within Ideology of MC	41.1	11.8	19.2
	Total	Count	107	314	421
		% within Ideology of MC	100.0	100.0	100.0

The abhorrence of intermarriage and inter-racial sexual activity is indicative of the Soul preoccupation with biologically reproducing intact social relations and traditional (stratified) social structures. Its opponents decried the ‘admixture of races’, which would result in the false hope of realizing the dangerous ideal of ‘social equality’. Laws prohibiting and preventing intermarriage were thus seen as essential to ‘let...each race know that there is no chance of social

⁷⁹ Bardaglio (1995) “Reconstructing the Household.”

equality, no danger of destroying the Caucasian race by mongrelization.’⁸⁰ The reproduction of racial superiority and stratified social structures necessitated the regulation of family sexuality. National state intervention, through regulatory policies, was considered essential to restrain natural, latent tendencies of promiscuity in non-white races and sexual lapses among whites:

‘Washington is destined to be a great residential city of the wealthy. The idle rich, having exhausted the pleasures of wealth, naturally seek animal pleasure, and the human animal of mixed race is often exceedingly handsome and highly seductive. Unless this and other restrictive measures are taken, such a saturnalia of vice will here reign...And the danger grows. The occasional social intercourse between a high dignitary and an illustrious negro or mulatto tends rapidly to break down the barriers of general social intercourse and thus increase the danger.’⁸¹

In brief, the intermarriage debates demonstrate the extent to which family sexuality – i.e. the family’s biological reproduction function – was an essence of Soul family policy in the Progressive era; sexuality within the family was viewed as a key family practice, most effecting social structures and thus in need of active policies. Issues of ‘blood,’ ‘posterity’ and lineage transmission were also vitally associated with the regulation of sexuality. For example, the object of the bill prohibiting intermarriage between Whites and Negroes and Mongolians in the District of Columbia was to ‘preserve ...the Union for the sons and daughters of the patriots whose life blood is the foundation of our great Republic.’⁸² Government intervention through punitive laws was seen as necessary to regulate sexuality, to preserve the reproducibility of intact family lines.

On their part, when Hearst members of Congress addressed the need to control ‘bad reproduction’, they asserted the national importance of producing a better, healthier American stock.⁸³ Hearst advocates were less interested in family sexuality, or the preservation of intact

⁸⁰ Senator Milton (D-FL) in 60th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, (March 1, 1909) P. 3483.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 3482-3483.

⁸² Id, p. 3480.

⁸³ Progressive era reformers extensively engaged in a nationalist, pronatalist project through a series of reforms and programs (such as eugenic ‘fitter families’ campaigns and the maternalist policy agenda) that promoted selective human reproduction, idealized agrarian motherhood, and promoted scientific racism and eugenics; this was the product of both their modernist conviction that reproduction could be regulated in national interest. [Laura Lovett (2007) Conceiving the Future: Pronatalism, Reproduction, and the Family in the United States, 1890-1938 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)].

family and social relations, and were more concerned with the production of a healthy population. They thus proposed several policies advocating Federal government programs, both welfare and regulatory, to enhance the physical capacities of the population. For instance, they called for Federal Aid for universal physical education in all schools from 6 to 18 years of age to ‘make all our youth as physically fit as science and teaching can make possible’ and to ‘help our girls...[become] sound healthy mothers.’⁸⁴ Health and educational programs for the protection of maternity and infancy as well as the mandate for the Federal Children’s Bureau were all founded on the assumption that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting healthy motherhood and the reproduction of healthy babies.⁸⁵

Similarly, punitive regulatory programs aimed at controlling the reproduction of undesirables, such as the feeble-minded and/or indigent populations, moral degenerates, and ‘hereditary’ criminals were espoused with the purpose of reducing the population of families most likely to become ‘charges on the state’.

Hearth and Soul members thus differed substantially in the Progressive era in terms of their concern with sexuality/reproduction in their policy proposals. For Hearth advocates, the reproduction of the ‘better sort’ was essential to *national interest* – reducing state charges and enhancing the physical fitness of future soldiers and mothers; whereas, Soul proponents were more concerned with effects of promiscuous sexuality on the traditional, patriarchal *family structure* and on traditional ‘home life’ and on traditional family practices. Hearth positions advocating healthful reproduction in various policies were asserted more instrumentally, in terms of family welfare and regulation of deviant populations *for the good of the nation*; while Soul policy positions on sexuality and reproduction were presented more innately, in terms of

⁸⁴ Statement of Senator Arthur Capper (R-KS), Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Federal Aid for Physical Education, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, p. 10-11.

⁸⁵ Lovett (2007) “Conceiving the Future,” pp. 134-139.

preserving home life and the family's primary function of reproducing future generations and blood lines. Morality/ sexuality was at the center of Soul family policy; while welfare and regulation in national interest lay at the center of Hearth policy, even when applied to issues of sexual activity.

The difference in the two conceptualizations of sex and family reproduction as policy targets played out across many Progressive-Era policies, including, for example, female labor legislation. Both Hearth and Soul members supported legislation regulating labor conditions of working women, such as minimum wages and limits on their hours of labor and both recognized the effects of labor on women's reproductive capacities. However members differed in their ideas of *why* the regulation of female labor was necessary in the first place. In consonance with a Soul ideology, Judge John E. Raker (D-CA) in a House committee hearing offered an amendment specifying the need to investigate "the influence of industrial employments *upon the subsequent home life* of wage-earning women."⁸⁶ Stating the underlying rationale of his bill, Raker claimed:

[Reading from his bill] "The adjustment of modern industrial mechanism and management to the physical and nervous organization of women" and specifically "the influence of industrial employments upon the subsequent home life of wage-earning women." To my mind, that is the crux of this legislation, and it ought to be, not only to their efficiency while they are working, but in the evident future, in view of the fact that 99 per cent of all these young girls go out from these various places of business and eventually become our mothers....[T]he delicate character of a woman is such that it is incumbent upon us to look out for them.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ The two bills referred to and debated were H.R. 1134 and H.R. 12679, 66th Cong. (1920).

⁸⁷ Statement of John E Raker (D-CA), Senate and House Joint Committees on Labor, Women's Bureau, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1920, p. 11. The Campbell bill, according to Raker, did not specifically make the connection between a wage-earning woman's home and working life and was deficient to that extent. The Campbell bill instead read more neutrally: "It shall be the duty of the said bureau to formulate standards and policies which shall promote the welfare of wage-earning women, improve their working conditions, increase their efficiency, and advance their opportunities for profitable employment." Indeed, progressives were more concerned with women's individual health and welfare in female labor (and other) legislation rather than their 'subsequent home life.' [For example, See Edward Keating (D-Co), in House Committee on the District of Columbia, Minimum Wage for Women and Children, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., 1918, p. 3: "The issue we have to present to this committee today – the question of giving women who work a wage which will be sufficient, at the very least, to buy the necessities of life. In other words...we are fighting for a living wage."] Similarly, Hearth progressives were more likely to view the necessity of protective legislation for women workers in terms of the inequality of their economic power and bargaining capacity vis-à-vis male workers and not, as argued by Raker, because of women's 'delicate character' ["It might be said that

In contrast, on the rarer occasion when Hearth members made reference to women's reproductive capacities, they stated this in terms of 'health' and of 'service to the state and Nation'; even the reproduction of future generations (or the reproduction 'of the race') was asserted instrumentally, as national interest:

I am very loathe ...to connect up minimum wages and moral questions[however] It is essential for the full development of young girls that their life be not too narrowed by hardship. There is something more than bread and butter and clothing and a roof over our heads, and adequate development calls for it. A girl who is lacking in any of these particulars is not a girl who is going to develop into the best woman, *to serve the state*;*when she marries and when she bears and rears children for the coming generation, if she has been properly trained and has adequate opportunities to care for herself we shall be able to maintain the integrity of the race, we shall be able as a Nation to meet the perils that confront us in the future;...otherwise we shall fail...*we must go beyond [the need of the individual woman] and must face the fact that *we are acting for the race, we are acting for the Nation, and the Nation needs all these women to be kept in the best possible condition.*⁸⁸

Policy debates over female labor legislation thus illustrate the Hearth and Soul positions vis-à-vis the family's reproduction function. Both recognized the importance of family as the fundamental unit of reproduction across generations; however within Hearth ideology this was significant inasmuch as it raised questions of health, physical capacity and the maintenance of the national interest over time. The Soul faction was less concerned with the larger implications

there is sufficient economic power on the part of the workers to beg decent wages. That undoubtedly is true as to men workers in great parts of the country. It undoubtedly is not true as to women workers...conditions combine to make women unequal in a context for decent conditions if they are left to their own resources.' [Statement of Felix Frankfurter, *Ibid* p. 9]. In her work, Christina Wolbrecht recognizes this difference in ideologies between the two sections of policymakers – Republicans, who up until the 1960s were more focused on women's equality as a policy principle, versus Democrats, who also till the 1960s concentrated on protection of women, whom they viewed as unequals. [Christina Wolbrecht (2000) *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, Change* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press)].

⁸⁸ Statement of Dr. W.C. Woodward, Health Commissioner of the District of Columbia, in House Committee on the District of Columbia *Minimum Wage for Women and Children*, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., 1918, pp. 29-30 (emphasis added). The connection between women, motherhood, and service to the state is very similar to what has been described as 'republican motherhood' in the Revolutionary Era. In that previous period the belief that children should be raised to uphold ideals of republicanism engendered a new and important role for mothers, regarding the civic duty and education of their children. 'Republican mothers' thus describes the motherhood ideal in the Revolutionary Era, in which mothers were ascribed the new role, in national interest, of rearing children into ideal citizens of the new nation. [Linda Kerber (1980) *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)].

and instead sought to protect home life itself, by preserving reproduction as the essential function of the family.

In sum, the Hearth and Soul family ideologies found in congressional debates and committee hearings invoked a wide range of ideational principles – from gender relations, to family structures, and further to ideas of family policy and the appropriate inter-relationship between family and state. These are summarized as follows in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Summary of Principles of Hearth and Soul Family Ideologies, as found in Congressional Debates and Committee Hearings, 1900-1920

Gender Relations

Common Belief – Gendered separate spheres, bifurcated into feminine moral/domestic sphere and masculine amoral/political sphere

Central Ideational Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal: Gender Equality
- Soul ideal: Paternalism, Chivalry

Associated Policy Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal: policies facilitating greater participation of women in politics and in the development of policies.
- Soul ideal: policies protecting the home and preserving the isolation of women from political participation.

Family Structure

Common Belief – Class; ideal family structures drawn from upper class families

Central Ideational Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal: Companionate family structure, focused on the creation of an environment of companionship and emotional support among family members.
- Soul ideal: Hierarchical /Patriarchal family structure, focused on the reproduction of intact, stratified social relations.

Associated Policy Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal: policies recognizing and facilitating greater inter-relationship between domestic and political spheres.
- Soul ideal: policies preserving rigid boundaries between domestic and political spheres.

Role of Government & Public Policy vis-à-vis Families

Common Belief – Public policy must sustain and/or encourage idealized family structures and gender relations.

Central Ideational Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal: National interest is paramount; necessitating active government intervention into the family through assistance and regulation of adverse family practices and conditions.
- Soul ideal: Local/Community Interest is paramount; necessitating limited government intervention, upholding parental authority and agency.

Associated Policy Dichotomy –

- Hearth ideal –
Policy target: socio-economic conditions of families, regulating adverse impacts of industrialization.
Policy form: expert-driven, centralized, standardized uniform policies.
- Soul ideal –
Policy target: traditional family morality, policies preserving and facilitating the continuance of traditional familial practices, particularly vis-à-vis procreation and sexuality.
Policy form: localistic, community-based, preservationist policies.

In summary, divisions in foundational family ideals among Hearth and Soul members of Congress accompanied their ideological clashes over the role of government in the family, and over the substance and form of appropriate family policies. The most salient difference in the policy conceptions of the two ideological camps, one that has been the most resilient across the 20th century, was that Hearth proponents sought to use policy to actively intervene into the family and imagined (national and state) government intervention, through provision of material services, as a vital mechanism to cure family dysfunction. On the other hand, Soul members were wary of government intervention into the family and instead privileged local and individual parental authority and choice; they advocated preservationist policies rather than those purporting to create active change. In the next section we will see how the ideational principles discussed in these last two sections, had distinct partisan and regional affiliations and how they engendered a concrete typology of family policies during this pivotal historical period.

§2: *Parties and Family Policies*

Having assembled the Hearth and Soul principles of family and government/policy during the Progressive Era, this section investigates patterns in the partisan affiliation of

members associated with both types of ideologies. It suggests a typology of family policies that corresponds to the kinds of policy concerns espoused by Hearth and Soul partisans during this period.

§2 (a)-Method

The section relies exclusively on the primary data collected from House and Senate committee hearings for eleven Congresses during the Progressive Era: the 56th through the 66th Congress, spanning the period from 1900 to 1920. I have compiled a dataset of 421 MC references to *anecdotes of real families* described in testimony at family-related hearings.

For this section, I coded 20 policy issues which MCs raised in their references to family cases (referred to as ‘policy issues’) and aggregated them into four broad conceptual ‘policy categories’: family autonomy, ascription, social welfare, and regulation.⁸⁹ The research objective was to discern partisan patterns in the conceptions of the family as a policy subject, as expressed through these policies issues and larger conceptual policy categories raised by members during hearings. The assumption throughout is that members raised policy issues of concern to them,

⁸⁹ For the list of policy issues that recurred in members’ questions/testimony regarding families and which were therefore used to code each family case reference, see Appendix, Table i. Each case was coded as ‘Hearth’ or ‘Soul’ on the basis of whether the family example made reference to primarily material conditions or cultural, non-material family aspects. The individual policy issues referenced were found to address four recurrent aspects of the family, aggregating into the above four policy categories (ascription, autonomy, social welfare, regulation). The cases were then separately coded for these policy categories, *independent* of their individual policy issue or their coding as a “Hearth” or “Soul” case. Indeed some exceptional Hearth family cases made reference to family autonomy (otherwise a typical Soul category), for example in the case of women’s suffrage but such a case was coded as “Hearth” if it, for instance, mentioned that such autonomy would lead to greater provision for child nutrition, health information or other material/economic goods related to the family. It was coded as “Soul” if it referenced the significance of women’s suffrage to women’s qualities as mothers or wives. The organization of policy issues into the four overarching policy categories and subsequently into “Hearth” or “Soul” relied on the *majority* distribution of policy issues and whether, in the majority of cases, they invoked a “Hearth” or “Soul” family ideal. Thus “Hearth/Soul”, “Ascription/Autonomy/Welfare/Regulation” and individual policy issues were all independently coded, based on their definitional parameters. Similarly, “Hearth” members were those whose case reference/s, in majority, invoked the materialist or culturalist definition of family, stressing either family economics or family self-regulation or morality as their primary focus, respectively.

which they illustrated through their comments/questions regarding actual family cases.⁹⁰ Policy issues are thus used as illustrations of members' conceptual positions on the family in relation to the state and policy; and actual family case references are qualitative *samples* to 'get at' or draw patterned inferences of members' conceptual positions on the family *as a policy subject*. Finally, I also coded the member's party and state in order to trace patterns of regional family conceptual divisions within and across parties. Research questions such as *which* issues/aspects and policy categories of the family were brought up by *which* members for policy consideration, from *what* party and *which* region, have thus guided the following analysis.

§ 2(b) – Overview: Party Politics in the Progressive Era

In many ways party politics in the Progressive era was similar to the contemporary period: parties were divided and mostly polarized by region.⁹¹ The election of 1896 had marked the beginning of the 'Fourth Party System' which favored the Republicans nationally, predominantly in Eastern and Midwestern states with manufacturing and capital interests,⁹² while Democrats were elected primarily from agrarian states in the South and West and scattered areas in the urban North.⁹³ This more or less stable alignment was in distinct contrast to the preceding, patronage-based 'state of courts and parties' in which electoral competition was

⁹⁰ See Method Section of §1 of this text (pp. 97-100).

⁹¹ Scholars of party polarization have measured high levels of polarization at the start and end of the 20th century. Party polarization takes the form of a U-Shaped curve, with high polarization at the two poles and decreased polarization levels during the postwar mid-century decades. (See: Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2006) *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 3-10; and Jeffrey Stonecash, Mark Brewer & Mack Mariani (2003) *Diverging Parties: Realignment, Social Change, and Political Polarization* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 1-11.

⁹² Theda Skocpol, (1992) "*Protecting Soldiers*" p. 263; Also Elizabeth Sanders (1999) *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 160-161.

⁹³ Theda Skocpol, (1992) "*Protecting Soldiers*" p. 263.

closely matched between the two parties and either could equally hope for victories after every election.⁹⁴

Diminished party competition, along with the decline of local party machines, led to the diminution of mass electoral participation.⁹⁵ However, reformist interest coalitions emerged in response to the period's rapid industrialization and urbanization; these groups decried the excesses and vagaries of the patronage-based political and laissez-faire economic systems and advocated instead widespread civil and social reform. In so doing, interest groups (radicals, agrarians, socialists, Progressives etc. as well as single-issue civic groups) were active directly in society as well as in politics and attempted to press their agenda on the masses, Congress, and state legislatures.⁹⁶ In many ways therefore the Progressive Era resembled our own period.⁹⁷ There was, however, at least one feature of partisan politics that was *unique* to the Progressive Era, which must frame the historical comparison of partisan engagements with family through public policies.

In terms of partisan politics, the Progressive Era occupied a temporal place in American political development very distinct from our own. Although the nation had come to a partisan

⁹⁴ Stephen Skowronek (1991) "Building a New American State" 39; On electoral partisan politics leading up to the Progressive Era also see: Chambers II (2000) "Tyranny" 41-44.

⁹⁵ The nineteenth century had remarkably high voter turnouts; for description of electoral and voting practices in the nineteenth century that explain this occurrence as a function of local party machines, elite interests, and mass voters, see Bense (2004) "The American Ballot Box"; See also: Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M Blumin (2000) Rude Republic: Americans and their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press).

⁹⁶ Theda Skocpol (1992) "Protecting Soldiers," 265; Eileen L. McDonagh similarly describes what she calls the 'institutional axis' of progressivism as 'a reform orientation that seeks to implement the power of state authority and government institutions – in contradistinction to dependence upon private, philanthropic institutions – to solve social and economic inequalities viewed as the source of societal ills.' [(1999) "Race, Class, and Gender in the Progressive Era" in "Progressivism," Milkis and Mileur (eds.) 147]; see also Chambers II (2001) "Tyranny," 133-171. This chapter follows such an intervention-focused characterization of progressivism. For description of various reform groups and the progressive impulse see also: Wiebe (1967) "The Search for Order"; Richard Hofstadter (1955) Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1955); Muncy (1991) "Creating a Female Dominion"; also see: Sanders (1999) "Roots of Reform," 164-165, as a farmer-based refutation of the Hofstadter-Wiebe elite-based interpretation of progressive reform actors.

⁹⁷ For a review of the Progressive Era and its legacies in the contemporary period, see Sidney M. Milkis "Introduction" in "Progressivism" Milkis and Mileur (eds.) 2-6.

alignment that was much more stable than that which had existed previously, it was still in its nascent stage. The country was only newly emerging from the ‘state of courts and parties’, and previously entrenched patronage-based party machines were only then being dismantled.⁹⁸ The two major parties were thus transitioning and becoming the more national programmatic parties with which we are familiar today, but they had not yet fully matured.

Although Republican Party ideology was largely informed by business constituencies and Democratic by agrarian, these commitments were not well-defined. Each party’s ideology was instead more an amalgam of a variety of worldviews, formed from a looser coalition of interests, than is the case today.⁹⁹ Social progressive, Hearth orientations toward the family – such as active state intervention into families, child-saving institutions and policies, moral uplift of impoverished, illiterate (often foreign) families – were thus not confined to one party but often dispersed across the two, although, as I will demonstrate, these found greater purchase in the Republican Party.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ The enhancement of bureaucratic machinery and establishment of new governing relations by progressive reform occurred “in an uneven and piecemeal fashion” such that during this period “[a]lthough... parties were losing some of their grip on the levers of action, party still framed the context in which most political decisions were made.” The system of party government was thus undermined but not displaced and was accommodated into a new set of governing relations [Robert Harrison (2004) Congress, Progressive Reform, and the New American State (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 6]; on this transitional phase in party government also see: Jerome M. Mileur (1999) “The Legacy of Reform: Progressive Government, Regressive Politics” in “Progressivism,” Milkis and Mileur (eds.) 265-271. Institutionally, the accommodation of newly emergent reform interests into dominant party structures required a reordering of both House and Senate internal organizations, these too were in their nascent stages, see: David Brady and David Epstein, “Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12 (1997): 26-49.

⁹⁹ Harrison (2004) “Congress, Progressive Reform,” 13-49.

¹⁰⁰ On Republican and Democratic common concern over family welfare see the overlap of Welfare issues such as ‘health/living conditions’, wages, and pensions as examples of shared policy issues, raised by MCs from both parties when referring to family cases during hearings [Appendix, Table ii].

§ 2(c) – *Partisan Interests & Types of Family Policies*


The following Figure 2 shows the majority partisan composition of the Senate and House of Representatives for the eleven congresses studied. For the Progressive period 1900-1920, the Republican Party was in the majority for most sessions; while Democrats were more dominant during the latter half of the Progressive era.

Figure 2.2: Majority Party Composition in Senate and House, 56th-66th Congress

Congress (Years)	Senate Majority (# of seats/Total # Seats)	House Majority (# of Reps/Total # of Reps)
56 th (1899-1900)	Republican (53/90)	Republican (187/357)
57 th (1901-1902)	Republican (56/90)	Republican (200/357)
58 th (1903-1904)	Republican (57/90)	Republican (207/386)
59 th (1905-1906)	Republican (58/90)	Republican (251/386)
60 th (1907-1908)	Republican (61/92)	Republican (223/391)
61 st (1909-1910)	Republican (60/92)	Republican (219/391)
62 nd (1911-1912)	Republican (52/96)	Democratic (230/394)
63 rd (1913-1914)	Democratic (51/96)	Democratic (291/435)
64 th (1915-1916)	Democratic (56/96)	Democratic (230/435)
65 th (1917-1918)	Republican (54/96)	Democratic/Progressive (218/434)
66 th (1919-1920)	Republican (49/96)	Republican (240/435)

Despite the lesser number of Democratic-controlled chambers, Southern Democrats, both in terms of numbers and seniority were prominent players in the congressional party for the Congresses investigated (56th to 66th). When in majority, they chaired and conducted most Democratic hearings, as the minority they actively challenged Republican policies and advocated their own. The strength of Southern Democrats during this period is also reflected in the distribution of (active) members of Congress who made reference to family cases during hearings, as seen below.

Figure 2.3: Region and Party of Active MCs, Committee Hearings (1900-1920)



Note: Unit of Analysis = Member of Congress who made reference to family case/s.

As seen in Figure 2.3 the regional distribution of active Democrats, who participated in family hearings and interacted and made references to family case examples, was skewed. In fact, almost three quarters (65%) of all Democrats active in this way were from the South. The regional distribution thus suggests that, more than any other delegation Southern Democrats participated in and actively drew upon cases related to family policy during the Progressive era. In comparison, Democratic members from the other three regions were much less active. Among Republicans, many more from the Midwest and Northeast were active, by presenting and engaging with family cases during hearings of this period.¹⁰¹

When discussing and interrogating family cases during hearings, members of Congress repeatedly addressed some aspects of family life, illustrated by the family case example (coded as family case '*policy issue*' in tables). These included: education of children and family members, family health and living conditions, housing, wages and pensions and other issues of

¹⁰¹ This distribution broadly matches Sanders' distribution of overall delegations in the House for 63rd and 64th Congresses; (See 'Table 5.1: Regions and Parties in the Progressive Era in the House of Representatives' in Sanders (1999) "Roots of Reform," 162-163.); in so doing the regional distribution of members who were active in family cases reflects the broader sectional distributional clusters in Congress at the time.

family welfare, and also parental rights, limits on government capacity to intervene into the family, sexuality and reproduction, race, gender relations etc.

The policy issues may be categorized into four overarching policy *categories*; each category encapsulating (i) certain, select family qualities and (ii) distinct policy objectives. The four policy categories that emerged from the examination of policy issues, as illustrated through family case references for the period are:

- (a) Ascription – these policies centrally targeted the *biological* (‘ascriptive’) qualities of the family; within this category, all policies addressed the preservation of a family’s ascriptive function, as a unit for the biological reproduction of social relations. This category was found to include the following policy issues: racial composition (intermarriage), ‘blood’ affiliation or ‘family lineage’, sexual practices and biological reproduction.
- (b) Autonomy – These policies focused on the *private*, internal qualities of the family, emphasizing its separateness from the state; policies within this category addressed limits on state expansion in the domestic realm, and were found to include the following policy issues: parental rights and parental choice, limits on government intervention and traditional gender relations.
- (c) Regulation – these policies targeted those aspects of family life centrally assumed to have *public* consequences viz. the family aspects perceived to have inordinate impact on larger society; policies within this category addressed the regulation of these family practices in the name public/national interest. This category included the following policy issues: compulsory schooling /education, juvenile institutions for delinquent children, immigration and Americanization of foreign families, control of liquor/gambling and of addictive/abusive behavior, marriage registration and divorce, and wives’ equality in suffrage/citizenship.

(d) Welfare – these policies focused on all features pertaining to the *economic* condition of family life; policies within this category addressed family welfare through alleviation of adverse economic conditions facing families; this category included the following policy issues: health and living conditions of the family, labor/work conditions, housing, child labor, wages and veteran’s pensions.

The above issues and policy categories, illustrated by family cases, correspond to the ideas assembled in the previous two sections regarding family structure, familial gender relations and the relationship between government and family (See Figure 1 for previous summary of these ideational principles). For the most part the family issues highlighted by legislators invoked the four central ideational themes of family and government found in the previous section; these are: (a) families as units of social/ascriptive reproduction; (b) family separateness or autonomy from the political/policy sphere; (c) economic conditions as determinants of family welfare; and (d) regulation of deviant/harmful family practices in national interest; this is summarized as follows:

Figure 2.4: Description of Ideological Principles, Related Policy Issues and Categories contained in Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)

Ideological Principle	Corresponding Policy Issue illustrated through family examples	Policy Category	Type of Family Order
Family as biological unit, reproducing extant social structures	(1) Sexuality/Reproduction (2) Family Lineage (3) Race	Ascription	SOUL
Family separateness from State	(1) Limited Government (2) Property/Wealth (3) Parental Rights (4) Traditional Gender Relations	Autonomy	SOUL
Economic conditions as determining family Welfare	(1) Living Conditions (2) Child Labor (3) Wages	Welfare	HEARTH

	(4) Housing		
	(5) Labor Conditions		
Deviant/undesirable family practices as harmful to national interest.	(1) Compulsory Education (2) Juvenile Institutions (3) Immigration (4) Americanization (5) Women's Equality (6) Uniform Marriage/Divorce (7) Liquor/Gambling (8) Law & Order	Regulation	HEARTH

Partisan preferences for one or the other family policy issues, categories, and family orders may be further determined from the data on family cases, as seen in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8: Family Orders, Policy Categories, and Policy Issues in Democratic and Republican Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

			Party of Active MC			
			Democratic		Republican	
Family Order	Category	Policy Issue of Family Case	Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Soul	Ascription	Sexuality/Reproduction	18	36.0	2	28.6
		Family Lineage	19	38.0	3	42.9
		Race	13	26.0	2	28.6
		Total	50	100.0	7	100.0
	Autonomy	Limited Government	12	35.3	0	.0
		Property/Wealth	3	8.8	15	93.8
		Parental Rights	12	35.3	1	6.2
		Traditional Gender/Protectionism	7	20.6	0	.0
		Total	34	100.0	16	100.0
		Hearth	Welfare	Limited Government	1	2.3
Health/Living Conditions	11			25.0	42	33.1
Education	0			.0	6	4.7
Juvenile Institutions	0			.0	2	1.6
Child Labor	20			45.5	50	39.4
Labor Conditions	1			2.3	2	1.6
Wages	8			18.2	11	8.7
Housing	0			.0	9	7.1
Veterans' Pensions	3			6.8	5	3.9

	Total	44	100.0	127	100.0
Regulation	Health/Living Conditions	0	.0	5	3.9
	Education	8	50.0	9	7.1
	Juvenile Institutions	3	18.8	15	11.8
	Child Labor	0	.0	11	8.7
	Immigration	0	.0	10	7.9
	Americanization	1	6.2	12	9.4
	Women's Equality	0	.0	19	15.0
	Uniform Marriage/Divorce	0	.0	10	7.9
	Liquor/Gambling	4	25.0	13	10.2
	Law and Order	0	.0	23	18.1
	Total	16	100.0	127	100.0

Source: Compiled by Author, Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920) [Note: unit of analysis = family case] Total Democratic Cases = 144; Total Republican Cases = 277.

As seen above, Democratic members of Congress used a large number of family cases to illustrate issues within the ascriptive policy category, stressing sexuality/reproduction, family lineage and race. Within the autonomy category, Democratic MCs disproportionately discussed limited government and parental rights when compared to their Republican colleagues. Significantly however, we also find that autonomy was central to certain Republican members, who invoked the autonomy ideal when discussing the issue of reproduction of family ‘property/wealth’. Certain policy issues, such as ‘health/living conditions’, ‘child labor,’ ‘juvenile institutions’ and ‘education’ invoked both principles of welfare as well as regulation.

Further, certain policy issues within the category of welfare were of common concern to both Democratic and Republican members. Members from both parties referenced a similar number of family cases to raise issues such as schooling and ‘education’ of children and illiterate family members, ‘wages’ and salaries of government employees, and ‘veterans’ pensions’ (see Table (i) in Appendix). It also need be noted that second to ascription, the largest number of family cases were used by Democratic members to reference issues of family welfare. Despite

the overlaps, certain lines of partisan interest are evident across the four policy categories and the ideational principles of family and government invoked by each category.

Table 2.9: Family Policy Category of Democratic and Republican Family Cases, 56th-66th Congress

		Party of Active MC					
		Democratic		Republican		Total	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Ratio Democratic % to Republican %
Policy Category	Ascription	50	34.7	7	2.5	57	13.8
	Autonomy	34	23.6	16	5.8	50	4.1
	Welfare	44	30.6	127	45.8	171	.7
	Regulation	16	11.1	127	45.8	143	.2
	Total	144	100.0	277	100.0	421	1

Source: Compiled by Author, Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920) [Note: unit of analysis = family case]

Table 2.9 supplements the findings of the previous Table 2.8. The cross-party comparison here, demonstrates the extent of attention paid to one or the other policy category by Democrats *relative to* Republicans notwithstanding the absolute number of family cases per category per party. Much like Table 2.8, it reveals that in comparison to Republicans, Democratic members used a disproportionate number of family cases to emphasize policy issues in the categories of family ascription and autonomy; and Republican members used larger proportions of family cases to focus on issues in the categories of family regulation and social welfare. Democratic members raised ascription issues in 13.8 times more family cases than did Republican members, and they also raised autonomy issues in 4.1 times the number of family cases in which Republicans did as much (see last column). In contrast, for every one case in which Democrats raised issues of family welfare, Republican members did so in almost two cases (1.5), and for every one case used by a Democratic member to focus on family regulation issues there were approximately four cases (4.1) by Republican members (flipped ratio from last column).

Thus the partisan distribution of the policy categories used in discussing family cases during the Progressive period was as follows.

Figure 2.5: Partisan Distribution of Family Policy Categories

Dominant Party Affiliation	Family Policy Category	Determining Family Feature	Issue Components
Strongly Democratic	Ascription	Biological, ascriptive family Features	1. Racial composition 2. Family lineage – (“blood” issues) 3. Sexual/ reproductive Practices
Moderately Democratic	Autonomy	Private qualities, autonomous From State	1. Parental choice 2. Traditional gender relations in family 3. Limits on government intervention into family
Moderately Republican	Welfare	Economic family Conditions	1. Health/ living conditions 2. Labor/work conditions 3. Housing 4. Child labor 5. Wages 6. Veteran’s pensions 7. Wealth/Property
Strongly Republican	Regulation	Harmful/Deviant family practices in need of control, in national interest.	1. Compulsory schooling 2. Juvenile institutions 3. Immigration/Americanization 4. Liquor/Gambling/ Abuse 5. Marriage registration/ divorce 6. Women’s (wives’) suffrage/citizenship

Source: Compiled by Author from Congressional committee hearings, 1900-1920

Issues within the policy categories of ascription and autonomy were overwhelmingly cultural, whereas issues of social welfare and regulation were economic, and economic and cultural respectively.¹⁰² Both cultural and economic aspects of family life were thus raised and

¹⁰² The 4 coding categories were created and classified (as cultural and/or economic) from the Clausen and Peltzman issue coding schemes as described in Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll-Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press) 259-260.

highlighted by members in Congress when they interrogated and discussed actual family cases.¹⁰³

The data from family cases demonstrate that Democrats in the Progressive era, much more than Republicans, emphasized Soul principles through ascription and autonomy policies. By so doing, they exhibited the Soul preoccupation with the inherent, *innate* characteristics of the family that were largely separate from the state.

In contrast, Republican members at this time were clearly more Hearth-oriented in that they used family cases to highlight the Hearth principles of facilitating family welfare through the amelioration of adverse economic conditions and regulating undesirable family practices in the long-term interest of the nation. In both type of cases (welfare and regulation) they encouraged the inter-relationship between the domestic and political sphere by raising several issues, such as the need to ameliorate the impoverished conditions of child-laboring families, the importance of public child-saving institutions, and the enforcement of greater gender equality in citizenship and immigration.

Moreover, the data also reveal that the cultural and moral aspects of the family were of common concern to members of *both* parties. Democratic emphasis on traditional morality is evident from their frequent references to ascription and autonomy issues, yet even Republicans by raising issues of family regulation had clear moralistic overtones. For instance, Republican members (much more than state's-rights Democrats) discussed specific morally-imbued issues of regulation with greater frequency; this included the call for uniformity in marriage and divorce laws, which they advocated to address the moral laxity reflected in the growing divorce rates across the country. Republicans also addressed family cases to detail the deleterious effect of

¹⁰³ For a fuller analysis of the economic and cultural underpinnings of Republican Hearth and Democratic Soul ideologies during the Progressive Era, see: Alphonso (2010) '[Hearth and Soul](#).'

alcohol and gambling on the family and call for restrictive Federal and local (District of Columbia) legislation.¹⁰⁴

Yet vital partisan distinctions remained even when it came to the focus on cultural or moral aspects of the family: Republican members approached family morals in policies *also* within the Hearth framework: (a) family morality was seen as the instrumental means to secure healthful future generations, in the interests of the nation; and (2) family moral practices were imagined to be the outgrowth of larger economic conditions. On the other hand, Democratic members were more likely to approach family moral practices within the Soul framework, such that they viewed family morality as innately inhering to particular ascriptive populations, communities, and family structures, independent of economic condition.¹⁰⁵

§2 (d) - Regional Policy Interests within Parties

Not all members in the Democratic and Republican parties shared their party's ideology. Thus by analyzing the *regional* ideational divisions among Democratic and Republican members, I isolate the more Hearth and Soul-oriented factions *within* each party during the Progressive Era.

Within the Democratic Party (Table 2.10a) we find certain clear differences across regional groups. The Southern faction was the most representative of the overall Democratic Party position, showing high interest in the Soul issues of ascription and autonomy as well as in

¹⁰⁴ For example, the following committee hearings: House Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, To Restore the Canteen in the Army, 62nd Cong., 3rd sess., 1913; Senate Committee on District of Columbia, Regulation of Sale of Intoxicating Liquors in D.C., 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1908; and Prohibition Hearings: House Committee on Judiciary, Enforcement of Prohibition Part 2, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919; Senate Committee on Judiciary, Prohibiting Intoxicating Beverages Part 1, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919.

¹⁰⁵ See following section of this chapter.

the Hearth issue of welfare; Western Democrats used family cases, almost exclusively, to reference the Soul issue of ascription. On the other hand, Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats were more mixed, referring to comparable number of family cases across the four policy categories.

Table 2.10a: Democratic Family Cases by Policy Category, 56th-66th Congress

	Region of Active MC									
	Northeast		Midwest		South		West		Total	
	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Ascription	2	18.2	5	27.8	34	33.7	9	81.8	50	35.5
Autonomy	3	27.3	1	5.6	28	27.7	1	9.1	33	23.4
Welfare	3	27.3	8	44.4	32	31.7	0	.0	43	30.5
Regulation	3	27.3	4	22.2	7	6.9	1	9.1	15	10.6
Total	11	100.0	18	100.0	101	100.0	11	100.0	141	100.0

Among Republicans (Table 2.10b), those from the North (i.e. from the Northeast and Midwest) were the most Hearth-oriented, using large proportions of family cases to highlight both Hearth issues of welfare and regulation. Republicans from the West were less Hearth-based, emphasizing only regulation issues. None of the Republican regional delegations exhibited great interest in either Soul issue: ascription or autonomy.

Table 2.10b: Republican Family Cases by Policy Category, 56th-66th Congress

	Region of Active MC									
	Northeast		Midwest		South		West		Total	
	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Ascription	1	1.1	3	2.6	2	25.0	1	1.8	7	2.6
Autonomy	9	10.3	4	3.5	2	25.0	1	1.8	16	6.0
Welfare	39	44.8	66	57.4	2	25.0	12	21.8	119	44.9
Regulation	38	43.7	42	36.5	2	25.0	41	74.5	123	46.4
Total	87	100.0	115	100.0	8	100.0	55	100.0	265	100.0

The support for Hearth and Soul ideologies by regional delegations may be summarized as follows, in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6: Summary of Ideologies Displayed by Regional Factions within the Democratic and Republican Parties, 56th-66th Congress

Ideology	Regional Faction	Policy Issue Interest
Strongly Soul	None	
Moderately Soul	1. Southern Democrats 2. Western Democrats	Ascription, Autonomy, Welfare Ascription
Mixed (Hearth/Soul)	1. Midwestern Democrats	Ascription, Welfare
Moderately Hearth	1. Western Republicans 2. Northeastern Democrats	Regulation Welfare, Regulation, Autonomy
Strongly Hearth	1. Midwestern Republicans 2. Northeastern Republicans	Welfare, Regulation Welfare, Regulation

In sum, *more* regional factions across both parties espoused Hearth, rather than Soul family ideologies during the Progressive Era. Even the staunchest Soul faction in the Democratic Party – Southern Democrats – used large proportions of family cases to highlight their Hearth concern in social welfare. Further, Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats emphasized both Hearth and Soul issues, using cases to highlight welfare and regulation, as well, autonomy and ascription.

The Republican delegations were less mixed in their ideological emphases than their Democratic counterparts. Republicans from all regions used family cases to emphasize Hearth issues; however, by far, Republicans from the North – from both the Midwest as well as the Northeast – were the most Hearth-oriented, using a disproportionate number of cases to reference interests in both welfare and regulation. It is worth noting that when compared with all other factions, Northeastern Republicans also emphasized autonomy issues in a disproportionately larger percent of their cases. As we shall see in the following chapter, this seeming anomaly during this period was to become the norm in the post-New Deal and postwar period, with

Northern Republicans leading their party to espouse an individual-centered autonomy-based Soul ideal instead of a welfare-oriented Hearth one.

§3: Demographic Family Conditions

As seen in the previous section, mostly Southern Democratic members of congress espoused the Soul family ideology during the Progressive period and Republicans from the North, Northeast and Midwest, were the staunchest advocates of the Hearth ideology. In this section, I analyze variations and trends in demographic patterns of nuptiality and fertility that occurred alongside the emergence of the two family orders in the Progressive era. The overarching argument of the section is that regional variations in family demographic behavior, as well as demographic transitions countrywide, were vital conditions for the existence of divergent family (policy) ideologies in Congress. The Democratic Party as the party of the South and the Republican Party that of the North espoused Soul and Hearth family ideologies, respectively, in consonance with the family demographic developments in their respective regional bases.

In the first part of this section, I identify some of the salient demographic trends used in family policy debates in Congress during the Progressive Era, demonstrating that legislators did, in fact, take note of and consider demographic trends in their discussions of policy; following this, I investigate patterns specific to the regions (North and South) that generated the most prominent divergent blocs of members in Congress.

As mentioned previously, Hearth members in the Progressive era valued the collection of systematic data on family behavior as a basis for generating efficient and effective family policy. In this regard they were especially cognizant of statistical demographic data on families, and used these extensively to argue for policy reform. For instance, the organic statute establishing the Children's Bureau, a landmark Hearth institution, outlined the mission of the Bureau as that of investigating demographic data for the purpose of child 'public welfare' policy analysis and formulation:

The said bureau shall investigate and report upon all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life, and shall especially investigate the questions of *infant mortality, the birth rate, physical degeneracy, orphanage, juvenile delinquency and juvenile courts, desertion and illegitimacy, dangerous occupations, accidents and diseases of children of the working classes, employment, legislation affecting children in the several States and Territories, and such other facts as have a bearing upon the health, efficiency, character, and training of children.*¹⁰⁶

The early 20th century stood at the cusp of a long demographic transition, extant since the 19th century. Although the Census Bureau did not ask about marital status until the 1880 census, many state censuses had been doing this; thus data on marriage and fertility patterns were well known and publicized.¹⁰⁷ Records of congressional debates and committee hearings reveal that many members in Congress paid close attention to family demographic changes occurring through the Progressive Era, when arguing for both Hearth and Soul types of family policies.

Firstly, rising divorce rates were often cited by members and their witnesses as causes of great alarm, and often offered as a rationale to galvanize Federal action on divorce and/or marriage. For example, in 1916 during a hearing on 'Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce' by a subcommittee of the House Committee of the Judiciary, Chairman Warren Gard (D-OH) averred:

¹⁰⁶ H.R. 24148 60th Cong., 2nd sess. (introduced by Herbert Parsons (R-NY)) cited in Congressional Record, 60th Cong, 2nd Sess. (1909) p. 2897.

¹⁰⁷ Michael R. Haines (2000) 'The White Population of the United States, 1790-1920,' in A Population History of North America Michael R. Haines and Richard H. Steckel (eds.) (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press) 305-370, p. 317.

‘Do you know the United States of America comes only next to Japan in the number of divorces in proportion to marriages? ...Do we realize that in the last 50 years there have been over 2,000,000 divorces and a million and a half children left without either father or mother – left virtually orphans and sometimes worse than orphans? We have the idea that marriage is nothing but a civil contract. It was not so long ago when two boys were playing together in Newport, and they saw a man coming along the street, and one said to the other, “Here comes my father.” The other boy said, “He does not amount to much; he was my father once.” That is the idea with which children grow up. They have no idea of home, and no idea of parentage.’¹⁰⁸

Based on its exceptional divorce rate (i.e. number of divorces per 100,000) the populous Western state of California was repeatedly decried as the ‘greatest divorce center’, however ten Midwestern states were seen to bear the ‘supremacy of guilt in granting divorces’ insofar as they accounted for ‘more than half of all ...divorces...granted in the forty years from 1867 to 1906.’¹⁰⁹ National and state census figures were cited extensively to illustrate that even conservative Northeastern states, such as Massachusetts, had seen a growth in divorce ‘three times as fast as the population in Massachusetts from the years, 1860 to 1915’. The effect of ‘small, smutty, western’ towns such as Reno was also recognized as extending beyond the western country, as Reno served as the de facto ‘divorce Mecca of New York and the rest of the Union’.

Thus during the 56th to 66th Congress (1899-1920), 33 bills and resolutions were introduced in the House and Senate proposing uniform marriage and divorce laws across the United States. As seen in Table 2.11 below, the majority of members introducing these measures were from the Republican Party, representing Midwestern and Northeastern States, the regions with rapidly climbing frequencies of divorced and single-parent families.

¹⁰⁸ House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, pp. 27-28. Also see, ‘Statement of Rev. Harry Adams Hersey, Chairman of the Commission of Public Morals of the Universalist General Convention, Foxboro, Massachusetts: ‘We are...asking this committee of Congress ...to give the many thousands of persons who are alarmed at our high divorce rate, which I understand is 1 in 12, a higher rate than any other country except Japan – we are asking that Congress give us in the States the opportunity to express ourselves on this question.’ [House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, p. 24].

¹⁰⁹ ‘Statement of Mr. Francis Miner Moody, M.A., Chicago, Executive Sec’y of the International Committee on Marriage and Divorce, House Committee on Judiciary, Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., 1918, p.3.

Table 2.11: Sponsorship of Bills and Resolutions providing for Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, 56th-66th Congress (1899-1920)¹¹⁰

		Party of Bill Sponsor		Total
		Democratic	Republican	
Region of Bill Sponsor	Northeast	4	9	13
	Midwest	3	10	13
	South	3	0	3
	West	0	4	4
	Total	10	23	33

Further, statistics on birth and death rates (especially infant and maternal morality) were also used to advocate ‘public protection of maternity and infancy’ through federally- funded prenatal healthcare for mothers and children such as the Sheppard-Towner program.¹¹¹ The Children’s Bureau (established in 1913) conducted extensive studies into the ‘economic, industrial, social, civic, and family factors surrounding the child and mother’ and found that ‘many other civilized countries exhibit[ed] more favorable records of maternal and infant deaths than d[id] the United States as a whole.’¹¹² In this instance as well as numerous others, Hearth members of Congress, their witnesses, and constituents, used tangible demographic data to propose interventionist welfare services and regulatory programs. These government programs were characterized in the main as ‘recogniz[ing] the family [as] the social unit’ and providing essential, diverse services

¹¹⁰ Data compiled by author.

¹¹¹ For infant mortality statistics as marking the importance of the Children’s Bureau’s work see: House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, “Public Protection of Maternity” (1920) pp.22-23; regarding statistics relating to the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and infant programs, see, Senate Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine, Protection of Maternity and Infancy, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920, p. 11; for the use of birth and death rates and the impact of prenatal healthcare, see: House Committee on Labor, Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., 1919, p. 29, 35. The Sheppard-Towner Infancy and Protection Act in 1921 established the first federal social welfare program. It provided for the dissemination of health-care information to mothers by the federally subsidized pre- and post-natal clinics, conceived as a public health entitlement of all women, not just the poor. The Sheppard-Towner maternity health program ultimately lost favor with powerful political interests and succumbed to demise only to be resurrected, in a modified form, by the Social Security Act of 1935. [Muncy (1991) “Creating a Female Dominion” p. 93-101; Molly Ladd Taylor (1993) ‘My Work Came Out of Agony and Grief’: Mothers and the Making of the Sheppard-Towner Act’ in Seth Koven & Sonya Michel (eds.) Mothers of a New World, (New York: Routledge) 321-342, p. 322].

¹¹² Julia Lathrop, Chief of the Children’s Bureau, Department of Labor, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, “Public Protection of Maternity” (1920) p. 11.

for family well being, imagined to ‘involve many services, among them those of teacher, physician, nurse and social economist.’¹¹³

Other changes in family demographic behavior, also distinctive of the Progressive era, such as increasing women’s wage labor and their new dual burden of homemaking and employment, urban migration and foreign immigration of families, and alterations in their living arrangements (changes in housing quarters from single-family to tenement housing) were all emphasized by Hearth advocates seeking active government intervention into families through diverse policies – such as Federal funding for Home Economics programs for women, immigration reform, housing and reconstruction policies.¹¹⁴ For the period under study (1899-1920), 62 such bills and resolutions pertaining to services and programs for immigrant families, female wage earners and mothers were introduced in Congress. As seen in Table 2.12 below, here too the greatest aggregate proportions of such bills were sponsored by Republican members from Northeastern and Midwestern states; although Democratic members from these regions, particularly the Midwest, were also active sponsors.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ For statistics on women’s employment and increased burden of wage labor in addition to homemaking, as justifying Home Economics programs, see House Committee on Education, Federal Aid for Home Economics, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1921, p.7; On immigration statistics and reform of naturalization laws for immigrant families, see : House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Proposed Changes in Naturalization Laws, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919, p. 21; Immigrant family literacy data and need for Americanization programs, see: Ibid., p. 15; On patterns of living arrangements, tenement house laws and associated death rates among poor, urban families, as rationale for housing policy reform, Senate Select Committee on Reconstruction and Production, Reconstruction and Production. Vol. 1, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 1921, p. 111, 456-457, 917 (Chicago as prime example).

Table 2.12: Sponsorship of Bills and Resolutions providing for Services for Immigrant Families, Women Wage Laborers, and Mothers, 56th-66th Congress (1899-1920)¹¹⁵

		Party of Bill Sponsor		Total
		Democratic	Republican	
Region of Bill Sponsor	Northeast	5	18	23
	Midwest	9	13	22
	South	7	0	7
	West	2	8	10
	Total	23	39	62

Soul members were less preoccupied with changing family demographics, and cited them less prominently during hearings and debates to justify policy positions. However, as seen in the previous discussion on women's suffrage, they sometimes used family demographic trends (such as high divorce rates) to critique the impact of Hearth policies, on the integrity and autonomy of the traditional, patriarchal family. Further, when challenging the necessity for uniform marriage and divorce laws across the country, Soul members emphasized the lower rates of divorce in their own states to stress the significance of *internal* moral codes of conduct; thus privileging religious and other 'higher' laws over mere man-made ones.¹¹⁶ Southern Democratic members also used regional demographic differences in the racial composition of the North and South, to question the capacity of non-Southern members to accurately contemplate the 'race question'

¹¹⁵ Also see Table ii in Appendix, for distribution of Bill Sponsors by *type* of Bill Sponsored (Immigrant Family, Female Wage Earners, Mothers, and Housing Bills). As seen in that Table, Northeastern Republicans disproportionately sponsored bills relating to immigrant families; Midwestern members, Republicans *and* Democrats, sponsored the most number of Bills pertaining to Female Wage Earners; and Northeastern and Midwestern Republicans as well as Southern Democrats were active sponsors of Bills pertaining to services for Mothers.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Representative Whaley (D-SC) in House Committee on the Judiciary, "Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce," 1916, p. 19-20: "Do you know of anything in the Bible that justifies divorce? ... Do you not believe where you have a provision for divorce it places a premium on people not getting along together, and that where you do not divorce laws that it works the other way? That has been our experience in South Carolina. We have not got any divorce law down there, and we have very few separations. I do not believe we have had more than seven in the whole States, with a million and a half population. You never hear of them going to other States and getting divorces, very few of them ... We have a high standard and live up to it. Why should we have our standard lowered because the other States want to force us to do it by the adoption of such a law as is proposed?...Where they know they can not get a divorce they are not going to separate, and it is only in exceptional cases that they do separate... It is very seldom that you find two South Carolinians who go outside of the State to get a divorce. They have been reared in a different atmosphere."

when, for instance, ‘in two counties in Georgia there [were] 101,000 [negroes] – more than in the whole nine suffrage states put together.’¹¹⁷

Soul-oriented Southern Democrats also used the conservative figures of the census occupation statistics for boys and girls in southern states to challenge Hearst organizations, such as the National Child Labor Committee, and critique their depiction of widespread employment of young children in cotton mills of the South.¹¹⁸ Regional demographic differences in family living conditions, as well as variations in the levels of industrialization and wealth distribution, were frequently cited in defense of state’s rights and local community norms in deciding what was best for southern families.

In sum, Hearst members of congress focused on rising divorce rates, increasing women’s employment, overcrowded familial living/housing conditions, and high infant and maternal mortality rates to propose enhanced state intervention in the interests of families and, most especially, of children. In contrast, Soul members of Congress were less interested in changes in demographic family behavior, instead they emphasized striking demographic differences between regions, such as differences in divorce rates, race composition, child occupation statistics, and mean family wealth and income, to challenge Federal intervention and argue instead for state’s rights and self-regulating, traditional family structures.

Thus not only did Hearst and Soul members highlight different aspects of family demographic behavior, Soul proponents in particular were especially cognizant of regional variations and used these to mount attacks on national (interventionist) Hearst policies. Were such regional demographic differences real or imagined? By looking at patterns of fertility,

¹¹⁷ Senator Bryan (D-FL), 63rd Cong, 2nd Sess., Congressional Record (March 3, 1914), p. 4199; Also “I have no more idea that the white women of the South would go to the polls alongside of the black women of the South than I have that they would do so in Colorado, *if the numbers were equal or approximately so.*” (emphasis added) [*Ibid*].

¹¹⁸ Extension of Remarks of Edwin Y Webb (D-NC), 63rd Cong, 3rd Sess., Congressional Record (January 23, 1915) p. 170.

nuptiality, and age of first marriage during this period, controlling for region, we find that they were indeed real. Members of Congress, Hearst and Soul, Republican and Democrat, did indeed highlight accurate family demographic conditions and trends in their own regions as templates for policy intervention. Thus regional divisions in family demographic trends yielded differences in family ideology and policy preferences among policymakers.

Fertility – Through the nineteenth century the country experienced a sustained decline in birth rates up until the 1940s, when this pattern was reversed by the Baby Boom. Although (white) fertility decreased across all geographic regions, during this period the South lagged behind the Northeast and Midwest in the timing and speed of reduction.¹¹⁹

After the Civil War, the South and West had substantially higher fertility rates than the Northeast and Midwest.¹²⁰ In 1810, the fertility ratios of the South were over 30% higher than those of New England, the region with the lowest fertility; this differential increased to around 60% in 1860 and remained the same through 1910, after which the fertility patterns across the regions began to converge.¹²¹ The Midwest moved from being a region with large families and, by 1920, began to mirror the low fertility rates of Northeastern regions (New England and the Mid-Atlantic).¹²² Thus through the late nineteenth-century and the Progressive Era, families in the North were increasingly smaller than those in the South and in the West.

The following Table 2.13 presents the data on regional fertility rates as measured by the proportion of children less than 5 years of age to 1,000 females 15 to 49 years of age, for the period 1850 to 1900. As may be observed the Midwestern states witnessed the greatest reduction

¹¹⁹ Haines (2000) “White Population, 1790-1920”, Michael R. Haines & Richard H. Steckel (eds.) A Population History of North America, p. 320.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 322.

¹²¹ Id., p. 323.

¹²² Id.

in fertility and family size – from about 7 children per female in 1850 to less than 5 per woman in 1900.¹²³ The Northeast continued to be the region with the lowest fertility during this period, from almost 5 children per woman to less than 4 in 1900. Compared to the other regions, although the South and West also had reductions in their fertility rates, high absolute fertility rates persisted across this period – from around 7 children per woman to over 5, in 1900.

Table 2.13: Number of children under 5 years of age to 1,000 females 15-49 years of age, by region: 1850-1900

		Year					
		1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900
		Proportion of Children per 1,000 females	Proportion of Children per 1,000 females	Proportion of Children per 1,000 females	Proportion of Children per 1,000 females	Proportion of Children per 1,000 females	Proportion of Children per 1,000 females
		Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Region	Northeast	479	483	430	396	349	377
	Midwest	739	751	666	598	510	469
	South	688	672	615	653	566	556
	West	713	776	692	664	568	536
	Total	651	673	612	596	515	500

Source: Compiled from Table IV, Proportion of Children in the United States, Bulletin No. 22, Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce and Labor, 1900

Demographers have highlighted the east-west and north-south gradients as prominent features of regional fertility differentials of whites in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The east-west gradient was consistent through the 19th century, with higher fertility in the Midwest and the South Central regions than in the Northeast and South Atlantic areas; however this differential largely disappeared by 1920 as reductions in the fertility rate of the Midwest brought that region more on par with the low-fertility Northeastern region. The north-south gradient, with higher fertility

¹²³ Bureau of Census (1900) *Proportion of Children in the United States*, Bulletin No. 22, Bureau of Census, (Washington D.C.: Department of Commerce and Labor) Table IV; Note Table 2.14 (p. 158) reports the proportion in terms of absolute numbers per 1000 females 15 to 49 years of age.

among Southern whites, was initially less significant but became more prominent over the course of the nineteenth century.¹²⁴

Marital and nuptiality data for this period also exhibit trends of North-South regional differences. As seen in the following table (Table 2.14), the Southern region had the greatest proportion of married men and women above 15 years of age. This comparative excess increased from 1900 through 1920, particularly in relation to the Midwest, the region that had previously the highest proportion of married people in its population. Marriage as a widespread practice in the South, in comparison to other regions, is especially observable in the data on single populations. The South had noticeably lower proportions of single people (Table 2.14); the difference between the South and other regions in this regard surpasses that in married populations.

Table 2.14: Proportion of Married Persons, 15 years and older by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920

		Year		
		1900	1910	1920
		Population Married	Population Married	Population Married
		Mean	Mean	Mean
Region	Northeast	54.2	55.3	57.8
	Midwest	57.0	57.8	60.3
	South	56.3	59.4	61.3
	West	53.5	55.3	59.6

Source: Based on Table 8, Percent Distribution of Marital Condition of the Population by Sex, By Divisions, and States, 1920, 1910, 1920 in "Chapter IV: Marital Condition", 1920 Census Report, U.S. Bureau of Census, 358

¹²⁴ Conrad Taeuber and Irene B. Taeuber (1958) *Changing Population of the United States*, (New York: Wiley) p. 250-253 cited in Haines (2000) "White Population, 1790-1920", Michael R. Haines and Richard H. Steckel (eds.) *Population History* p. 325.

Table 2.15: Proportion of Single Persons, 15 years and older by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920

		Year		
		1900	1910	1920
		Population Single	Population Single	Population Single
		Mean	Mean	Mean
Region	Northeast	36.7	36.1	33.3
	Midwest	35.3	34.2	31.2
	South	34.5	31.7	29.7
	West	37.8	36.2	30.8

Source: Based on Table 8, Percent Distribution of Marital Condition of the Population by Sex, By Divisions, and States, 1920, 1910, 1920 in "Chapter IV: Marital Condition", 1920 Census Report, U.S. Bureau of Census, 358

When we additionally consider widowed and divorced populations, we similarly find the predominance of traditional marital behavior in the Southern region; insofar as the greatest combined proportion of ‘married and widowed’ populations and the smallest combined proportion of ‘single and divorced’ populations were found in the South (See Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix).

Moreover in the South, unlike the West, higher proportions of married populations were not limited to women, Southern men too married in high proportions rather than in other regions. This is evidenced by computing the ratios of single to married men; we find that in the South for every one single man in 1920 there were almost 2 married men (1.82, Table 2.16 below); this ratio – and the preponderance of ‘married men proportions over single men’ in the South vs. other regions– grew through the Progressive Era.

Table 2.16: Ratio of Proportion of Single to Married Men by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920

		Year		
		1900	1910	1920
		Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Men	Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Men	Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Men
		Mean	Mean	Mean
Region	Northeast	1.39	1.44	1.65
	Midwest	1.35	1.43	1.66
	South	1.42	1.61	1.82
	West	.95	1.05	1.45

Source: Table 8, Census of 1920, General Report, Chapter IV, "Marital Condition," p. 358

As observed in the above Table, the West had starkly lower proportions of married to single men (in 1900, for example, there were more single than married men). This was largely reversed in the case of Western women; such that the West had disproportionately large percentages of married over single women (Table 2.17, below).

Table 2.17: Ratio of Proportion of Single to Married Women by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920

		Year		
		1900	1910	1920
		Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Women	Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Women	Ratio of Proportions of Single to Married Women
		Mean	Mean	Mean
Region	Northeast	1.57	1.64	1.84
	Midwest	1.97	2.04	2.29
	South	1.94	2.24	2.40
	West	2.25	2.38	2.73

Source: Table 8, Census of 1920, General Report, Chapter IV "Marital Condition", p. 358

The east-west differential in marital condition followed the same trend previously noted in fertility rates. The West began to converge toward parity with more dominant, traditional family behaviors – more men married than stayed single (Table 2.16 above), and, by 1920, the region no longer ranked the highest in its proportion of single people (Table 2.15 prior). Instead, by 1920 the Northeast had the highest proportions of single and combined ‘single and divorced’

populations than did the West (Table 2.15 and Figure 2 in Appendix). In the case of women, the Northeast had consistently higher proportions of single women than in any of the other three regions from 1900 through 1920 and the comparative excess in single women proportions in the Northeast became more apparent through this period.

The North-South differential thus became more marked through the early 20th century in the case of nuptiality, as was also seen in terms of fertility rates; while the east-west gradient began to subside.¹²⁵

North-South differences in family conditions also impelled variations in the positions of legislators in the 56th to 66th Congresses (1900-1920). These divisions were evident in the family cases used by members to illustrate their policy preferences.

In the Progressive Era Congress undertook the task of direct city management of the District of Columbia.¹²⁶ Thus among the numbers of committee hearings pertaining to the family, several were by the Committee of the District of Columbia and discussed (state-like) police power policies in that city. Thus a considerable percentage (roughly 35%) of total family cases referenced by members of Congress during this period hailed from the nation's capital. In order to analyze more effectively the partisan dimensions of the kinds of families used as policy examples, I therefore split the dataset of family cases into 'D.C' and 'Non-D.C' families. I then analyzed the 'Non-DC' family cases. While this method reduced the total N of family case examples, the aim was to study a more representative sample of cases from around the country

¹²⁵ The link between fertility and nuptiality trends is not surprising since, during this period, conception of children predominantly occurred during marriage. For the link between fertility, nuptiality (as well as the increasing practice of contraception) see Michael Haines (1996) "Long Term Marriage Patterns in the United States from Colonial Times to the Present," *The History of the Family: An International Quarterly* 1(1): 15-39; also Haines (2000) "White Population, 1790-1920", Michael R. Haines & Richard H. Steckel (eds.) "*Population History*," pp. 317- 323.

¹²⁶ From 1874 up until 1973, and the enactment of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, the District was under direct rule of Congress.

without skewing the results (particularly in terms of region) by including the 146 DC family cases.

Among ‘Non-D.C.’ family examples, clear partisan divisions in family region are observed. Democratic members of Congress, as seen in Table 2.18(a) (below), used families residing in the South to most illustrate *positive* cases, to be emulated in family policies (64.7% of all Democratic positive family cases were from the South); while Republicans disproportionately used Northeastern families as such positive examples (45.5% of all Republican positive cases).

Table 2.18(a): Positive Family Case Examples, Region and Area of Residence, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Region of Family Residence	Northeast	6	8.8	30	45.5
	Midwest	11	16.2	13	19.7
	South	44	64.7	12	18.2
	West	7	10.3	11	16.7
Population Size of Family Residence	Village	26	41.3	5	9.1
	Small town	10	15.9	9	16.4
	City	14	22.2	9	16.4
	Large city	7	11.1	7	12.7
	Metropolis	6	9.5	25	45.5

a. Appraisal of Family = Positive Family

However, when illustrating *negative* families the two Parties switched; as seen in Table 2.18 (b) Democratic members emphasized Northeastern families as ‘negative case’ examples (40% of all negative Democratic cases); while Republicans’ negative family cases were predominantly from the South (35.3% of all Republican negative cases).

Table 2.18(b): Negative Family Case Examples, Region and Area of Residence, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party Sponsor of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Region	Northeast	18	40.	19	27.9
	Midwest	2	4.4	20	29.4
	South	11	24.4	24	35.3
	West	14	31.1	5	7.4
Population Size	Village	5	11.9	9	14.5
	Small town	15	35.7	7	11.3
	City	12	28.6	20	32.3
	Large city	4	9.5	5	8.1
	Metropolis	6	14.3	21	33.9

a. Appraisal of Family = Negative Family

Controlling for positive and negative case examples, the relationship between family region and party of member associated with that family example is statistically significant. In sum, families from the South disproportionately formed positive case examples for Democrats but negative examples for Republicans. Similarly, families from the Northeast were mostly positive case examples for Republicans but negative illustrations for Democrats.

I further coded family case examples by the size of town in which they resided. A town with less than 5000 people was coded as a ‘village;’ that with a population between 5,000 and 10,000 as ‘small town;’ between 10,000 up to 25,000 as ‘City;’ 25,000 to 100,000 as ‘Large City;’ and that with over 100,000 was categorized as ‘Metropolis.’ As seen in Tables 2.18 (a) and (b), Democratic family examples resided in either small towns or small cities with populations of less than 10,000; Republicans also drew on families in small cities but the largest proportion of Republican family illustrations were more urban and resided in Metropolises (mostly New York City and Chicago), with populations of over 100,000.

Moreover looking at the region of the MCs themselves, we find that members from both parties generally drew on family examples from their *own* regions as *positive* cases. Thus Table 2.19 (a) shows that Democrats from the South disproportionately used Southern families as positive examples, almost 80 percent of their positive cases were from the South, and Northeastern families comprised of almost 90 percent of Northeastern Republicans' positive examples. However, when illustrating *negative* families, Table 2.19(b) reveals that Northeastern Republicans mostly cited families from the South (almost 44% of the times) and Southern Democrats, while still using Southern families to illustrate negative cases nevertheless cited many more Northeastern families as negative rather than positive cases (40.9% of all Southern Democratic negative family cases were from the Northeast as opposed to 5.6% of their positive cases – Tables 2.19 (a) and (b)).

Table 2.19 (a): Region of Positive Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 56th- 66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party of Active MC							
		Democratic				Republican			
		Region of MC				Region of MC			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
		Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Family Region	Northeast	2	0	3	1	21	1	1	6
	Midwest	1	3	7	0	0	10	1	2
	South	0	2	42	0	3	4	2	3
	West	0	2	1	3	0	0	2	8
	Total	3	7	53	4	24	15	6	19

a. Appraisal of Family = Positive Family

Table 2.19 (b): Region of Negative Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party of Active MC							
		Democratic				Republican			
		Region of MC				Region of MC			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
		Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Family Region	Northeast	1	8	9	0	10	5	1	2
	Midwest	0	0	2	0	7	10	0	3
	South	0	0	10	1	14	3	1	0
	West	2	2	1	9	1	0	0	3
	Total	3	10	22	10	32	18	2	8

a. Appraisal of Family = Negative Family

Tables 2.19 (a) and (b) suggest that in general MCs tended to draw on family examples from their own regions, more than from any other region *and* that they used parochial family examples more as positive rather than negative illustrations of families. For all the cases (positive and negative), by testing the exact significance of Pearson's Chi-Square statistic, the relationship between region of MC and region of family example was found to be statistically significant at a level of .05 for *both*, Republicans and Democrats.

When looking at the demographic characteristics of Republican and Democratic family case, we find that Democrats and Republicans were significantly divided in the marital condition, race, and income status of the family cases they referenced; however they were not significantly different when it came to the families' nativity or the mother's employment status in their cases.

Table 2.20: Demographic Characteristics of Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Marital Condition ** (Chi-Sq = 2.87, Sig = .092)	Single/ Separated	6	6.0	16	12.7
	Married/ Widowed	94	94.0	110	87.3
	Total	100	100.0	126	100.0
Family's Race *** (Chi-Sq = 29.9, Sig = .000)	White	74	65.5	124	93.2
	Non-White	39	34.5	9	6.8
	Total	113	100.0	133	100.0
Parents' Nativity (Chi-Sq = 2.04, Sig = .153)	Native Born	87	79.1	96	71.1
	Foreign Born	23	20.9	39	28.9
	Total	110	100.0	135	100.0
Income Status *** (Chi-Sq = 11.62, Sig = .003)	Lower Income	72	78.3	70	56.0
	Middle Income	10	10.9	27	21.6
	Upper Income	10	10.9	28	22.4
	Total	92	100.0	125	100.0
Mother's Employment (Chi-Sq = .062, Sig = .80)	Housewife	20	50.0	28	47.5
	Employed	20	50.0	31	52.5
	Total	40	100.0	59	100.0

** $p \leq .1$; *** $p \leq .05$

Both Democratic and Republican members overwhelmingly used families in which the parents were either married or widowed (94% of Democratic versus 87.3% of Republican cases); however Republican MCs drew on single-parent/separated family examples more significantly than did Democratic members. Also, Democratic members used significantly more non-white family cases than did Republicans (34.5% of Democratic cases vs. 6.8% of Republican), and emphasized lower-income family cases more than Republicans, the latter used larger proportions of upper and middle-income families.

Moreover, controlling for case appraisal (positive or negative illustration of policy question) Democrats emphasized lower-income families in greater proportion as positive cases; while Republicans highlighted upper-income families. Democrats similarly used many more non-white families positively, than did Republicans.

Table 2.21(a): Demographic Characteristics of Positive Family Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Marital Condition	Single/ Separated	1	1.7	2	3.3
	Married/ Widowed	58	98.3	58	96.7
	Total	59	100.0	60	100.0
Family's Race	White	44	64.7	58	86.6
	Non-White	24	35.3	9	13.4
	Total	68	100.0	67	100.0
Income Status	Lower Income	41	78.8	19	31.1
	Middle Income	7	13.5	19	31.1
	Upper Income	4	7.7	23	37.7
	Total	52	100.0	61	100.0

a. Appraisal of Family = Positive Family

Among negative cases though, only Race (and not income nor marital condition) was significant to Party – here too Democrats used larger proportions of non-white cases as negative examples. However, in terms of income, MCs from both parties disproportionately emphasized lower-income families as negative cases. Similarly, MCs from both parties focused on ‘single/separated’-parent families as negative case examples, even though more Republican cases exhibited that characteristic.

Table 2.21(b): Demographic Characteristics of Negative Family Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920)^a

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Marital Condition	Single/ Separated	5	12.2	14	21.2
	Married/ Widowed	36	87.8	52	78.8
	Total	41	100.0	66	100.0
Family's Race	White	30	66.7	66	100.0
	Non-White	15	33.3	0	.0
	Total	45	100.0	66	100.0
Income Status	Lower Income	31	77.5	51	79.7
	Middle Income	3	7.5	8	12.5
	Upper Income	6	15.0	5	7.8
	Total	40	100.0	64	100.0

a. Appraisal of Family = Negative Family

In sum, the Democratic positive family, as exemplified by the characteristics of their family case examples, was Southern, rural (from villages and small cities), married, lower-income and included many non-white families. Republican positive families, also from their case examples, were from the Northeast, they were urban (many from metropolises), also married but more upper-income and almost exclusively white. Republicans, much more than Democrats, were concerned with single-parent (separated and unmarried) families which they presented as negative families in need of policy assistance; and Democrats were correspondingly more focused on non-white families, which they, in turn, presented as both positive and negative examples.

Thus the characteristics of the family examples matched the actual demographic conditions of families from those regions. The Democratic Southern family examples – like most families from those regions – were indeed more rural, married, of lower-income, and racially diverse than the Republican Northern family examples. The family cases cited by members from

the two parties can be said to be fair representations of the family conditions prevailing from those regions. Finally the analysis of family case data suggests that during the Progressive era, race (first) and income differences (second) among North-South families appear the most salient to partisan divisions in family ideology and policy preferences.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the ideological substance, partisan membership, policy preferences, and demographic family conditions that collectively formed the Hearth and Soul family systems in the Progressive Era. It demonstrates that during this period Northern Republicans constituted the most consistent Hearth bloc in Congress; while Southern Democrats predominantly espoused Soul ideals. Each set espoused ideational visions of the family, as a policy target, and of its relationship to the state. I have also suggested that these ideological variations impelled policy divisions. The Hearth ideal of a companionate family, determined by its economic condition and in which the welfare of women and children was paramount, underpinned their preference for welfare and regulatory family policies. On the other hand, the Soul ideal of a patriarchal-hierarchical family, determined more by its moral strength and in which the welfare of the family, as a self-regulating unit, was essential, underlay their preference for ascriptive and autonomy family policies. The chapter also analyzed the demographic conditions underpinning the Hearth and Soul family ideologies of the era. Here my central finding was that the two family ideologies mirrored North-South demographic divisions in family condition and parties' espousal of one or the other ideology was, to a large extent, the outcome of its regional constituencies. For instance, Democratic members from the South were

more likely to support a Soul family ideology, reflecting family demographic conditions (lower income, high marriage rates, more racially diverse populations) in that region; and Republican members from the Midwest and North were more likely to support a Hearth family ideology, consonant with the demographic family conditions (more single-parent smaller families, higher income, more urban) of the electorate there. Bottom-up, society-centered phenomena, such as North-South variation in family demographic conditions, must therefore be acknowledged as, at least, conditioning the partisan clashes over family ideology and policy during the first two decades of the 20th century.

The Progressive era saw a reconfiguration of the boundaries between public and private in policy debate. No longer were certain family practices, such as maternal and infant care or even decisions of whether or not children should be allowed to labor, considered the concern of solely individual family units but were increasingly seen as involving ‘public’ significance, warranting state intervention. Yet, at this time, the ‘public’ face of private life was imagined as essentially an economic one. State intervention was solicited mostly for correcting or substituting family conditions which stemmed from economic deprivation.

In the next chapter, I turn to similar family policy developments in the postwar era, following World War II.

CHAPTER III

DELINQUENT MOTHERS & DESERTING FATHERS – ANXIETY OVER NUCLEAR FAMILY NORMS & THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE POSTWAR ERA, 1945-1956

Introduction

In her book, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, Elaine Tyler May demonstrates the connections between political and family values in the postwar period. Far from being the ‘inevitable result of a return to peace and prosperity,’ she documents how the 1950s nuclear family was in fact the “first wholehearted effort [at] creat[ing] a home.” The postwar iconic family represented the prevailing political ideology of domestic containment in which family was, for the first time, elevated to first line of defense against new, potentially dangerous, social forces.¹

As we shall see, this domestic ideal is well evidenced in national policy discussions in the decade following World War II, from 1945 to 1956. During this period legislators in Congress accorded the family a pivotal role in offsetting postwar and Cold War uncertainty and sought to create conditions conducive to its success. The 1950s nuclear family, indeed, left just such an imprint in national memory, as having been a ‘permanent haven when everything change[d],’² continuing on as a cherished vision still pursued in our own time.

¹ Elaine Tyler May (1988) *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York, NY: Basic Books) p. 11, 14. In her book May studies the confluence of public policy and private behavior, converging on the domestic family ideal.

² Republican Party Platform of 1992, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php> (62)

Supporting May's assertion, congressional hearings of the postwar period demonstrate the beginning of national policy recognition of the family unit as the keystone to social order or, more accurately, the event of its disruption as the root cause of social stress. This is unlike previous periods in the 20th century, such as the Progressive and even New Deal eras when families were approached more as loose collectives of individuals (male breadwinners, mothers or children) and less as a unit with its own agency and dynamics, capable of creating social problems. This approach regains salience in the later decades of the 20th century. A central finding of this chapter is thus that the postwar era marks a new development in family policy in that legislators then were the first to identify family instability as a significant issue for national policy consideration, prompting some to posit the strengthening of the (nuclear) family as an appropriate goal of national, not only state, legislation. This development came in the aftermath of World War II and the real and potential social dislocations that occurred among American families in its wake.³

During World War II several million families had been uprooted from their homes and from familiar and kinship networks on an unprecedented scale due to travel to war boom towns in search of employment or to army bases in order to stay close to servicemen-husbands. As part of postwar readjustment, these families now faced residential and economic uncertainty with the closure or reduction of war-related industrial jobs and the service discharge of husbands. Further, a large proportion of veterans' marriages and families had been formed in haste prior to their leaving for war and were often strained by the interim (wartime) marital infidelity by one or both

³ It is interesting to note that social dislocations in previous periods, such as during the Great Depression or after World War I did not result in such a policy development. While Congress then did consider and enact several pieces of prominent legislation to assist stricken families, the goal of family stability or rather 'containing' family disruption was not actively pursued through a concerted, national policy effort.

spouses. Increasing rates of divorce and family desertion in the immediate postwar period illustrates the instability of these war-forged families.⁴

Also, importantly, World War II had for the first time called for large-scale incorporation of women, particularly mothers, into the workforce and paid female employment had destabilized traditional gender norms within families.⁵ A sizeable proportion of working women returned to the home in the wake of demobilization and the return of male veterans, seeking to resume their previous role as breadwinners.⁶ Even so, a vast majority of them wanted to retain their jobs even in peacetime⁷ and the cessation of war did not result in the large-scale retreat of women from the work force as predicted.⁸ Thus women's (particularly married women's) paid employment became one of the 'many changes created by the war [that] became permanent once the nation...readjusted to peacetime living.'⁹ The war and its legacy thus severely strained traditional family norms and practices, causing widespread fears regarding its future direction.

As Karen Anderson has asserted:

⁴ Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg (1988) Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life (New York: The Free Press) pp. 170-171.

⁵ Between 1941 and 1944, 6.5 million women entered the workforce, more than 50% of which had previously been unpaid homemakers. By the end of the war in Europe, in May 1945, women workers comprised of 57% of all employed persons and almost half of all working women at that time were married, a dramatic increase in just 5 years from the previous low proportion (36%) of married women among female workers. The phenomenal increase in married women's participation in the labor force during WW II was in marked contrast to previous female labor patterns where married women would by and large eschew paid labor, outside of the home, with single women constituting the vast majority of working women. [Carl N. Degler (1980) At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present (Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press) pp. 420-421; also see: Karen Anderson (1981) Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations and the Status of Women during World War II (Westport, CT; London, England: Greenwood Press) p.p. 25-29, Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions," p. 172.]. Moreover, the war widened the occupational opportunities for women enormously and millions of women moved out of low wage work into good paying jobs, war-related and otherwise, that had previously been out of their reach.

⁶ In the first year after the end of the war 2.25 million women workers gave up their jobs voluntarily and another million were laid off in anticipation of returning male workers [Degler (1980) "At Odds," p. 422].

⁷ Women's Bureau Bulletin # 297, Handbook on Women Workers, 1975, (Washington, D.C: n.d) cited in Ibid.

⁸ In fact, at about the same time (in 1946) when women were leaving the workforce, 2.75 million women workers newly entered paid labor [Degler (1980) "At Odds," p. 422].

⁹ Anderson (1981) "Wartime Women," p. 7. This occurred despite 'public pressure to return to the home and [women's] competitive disadvantages...caused by discriminatory union and employer practices, their unfavorable seniority ratings, and preferential hiring of veterans [:] even though it meant accepting jobs as skill and pay levels considerably below what women had become accustomed to, as the sex-segregated labor market was reestablished during the reconversion period' [Ibid].

Although the war offered women new opportunities for independence and role flexibility and challenged conventional stereotypes regarding women's physical and emotional makeup, it also promoted considerable apprehension about family stability...Rather than providing clear-cut alternatives to previous sex role definitions, the war years generated contradictory tendencies, confusion, insecurity, and anxiety. Given this ambivalence, the continuation of contradictory behavior in the postwar years should not have been surprising.¹⁰

Anxiety over the family continued into the 1950s despite the rather contradictory occurrence of the large-scale adoption of the domestic ideal by the American population in that decade.¹¹ The erstwhile muted values of a consumer society now flourished in the postwar years, which insisted on the maintenance of a certain standard of living, as more important than even conformity to conventional gender norms.¹² The competing influences saw the sustained entry and retention of married women into the paid labor force alongside the continuation of wartime anxiety over the stability and durability of the family; working mothers were blamed for a rising divorce rate, child neglect, an increasing rate of juvenile delinquency, and numerous other social ills seen as exacerbated by women's new independent roles.¹³ The Red Scare and fear of subversive activities within the nation, along with a pervasive sense of national insecurity over the Cold War, further engendered a preoccupation with family conformity and the need to re-create a social equilibrium.¹⁴ Thus well after the war, as late as the mid-1950s, social observers such as Dr. Grace Sloan Overton (a nationally-known youth counselor) could be found cautioning large audiences, this one in Knoxville, Tennessee, about the precarious position of the family within American society:

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 111.

¹¹ In the decades between 1940 and 1960 increases in birth rates and in women's employment occurred in tandem with each other, throughout the social and economic spectrum, in contrast to the conventional inverse relationship between fertility and female work patterns in the periods prior and since. [See: Susan Householder Van Horn (1988) *Women, Work, and Fertility, 1900-1986*, (New York, London: New York University Press) pp. 5-7 (especially Figure 1.2 on p. 6) and p. 83.

¹² Anderson (1981) "Wartime Women" p. 9-10

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 10, 111; Richard Polenberg (1972) *War and Society: the U.S., 1941-1945* (Philadelphia: Lippincott);

¹⁴ May (1988) "Homeward Bound"

“...If we are not careful in America....within 3 generations, possibly 2, the homelife as we know it will not exist any more. The idea of family will be over and done with.”¹⁵

Policymakers in Congress during the postwar period were concerned with the emergence of such new conditions as potentially disruptive of traditional family norms, seeking to stem the tide. They evaluated policies relating to veterans and social welfare on grounds that they accommodated, and thus unwittingly contributed to, non-traditional family behavior. For instance, they discussed the bona fides of servicemen's marriages and debated the extent to which pension laws and dependents benefits contributed to or accommodated fraudulent or insincere marriages;¹⁶ now proposing new expansive dependent allowances to encourage marriage and family life among the lower ranks in the military.¹⁷ Furthermore they debated the legitimacy of public assistance, most particularly welfare programs to families (Aid to Dependent Children) and public housing projects, on the grounds that they encouraged subversive family relations.¹⁸

¹⁵ Statement of Mrs. B.H. Dillard, East Knoxville County Democratic Women's Club, Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Committee of the Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency (Education), 84th Cong 1st sess., 1955, p. 108.

¹⁶ House Subcommittee No. 10, Pay and Administration, of the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 1363, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947; House Committee on Pensions, Increase in Service Pensions for Certain Veterans and Widows of Veterans of Spanish-American War, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, pp 13-14 (describing the concern of Mr. William Gallagher (D-MN)/Mr. Leonard Allen (D-LA) over the liberality of pension laws that include young women marrying 'old goats' solely for their pensions versus Mr. Alvin Weichel (R-OH) and Mr. William Stevenson (R-OH) who stress eligibility of the widow regardless of her motivation for marriage), also, House Subcommittee on Spanish War Veterans of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Increasing Service Pensions for Veterans of the Spanish-American War and Their Dependents, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947 (same set of debates).

¹⁷ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Dependents Assistance Act of 1950 (Family Allowances) Part 1, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, p.7; Senate Committee on Armed Services, Dependents Assistance Act of 1950 (Family Allowances) Part 2, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 17-20 [Note bill sponsors of the Senate and House version of 81 S. 3986, Bill to provide family allowances for the dependents of enlisted members of the Armed Forces of the United States and for other purposes, were Senator Millard Tydings (D-GA) and Carl Vinson (D-GA)].

¹⁸ The hearings in which this issue is raised are too numerous to list exhaustively, representative examples may be found in: House Committee on Ways and Means, Social Security Act Amendments of 1949. Part 1: Public Assistance and Welfare, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 421, 547-548; Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security Revision. Part 1, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, pp. 138-139; Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security Revision Part 2, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, pp. 286-287; 295, 574; House Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, Analysis of the Social Security System Part 4: OASI: Coverage, Eligibility, Benefits; and Public Assistance, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 632-633; House Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, Analysis of the Social Security System Part 3: Economic Status of the Aged and Public Assistance, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, pp. 301-305; Senate Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking

Postwar policymakers in Congress were also apt to view ‘family breakdown’ as the chief cause of prevailing social problems. Juvenile delinquency, for example, received widespread media and congressional attention. In 1953 the Senate established a ‘Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the United States.’ Through the 1950s, the subcommittee conducted over 70 hearings in 20 cities across the country on a variety of topics such as comic books, television, pornography and plural marriages; all of which were seen to threaten existing social relations and traditional (nuclear) family norms. Senator Hendrickson (R-NJ), the original sponsor, told the New York Times that the subcommittee was formed in response to the alarming 30% increase in juvenile crimes in the five years since 1948.¹⁹

In contrast to current nostalgia for the 1950s as a Golden era of Norman Rockwell families, the subcommittee hearings highlighted a breadth of postwar youth delinquent behavior, extending from automobile theft and joyriding to youth gangs and juvenile sex parties. In all of these hearings family instability was repeatedly cited as having a profound impact on postwar social disruptions. Child development experts pointed to family breakdown and ‘delinquent parents’: deserting fathers who shirked their breadwinning responsibility and, more often than not, preoccupied, uncaring working mothers.²⁰ Thus the remarks and testimony of members of

and Currency, Housing Act of 1955, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, pp. 366-378; House Committee on Ways and Means, Public Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, pp.59-61.

¹⁹ ‘Senators to Hold Teen Age Hearings’ New York Times Sept 19, 1953.

²⁰ On working mothers as the cause of juvenile delinquency and other social problems, see: Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. of the Committee on Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency (Television Programs), 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1954, p. 82, 112; Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. of the Committee on Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency (Obscene and Pornographic Materials), 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, pp. 5-6; Also see: Senate Committee on Appropriations, Labor-Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1955, 1954, pp. 465-466. For a contrary position, refuting the significance of the negative role of the ‘much-blamed mother’ see: Statement of Dr. Frederick Wertham, Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. of the Committee on Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency (Comic Books), 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1954, p.86; Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. of the Committee on Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency (Philadelphia, Pa), 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1954, p. 170. On strong, responsible, fathers as curative of juvenile delinquency among other ills, see: Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S., “Juvenile Delinquency (Television)” p. 40; Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S., “Juvenile Delinquency (Education),” p.358, 360.

Congress reveal a deep-seated anxiety over maintaining social order and containing any abandonment of traditional family roles in the postwar era. However, as we shall see throughout the chapter, they were ideologically divided over whether or not this required national state intervention.

Since the Progressive Era, proponents of the Hearth family ideology had been focused on children - their unique vulnerability to social and economic stress and the inability of individual families and private or local relief groups to adequately address children's issues. The postwar era marked the pinnacle in the popularity of such child-centered ideals of family, while simultaneously witnessing an inward shift in policymakers' concern for children – from the structural impoverished conditions in which they lived (the Progressive era focus),²¹ now to individual parents and their crucial role in child success or failure. The Hearth legislative agenda in the early postwar period thus comprised of expanded welfare policies, now providing 'constructive' family services (including counseling, referrals and guidance) to instruct parents in parenting, and also some regulation policies, coercing delinquent parents to step up and fulfill their traditional family roles.

In the postwar period families found themselves in certain conditions which proved to be greatly conducive for the ascendance of the Hearth-endorsed nuclear family ideal and its associated models of parenting and child-rearing; these conditions also facilitated a greater openness to expert assistance and a heightened expectation of conformity to nuclear family roles. The large-scale movement of middle-class Americans to suburbs was a distinguishing feature of postwar society. Aided by the federal government's provision of low interest mortgages through

²¹ See, as an example of the Progressive-era Hearth focus on conditions of deprivation, Address of Judge Ben B. Lindsey, Judge of the Juvenile Court, Denver, Colorado, "Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children," pp. 218-219, cited in Chapter Two (p. 101-102) of this text.

the Veteran's Administration and the Federal Home Administration, the abundance of cheap gasoline, and extensive highway construction by state and federal governments, millions of middle-class Americans had moved to the suburbs.²² 'Suburbanization reinforced the [nuclear] family orientation of postwar society. Most... residents were newlyweds or young couples between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five and their children ...[and] fewer suburban wives and mothers worked than their urban counterparts.'²³ These conditions engendered child-centered family practices. As historians Mintz and Kellogg note: "Filiarchy" [came to] replace traditional patriarchy and suburban children were "pampered as never before" [as one best-seller explained:] "Mobile people [had] adopted the notion that you must eternally give to your children, otherwise you are not a loving parent.'"²⁴

Suburbanization and serial migration were also conducive for the widespread turn towards professionals, as experts on child-rearing. Faced with new technologies and the uncertainties of an atomic age, unmoored from kinship networks and ever on the move, postwar suburban families came to increasingly rely on professional advice in books, magazines and child-care manuals. Dr. Benjamin Spock, for example, became a household name.²⁵

Now more than ever, society expected more of its parents, especially of mothers, requiring them to be familiar with, and conform to, well-publicized child-rearing practices. Hearth advocates in Congress thus came to find an additional role for the national government, namely assisting parents to obtain professional advice and information regarding parenting and childcare. 'Delinquent' parents were those who were either too ignorant or self-centered and unwilling to independently seek or benefit from available advice and thus were viewed as

²² Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg (1988) Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life (New York, NY: The Free Press) 184.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) Domestic Revolutions 185.

²⁵ Ibid 187.

especially in need of active, even coercive, state intervention. Such parents, Hearth proponents claimed, were not limited to the lower income group.

For instance, Judge Arthur E. Moore, from Oakland County, Michigan, a juvenile court judge, in his statement in favor of legislation providing child welfare services across income groups, cited the case of the following family. The simulated responses of the juvenile judge here illustrate the preoccupation of Hearth advocates with the need to teach parents (especially mothers) how to realize child-centered, nuclear family norms.

‘Let me recite some typical juvenile court cases.

Cleaned only for court

“Who’s this nice, slick-looking, red-headed mother with these scrubbed-up children? What’s this on the investigation report? ‘Four neglected children, ages 5, 6, 8, and 9. Father just out of the Army. Mother keeps home dirty as a pigpen. Children without clothes or adequate food --- left alone while mother out with other men. Children have lice and ringworm. Haven’t been in school yet, although the semester is nearly over!’”

Judge to himself, “What a mother! Kids are cute now that they are cleaned up for court.”

“What’s that the father says? ‘He’s forgiven wife for tearing around. She has promised to straighten up and look after the kids.’ Poor G.I. Joe – you’ve taken a lot on the chin. Do you really have such faith? Or were you a cheater too, and willing to forgive temporarily to salve your own conscience?”

Aloud, “Anyway, sir, you deserve a try at it – say for 3 or 4 months. We’ll check up on you – put your family on probation. We’ll try to help you both. Get those kids in school! Clean things up! Start over again. Try to trust each other. *If your affection for the children is great enough, you can do the trick!* Good luck, soldier! *Both of you should have been taught how to be good parents when you were young.*”²⁶

For Hearth advocates the growing prosperity of American families did not signal their increasing self-sufficiency; on the contrary, families now more than ever – across all income groups --- faced new pressures, veering them away from their expected familial roles and thus enhancing their need for state-provided professional services and guidance. Thus the social convergence of demographic behavior around nuclear family norms that marked the “Golden

²⁶ (Emphasis added) Judge Arthur E. Moore, Judge of Probate and Juvenile Courts, Oakland County, Michigan, “Let’s Prevent Juvenile Delinquency: Juvenile Delinquents are Tomorrow’s Criminals,” in Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Maternal and Child Welfare, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1946, pp. 234-235.

Age” of the so-called ‘traditional family’ was simultaneously accompanied by a heightened expectation that parents now conform to these standardized, expert-determined, nuclear family roles. For Hearsh proponents, through grants-in-aid to state and local programs, the national state played an ever increasing role in providing resources to guide ‘delinquent’ fathers and mothers into these roles.

Soul advocates on the other hand, like in the Progressive Era, continued to espouse a laissez-faire conservatism²⁷ that remained, at its core, an antistatist philosophy. An expanded national (welfare) state was viewed as diminishing the self-reliance of more local groups such as families, communities and voluntary organizations to resolve their own social problems. For example, Soul proponents vehemently protested national policy proposals for health and welfare services that did not incorporate a means test. While Hearsh advocates argued that the means test reduced a public responsibility to a relief program, was ‘degrading,’ and effectively precluded a large proportion of families from seeking the help they needed;²⁸ Soul advocates claimed that the lack of a means test would ‘foster excessive dependence on government and discourage individual self-reliance.’²⁹ Within this framework, the problem of family disruption and its

²⁷ Clinton Rossiter (1955) Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books) as coining the term ‘laissez-faire conservative’

²⁸ See, for example, remarks by Claude Pepper in favor of providing medical care to children without a means test, arguing ‘we should not subject children to the ignominy or the embarrassment of their families or themselves having to meet a means test to get the care that will mean to children the proper physical, mental, and spiritual well-being.’ [House Committee on Labor, Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25, 79th Cong. 2nd sess., 1946, p. 2711]. Pepper was the sponsor of the Maternal and Child Welfare Act of 1945 (79 S. 1318). Also, in favor of no means test, see: Statement of David D Rutstein, MD, representing the American Council on Rheumatic Fever of the American Hearsh Association: “I don’t think it is desirable to make people poor in order to make them well” [*Ibid* p. 2944].

²⁹ Minority Report of Annual Meeting of the Children’s Bureau and Advisory Committees on Maternal and Child Health Services and on Services for Crippled Children, Children’s Bureau, United States Department of Labor, November 8 and 9, 1945 cited in House Committee on Labor, “Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25” p. 2765; for other witnesses opposing the ‘revolutionary’ character of the Pepper bill and the lack of a means test, mostly individual physicians and physician groups, see *Ibid*, pp. 2918-2919 (representative of the American Academy of Pediatrics); also Statement of Charles J. Chandler, Chairman of Kansas Crippled Children’s Commission submitted by Edward Rees (R-KS): “...such a move would seriously undermine the individual responsibility of our citizens which we believe to be a basic requirement of the successful continuance of our form of government” [*Ibid*, pp. 2906-2907].

attendant social ills required a resumption of private initiative and voluntary activity, all of which was seen to have been eroded by the New Deal.

In the postwar period, national state action was additionally opposed by Soul adherents on grounds of being ‘un-American’ and ‘socialistic.’ The Cold War and the ongoing threat of communism globally and nationally facilitated such an ideology. The Soul family ideology in the postwar era was thus primarily aimed at opposing the expanded national government in social programs, such as Aid to Dependent Children and the Fair Labor Standards Act (minimum wage provisions), and to uphold previous constitutional limits on the national state by asserting ‘State’s Rights’ and federal boundaries. At this time, Soul advocates viewed their challenge to New Deal Hearth philosophy moralistically – as much a battle for the nation’s Soul (its founding principles, fundamental ideals of liberal capitalism) as it was for its material future and prosperity.

The emphasis of Soul ideology on individualism and personal liberties did not extend to an acceptance of unconventional individual behavior; Soul advocates were equally, if not more, concerned with the instating nuclear family norms among mothers and fathers as were their Hearth colleagues. Indeed, the postwar period is distinctive insofar as both Hearth and Soul proponents shared similar cultural family ideals, pivoted around variations of the nuclear family. And yet in contrast to Hearth proponents, Soul members viewed the national state as part of the problem of family instability itself rather than its solution. Instead individual families could be more effectively made to conform to their expected roles by local, private, relief agencies that were more familiar with local conditions.³⁰ On the contrary, national policies were imagined to occlude voluntary and local communitarian action and generate a climate of diminishing moral

³⁰ See footnote 98 of this Chapter (p. 210) and accompanying text. (Statement of Eugene Millikin (R-CO)).

values, family and social responsibility. For example, Senator William Purtell (R-CT) described his thinking in this way:

‘I am beginning to wonder perhaps whether we haven’t swallowed the idea that down in Washington there is a thing called a Great White Father who creates wealth. I wonder whether that very philosophy channeled down to the kids in other forms may not have something to do with some of our delinquency problems, the removal of responsibility in other words from the community and State up to the so-called Federal level...and that idea of the removal of responsibility from the communities to the Federal Government may have something to do with the laxity in those communities in solving their own problems.’³¹

The position of postwar Soul advocates was in many ways a continuation of their position from the Progressive Era, when national state intervention in policy areas such as child labor and compulsory education were then also opposed on grounds of diminishing family autonomy and private family decision-making. In this period however we find that Soul advocates attributed a larger, deeper meaning to these qualities, circumscribed with an individualist (even capitalist) moralist framework. Thus ‘private initiative’ and ‘family autonomy’ were now imbued with a moral character, as being distinctly ‘American’ (democratic) liberty-based values in contrast to totalitarian, fascist ideals. Moreover ‘Federalism’ and protecting the boundaries between individual states and the national state also now became central to Soul ideation.

Thus in the postwar period both Hearth and Soul advocates were indeed ‘Homeward Bound,’ both now viewed the family as central to the nation’s social stability and success. Both were concerned with instating nuclear family norms and controlling non-traditional behavior. However this impelled two distinctive policy developments within their respective ideological frameworks. For Hearth proponents this meant an expansion of their policy focus – from solely an *external* focus on poverty and impoverished family conditions to now include a distinctly

³¹ Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the United States of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Juvenile Delinquency [Part 1] 84th Cong 1st sess., 1955, pp. 181-182.

internal focus on negative family dynamics and delinquent parents; all of which implied greater than ever national state intervention. For Soul advocates, on the other hand, ‘Homeward Bound’ and the Cold War era meant a new moralistic and individualist tone in which family autonomy, federalism, and free enterprise were now imbued with simultaneously ‘moral’ and individualist, American values; in essence, distinguishing the American nation from its communist and fascist competitors.

In this chapter I first analyze the impact of War World II and the New Deal national state on the emerging state and policy ideals of Hearth and Soul proponents in postwar congresses. Next, I connect these dual (national) state ideals to contrasting family ideals, attempting to show how a democratized companionate family ideal centered on the experiences of suburban and urban families was at the center of the Hearth interventionist state and a more hierarchical family ideal situated within a vision of small-business, organic social relations was at the core of the Soul minimal state. In the third section, I analyze the partisanship of Hearth and Soul advocates, identifying three partisan ideological factions and using my findings to reflect on the dynamics of party competition in that era. In that section, I also analyze the regional patterns among the three ideological factions, their preferred policies and the characteristics and regions of the underlying families at the core of their policy ideation. In the concluding section I draw comparisons between the Hearth and Soul frameworks of the postwar era and their later versions found in the ‘culture wars’ of the late 20th century.

§ 1: An Illusory Consensus: Hearth & Soul Variations in State and Policy Ideals

Far from the conventional picture of mid-century ideological consensus, national government expansion and its opposition impelled Hearth and Soul family ideational battles during the postwar era. This central dichotomy owed much to the effect of the Great Depression, the New Deal and World War II – each impelling its own set of institutional and ideational legacies that cumulatively left a marked imprint on postwar policy ideas and preferences. In this section I use the historical and institutional context of these events to parse out the central elements of Hearth and Soul ideals of *state*, contained within their approaches to family policy. In so doing, we shall see how both state ideals (expanded and limited government) addressed concerns over disruption of family roles, each offering their own policy solution and in turn accommodating its own family ideal.

§ 1 (a): The New Deal State and World War II: the Backdrop to the Postwar Hearth State

The diversification of family issues with which the postwar national state came to be concerned occurred in aftermath of the New Deal. The New Deal had dramatically altered the role of the American state in such a monumental way as to be referred to by a leading political scientist as the second founding of a new Republic.³² Franklin Roosevelt and his Democratic supporters responded to the Great Depression of the 1930s and redefined constitutional boundaries between federal and state prerogatives, successfully making the case of an active national state to the American public.³³

³² Theodore Lowi (1979) *End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.) 2nd ed.

³³ Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash (2009) *Dynamics of American Political Parties*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) p 81.

The social insurance and public assistance programs contained in the landmark Social Security Act of 1935 marked the first time the national state assumed responsibility for destitute children, the unemployed and the elderly. Public works programs and numerous New Deal alphabet soup agencies meant an exponential increase in the size and expenditure of the federal government. Regulation of financial markets and support of workers' collective bargaining rights were still more ways by which New Dealers had now brought the federal government into the lives of the American people.³⁴ The enhanced presence of the national state was now the new normal, seen as a positive virtue by a majority of Americans and not merely a necessary evil.³⁵

The increasing acceptance of an active national state (the Hearsh view) was accompanied for the first time by the recognition that 'the protection of family' was also a legitimate national policy goal, not one merely confined to the police powers of individual states. In the historic 1936 election, in which FDR won a resounding 60.8% of the popular vote, the Democratic Party Platform had asserted the 'self-evident truth...that government in a modern civilization has certain inescapable obligations to its citizens, among which are: (1) Protection of the family and the home. (2) Establishment of a democracy of opportunity for all the people. (3) Aid to those overtaken by disaster.'³⁶ Certainly, we find that there was an exponential increase in the number of bills addressing families which were sponsored in postwar congresses compared to, for example, the previous Progressive era. On an average, 42 Hearsh bills were introduced in each Progressive era Congress in comparison to 88 such bills per postwar congress.³⁷

³⁴ See, for example, William E. Leuchtenberg (1963) Franklin D Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, NY: Harper and Row); also, Sidney M. Milkis (1993) President and the Parties: Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal (New York, NY: Oxford University Press).

³⁵ Lowi (1979) "End of Liberalism."

³⁶ Democratic Platform of 1936, Woolley & Peters, "American Presidency Project"(13).

³⁷ In comparison 7 Hearsh bills were introduced per Progressive Congress compared to 3 in the postwar period. Computed from Tables 1.8 and 1.9 (p. 73).

For Hearsh proponents World War II further entrenched the need for an active, expanded national government. The war had revealed many lapses in families' lives which, they argued, could not be met by individual states or private charities alone. In particular, the health of citizens, especially that of children, received heightened attention. In November 1945, just seven months into his presidency, Harry S. Truman sent a Presidential message to Congress proposing a new national health care program, which continued to be a central priority of his Fair Deal agenda.³⁸ In that message, Truman pointed to the widespread rejections by the Selective Service System (the draft) during the war, which had classified 30% of all registrants as unfit for service. This, he claimed, was stark evidence that the health of children, like education, should now be assumed as a 'public responsibility':

The people of the United States received a shock when the medical examinations conducted by the Selective Service System revealed the widespread physical and mental incapacity among the young people of our nation...As of April 1, 1945, nearly 5,000,000 male registrants between the ages of 18 and 37 had been examined and classified as unfit for military service... It is...important to resolve now that no American child shall come to adult life with diseases or defects which can be prevented or corrected at an early age... We should resolve now that *the health of this Nation is a national concern*; that financial barriers in the way of attaining health shall be removed; that *the health of all its citizens deserves the help of all the Nation...* *The health of American children, like their education, should be recognized as a definite public responsibility...* By preventing illness, by assuring access to needed community and personal health services, by promoting medical research, and by protecting our people against the loss caused by sickness, *we shall strengthen our national health, our national defense, and our economic productivity.*³⁹

Hearsh proponents viewed this wartime discovery of widespread 'defects' among the American population as a wake-up call to the fact that 'individual families alone [could not] buy good

³⁸ On the Fair Deal, see, for example: Alonzo Hamby (1974) Harry S. Truman and the Fair Deal (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath) also Alonzo Hamby (1973) Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press).

³⁹ Harry S. Truman, 'Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program,' November 19, 1945, Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953, (emphasis added); available from the wide world web at: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=483&st=&st1=>

medical and emotional health for their children.’⁴⁰ Family incapacity extended beyond those with limited incomes as the financial burden of good medical care for chronic or catastrophic illness prevented ‘even families with comfortable incomes’ from providing full medical care to their children.⁴¹ Others pointed to the ‘terrifying’ national implications of ‘defective manpower’ in times of war and ongoing preparedness as further grounds for national state action.⁴² The push in the 1940s for the national state to assume responsibility for families’ physical and mental health thus greatly drew on the nation’s experiences during the war.

Further, during World War II the federal government had provided temporary services to the families of servicemen and war workers. Through these services it had entered into families’ lives in unprecedented ways and these wartime policy experiences were used as templates for proposed Hearth programs in the postwar period. For example, through the Emergency Maternal and Infant-Care program enacted during the war in 1943, the national government had provided servicemen’s wives with medical care throughout their pregnancy, during childbirth and thereafter, also providing care for their children during the first year of their lives.⁴³ Through the Lanham Act the federal government also provided temporary funding for public daycare centers, enabling mothers to work in wartime industries. By housing these day care centers in public schools, the Act pioneered their identity as a public service similar to public education, universally available to mothers across income groups. In this way, it altered the previous perception of public day care as a relief program, now extending their relevance to all working

⁴⁰ Claude Pepper (D-FL) Statement, House Committee on Labor, “Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25” p. 2710.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Services System, Statement, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Health of School Children, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, pp. 26-27.

⁴³ See: William M Tuttle (1993) “Daddy’s Gone to War”: The Second World War in the Lives of America’s Children (New York: Oxford University Press).

mothers throughout the income spectrum.⁴⁴ The emergency medical and day care measures were set to expire 6 months after the official end of the war. Hearth proponents in Congress called for them to be made permanent arguing that ‘we can not say to the mothers of this Nation that we value their lives and the well-being of their children in war, but think little of them in peace.’⁴⁵

In addition to enhanced welfare services, the legacy of the war included new coercive measures undertaken by the federal government to reduce delinquency and maintain social conformity during the war. So-called ‘victory girls,’ (also called ‘khaki-wackies’ and ‘free girls’ by the media) had received great attention by public officials and private citizen groups intent on preventing female ‘sex delinquency’ and safeguarding public morals and health.⁴⁶ In contrast to Rosie the Riveter (the much-celebrated, patriotic woman who left the home to work in wartime production) victory girls were derided for performing sexual service for servicemen out of a sense of their own (misguided) patriotic duty.⁴⁷ The May Act of 1941 established the Social Protection Division administered by the Federal Security Agency which was charged with the responsibility of ‘protecting’ servicemen from the spread of venereal disease by suppressing ‘lewdness, assignation and prostitution.’⁴⁸ Unlike previous efforts during World War I, the Act was focused on suppressing prostitution and extra-marital female sexual activity whilst eliminating punitive measures against servicemen who contracted venereal disease.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Elizabeth R. Rose (1999) A Mother’s Job: the History of Day Care, 1890-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press) p. 169.

⁴⁵ Claude Pepper (D-FL), Statement, House Committee on Labor, “Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25.” p. 2708.

⁴⁶ Anderson (1981) “Wartime Women.” pp. 103-104.

⁴⁷ Marilyn E. Hegarty (2008) Victory Girls, Khaki-Wackies, and Patriotutes: The Regulation of Female Sexuality during World War II (New York: New York University Press).

⁴⁸ Public Law 381 (May Act) 79th Congress.

⁴⁹ Thomas H. Sternberg et al (1960) ‘Chapter X. Venereal Disease’ in Leonard D Heaton, John B Jr. Coates, Ebbe C Hoff, Phebe M Hoff, Office of Surgeon General (Army) (eds) Preventive Medicine in World War II. Volume 5. Communicable Diseases Transmitted through Contact or Through Unknown Means (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Ft. Belvoir Defense Technical Information Center). Under the guidance of the SPD, state and local governments authorized all women arrested or held for investigation on various morals charges to be also detained for mandatory testing for venereal disease. This led to the change in morals laws across several states enabling them to be sufficiently broad to allow the apprehension of a wider range of ‘suspect’ female behavior. As the SPD repeatedly noted the commercial

Recognizing the May Act as extraordinarily effective in suppressing prostitution and venereal disease, members in postwar congresses recommended that it too be made permanent.⁵⁰ These regulatory measures during the war articulated an ongoing concern with the regulation of women and their sexuality during times of emergency, which continued through the uncertain postwar years. In addition, Hearsh advocates had also viewed the ‘victory girls’ phenomenon as a tragic illustration of the inadequacy of local welfare services during the war, hence arguing for continued national state involvement in adequately providing for family welfare during the period of postwar readjustment as well.⁵¹

Thus for much of the immediate postwar period, family policy debate in Congress assumed an active role for the national state centered on war time experiences and the perception that families were increasingly unable to absorb and address need. Further, the perceived policy successes of temporary wartime programs also served to bolster the claims of Hearsh advocates for the continued relevance of an active national state even in peacetime. However, the Great Depression and World War II did not obliterate the Soul approach, and its emphasis on individual self-reliance rather than state assistance.

§ 1(b): Individual-centered, Limited Government – the Soul State Ideal

As in previous historical periods, Soul advocates in the postwar era proposed an anti-statist philosophy, opposing the expansion of the national government and instead celebrating

aspect was not essential, that a prostitute was, in effect, ‘any woman who was sexually active despite the lack of “sincere emotional content.”’ (Anderson (1981) Wartime Women p. 104 (also see pp.103-110)).

⁵⁰ S. Rept. No.1332, 79th Cong 2nd Sess. (1946): “Experience has revealed that, but for the existence of the [May] act, women of ill repute would assemble in communities adjacent to practically every military and naval post for the purpose of engaging in immoral and illicit conduct.” Cited in Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Federal-Labor Security Appropriation Bill for 194, 79th Cong 2nd sess., 1946, p 131.

⁵¹ “It was because most of our counties failed to provide adequate services that many immature girls from poor homes found their way to army camp communities during the war years.” Statement of Russell W. Ballard, Director, Hull House Settlement, Chicago, IL, Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Maternal and Child Welfare, 79th Cong 2nd sess. 1946, p. 31.

individual rights, and family autonomy from the growing state.⁵² Laissez-faire and limited government policies were now identified with those ‘traditional American goods – freedom, self-government, and democracy.’⁵³ With the cessation of hostilities following VJ-Day, Soul advocates renewed their call to scale back government, instead urging the resumption of private enterprise, individual initiative and voluntary activity in the American economy and society. They claimed that American families like private enterprise had relinquished much of their autonomy, and argued that government should make way for autonomous decision-making and voluntarism; this was more in keeping with peacetime normal conditions.

Policy debates regarding the postwar housing crisis are particularly revealing of these differences in state ideals between Hearth and Soul proponents. Hearth proponents, emphasizing the continuing emergency of the time, stressed the importance of government initiative to provide housing for veterans and their families. Soul advocates, on the other hand, emphasizing the return of more peacetime conditions, looked to the release of restraints on private capital and to individual families to address the problem. They claimed that the ‘time had come’ to remove government from the business of constructing homes, instead affording greater choice and self-determination to individual families. The exasperation of Soul advocates with continued government involvement was palpable in many committee hearings, as we see here:

Mr. J. Harry McGregor (R-OH): I am of the firm conviction...that when we broaden the field and you start again to construct new houses for veterans, or anyone else, you are going to be again in competition with private capital and that is a thing that I, as one

⁵² Within Republican Party ideology, John Gerring identifies anti-statism as part of the party’s new Neoliberal phase, whose first appearance was in the election campaign of Herbert Hoover in 1928. Neoliberalism differed from the party’s previous statist ideology, focusing on the dichotomy of the individual over the state in stead of its previous dichotomy of order over anarchy [John Gerring (1998) Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996, (Cambridge, UK, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) Chapter 4]. Also Sundquist identifies a new line of cleavage in party competition in the 1930s, for and against ‘activist domestic measures’ replacing the previous line of cleavage since the 1890s, then for and against the money issue [James L. Sundquist (1973) Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States, (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution) pp. 183-217].

⁵³ Gerring (1998) “Party Ideologies,” p. 136.

member, want to get out of as soon as possible. *I feel the time has certainly arrived* when we should give the private owner and private capital the right to repair and construct.⁵⁴ ... There are probably two, three, of four million people in the United States who want to build their own homes...in their own way, and in their own locations...many people who...want to invest [their] money in homes and...do not want the Government to design their homes for them. A man and his wife want to design their own little home. *There is a good deal of pride in self-designing* so that they can provide for the necessary things they want in the home that they want to live in all their lives.

Chairman Fritz G. Lanham (D-TX): I think that is a normal disposition of every person. Of course here we are trying to deal temporarily with the veterans who cannot do that.⁵⁵ ... Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA): ...whenever private capital can come in and do a good job on housing they ought to be encouraged and ought to be allowed to do it, but *that has nothing to do with this problem*. Men are coming back who are not on their feet yet. They do not know where to turn. They are confused, and *there is a kind of carryover from the war*. In good housekeeping you use what you have in a temporary emergency.

Mr. J. Harry McGregor (R-OH): *When is the emergency going to stop, Mrs. Douglas?*

Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA): I suppose when the war is over and we begin to get the men back on their feet and get them into jobs and get them working.⁵⁶

Soul member, McGregor, and Hearth members, Lanham and Douglas, were clearly at odds in their interpretation of just what constituted the housing problem. For McGregor it was the lack of opportunity for private initiative and individual family self-determination and for Lanham and Douglas it was much more tangible – providing temporary and other housing for the millions of returning soldiers and their families.

The widespread problem in health care previously discussed, also prompted Soul advocates' to propose a healthcare program. However, unlike the Hearth proposal which was universal in scope and provided for compulsory national health insurance (viz. the Truman-backed, Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill), the Soul proposed program instead was individual-focused, here too highlighting principles of 'personal choice,' 'individual initiative' and 'responsibility' as being more consonant with the American way of life.

⁵⁴ House Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, Housing for Distressed Families of Servicemen and Veterans with Families (No.1), 79th Cong. 1st sess., 1945, p. 20.

⁵⁵ Ibid. pp. 22-23 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶ House Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, "Housing for Distressed Families." p. 29 (emphasis added).

“In a free society most real wealth and all goods and services are primary the product of individual initiative and personal effort. It follows, therefore that a *national health program, consistent with this way of life, must encourage the individual to provide health protection for himself and his family though his own effort...* While society has a moral obligation to help the destitute and the disabled in matters of health protection, it has an even greater obligation to do this in a way that will increase the individual’s appreciation of his own obligations and by methods that will not make him increasingly irresponsible and dependent on the state...*Voluntary methods might be excruciatingly slow but at least they do not destroy human values such as freedom and personal responsibility and they do develop the capacity for cooperation and thus strengthen human character.*”⁵⁷

Hence for Soul advocates the provision of material goods, such as health services or housing, was not as significant as an individual’s (non-material) character development and the overall maintenance of American values, its ‘way of life’. While increasing national prosperity allowed for even Soul advocates to acquiesce to the provision of greater material assistance by government, they were ever vigilant to contain its expanding role within the boundaries of individual freedom and responsibility. For example, a primary Soul proponent, Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) claimed thus:

‘...the productive ability of this country is so great that it can afford to see that we abolish hardship and poverty in the United States, that we put a floor under basic essential services. I think this is demanded by the humanitarian instincts of the American people... You have to be careful that the floor does not get too high, that you do not begin to support people to a point at which they will not work, themselves, as hard as they should.’⁵⁸

Thus unlike Hearst advocates, Soul proponents in Congress did not view the War (or, previously, the Great Depression) as a legitimate ground to alter what they considered traditional American goods: freedom, private initiative, and personal responsibility. Instead for them, the return to peacetime and the emergence of the Cold War battle against communism meant a

⁵⁷Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, National Health Program (Part 1), 80th Cong. 1st sess. 1947, pp. 565-566 (see also pp. 550-551).

⁵⁸Robert A. Taft (R-OH), Statement, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “National Health Program (Part 1).” p. 50.

greater imperative to resume these basic principles and greater than ever vigilance against an expanding, potentially tyrannical, national state.⁵⁹

In sum, while the New Deal had effectively institutionalized the Hearth approach among the American public by legitimizing the interventionist/partnership role for the national state in families' lives, it would be inaccurate to characterize the period as one of an ideological consensus among legislators. The Soul approach emphasizing individual family autonomy, self-sufficiency and separateness from government bureaucracies although less popular now than in other periods, continued to be articulated by some in Congress. The (national) state ideals of the Hearth and Soul frameworks in the postwar period are summarized in the following, Figure 5.1.


Figure 3.1: Postwar Ideals of State, Hearth and Soul Frameworks

State Ideal – Hearth Framework
<p>STATIST PHILOSOPHY</p> <p><u>Foundation:</u> New Deal expanded national state.</p> <p><u>Immediate Context:</u> WWII, Cold War continuing emergencies.</p> <p><u>Ideals:</u> Freedom from Want/Need, Alleviation of Human Suffering, market regulation.</p> <p><u>Threat Perception:</u> Spread of poverty; social breakdown; increased human suffering.</p>
State Ideal – Soul Framework
<p>ANTI-STATIST PHILOSOPHY</p> <p><u>Foundation:</u> Opposition to New Deal state.</p> <p><u>Immediate Context:</u> return of peacetime conditions, fight against communism.</p> <p><u>Ideals:</u> Individual Autonomy, self-reliance, private initiative, free markets.</p> <p><u>Threat Perception:</u> Tyrannical government, individual subjugation</p>

⁵⁹ On the preoccupation with centralization as engendering a tyrannical state, see: Senator Robert A. Taft, speech in Syracuse, NY, quoted in statement submitted by Dr. J.P. Sanders, Louisiana State Medical Society, Dr. Guy R. Jones and Dr. W.P.D. Tilly, *Ibid* p. 609.

Committee hearings at this time provide quantitative evidence demonstrating the coexistence of both frameworks during the period. I code real-life family case examples, directly or indirectly provided by members of Congress as illustrations of their policy preferences during committee hearings, for a revealed Hearth or Soul ideology. By so doing, I find that the Hearth approach is certainly more salient, but the Soul framework continued to be extant during the postwar period. In fact, as the data in the Figure below show, as the postwar period progressed away from World War II and into the 1950s more family cases were used to articulate Soul family principles rather than Hearth ones.

Figure 3.2: Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-56)



Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

Paired Samples t-tests reveal that ‘Congress’ and “Family Ideology” (Hearth or Soul) are negatively correlated, revealing that family cases in later postwar congresses were more likely to illustrate Soul ideals than were those from earlier congresses.⁶⁰ Thus we see that members of the 79th Congress (1945-1946) exclusively used family cases to articulate a Hearth ideology and the Hearth framework was dominant up until the 83rd Congress (1954-1955); however, we also see a

⁶⁰ N= 524, Correlation = -0.421, sig. = .000

few family cases illustrating the Soul framework in the 80th and 81st Congress which increases through the 1950s, peaking in the 84th Congress (1955-1956).

In sum, underlying the Hearth and Soul contest over state ideals in the postwar era was an ongoing difference in what their members assigned political value to. Soul advocates assigned political value to *character* goods such as individual initiative, responsibility, personal choice, which engendered a non-interventionist state. In contrast, Hearth proponents assigned similar value to more tangible, *material* goods such as provision of healthcare, housing and other services, requiring an active, participatory state. The intervening events of the Great Depression and World War II did not obliterate either of the two state ideals, also found previously in the Progressive era. Despite the widespread popularity of the interventionist Hearth state among the majority of the American public, a sizeable proportion of members of Congress and their constituents continued to embrace the ideal of a limited state privileging character, not material or service, goods. In the next section, I connect these Hearth and Soul ideals of state, as described in this section, to their underlying competing *family* ideals.

§ 2 – Postwar Family Trends and the Development of Hearth & Soul Family Ideals

The postwar period witnessed marked transformations in how Americans practiced and perceived family life. The emergence of the iconic 1950s family occurred alongside profound ideational changes in the American psyche in terms of the essence of family, its goals, and new-found significance to social and national success. In this section I analyze the extent to which social trends in family practice and ideation in the postwar period filtered into policy ideational

developments among members of Congress. The democratization of the companionate family ideal, deliberate rejection of traditional family practices, increasing reliance on experts, preoccupation with mothers, and the rise of a therapeutic/psychoanalytical approach to child rearing were some of the developments that accompanied rapid suburbanization and the growth of middle-class, mobile, suburban families. These social trends were differently interpreted and imbibed into Hearth and Soul ideologies, depending on their proponents' core constituencies and their underlying conception of society. Whereas the urban (and suburban) working-class, nuclear family lay at the heart of Hearth ideologies, Soul ideologies centered instead on the small-business family with independent capital; thus engendering dual conceptions of family policy – its goals and appropriate mechanisms.

In the postwar period, the companionate nuclear family idea gained great prominence, becoming the ideal around which middle-class suburban families designed their lives. In earlier times only the affluent could accommodate the need for affection, intimacy, companionship and child-centeredness in family life, which collectively characterize the 'companionate family ideal,' as discussed in the previous chapter. In contrast, the prosperous postwar era witnessed a 'democratization of the companionate family,'⁶¹ as its once-elusive goals were now within the reach of millions of American families.⁶² Love, togetherness and personal fulfillment were family attributes⁶³ that were now sought more universally, by children and families across regions and income groups.⁶⁴ This social trend was matched by a political, policy development.

⁶¹ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions," p. 186.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions," p. 187.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Hearth legislators⁶⁵ were beginning to incorporate the language of ‘needs’ into their legislative philosophy, arguing that unmet family ‘needs’ justified an ever more solicitous national state.⁶⁶ As seen in Chapter One, ‘family needs’ had found little or no mention in the platforms of either party prior to 1940; however since then (and particularly so after WWII) it became increasingly common.⁶⁷ The social trend toward the democratization of the companionate family ideal was accompanied by a political trend towards broadening or *universalizing* family need. No longer did policymakers approach the problems of lower-income families solely through the lens of their material needs; instead companionate aspirations such as relationship and psychological well-being were now applied to such families, becoming additional policy goals for national state action. Expanded state services (to be largely funded by the federal government) were proposed *beyond* material assistance, extending to relationship

⁶⁵ Note: “Hearth” and “Soul” legislators refer to those whose majority of references to family cases stressed either the economic or non-economic/moral/cultural quality of the family, respectively. For greater detail on coding used, see note 89 on p. 133.

⁶⁶ See, for example, remarks of Chairman Robert L. Doughton (D-NC) in reference to proposed legislation expanding Old Age Insurance: “If it were not a question of need, none of these pension plans, either by Government or by private industry, would be required at all. Is that not the paramount issue, the paramount consideration in these pension plans?” [House Committee on Ways and Means, Social Security Act Amendments of 1949 Part 2: Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 1515]. See also the remarks of Arthur J. Altmeyer, Commissioner for Social Security, on the public assistance programs in the Social Security Act: “ Since [the public-assistance system] is designed to provide for persons in need, it contracts or expands as need increases or diminishes....Since VJ-day the extent of need as been on the increase in the United States. Many factors, among them lessened work opportunities for submarginal workers with the return of servicemen to civilian life, and the inflationary trend, have been responsible for the steady rise in public assistance rolls and in payment levels’ [House Committee on Ways and Means, ‘Social Security Act Amendments of 1949 Part 1,’ p. 11-12. Also see exchange between Representative Noah Mason (R-IL), a member who consistently articulated a Soul ideology, and Hearth witness, George Ehinger, representing the Child Welfare Commission of the American Legion, regarding variable grants (based on income levels in individual states) and the ever-expanding scope of a ‘needs-based’ ideology of public assistance:

Mr. Mason: Is it your opinion, that because a child is born in Alabama and another child in New York, Uncle Sam is equally responsible to see that each child gets at least the minimum of his physical needs?

Mr. Ehinger: Yes, I would say so.

Mr. Mason: Then is that is true, then Uncle Sam is equally responsible to see to it that each child... is entitled to a minimum of his mental needs..?

Mr. Ehinger: Yes...

Mr. Mason: Then if I were to go one step further, Uncle Sam is responsible for the spiritual needs of each child, whether born in New York or whether born in Alabama?

Mr. Ehinger: No, I would not go that far because after all we are dealing with a public program and religion has not become a public program yet. [*Ibid.*, p. 878].

⁶⁷ Figure 1.3 (p. 30).

advice, guidance, referral and active instruction in child-rearing and family practices. The companionate nuclear family ideal, with its emphasis on emotional, not merely material, fulfillment at the same time thus served to expand the range of services considered necessary for a family to survive:

“People in increasing numbers are looking to the local welfare department not only for financial aid but for other services unrelated to immediate financial need...The American family today is under considerable strain. Many families experience family crises which threaten their very existence. Our very high divorce rate, for example, shows quite clearly that many families do not survive these crises. The records of the welfare agencies of this country....show that many families do survive when they get the kind of help they need at the right time. Sometimes the help that they need is financial.... Many families are emotionally in conflict to the point where they do not see how to go on living together as a group. Frequently, if such a family can find a skillful and understanding counseling service, *they can find a way through their emotional confusions to a sound basis of mutual understanding and relationship that makes it possible for them to continue to live successfully as a family group....*Certainly any effective steps to prevent family disintegration are worth taking, for nothing is more socially wasteful, both in terms of human values and expense than a broken home.’⁶⁸

As noted in the above statement from Jane Hoey, Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance, families in higher income groups were viewed as equally vulnerable to relationship stress and emotional conflict. By adopting this therapeutic approach Hearsh advocates now also justified an active role for the national state in *all* types of families, not limited solely to the economically needy or deprived.⁶⁹ Thus on the one hand, the pervasive presence of the companionate family in the postwar era attuned Hearsh proponents to psychological family problems *in addition to* economic/material ones, while on the other, it served to expand their clientele, inasmuch as all families (including the affluent) could be seen as needing some form of government assistance or

⁶⁸ Statement of Jane M. Hoey (1949) Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency in House Committee on Ways and Means, “Social Security Act Amendments of 1949. Part 1,” p. 402 (emphasis added).

⁶⁹ I need to mention that this new focus on psychology and relationship dynamics within the family did not *replace* the Hearsh’s focus on economic deprivation, it was however an *added* component of ‘family need’ one which was used to justify national state intervention into poor families in new ways and also now into non-poor families as well.

the other. Within their policy proposals, Hearth advocates now often proposed to meet families' emotional and social needs alongside their physical and material ones, extending therapeutic services to non-indigent families.⁷⁰

The incorporation of a family's (especially children's) psychological and mental well-being into the policy goals of Hearth advocates reflected another postwar trend: the increasing appreciation of professional and expert advice. In an atomic age, rife with uncertainty, in which children were now born into a world unfamiliar to their parents, families increasingly looked to professionals to tell them how to manage and lead their lives. The tremendous popularity of books such as Benjamin Spock's *Baby and Child Care* and Norman Vincent Peale's *The Power of Positive Thinking* illustrated this postwar disposition of young Americans to turn to the advice of experts in their quest 'toward a radically new vision of family life [by] trying self-consciously to avoid the paths of their parents'.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Hearth advocates justified the integration of material and non-material services on grounds that the two were closely imbricated with one another and one could not be effectively address in isolation of the other. See, for example, Claude Pepper (D-FL): a primary Hearth proponent, justifying the combined inclusion of health and child welfare services in the proposed Maternal and Child Welfare Act of 1946:

'It is a recognition of a fact of life that is common knowledge to many specialists dealing with the problems of child life. Many doctors tell me that often the medical problems they are called on to cure or correct in children have their roots in the social problems of their families with which doctors are not trained to deal. Likewise, social workers in helping the socially handicapped child, frequently need the help of the medical profession... There is the closest kind of relationship between the health and welfare needs of children.' [House Committee on Labor, "Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25," p. 2708].

Also see House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "Health of School Children," p. 47,48 on provisions of proposed bill, providing for prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical defects in school children along with similar 'mental hygiene' services for them. Katherine Lenroot, Chief of the Children's Bureau testified in favor of such an expanded, integrated approach, arguing that the 'needs of children... cannot be divide into separate watertight compartments labeled "health" or "welfare," but [they] must be viewed and served as living, growing human beings [Statement of Katharine Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau in House Committee on Labor, "Aid to Physically Handicapped Part 25, 2717]. Lenroot affirmed the universal need for child welfare services beyond income groups: 'A child may need such [welfare] service because conditions in his home are such that he is neglected or mistreated, or feels unhappy and unwanted, or because of orphanage, desertion, juvenile delinquency, difficulty in getting along in school or with other children, or mental deficiency. Experience has shown that children from all economic groups may have these problems, that many parents want help and advice in dealing with them, and that service should be available without feeling that to receive help from a child-welfare worker carries any disgrace or stigma.' [Ibid].

⁷¹ May (1988) "Homeward Bound," p. 26.

Indeed, ‘postwar America *was* the era of the expert.’⁷² Reflecting this trend, members of Congress too relied heavily on professionals – social scientists, doctors, psychologists, social workers – to formulate their policy ideas about family problems. At postwar committee hearings, for example, a full 57% of family case anecdotes (in support or against a policy proposal) came from professional witnesses, in contrast to merely 33% of all such anecdotes in the contemporary era, and 53% in the Progressive era. On the other hand, private citizens accounted for only 16% of all family case examples during postwar committee hearings, compared to 48% in the contemporary era, and 22% in the Progressive period. In contrast to today, professionals were thus much more likely than private citizens to play a central role in policy discussion.

Whereas professional experts have always played a pivotal role in the formulation of Hearth policies, making the case for greater state intervention and external agents’ partnership in families lives; during the postwar period professional witnesses also articulated some Soul family principles in their cases (see Table below), additionally stressing the independent importance of individual family dynamics separate from government.

Table 3.1: Witness Types, Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Row %	Count	Row %
Type of Witness	Private Citizen*	9	10.7	75	89.3
	Celebrity Witness	3	100.0	0	.0
	Professional Witness*	76	25.4	223	74.6
	Bureaucrat*	1	1.8	56	98.2
	State Legislator	0	.0	1	100.0
	Current Member of Congress	10	12.5	70	87.5

Data compiled by author, committee hearings 1945-1956

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

In the aftermath of World War II and the pervading pressures of the Cold War era, social scientists and other professional experts proposed publically-funded educational programs as a

⁷² Ibid.

means to achieve family stability and address social ills, such as juvenile delinquency. The educational approach was predicated on the ‘readily admitted fact that parents do not already know those things which will assure them of being wise and judicious in all situations. Parents themselves are the first ones to admit this.’⁷³ The programs served to reinforce the virtues of companionate practices of child rearing, reinstating the trend towards reliance on experts and downplaying parents’ own intuitive and local knowledge:

“A lot could be said about our rapidly changing technological age, about the every growing imbalance between advancing science and lagging social behavior, but parents no longer have to be convinced by such material. *Indeed, today there is a definite trend toward seeking help...* Parents are finding out that the only way they can raise good children is to know their children so thoroughly that they do not ask the impossible, but they do expect their children to make a worthy effort to use all of our capabilities.... Parents are also finding out that to have the wonderful children about which they dream they have to fulfill some of the dreams children have about them as being wonderful parents... Too often mothers go to seed within the four walls of a little home allowing the thousand and one repetitive and never ending duties to completely absorb them and to wash all the sparkle out of their personalities. *Mothers particularly in parent-education classes are finding opportunities to renew their growth as important, unique, and interesting personalities in their own right. They know better than ever that a vital, interesting, well-informed mother is a much better companion for the husband, and mother for the children than a half-dozen household martyrs.*’⁷⁴

Soul proponents in Congress were guided less by companionate family ideals. Love, affection and personal fulfillment, although important, were secondary to their more traditional family ideals of moral discipline, parental respect, obedience and personal responsibility. Unlike Hearth families, the Soul family ideal was more religious and more hierarchical, parental responsibility and authority often trumped child-centeredness and spousal fulfillment. For example, Mrs. Mary Bittinger, wife of the church pastor and social worker at the Presbyterian Child-Placing Service of the Presbyterian Church in Nashville Tennessee testified before the

⁷³ Thomas A Van Sant, Director, Division of Adult Education, Baltimore, MD, Statement, Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S, “Juvenile Delinquency (Education),”p. 276.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 277.

Senate and offered, as an example, her son's new family as an illustration of ideal family relations. These ideals were readily applauded by Senators Estes Kefauver (D-TN) and William Langer (R-ND).⁷⁵

...we have a 23-year-old son...who is a senior in the School of Business Administration at the University of Tennessee. He is graduate of...Peabody Demonstration School... and has served his 2 years in the United States Naval Air Force. His bride is also a graduate of Peabody Demonstration School where they met as freshmen, their recent marriage a culmination of college and high school romance. Marge is also a graduate of Peabody College where she majored in home economics and is now employed as color consultantin Knoxville. When these children were asked to delay their marriage a year, John replied: "You know I wouldn't do anything you forbid." Marge's statement was, "I wouldn't want to marry without your consent and blessing." They were obedient to the request made of them. They later enjoyed all the loveliness of a church wedding in the church of the groom, ceremony performed by the groom's father. Their request as a request from the groom's father was an autographed Bible to take with them to their new home. The first Sunday they were in Knoxville they sought out Sequoia Hills Presbyterian Church where they placed their membership, and where they are active worshippers and workers. It is a relationship as this that every American boy and girl should be able to enjoy, having grown up in an environment of emotional security."⁷⁶

From committee data (see Table 3.2 below) we find that a significantly larger proportion of Soul family examples rather than Hearth mentioned religion or religiosity in the family, stressed values as moral rather than secular ideals, and discussed principles of liberty and self-sufficiency.

⁷⁵ Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S, "Juvenile Delinquency (Education)," pp. 4-7.

⁷⁶ Statement of Dr. J.B. Bittinger, Pastor, Second Presbyterian Church, Nashville, Tennessee, and Mrs. J.B. Bittinger, Director of Social Services, Monroe Harding Home, Nashville, TN, in Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S, "Juvenile Delinquency (Education)," pp. 57-58.

Table 3.2: Religion and Values Illustrated in Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Value emphasized by policy***	Liberty/Self-Sufficiency	32	41.0	13	5.1
	Equality/Inequality	0	.0	38	15.0
	Social Justice	0	.0	48	19.
	National Gratitude	0	.0	29	11.5
	Democracy	0	.0	59	23.3
	Parents Irresponsibility	20	25.6	53	20.9
	Irresponsible Business	26	33.3	13	5.1
	Total	78	100.0	253	100.0
Religiosity Mentioned***	No	90	90.9	414	98.1
	Yes	9	9.1	8	1.9
	Total	99	100.0	422	100.0
Types of Values***	Secular	31	34.8	193	75.4
	Moral	58	65.2	63	24.6
	Total	89	100.0	256	100.0

Data compiled by author, committee hearings 1945-1956

*** the Chi-square statistic is significant, $p \leq 0.000$

As seen above, 41% of the Soul cases that mentioned values discussed ‘liberty’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ in contrast to only 5% of such Hearth cases; also a larger proportion of Soul cases focused on irresponsible businesses such as comic books, television programming etc as negatively impacting family life.⁷⁷ In comparison, Hearth cases mentioned values of ‘democracy’ (23%), ‘social justice’ (19%) and ‘equality’ (15%) in their descriptions.

The table also reveals that considerable proportions of *both* Hearth and Soul cases mention ‘irresponsible parents’ such that there is no significant difference between the two in this regard. 26% of Soul and 21% of Hearth cases expressly mentioned the irresponsibility of parents. Indeed in hearings we find that members when articulating both ideological frameworks expressed concern over, for example, ‘deserting fathers,’ as a social phenomenon of increasing

⁷⁷ By running column proportions tests (z-tests) these proportions are found to be (statistically) significant ($p \leq 0.05$), indicating a significant difference between Hearth and Soul cases on these issues.

proportions in the postwar period. Midwestern members in particular, such as Gerald Ford (R-MI), Andrew Jacobs (D-IN) and Louis Rabaut (D-IN) proposed numerous regulatory bills in successive congresses ‘making abandonment of dependents a federal crime.’ These bills were designed to enforce child-support orders across state lines, targeting the ‘illegal meanderings’ of deserting husbands who defaulted in their responsibility to provide for their families. The bills were thus nicknamed ‘runaway pappy bills’ and gained much public attention.⁷⁸ Members stressed the legitimacy for the involvement of the federal government in such cases, stating that:

“...this is a matter which vitally affects the national interest in that the strength of American families is of the utmost importance to the strength of America, and secondly, the fact that the ‘runaway pappy’s’ move across state lines invokes the constitutional ability of Congress to legislate on matters affecting interstate commerce.”⁷⁹

The emphasis on love and personal fulfillment within the Hearth companionate family ideal permeated even their approach to deserting fathers. Hearth advocates, such as Katharine Lenroot, Chief of the Children’s Bureau, were hence more prone to viewing the problem of non-support as part of a larger ‘complex’ problem, arising out of strained family relations: “Where family relations are so strained, where the husband and father is not only separated from his wife and children but fails to provide for them, support is but one of a multiplicity of problems.”⁸⁰ They thus proposed expanded welfare and counseling programs in addition to strengthening child-support enforcement.⁸¹

⁷⁸ See William J. Brockelbank & Felix Infausto(1971) Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (The Runaway Pappy Act). (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.).

⁷⁹ Statement of Louis C. Rabaut (D-MI) in House Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary, Making Abandonment of Dependents a Federal Crime, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd sess., 1949, 1950, p. 46.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 99.100

⁸¹ In 1935 the federal government first got involved with family support through the creation of the first national welfare program: Aid to Dependent Children was part of Title IV-A of the Social Security Act. The program involved the disbursement of federal money to the states in support of children whose fathers had died, become disabled, or otherwise deserted the family. Its original purpose was to ‘encourag[e] the care of dependent children in their own homes on in the homes of relatives by enabling each state to furnish financial assistance.’ [Act of August 24, 1935, Ch, 531, § 1, 49 Stat. 620]. Through the postwar period, there were several proposals to expand this

Soul advocates however were more concerned with parental authority, self-sufficiency, and discipline within hierarchical family structures. Within this framework, paternal responsibility was *the* keystone to family integrity; the phenomenon of deserting fathers thus implied the erosion of human values, the diminution of the self-sufficiency of the family unit, hence a threat to the very social fabric. Thus such fathers were roundly derided as being the ‘vilest segment’ of the population,⁸² and ‘buzzard bait’ who’d ‘proven that his fatherly affection is of not much value.’⁸³ Motivated purely by selfish pursuits these fathers, they claimed, only warranted punitive action and sanction by the state, coercing them to fulfill their monetary responsibility and hence restore family self-sufficiency.⁸⁴

Mr. Jacobs (D-MI): I agree with Ms. Lenroot that there is a great deal to the psychology of people who are participants in broken homes, but there are different kinds of psychology. Judge Niblack back in my district...has the best brand that I know of. He would say, “Did you work last week?” and the offender would say, “Yes, but I had a payment to make on my car.” The judge would say, “Your payment on your car is not nearly as important as your children. Put him in jail over the week end and we will see what he is able to do next Saturday.” That kind of psychology is tops because it works....These fellows...are unfit to bring children into the world. I do not think you need to hold them on your knee too much or coddle them.⁸⁵

As seen above, the disciplinarian, tough love approach within the Soul family ideal was mirrored in their advocates’ policy treatment of deserting fathers. Thus while Hearth and Soul members in Congress were commonly concerned with parental irresponsibility during the postwar period; their alternative family ideals (companionate or hierarchical families) meant variation in what they conceived to be the problem and what policy solutions it was seen to warrant.

program by providing greater sums for assistance and including even those families where the father was unemployed, rather than dead, disabled or deserting. See, for example, House Committee on Ways and Means, “Social Security Act Amendments of 1949. Part 1:” also Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security Revision. Parts 1,2,3, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. 1950.

⁸² Tom Steed (D-OK) in House Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary, “Making Abandonment of Dependents a Federal Crime,” p. 57.

⁸³ Ibid. Andrew Jacobs (D- MI) p. 114

⁸⁴ Id.

⁸⁵ Id.

Just as ‘deserting fathers’ received heightened attention by the national state for the first time in the postwar era, reflecting an inward turn to family psychology and relationships in society and politics, the problem of ‘delinquent mothers’ now also assumed salience in policy debate at this time. This policy development also reflected a social trend in which mothering was increasingly seen as pivotal to family well-being, acutely linked to the psychological make-up of children. For long, mothers had been viewed as central to their family’s and, particularly, their children’s health given their primary role in caregiving and in food preparation;⁸⁶ however in the postwar period mothers were now seen as fundamental to the very psychological fabric and emotional make-up of every individual.

Despite their confident rejection of conventional parenting practices, child care manuals of the 1950s were fraught with an undercurrent of anxiety.⁸⁷ Experts expressed an anxiety not only about children’s physical health but also about their emotional and psychological well-being. A figure central to this concern was the mother and a slew of psychoanalytical studies traced numerous childhood disorders to defects in mothering.⁸⁸ Throughout the period professionals emphasized the problems that could result from a mother displacing her own frustrations from (unfulfilled) needs of independence and achievement onto her children. This pattern of maternal behavior was linked to various resulting psychological disorders in adults, such as schizophrenia, homosexuality, identity diffusion, and an inability to assume the commitments of adulthood.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ For example in the Progressive era, progressive settlement workers and maternalist bureaucrats would target mothers, in their attempt to change nutritional and health practices that had been discovered to be unhealthy. Mothers were also seen as crucial in progressives quest to Americanize children and families of immigrants. See: Gwendolyn Mink (1995) Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press); and Chapter Two of this text.

⁸⁷ ‘No previous generation of child care books had ever expressed so much anxiety and fear about children’s health, safety, and happiness’ [Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p.188].

⁸⁸ Ibid p. 189.

⁸⁹ Id.

At its core, the concern over the ‘bad mother’ was fundamentally a concern about maintaining traditional gender norms, which had been threatened by the large scale entry of women into the workforce during and since the World War⁹⁰ and the converse fact that vast proportions of other mothers (suburban housewives) were now raising their children ‘with an exclusivity and in an isolation without parallel in American history.’⁹¹ Unlike in the contemporary era, when the companionate family has assumed an egalitarian form in which the roles of male and female spouses are interchangeable (in theory), the postwar companionate family was strongly prescriptive of traditional gender norms, prescribing a supportive, subordinate role of the mother and wife.⁹² In contrast with the 1920s, when popular readings of new psychological theories were used to justify a ‘freer sexual expression for women and men...[in] the 1940s [and ‘50s] ‘...psychology was beginning to serve the interests of those seeking to inhibit sexual and social freedom for women....psychologists and social workers were [now] being delegated the primary responsibility for adjusting women to more repressive standards.’⁹³ Through the 1950s the roles of wife and mother thus resumed their dominance as pivotal cultural values, being pursued by a vast majority women, with childbearing steadily confined within the boundaries of marriage.

During committee hearings mothers were invariably at the center of most expert witness accounts of social ailments; and defective mothering was linked to juvenile delinquency, inadequate sex education and social control of adolescent girls, lack of moral instruction, and

⁹⁰ Anderson (1981) “Wartime Women,” p. 10.

⁹¹ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p. 190.

⁹² In the companionate ideal of family life, ‘the American housewife was now respected as full and “active” partner in her marriage. In fact, partnership did not mean equality. A wife’s primary role was to serve as her husband’s ego massager, sounding board – and housekeeper....The fifties ideal of a marital partnership was based on the assumption of a wife’s role as hostess and consort. [Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p. 186-187].

⁹³ Anderson (1981) “Wartime Women,” p. 111.

indiscipline in boys as a result of their resentment to their mother's authority.⁹⁴ The bulk of both Hearth and Soul family cases mention 'married mothers', (see Table 3.3 below). However, 'widowed mothers' featured more prominently in Hearth cases rather than Soul. 12% Hearth cases mentioned widowed mothers versus 4% of Soul.⁹⁵ The Soul preoccupation with family self-sufficiency as a private solution to social problems can also be observed in their disproportionate mention of 'remarried mothers'. 5% of Soul cases which discuss mother's marital status described remarried mothers in comparison to only 1% of Hearth.

Table 3.3: Characteristics of Mothers, Illustrated in Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Mother's Marital Status	Unmarried	1	1.3	10	2.6
	Married	66	83.5	290	76.1
	Widowed*	3	3.8	46	12.1
	Deserted	4	5.1	24	6.3
	Remarried*	4	5.1	4	1.0
	Dead	1	1.3	7	1.8
	Total	79	100.0	381	100.0
Mother's Characteristics	Involved mother	27	57.4	71	44.9
	Irresponsible Mother*	18	38.3	32	20.3
	Ill mother*	2	4.3	46	29.1
	Dead	0	.0	9	5.7
	Total	47	100.0	158	100.0

Data compiled by author, committee hearings 1945-1956

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Moreover both Hearth and Soul cases in comparable proportions, talked about how involved mothers were, with Soul cases emphasizing the 'irresponsible mother' more than Hearth ones.

⁹⁴ On the need for mothers to provide 'moral guidance' to delinquent girls, see: Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. "Juvenile Delinquency (Philadelphia PA)," p. 37 [Statement of Norma B. Carson, Former Chief Policewoman, Juvenile Bureau, Police Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania]; On maternal authority as being resented by boys and the need, instead, for fathers to instill discipline and responsibility, see: Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S., "Juvenile Delinquency (Education)," p. 358, 360 [Statement of Reverend Nicholas W. Wegner, Director, Boy's Town, Omaha, Nebraska].

⁹⁵ Indeed widowed mothers were central to policies regarding both Veterans' Dependent Benefits, Social Security and Aid to Dependent Children; see foot note 81 (p. 204).

Soul cases often pointed to ‘irresponsible mothers’ to illustrate the irresponsible state – the national welfare state by attempting to substitute a dead, incapacitated or deserted father’s breadwinning role was, in fact, encouraging extramarital childbearing and irresponsible behavior by mothers. Some witnesses, particularly Catholic charity organizations, cited such cases as examples of the inefficacy of large public relief programs as opposed to more local, private relief efforts.⁹⁶

Hearth and Soul Conceptions of Society: Hearth and Soul ideals of family and state, also exhibited varied ideals of society, in which both family and state were imagined as embedded. At the heart of postwar Soul ideology was small business and its vision of an inter-dependent, organic society.⁹⁷ Small family-run businesses presented a Jeffersonian picture of society in which individual family units, employers, churches, and local groups were cohesively inter-connected to one another. Each actively looked out for one another and they were best able to do this without outside government intervention. This picture, of course, stood in stark contrast to the Hearth vision of discrete, suburban family units, always on the move, with little or no community life or connection; or else urban family units also with minimal connection to their neighbors.

The Soul organic vision of society permeated its proponents’ arguments to remove the federal government and reinstate local, private and voluntary, organizations at the center of

⁹⁶ See testimony of Msgr. John O’Grady, Secretary, National Conference of Catholic Charities, in Senate Committee on Finance, “Social Security Revision Part 2,” pp. 589-602 (and general agreement by Chairman Walter F. George (D-GA) and Owen Brewster (R-ME)).

⁹⁷ Within party competition, for the new centrality of small business to the postwar Republican agenda, in contrast to its previous corporate business base, see: Byron Shafer (2003), The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press) p. 186. (‘The organization [interest]...within the Republican Party was not really corporate business but small business, and a hostility to both social welfare programs and the taxes necessary to fund them remained substantively central to small-business sectors of the party.’) Also, Gerring documents the Republican Party’s new ideological shift (since 1928) ‘from economic nationalism to economic liberalism...Identifying themselves with *small* business, Republicans charged that this constituency was being victimized by government-imposed monopolies and by government itself...Shifting the focus of attention from the marketplace to the state, Republicans removed the onus of monopoly from American business and placed it squarely upon the back of government’ [Gerring (1998) “Party Ideologies,” p. 136].

family welfare and assistance. Neighbors and local communities, closely interlinked and cohesive, were seen to be best able to administer, monitor, and assess public assistance and welfare programs. Welfare measures by their very nature were understood as fundamentally local problems needing local solutions.

Senator Eugene Millikin (R-CO): Do not the churches and the lodges and the community chest and the governmental efforts of the local units concern themselves with that problem (of general assistance)?

Miss Dunn: ...they do concern themselves. But there is a great unevenness, Senator, over the country, as to the availability of those facilities...in some sections of the country, I think you do have highly organized machinery of public and private agencies to do a better job than you would find in some of the more remote and rural areas.

Senator Millikin: Could not an argument be made directly to the contrary: that the vastness of this country, with all its inequalities, makes it rather impractical to have a rigid (standardized) system?...why is it, generally speaking, that we at home are not able to solve these problems of general need where there is real distress? ... Why do we come to Washington, in other words, and ask for a solution of a problem which, by its nature, is local?...after all, if a person is sick, he is sick in the town of Squedunk; or if disabled, he is disabled in the town of Squedunk. And that has a direct impact on his family and on his neighbors and on the community, and in a dozen other directions, the most of which are local....What kind of country are we developing that we cannot take of crippled children at home?...what is the matter with out humanity, what is the matter with your local decencies, when people feel impelled to come to Washington to ask us here to pass laws and appropriate money to take care of a crippled child, who essentially is living at home, and whose problem reflects itself all over the community?⁹⁸

Conflicting, Hearth and Soul, ideals of society, can also be found in their policy debates over national wage legislation. Hearth advocates argued that economic deprivation destroyed all spirit, including home life, thus a 'decent' wage was one 'which w[ould] make it possible for a man with a family to raise his children.'⁹⁹ For them, society comprised of discrete family units

⁹⁸Senate Committee on Finance, "Social Security Revision Part 2," pp 164-165. Also, Senator Edward Martin (R-PA): ...If the local people are paying a pretty large percent of the expense, it has been my experience that they give pretty close observation themselves, and I do not believe that there is any better way to determine this than by the observation of the people in the community. The people in the community know the people that ought to have assistance, and they know the ones that can spend the money to their advantage and those who cannot. They know where there is a father that will go the taproom... [*Ibid*, p. 285].

⁹⁹ Testimony of Dr. Isadore Lubin, New York, N.Y., Appearing on Behalf of Americans for Democratic Action, in House Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor, Minimum Wage Standards and Other Parts of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 Vol. 3, 80th Cong. 1st sess., 1947, p. 1715; Hearth proponents claimed, that

within an economic order; where both the economic productivity of an individual and his family life itself depended on fair remuneration of his wage work. In illustrating his position in support of a bill raising the minimum wage in 1947 to 75 cents, Solomon Barker, Director of Research, Textile Workers of America, cited the numerous positive changes in the lives of southern textile families with the onset of organized labor and higher wages to the South. Here he describes workers' material, working conditions as formative of their very experience of family and community:

Mr. Barkin: You know what is normally referred to as the trifling attitude of the southerner?

Mr. McCann (General Counsel of Committee, AL): What we call white trash.

Mr. Barkin: That is right....The white trash that is referred to here, works in the cotton mills...do you know what that is created by? Low wages...

...You will find that when people are undernourished, when people do not have good conditions of living, work just does not matter because in cotton mills, for example, until a few years ago you could work a whole week and come out with a blank check because all the money was spent in the company store and you paid the company or the employer for his home and his services...and other debts...Under that set of conditions...people did not have any interest in jobs...They were indifferent and we used to say, back in 1939, that *we had never seen a textile worker walk about the town except in denims...His wife would be going into the mill wearing her print cloth dress, usually secured at the remnant shop in the mill out of the company store. She would come in walking downtown with tufts of cotton lint about her. She did not care about her appearance. The town was unimportant, her home was unimportant, nothing mattered.*

Now, I would like to invite members of your committee to visit a southern cotton textile town. They have not gotten many new homes....but there has been a tremendous improvement. They used to pay 25cents a room a week, now southern textile workers are paying \$35 a month but they now have modern homes... Why you could not go to the Southern community on Sunday and find anybody in denim; they are all wearing store suits and white shirts.

contrary to Soul assertions, that regulation of wages and ensuring workers a decent wage on which to raise their families would in fact ensure they remain self-supporting instead of turning to relief. Inadequate wages, they claimed, meant a family's incapacity to make ends meet no matter how hard they tried, forcing them to have to seek relief measures. They also pointed to the fact that 'unless the average family has three children the population of the United States is going to be reduced.' [Ibid] On this score see also Senator Douglas (D-IL) in Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Part 1, 84th Cong. 1st sess., 1955, pp. 54-55 arguing against the low minimum wage proposed by Secretary Mitchell of the Eisenhower administration on grounds that it would provide for less than half the amount needed to sustain a family in New Orleans and only 40 percent of the amount required in Washington D.C. ["If he didn't support [at least one half of a family] where would the human race come from?"]

They have a new bearing, they have a new independence....just because we raised the minimum wage and the wage of those textile workers.¹⁰⁰

Soul advocates on the other hand asserted that a standard, countrywide, minimum wage reduced the traditional humanism and cooperation in employer-employee relations into one of artificial contractualism and distrust. Qualities such as cooperation and inter-dependence within cohesive communities were once again privileged above, and separate from, coarse materialism. For example, a representative of the Southern lumber industry opposed a proposed minimum wage increase in 1947 in the following way:

‘The wage-hour law...has destroyed that amiable and cooperative employer-employee relationship that made American industry the greatest of any in the world... the wholesome security of the “family” atmosphere, so typical of the South and Southern industry for generations, has been dissipated by the Fair Labor Standards Act and, in its place, has been substituted a venomous of skepticism, distrust, and in some cases, actual animosity between men on whose cooperation the survival of both depend.’¹⁰¹

Another owner of an Auto Service plant from Columbus Ohio cited a personal case in which his generosity to a mentally-challenged worker and his family was misinterpreted by wages and hours bureaucrats, causing him to un-employ him till he could receive specific clearance:

“He is a moron who loafed in my blacksmith shop day after day, until...I asked where does that fellow come from and they said he just comes in here off the street, and lives nearby. I said, “Well, if he can sweep we will put him on the pay roll at 25 cents an hour, and give him \$10 a week, because he is in here all the time anyway...he has been there for 5 or 6 years. He gets \$500 to \$600 a year, which helps his father and he appreciates it very much.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Statement of Solomon Barkin, Director of Research, Textile Workers Union of America, on Behalf of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, in House Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor, “Minimum Wage Standards Vol. 3,” pp. 1807-1808.

¹⁰¹ Edwin L Douglass, on Behalf of Southern Hardwood Producers Inc., Augusta, GA, in House Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor, “Minimum Wage Standards Vol. 3,” p. 1464.

¹⁰² Testimony of Harry J. Broomhall, President, Hoffman Auto Body Service inc., Columbus, OH, in House Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor, “Minimum Wage Standards Vol. 3,” pp. 1489-1490. In recounting the case to another witness, General Counsel to the Committee, Irving McCann and Congressman Wint Smith (R-KS) stressed the inefficacy of the red-taped approach contained in government regulation of hours and wages: ‘Mr. McCann: Mr. Smith you may remember it [the case] ...of a man who was a moron, and the owner put him to work just to give him something to do...the Wage and Hour Division stated that he was guilty of violating the law because he had not gotten a certificate [a handicapped worker exception]. Then after he was found guilty of violating the law, they permitted him to employ this fellow as a man who was deficient at a reduced rate. Mr. Smith: But tell the whole story, it took him 3 months to get that permit. The inspector made two

In sum, Hearth and Soul ideals of family and society differed considerably even in the postwar era. Whereas Hearth proponents stressed companionate family ideals of love, child-centeredness, and reliance on expert knowledge, Soul advocates espoused a more hierarchical family structure in which responsibility, discipline and obedience were more central. The Hearth family ideology was predicated on a conception of society, in which families were discrete social units, and the success of family life was much dependent on material conditions at work and at home. In contrast the Soul family ideology assumed a more cohesive, organic conception of society built on cooperation and trust between interdependent social units. Within the Soul ideal, personal relations and the quality of intimate interactions were once more privileged over the materialism found in the Hearth ideal. The family ideals within the two frameworks are summarized in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Postwar Ideals of Family, Hearth and Soul Frameworks

Family Ideal – Hearth Framework
<p><u>Family Ideal Type</u>: Companionate Nuclear Family</p> <p><u>Ideals</u>: Love, spousal affection and companionship, child-centered, expert reliant</p> <p><u>Society Conception</u>: Discrete family units, working (material) conditions dictate home life.</p> <p><u>Core Constituency</u>: Mobile, urban and suburban, laboring families.</p>
Family Ideal – Soul Framework
<p><u>Family Ideal Type</u>: Hierarchical Family</p> <p><u>Ideals</u>: Parental authority, moral values, religious, obedience, discipline, anti-expert</p> <p><u>Society Conception</u>: Organic society, with inter-dependent and localized family units, cooperative social relations; interpersonal human relations more important than materiality.</p> <p><u>Core Constituency</u>: Small business family, family farm.</p>

trips by air to Cincinnati out to this man's plant to find out whether he could hire this moron at \$10 a week.... Here is the Government stepping in and telling you [a small business owner] how much to pay, and we have always thought that wages were based on the productivity of that labor... [and] by our age-old custom of supply and demand.' [pp. 2099-2100].

§ 3 – Partisanship, Policies and Regional Bases of Hearth and Soul Proponents in Congress in the Postwar Era

In this final section, I closely analyze the partisanship and policy preferences of Hearth and Soul proponents in Congress. However, in so doing, my focus continues to remain on ideology, to that extent I am able to discern three ideological factions among the two parties. The purpose of this section is to determine the link between parties, their regional bases, and the policy ideologies they come to espouse. In so doing, I first determine the partisanship of Hearth and Soul members in Congress, next the regions they come from, and finally the characteristics and regions of the families that serve as their policy targets. As we shall see, Hearth and Soul partisans for the most part relied on families they were most familiar with: families of their core constituents, their family practices and the ideals they engendered.

Partisanship: In many classic and recent accounts, the postwar period is characterized by the rise of a liberal ideological consensus in American politics.¹⁰³ Democrats held the presidency for twenty consecutive years and electoral support for the New Deal Democratic coalition and its public philosophy of expanded national government remained stronger than ever.¹⁰⁴ Born out of the Great Depression, social welfare issues continued to cast a long and dominant shadow during the postwar era; with foreign affairs coming in second, as the next cluster of salient issues.¹⁰⁵ Whereas the Democratic Party was widely presumed to be more in tune with public

¹⁰³ See, for example: Richard Hofstadter (1948) *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made it* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) ; also, Louis Hartz (1955) *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace); Nicole Mellow (2008) *The State of Disunion: Regional Sources of Modern American Partisanship* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press) p. 29.

¹⁰⁴ Brewer & Stonecash (2009) “*Dynamics of American Political Parties*,” p.105.

¹⁰⁵ Shafer (2003) “*Two Majorities*,” p. 8.

preferences on social welfare; Republicans were seen as more in tune with the public on foreign affairs. The ongoing electoral success of the Democratic Party lay in the fact that the public placed a much higher priority to issues of social welfare.¹⁰⁶

The Democratic Party was aligned with a blue-collar coalition, featuring working-class Americans across regions, a few multiclass ethnic minorities (notably Jews and Catholics) and the entire solid South. The Republican Party was instead aligned with a smaller, white-collar coalition, reliant on middle-class Americans.¹⁰⁷ Organized labor, at its peak at the start of the 1950s, was the mainstay interest group aligned with the Democratic Party, its Republican counterpart being small business.¹⁰⁸

Typically the political fortunes of the GOP in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s are understood to have been bleak, with the exceptional presidential victory (Eisenhower) being attributed to individual, not party, popularity. Within this understanding, barring a small proportion of ‘forceful dissenters,’ ‘committed conservatives [who] had not given up...their efforts to make a case against expanded government,’ the GOP itself is seen to have moved toward a more moderate course, accepting the triumph of ‘the Democratic Party’s argument that [national] government should play a strong and active role in society.’¹⁰⁹

Congressional committee hearings reveal this picture of ideological convergence in the immediate postwar period to be inaccurate. Instead, as some scholars have observed, the partisan dynamic within congressional elections was at odds with that of presidential elections. Thus while the ‘presidential Republican party *did* accept the social welfare consensus[,] [i]n

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ Sundquist (1968) “Dynamics of the Party System.”

¹⁰⁸ Byron Shafer (1998) *Partisan Approaches to Postwar American Politics* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House), Ch. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Brewer & Stonecash (2009) *Dynamics of American Political Parties*, p. 83.

congressional contests , however, the situation – with its incentive structure – was strikingly different.’¹¹⁰

‘Many seats remained reliably Republican, thus obviating the need for social welfare accommodation. Many of the rest were reliably Democratic, such that accommodation (or not) was irrelevant. Lacking much incentive, then, few successful Republicans moderated at the congressional level.’¹¹¹

Indeed my data from committee hearings during this period reveal significant ideological differences between congressional Republicans and Democrats during the postwar era. As seen in Table 3.4 below, members from both parties used a majority of family cases to articulate Hearth principles, nevertheless Republicans used a significantly *larger* proportion of their cases to consistently articulate Soul principles rather than Democrats; and Democrats disproportionately used their cases to illustrate Hearth ideals¹¹². 39% of Republican cases illustrated Soul ideals and concerns versus 14% of Democratic cases. Across both parties, 81% of cases however illustrated Hearth principles, compared to 75% in the Progressive era and 78% in the Contemporary period. Thus although social welfare issues and the Hearth ideology were undeniably central to postwar party politics, they were not, by any means, unanimously accepted across the board.

¹¹⁰ Shafer (2003) “The Two Majorities” p. 10 [emphasis added]; see also, Paul Eidelberg (1968) The Philosophy of the American Constitution: a Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, (New York: Free Press), chapters 4, 5.

¹¹¹ Shafer (2003) “The Two Majorities,” p. 10; Shafer argues that ‘Because president and Congress were separately elected, there had to be, in effect, *four* institutional parties within the American two-party system: a presidential and a congressional Democratic and Republican Party.’ He notes that this institutional differentiation in incentive structures between Congress and the Presidency while rendering the prospects for Republican control of government dire in the postwar era, presented no difficulties for the majority Democrats. For them the Democratic party label could comfortably accommodate differing presidential and congressional parties as both were dominant and if they needed to ‘reconcile for policy purposes, they could always do so in government, in Washington.’ [Ibid].

¹¹² Chi-Square = 35.5, p=.000

Table 3.4: Hearth and Soul Ideologies among Democrats and Republicans, 79th – 84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Row %	Count	Row %
MC Party	Democrat*	57	13.7	359	86.3
	Republican*	42	38.9	66	61.1
	Total	99	18.9	425	81.1

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

As we see in the following table (Table 3.5) these partisan ideological differences held firm through the decade, from the 79th Congress (1945-1946) to the 84th (1955-1956).¹¹³ Interestingly Republicans in the two Republican-dominated congresses, the 80th (1947-1948) and the 83rd Congress (1952-53), appear to have espoused Hearth principles in greater proportion than they did in all other congresses. On an average, Republicans used 61% of their family cases to articulate Hearth principles and 39%, for Soul. In the 80th and 83rd Congresses, instead, Republicans used more of their family cases (71% and 76%) to argue for Hearth principles. The data supports an inference that control of both chambers moved Republicans towards a more conciliatory position, rather than when in minority.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ The proportion of Hearth cases offered by Democratic MCs were significantly different from those by Republicans through the Congresses (79th-84th) [Chi-Square (Hearth/Party * Congress) = 236.2, $p = .000$; and similarly, the number of Soul cases offered by Democratic and Republican MCs were also significantly different [Chi-square= 25.6 p (exact) = .000]

¹¹⁴ The Republican majority elected to the 83rd Congress entered on the coattails of Eisenhower, arguably the most popular living American and a self-avowed “modern Republican” who accepted social welfare programs and largely continued FDR’s legacy. However given the strength of their opposition to the New Deal, despite their higher-than-average articulation of Hearth ideals, they did not evince sufficient support for the New Deal and accordingly were voted out at the first opportunity, in the midterm elections of 1954. Eisenhower himself could not pull them back to a majority when he was reelected by a landslide in 1956. This episode is interpreted to reveal the dissonance in the ideologies of (more conservative) congressional Republicans and the Party’s overall position, as seen through its Presidential candidates [Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 11, also cited: Stephen E. Ambrose (1990) Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Shuster)].

Table 3.5: Hearth and Soul Ideologies in Democratic & Republican Family Cases, 79th - 84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology								
		Soul						Hearth		
		Democrat			Republican			Democrat		
		Count	Column	%	Count	Column	%	Count	Column	%
Congress	79 th	0	.0		0	.0		135	37.6	
	80 th	2	3.5		5	11.9		4	1.1	
	81 st *	1	1.8		9	21.4		135	37.6	
	82 nd	0	.0		0	.0		36	10.0	
	83 rd *	5	8.8		12	28.6		11	3.1	
	84 th *	49	86.0		16	38.1		38	10.6	
	Total	57	100.0		42	100.0		359	100.0	

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

*Values in the same row are significantly different for all four columns at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the ongoing partisanship of Hearth and Soul ideologies during the postwar period. By focusing on family ideals (and attendant notions of state) within policy debates we find that although the Hearth ideology of the Democratic Party was dominant during this period, congressional Republicans nevertheless expressed the counter Soul ideology fairly consistently throughout.¹¹⁵

Region: Analyzing the regional affiliations of Hearth and Soul cases submitted by members of both parties it is possible to distinguish 3 ideational factions.

¹¹⁵ The 1950s saw what many refer to as the founding of the modern conservative movement. Influential conservative intellectuals such as Friedrich Hayek, William F Buckley Jr. and Russell Kirk began to widely disseminate their ideas, urging limited government as essential to the American democratic order. Although these ideas would grow in significance through the following decades, affecting a whole-scale party realignment only in 1980 with Ronald Reagan, as we see here, the political environment of the early postwar period was not bereft of such ideas either, as usually claimed. For an overview of postwar conservative thinking, See: Donald Critchlow (2007) *The Conservative Ascendancy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 6-40 and Leo R. Ribuffo (2003) 'The Discovery and Rediscovery of American Conservatism Broadly Defined,' *OAH: Magazine of History* (Jan 2003) 17(2): 5-10. Also see: George H. Nash (1976) *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America* (New York: Basic Books) as the classic treatment of conservatism during the period.

Table 3.6: Democratic and Republican Hearth and Soul cases by Region of MC, 79th-84th Congress

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Row %	Count	Row %
Democrat	Northeast	0	.0	81	100.0
	Midwest	0	.0	29	100.0
	South	57	22.4	198	77.6
	Mountain/Pacific West	0	.0	51	100.0
	Total	57	13.7	359	86.3
Republican	Northeast	21	51.2	20	48.8
	Midwest	16	61.5	10	38.5
	South	0	.0	1	100.0
	Mountain/Pacific West	5	12.5	35	87.5
	Total	42	38.9	66	61.1

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

The Republican cases in Table 3.6 (above) reveal that Republicans across regions articulated Soul principles in a substantial proportion of their cases (from 13% of Western Republican cases to 62% of Midwestern Republican cases), in addition to Hearth ones. Through a majority of their cases, Republicans in the Northeast and Midwest articulated Soul principles, while those in the West espoused Hearth ideals in their majority. Republicans in the Northeast used family cases to illustrate *both* Hearth and Soul ideals almost equally (51% Soul and 49% Hearth), demonstrating their more ‘moderate’ character in comparison to those from the Midwest who instead cited far more cases (62%) to illustrate Soul ideals. Midwestern Republicans such as Senators Robert Taft, from Ohio, and Homer Capehart from Indiana discussed self-sufficiency and maintenance of individuals’ and families’ autonomy from the state in policies such as private, voluntary national health insurance, opposing federal involvement in public housing and favoring a means tests to limit eligibility of families to federal social services.¹¹⁶ Overall, 39% of Republican

¹¹⁶ See, for instance, Taft’s (R-OH) debate with Hearth advocate, Claude Pepper (D-FL) in Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “National Health Program (Part 1),” pp. 55-61; Homer Capehart (R-IN) in Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Housing Act of 1955, Senate, 84th Cong 1st sess., 1955. Capehart, along with Senator Kenneth Wheery, was a strong proponent for military housing (Capehart Act passed in 1955 to authorize construction of housing units for military families). Yet his support for national housing projects

family cases illustrated Soul ideologies as opposed to 14% of Democratic ones. Republicans were by any account ideologically dissimilar from the majority of Democrats in the postwar era.

Table 3.6 also shows that outside of the South, Democrats from all regions exclusively espoused Hearth ideals through their family cases: we see that a full 100% of cases by Democrats from the Northeast, Midwest and the West illustrated such ideals. Southern Democrats within their Party were distinctive in that they alone used approximately a quarter of their cases to espouse Soul ideals. The data reflect partisan developments in Congress. By 1937 several conservative Democrats in Congress had become publically hostile to the New Deal and joined Republicans to vote against Democratic policies. These conservative Democrats all came from the South (such as Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), Representatives Howard Smith (D-VA) and Carl Vinson (D-GA)) and joined with Republicans to block New Deal programs; called the Conservative Coalition, they wielded much power during the postwar period.¹¹⁷ Like in the case of Republicans, the ideological distinctiveness of the southern faction of Democrats within

was limited to the military, while he staunchly opposed public housing projects. In this hearing he supports witness Henry G. Waltemade, President, National Association of Real Estate Boards, who submits material by Judge Roy F. Campbell, 80th Dist Judge, on the immoral practices, promiscuity, crime and juvenile delinquency in the San Felipe Courts projects in Houston, Texas [*Ibid.*, p. 339, 366-368].

¹¹⁷ Nelson Polsby (2004) How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press). Southern Democrats amassed much institutional power in the postwar Congress as the solidity of the Democratic South meant that they were reliably re-elected, election after election, thus being able to gain seniority and head key committees in the House, controlling the flow of legislation; Southern Democrats in the Senate used experience in that chamber to successfully use its institutional prerogatives, such as the filibuster, to also block unfavorable policies, such as civil rights legislation.

In addition southern Democrats' power also came from the fact that they were vital to the overall electoral success of the party. Since 1940 although the Democratic Party continued to carry presidential elections till 1952, they increasingly did so on the strength of their Southern vote, with only a slight advantage in the West. GOP prospects in House elections, too, were much less dire than is usually assumed: since 1938 in all regions outside the South, Democratic vote percentages had fallen to 50 percent or less, giving Republicans a tie or electoral advantage – their improved prospects finally resulted in Republicans control of both Houses of Congress in 1946. [Alan Ware (2006) The Democratic Party Heads North, 1877-1962 (New York: Cambridge University Press)] The South was thus crucial to sustaining Democratic dominance through the postwar period, barring which both parties were competitive. [Brewer & Stonecash (2009) “Dynamics of American Political Parties”]. This made for an inherently unstable Democratic coalition during this time, one which finally gave way when the South moved away from the Democratic Party, ultimately engendering the rise of southern Republicans and party realignment in its wake [Earl Black and Merle Black (2002) The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press)].

the Party reflects the institutional difference in Democratic Party dynamics in Congress and in the Presidency during the postwar era.

As we see in Table 3.4, however, Southerners despite their conventional loyalty to Soul ideals such as limited (national) government and State's rights, were often supportive of the Democratic social welfare agenda; 78% of Southern Democratic cases espoused the Hearth ideology, which was (at this time) was centered on social welfare. In fact some Southern Democrats (such as Claude Pepper (D-FL)) were populists and far from being conservative championed Democratic Hearth policies as strongly as their Northern colleagues. A great many Southern Democrats were moderates, however, who supported the expansion of national social welfare programs *despite* their opposition to a strong national state. They justified their pragmatism on grounds of regional inequalities, the South's poverty, and its increasing share of the nation's elderly and children.¹¹⁸ Senator John Connally (D-TX), in response to conservative Republican, Senator Eugene Millikin (CO), discussed the paradoxical quality of Southern support for national welfare programs in this way:

Senator Millikin (R-CO): ...The more we put these burdens upon the Federal Government which perhaps....should be handled at home, the less able we are to meet our problems at home. Last year we passed a bill in aid of crippled children, And frankly it made me sick, I mean physically sick, to see a situation where a community would bring the problems of a crippled child to Washington for solution.

Senator Connally (D-TX): ...I would like to suggest...that one of the reasons these things come to Washington is the unjust and uneven economic situation in the United States

¹¹⁸ Southerners argued that the large-scale northward migration since the 1930s was wrecking dramatic havoc on local welfare agencies inasmuch as fathers would migrate northward to seek employment, often leaving behind the very young, the disabled and the elderly. Moreover, many children who were once on relief during their youth or attaining adulthood and productivity would leave for the North. See, for example, Representative Sidney Camp (D-GA) remarked: 'We know that the States and the areas of higher income are mostly industrial states and we know that the able-bodied from all over the country have drifted there or go there for work. In my section the able workers go but they leave the children at home and they leave the blink back at home....We must have variable grants if we are to do the job....I would like to give an illustration of it. A mail carrier in my district came into my office...and he reported a blind man on his route, aged 75, and he said that the man had a wife. He said that an investigation showed that his children had gone to Detroit to work in the automotive industry and had left them at home. Unless we have a variable program there is no method that will reach these areas' [House Committee on Ways and Means, "Social Security Act Amendments of 1949. Part 1." p. 471].

whereby there are funneled to the rich centers like Chicago and New York, the problems and the emoluments that come from all over the United States....The people out in the States see the injustice of paying these enormous profits in comes into these rich centers and then having the rich centers holler, "Oh, States' rights. We cannot do this. You must go back and do it at home." When you try to force some little State right now to put on these programs alone, without outside aid, it is simply unworkable, and in a way tyrannical....My sympathies are all the other way so far as the governmental theory is concerned. *But the governmental theory is one thing, and digging down in your pocket and getting the money is another thing.* However, you cannot disassociate them...
...if you look back over the roll calls, you will find that a lot of southerners who believe in State rights, and all that, every once in a while vote for these bills putting the responsibility on the Federal Government, and the reason is just founded in what I have said in this statement.¹¹⁹

Thus far from a neat picture of ideological convergence, my data from family hearings support the more complicated account of postwar partisan politics, revealing the presence of three, distinct, ideological factions: Northern-based liberal Democrats, conservative Southern Democrats and Northern-dominated Republicans formed three separate camps.¹²⁰ As Table 3.7 shows these three ideological camps bore significant differences to one another.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Senate Committee on Finance, "Social Security Revision Part 2," p. 165.

¹²⁰ There is some divergence in accounts of party development in this period. Some point to the three ideological camps as mentioned above, highlighting the distinction among Southern and non-Southern Democrats, in addition to Republicans (Shafer (2003) "The Two Majorities"). Others see the division between moderate and conservative Republicans in this era as significant (Brewer & Stonecash (2009) "Dynamics of American Political Parties") thus positing the presence of four, not three, ideological camps during this period. As we have seen in this text, there were indeed some ideational differences between groups of postwar Republicans, some more supportive of a Hearth framework (Western and Northeastern wings) than others (Midwestern Republicans) which no doubt yield significant variances when one looks solely at roll call votes, however by focusing instead on their *discourse* during committee hearings we find that postwar Republicans shared a common (ideological) core: a liberty-based opposition to national government expansion, seen as even more of a defining American characteristic in the light of the omnipresent communist/fascist (ideological) threat during and after World War II. (See Gerring (1998) "Party Ideologies" pp. 133-135. Gerring describes the Republican ideology from 1928 to date as "Neoliberal," driven by free enterprise and small business rather than its previous ideological commitment to "Nationalism," in which the ideological goals of social order and big business interests held sway.)

¹²¹ Chi-square = 67.35, p = .000

Table 3.7: Hearth and Soul Family Cases by Ideological Faction, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Ideological Faction of MC					
		Southern Democrat		Non-Southern Democrat		Republican	
		Count	Southern Democrat %	Count	Non-Southern Democrat %	Count	Republican %
Family	Soul**	57	22.3	0	.0	42	38.9
Ideology	Hearth**	199	77.7	160	100.0	66	61.1
	Total	256	100.0	160	100.0	108	100.0

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings 1945-1956

** column proportions are significantly different (z-tests) for all three columns at $p \leq 0.05$

Northern Democrats exclusively emphasized Hearth ideals through 100% of their family cases. Southern Democrats highlighted such ideals in roughly three-fourths of their cases (77%), the others illustrating Soul principles; and Republicans used even less (61%) to propose Hearth ideologies, instead using 39% of their cases to emphasize Soul ideals. Southern Democrats thus occupied an ideological space *between* northern Hearth Democrats, on the one hand, and Soul Republicans, on the other, espousing a mixed Hearth-and-Soul ideology.

At the level of specific issues, in the postwar era Hearth advocates are found to have disproportionately concerned themselves with providing maternal and child health programs, establishing comprehensive child welfare services, alleviating family poverty, addressing the health needs of families and responding to the rising costs of living (see Table iii in Appendix).¹²² Soul family cases, on the other hand, disproportionately focused on education, sexuality and family reproduction issues, and juvenile delinquency (ibid). I need note that unlike in the Progressive era, however, sexuality cases now did not illustrate the moral panic over the reproduction ascriptive family relations such as that of the white family which we witnessed in the anti-miscegenation and white slave traffic Progressive era debates.¹²³ Instead members were

¹²² Significant differences between Hearth and Soul cases calculated by column means tests (z-tests). It is important to note that most policy issues illustrated through the family case examples.

¹²³ The issue of race was by-and-large suppressed in public debate at this time, the New Deal Democratic Coalition being sensitive to the concerns of white Southern members within its fold, who were vehemently opposed to the

now preoccupied with modern alterations to traditional sexual norms (such as increases in juvenile, premarital sexuality, homosexuality, and ‘active’ female sexuality, all of which came to increased public attention through the infamous Kinsey reports). Further, as seen in the previous section, Soul advocates would often point to extra-marital childbearing in the context of welfare policy rules, such as ‘man-about-house’ rules which they claimed induced extra-marital sexual behavior. Sexuality was thus another means for Soul advocates to critique government policies, reinforcing the central partisan dichotomy (for or against an expanded national state) and not replacing it.¹²⁴

I aggregated the above policy concerns into the four-fold policy scheme developed in Chapter Two and coded members’ reference to family cases for the kind of policy issue they addressed; classifying all policy references into the four categories of Ascription, Autonomy, Social Welfare and Regulation.¹²⁵ In Table 3.8 we observe the key aspect of partisan ideological politics during the postwar period: namely Social Welfare policies, which was the primary faultline in postwar politics. Members from all three factions used the majority of their family cases to make reference to Social Welfare policy issues. 66% of all non-Southern Democratic cases, 54% of Southern Democratic cases, and 51% of Republican cases mentioned Social Welfare policies.

national state intruding into (racial) segregation practices within their region. On the deliberate suppression of race issues in the construction of the New Deal Democratic Coalition, see, for example: William E. Leuchtenberg (2005) *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Lyndon B. Johnson* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press); Sundquist (1968) “*Dynamics of the Party System*” pp. 315-317; Brewer & Stonecash (2009) “*Dynamics of American Political Parties*”).

¹²⁴ See discussion on ‘victory girls’ during the war, and the May Act on pp. 188-189.

¹²⁵ See Figure 2.4 (p. 140), including text from pp. 139-140 for description of the four policy categories.

Table 3.8: Policies Illustrated through Family Cases by Ideological Faction, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Ideological Faction of MC					
		Southern Democrat		Non-Southern Democrat		Republican	
		Count	Southern Democrat %	Count	Non-Southern Democrat %	Count	Republican %
Policy	Ascription	0	.0	0	.0	0	.0
Category	Autonomy	21 _a	8.2	0	.0	12 _a	11.1
	Welfare	139 _{a,b}	54.3	105 _a	65.6	55 _b	50.9
	Regulation	96 _a	37.5	55 _a	34.4	41 _a	38.0
	Total	256	100.0	160	100.0	108	100.0

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings 1945-1956

Note: a, b subscripts report the results of column proportions tests with significance of 0.05. Each significant pair is marked by differing subscripts; those with identical subscripts having no significant difference.

However, testing for significant column proportions, we also see that it is mainly with respect to Welfare policies that members from the three factions significantly differed. No member from any of three groups mentioned Ascription policies (in contrast to both the Progressive and Contemporary eras) and they mentioned Regulation policies in comparable proportions (roughly a third of all cases); Southern Democrats and Republican members emphasized Autonomy policies in similar proportions (around 10%) and differed from non-Southern Democrats whose cases made no reference to Autonomy policies.

However, it is with respect to Social Welfare policies all three factions were distinct.¹²⁶ Non-Southern Democrats significantly differed from the other two camps in that they used the largest proportion of their cases to reference Social Welfare policies (66%), Southern Democrats were in the middle, not significantly different from either of the other two groups in their

¹²⁶ It bears noting that the centrality of Social Welfare policies to postwar family policy evidences the dominance of the Hearth framework during this era. I coded references to family cases independently for the kind of policy issue they raise (Ascription, Autonomy, Social Welfare or Regulation) and, additionally, for the ideological framework invoked (Hearth or Soul). As seen in Table (iv) in the Appendix, 90% of the family cases that mentioned Social Welfare policies emphasized expanded national government partnership with individual families; 10% of such Social Welfare cases were used to voice the need for *less* national government intervention emphasizing instead civil society institutions and voluntarism. On the other hand, 76% of cases highlighting Autonomy policy issues, such as parental control in education, self-sufficiency in housing etc, invoked the Soul framework, arguing instead for limited government intervention and the separateness of the family from the federal government; 24% of such Autonomy cases however saw a more active role for national government, particularly with respect to funding for local organizations to encourage or 'develop' self-sufficiency, a more dynamic form of conservatism soon to gain prominence in the late 20th century.

moderate proportion of social welfare cases (54%), while Republicans reveal their own distinctiveness by using the least proportion of their cases (50.9%) to highlight social welfare policies.

Three Kinds of Families: Partisan Hearth and Soul members differentially stressed certain family characteristics over others as illustrations for their policy preferences. Much like the members themselves, these family variants too had distinct regional variations.

Table 3.9: Characteristics of Family Cases by Active MC's Ideological Faction, 79th-84th Congress

		Ideological Faction					
		Southern Democrat		Non-Southern Democrat		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Types of Values***	Secular	89 _a	53.0	86 _b	92.5	49 _a	58.3
	Moral	79 _a	47.0	7 _b	7.5	35 _a	41.7
	Total	168	100.0	93	100.0	84	100.0
Family Race***	White	207 _a	91.6	113 _b	75.3	62 _b	71.3
	African American	9 _a	4.0	5 _a	3.3	0 ¹	.0
	Foreign/White Ethnic	6 _a	2.7	30 _b	20.0	1 _a	1.1
	Other	4 _a	1.8	2 _a	1.3	24 _b	27.6
	Total	226	100.0	150	100.0	87	100.0
Family Structure	Nuclear	222 _a	87.7	152 _b	95.6	99 _{a,b}	92.5
	Extended	31 _a	12.3	7 _b	4.4	8 _{a,b}	7.5
	Total	253	100.0	159	100.0	107	100.0
Income Status	Lower Income	153 _a	79.3	92 _b	66.7	63 _{a,b}	69.2
	Middle Income	36 _a	18.7	33 _a	23.9	22 _a	24.2
	Upper Income	4 _a	2.1	13 _b	9.4	6 _{a,b}	6.6
	Total	193	100.0	138	100.0	91	100.0
Mother's Marital Status***	Married	164 _a	71.9	126 _b	85.7	66 _{a,b}	77.6
	Widowed	34 _a	14.9	10 _a	6.8	5 _a	5.9
	Deserted	11 _a	4.8	11 _a	7.5	6 _a	7.1
	Other	19 _a	8.3	0 ¹	.0	8 _a	9.4
	Total	228	100.0	147	100.0	85	100.0
Mother's Characteristics***	Involved Mother	53 _a	47.3	25 _a	52.1	20 _a	44.4
	Irresponsible Mother	25 _a	22.3	3 _b	6.3	22 _c	48.9
	Ill or Dead	34 _a	30.4	20 _a	41.7	3 _b	6.7
	Total	112	100.0	48	100.0	45	100.0

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

*** Chi-square significant at $p \leq 0.05$. Note: a, b subscripts report the results of column proportions tests with significance of 0.05. Each significant pair is marked by differing subscripts; those with identical subscripts having no significant difference.

Family cases referenced by members from the three groups were significantly different in terms of the types of values mentioned, the family's race, mother's marital status and mother's other characteristics. No statistical difference was found in the cases regarding family income or structure. Both Southern Democratic and Republican cases mentioned morality in a higher proportion than non-Southern Democratic cases, the latter stressing secular values such as 'democracy' with greater frequency. Almost 5 out of every 10 Southern Democratic cases mentioned morality in some way, versus 4 out of 10 Republican cases and less than 1 out of 10 non-Southern Democratic cases. Whereas a vast majority of cases across the three groups were drawn from white families, Southern Democratic cases were the most white (92% compared to 75% of non-Southern Democratic cases and 71% of Republican cases). Non-Southern Democratic cases had the highest proportion of foreign or white ethnic families and Republican cases had the largest proportion of Hispanic and Native American cases, the latter drawn from mountain states such as North Dakota and Utah.

The racial composition of family cases submitted by member from the three groups to a large extent reflects the makeup of their constituents. Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 since Reconstruction African-Americans in the South had been effectively disenfranchised, their interests thus being peripheral to southern members. However as we saw in the previous chapter southern Democrats in the Progressive era cited black families with much greater frequency than members from other regions. Their almost exclusive focus on white family cases in the postwar period can be attributed to demographic shifts and policy changes since the Progressive period. Although in the postwar period the South was still the region with the largest African-American population, the increasing mechanization of cotton harvesting displaced millions of black tenant farmers who migrated out of the region in search of employment. Hence from 1940 to 1970 five

million African-Americans migrated northward, to more industrial urban centers, greatly diminishing their presence in the South.¹²⁷ Further as we shall see in greater detail in chapter five, local control over newly instated federal welfare programs served to institutionalize the paternalistic control of the southern planter elite over rural blacks and poor whites, enabling the south as a region to reproduce its racial politics on its own during this period without having to approach Congress directly.¹²⁸ Thus we find that Southern Democrats in the postwar period almost exclusively referenced white families as illustrations of their policy concerns and preferences. Outside of the South, Democrats had been gaining a strong foothold among white ethnics, first and second generation immigrants who were either themselves, or with parents who were, foreign-born. This constituency is reflected in the higher-than-average mention of foreign-born immigrant or white ethnic families among the cases referenced by non-Southern Democratic members and their witnesses. The large proportion of ‘other’ race families referenced by Republican members reflects Republicans stronghold in mountain states such as Utah and the Dakotas, where Native Americans could be found in larger numbers.

Column proportions tests¹²⁹ show that Southern Democrats were more likely than members from the other two groups to reference large, extended family networks where grandparents and other kin played active roles. Yet family structure and ideological faction of MC are not significantly correlated across the three ideological sections. Similarly, column proportions tests indicate that Southern Democrats, more than their northern Democratic colleagues, referenced lower-income families (79% percent of Southern Democratic cases that

¹²⁷ Nicholas Lemann (1992) The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America (New York: Vintage Books) Ch.1; Gavin Wright (1986) Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, (New York: Basic Books) p. 230-257.

¹²⁸ Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie (1999) Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South, 1865-1965 (Boston: Cambridge University Press).

¹²⁹ Note: a, b subscripts report the results of column proportions tests with significance of 0.05. Each significant pair is marked by differing subscripts; those with identical subscripts having no significant difference.

mentioned income versus 68% of non-Southern Democratic cases, talked about lower-income families). In the postwar era, as we saw in the previous section, Democrats attempted to ‘universalize need,’ calling for an expansion of state programs to assist all families regardless of income groups. Arguably, this strategy is reflected in the substantial proportion of non-Southern Democratic cases that reference middle and upper-income families (32% combined); the Table would indicate that this expansive approach was more ‘Northern’ in character, with Southern-Democrats in the postwar period focusing policy discussion on lower-income families. Republican cases on the other hand, do not show statistical difference with either faction of Democratic cases with regard to family income; whether in terms of lower-income families or those in upper-income brackets.

Finally, the data reveal that non-Southern Democrats, Southern Democrats and Republicans had viewed varied aspects of motherhood as important to policy formulation. Whereas non-southern Democratic cases, more than Southern Democratic ones, focused on married mothers (in 86% of all non-southern Democratic cases the mothers described were married versus 71% of southern Democratic cases); Southern Democrats were more likely to reference ‘other’ mothers i.e. mothers who were either ‘unmarried’ or ‘remarried’ or ‘dead’. Republican cases were not statistically different from either southern or non-southern Democratic cases in regard to mother’s marital status, 78% of their cases referenced married mothers. It bears noting that across the three groups, a substantial proportion of cases referenced widowed mothers; indeed, widows were central to much veteran’s and social security legislation during this period and this focus diminishes over the rest of the century where we find the percentage of widows referenced in family cases dropping to a fraction of its postwar high.

Among the cases that mention the characteristics of mothers, both Democratic factions had comparable proportions of cases that stressed the illness or deceased status of mothers (30% of Southern Democratic cases and 41% of non-Southern Democratic cases, versus 7% of Republican cases). Among the cases that express mention of ‘irresponsible mothers’, we find that Republican cases, reflecting their Soul ideology, tended to disproportionately stress irresponsible mothers in 49% of their cases, Southern Democrats, in keeping with their more moderate, mixed ideology, mention irresponsible mothers in 22% of their cases, whereas non-southern Democrats, illustrating their Hearth-based, structural focus on families’ conditions, appear to least focus on irresponsible mothers with a limited number of their cases (only 6%) mentioning them.

In sum, non-southern Democrats were more likely to reference secular values in white and white ethnic families, from both lower income and upper income groups, with nuclear family arrangements, in which the mothers were mostly married and actively involved in family rearing, with some incapacitated by ill health or deceased. These kinds of families were thus at the core of the Hearth policy framework, which called for an expansion of national state partnership with families.

Southern Democrats, on the other hand, almost exclusively focused on white families, more often from lower-income groups and with extended family networks, in which, compared to their Democratic colleagues from the North, more mothers were remarried or unmarried and a good proportion were seen as irresponsible, along with a sizable proportion of those who were ill or deceased. Among these cases we see a mixture of Hearth and Soul characteristics, where the focus on economic deprivation is combined with cultural concerns over irresponsible mothering and family morals.

Finally Republicans were the most likely to stress moral values through family cases, their families including racial minorities in addition to white ones, extending across income groups, with an overwhelming focus on mother's married status and a preoccupation with the 'irresponsible mother' to the exclusion of a mother's incapacitation through death or disease. The Republican family picture seen through these cases reveal a stronger emphasis on cultural Soul qualities of a family in which moral values and mother's involvement and marriage status were vital in their policy opposition of expanded national state-family relations.

In many ways then, Southern Democrats in the postwar period reflected both Hearth and Soul concerns, their family cases being an amalgam of both Hearth and Soul qualities. In the final part of this section we see how these three kinds of families – the white/white ethnic nuclear family of non-southern Democrats; the white, often-extended, lower-income family of southern Democrats; and the more racially diverse, nuclear, varied-income, family of Republicans had distinct geographical bases.

Geography: A claim underlying this and other chapters has been that the policy framework and family ideology of members of Congress reflect the family lives and practices found among their electorate. Within this bottom-up model, regional (electoral) bases of the parties are reflected in their family ideals and in the kinds of policies that their members pursue. Within the postwar period, we found three ideological factions: Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans, each more aligned with the Hearth, mixed Hearth-and-Soul, and Soul ideologies, respectively. I also coded the family case examples referenced by members of Congress and their witnesses for the geographic location and region in which the family resided. In this way I test the match between members' family policy ideals and the real families they

target across the nation, testing for relevance of the bottom-up model in the development of partisan ideologies.

Table 3.10 below finds a significant relationship between the ideological faction of the member of Congress and the region of the family case that he or she referenced during committee hearings.¹³⁰ The Northern character of Non-Southern Hearth Democrats is illustrated by the fact that these members disproportionately drew on families from the Northeast in referencing their policy ideals. Southern Democrats, on the other hand, were significantly disparate from the other two groups inasmuch as they drew on much a larger proportion of families in the South when citing family cases; and Republicans, in contrast to both kinds of Democrats, were more likely to reference families in the West.

Table 3.10: Family Cases by Region and Ideological Faction of MC, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Ideological Faction					
		Southern Democrat		Non-Southern Democrat		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Region	Northeast	53 _a	23.9	54 _b	40.9	22 _a	21.0
	Midwest	39 _a	17.6	15 _a	11.4	16 _a	15.2
	South	113 _a	50.9	42 _b	31.8	34 _b	32.4
	West	17 _a	7.7	21 _b	15.9	33 _c	31.4
	Total	222	100.0	132	100.0	105	100.0

Data compiled by author, congressional committee hearings, 1945-1956

Note: a, b subscripts report the results of column proportions tests with significance of 0.05. Each significant pair is marked by differing subscripts; those with identical subscripts having no significant difference.

51% of southern Democratic cases hailed from the South and 41% of Non-Southern Democratic cases resided in the Northeast, with roughly 32% each of Republican cases residing in the South and the West. While Republican cases from the South are not statistically different from the proportion of northern Democratic cases from that region (same subscript) it bears noting that Republicans drew their largest proportion of cases from the South. This would seem to suggest

¹³⁰ Chi-square= 49.1, p=.000

that for Republicans their Soul family ideology was not reflective of the lives of their (majority) constituents, since the South was solidly Democratic at this time and had almost no Republican representation in Congress. Republican reliance on families in the West is more reflective of a bottom-up story since a good many districts in certain Rocky Mountain states were indeed reliably Republican.

Conclusion

In the postwar era both Hearth and Soul approaches for the first time evidence a preoccupation with internal family dynamics and the policy significance of family disruption. Far from reflecting a period of idyllic family relations, members of Congress from both parties and ideological approaches articulated an underlying social anxiety over the stability and certainty of the nuclear family as a bulwark against the challenges of that era. Depending on their perspective, family breakdown was used to argue for expanded national government programs and resources or else viewed as a reason for limiting national state involvement. We shall see that these dual approaches to family disintegration continue on into the contemporary period.

Postwar family policy dynamics were, however, different from contemporary ones in two important respects. Firstly, in the postwar period while the proponents of Hearth and Soul ideologies emphasized different qualities of families in their family policy ideals (moralistic v. secular, parent v. child-centered etc.) they both commonly assumed a nuclear family form. In contrast, as we shall see in the next chapter, in our current period Hearth and Soul advocates diverge sharply in their very assumptions of family form; Hearth proponents eschewing the

dominance of one form/structure and Soul advocates staunchly supporting the nuclear family form as the only legitimate family form.

Secondly and more importantly, in the postwar period, national government expansion and its opposition were at the core of the development of two family policy ideals. Thus social welfare (its expansion or curtailment) was the dominant policy axis on which members of both camps addressed family issues. This is unlike our current period when divergent cultural ideals themselves are at the core of the divergence in Hearth and Soul family policy ideals. Hence, now Soul advocates are less preoccupied with limiting government and more concerned with formulating policies that instate their own cultural ideals, engaging the national state both positively and negatively. Thus compared to the contemporary period, while we find the coexistence of both Hearth and Soul ideologies during the postwar period too, its politics was less partisan and much less culturally polarized than it is today

CHAPTER IV

BIG BROTHER OR STRONG FATHER? THE BATTLE OVER CULTURAL FAMILY
VALUES, 1980-2005

Since the last three decades of the 20th century, the national state has interacted with families more frequently and in ways far diverse from its previous, more-narrow, arrangements. Starting with the New Deal, the (federal) State had assumed the welfarist responsibility of enhancing the economic conditions of vulnerable families – initially devised to assist those left destitute, unemployed and impoverished by the Great Depression. In the postwar period the welfare function of the national state was expanded to extend to the emotional and psychological well-being of families in addition to their economic well-being, now including middle- and even upper-income families. As seen in the preceding chapter, this large-scale expansion in effect reconfigured the ideational boundaries between family and national state, re-ordering the longtime distinction between national and individual state prerogatives, in which most family matters were previously only considered under the jurisdiction of state governments.

In the postwar period, the dichotomy of an expanded national government and its opposition reverberated through Hearth and Soul ideologies and competing ideals of family (self-reliant or in need) were contained within divergent ideologies of state, while cultural differences were deliberately suppressed. The contemporary era is unlike any other to the extent that the enduring struggle over Heart and Soul family ideals is less about competing ideologies of the state and more about dueling cultural ideals themselves.

Thus the Hearth framework now assigns political value to its progressive cultural values. Material assistance is now tied to many more kinds of cultural family issues, such as promotion

of responsible parenting or gender equality within family structures. Thus, for example, in policy debates advocates of the Hearth regime now address single-women families not only as examples of families in need of economic assistance, but also as an opportunity for the national state to uphold women's choices, in family formation and marriage continuation.

The Soul framework, however, is divided in its commitment to the pursuit of cultural ideals through family and social policy. On the one hand, one Soul faction continues to view families through their ideologies of state, privileging parental choice and responsibility as a means to oppose government intervention and expansion. On the other, other Soul proponents, like contemporary Hearth advocates, are more committed to instating their own Soul cultural interests. Thus the two factions within the Soul tent are at considerable odds over their state ideals. They are united, however, in their common disavowal of the national state's welfarist role, the core of the Hearth regime's framework, and in emphasis on non-material (attitudinal and character) qualities of families over their material ones.

Thus Hearth proponents and a prominent Soul faction now expressly pursue their own cultural ideals in promoting their respective family policy ideals – the former stressing individual choice and the need to protect individual rights within the family and the former emphasizing family integrity and the need to preserve and encourage the nuclear family unit, as the only legitimate vehicle of desirable social reproduction. Thus, except for the libertarian faction among Soul proponents, both family policy approaches now collectively engender a vastly expanded ideal of national state-and-family.

In the following chapter, I demonstrate the ongoing battle over the normative relationship between State and Family, documenting partisan similarities and differences over its reconfiguration. I also demonstrate modifications to the two core ideals of family (companionate

and patriarchal family ideals) which have underpinned the contemporary policies of the Hearth and Soul approaches; commonly serving to accommodate (and even justify) an expanding State role into families. I argue that now, unlike say in the Progressive era, Hearth and Soul proponents are not significantly different in that both accept the (expanded) *extent* to which the State can, and must, interact with families. However, they continue to diverge in the *substance* of their family ideals and in their conceptions of *how* the State should interact with families. The family is hence now both a lightning rod between the two partisan regimes as well as a common beacon by which they illuminate their respective expanded visions of State, and its intervention into society. This reconfiguration of State-and-Family relations in service of instituting cultural (liberal or traditionalist) family values through social policies is a characteristic unique to postindustrial social policy, defining the current American Welfare State.

Additionally, this development demonstrates the shifting configuration in American politics, away from a muted or underlying moral dimension juxtaposed under an economic one, to a greater acknowledgement and articulation of morality and/or cultural ideals within social policy. I link this phenomenon to late-century sectional (and partisan) economic and political developments, best described as a recent “Southernization of American Politics.”

In the chapter that follows, the first section presents an analytical report and interpretation of partisan alignments over family policy from 1980 to 2005. The following sections reveal the historical origins of those alignments by retracing: first, the changes in family structure that occurred after 1960; second, the dramatic changes in the regional alignments of the major parties in national politics in the same period; and finally, the consequent consolidation of Hearth and Soul policy constellations within the congressional parties after 1980.

In my account, I highlight parties' shifting coalitions (mainly cultural liberals within the Democratic Party and evangelical Protestants within the Republican) and their consequent effects on Parties' policy and electoral agendas, also showing their interaction with sectional social-economic changes which have enabled them to build their mass constituencies; these factors have cumulatively produced (and sustained) the expanded national state, as a vehicle for promoting cultural family values. In the conclusion, I suggest some implications of this expanded family portfolio on partisan politics, in general, and on how we currently understand the welfare state.

§ 1: Private is the new Public – Family Policies in the Late 20th Century

Policies addressing the family are now just as likely to target its cultural, moral or social aspects as their economic conditions and material well-being. For instance, a quick perusal of prominent family-related bills proposed in Congress since 1980 shows the diversity of family issues addressed, including: abstinence education, child abuse and neglect, child care, child support, fatherhood, family leave, family preservation, marriage, teenage pregnancies, and parental abduction alongside Earned Income Tax Credit, family poverty and welfare reform. (see TABLE 4.1).¹ Parties now regularly vie to claim the family, in numerous ways, in their campaign slogans and policy agendas.

No phrase is as evocative of the increasing policy attention to cultural family issues than that calling for the 'strengthening' of families, to which both partisan regimes have laid claim. Jimmy Carter was the first president to make strengthening of families a general goal of his

¹ Karen Bogenschneider (2003) Family Policy Matters: How Policymaking Affects Families and What Professionals Can Do 2nd ed, (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.) p. 55.

administration.² During Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980, the Republican platform called for sweeping reforms to 'restore the family,' and President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address declared that the country's problems were rooted in the breakdown of families and communities.³ In 1994 Republicans emphasized the family in their pledged Contract with America, 4 of their 10 proposals addressing families; less than 2 years later, Democrats too rallied around strengthening families in their "Families First" Campaign in 1996, with Clinton and Dole battling to be the bearer of the American family in that election; in the 2000 election, Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore called for a family lobby as powerful as the gun lobby. In the 21st century, the re-election of George W. Bush in 2004 was widely attributed to the turnout of 'values' voters, for whom opposition to culturally liberal family issues, such as same-sex marriage, had become a clarion call.

Heightened (contemporary) national state interest in encouraging family unity and stability is often traced back to the Moynihan Report of 1965. The report entitled: *The Negro Family: the Case for National Action*, was the work of sociologist and Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan presented research on the black family to demonstrate a 'tangle of pathology' among urban, state-dependent African-American families, evidenced through their unconventional family behavior (mainly high rates of extra-marital fertility and absentee fathers). Through the report, he stressed the necessary role of policy in actively encouraging hitherto private family decisions – such as marriage and family formation – failing which, he warned, racial equality and social cohesion would remain elusive goals.⁴ To

² Steiner, G. (1980, Fall) 'The Family as a Public Issue: Many Causes with Many Votaries' *Carnegie Quarterly* 28(4), 1-5 cited in Bogenschneider (2003) "Family Policy Matters," p. 5.

³ Clinton, also like Reagan, issued an executive order requiring family impact statements (much like environment impact statements) on policies affecting families; this was however, more limited in scope than the Reagan's executive order which required agencies to review *all* policy proposals for their potential impact on families.

⁴ See: William Graebner (2002) 'The End of Liberalism: Narrating Welfare's Decline, from the Moynihan Report (1965) to the personal responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (1996)' *Journal of Policy History* 14:2, 170-190.

Moynihan the expanding economy of the 1960s along with a liberal political climate was the ideal time for the country to initiate policies which not only assisted families' in their economic conditions but, instead, also aimed at increasing the (marital) stability of the family unit.⁵

Democratic liberals at this time, proponents of the Hearth approach, now approached family stability as an added rationale for their progressive agenda; enacting government programs now with the dual goals of strengthening families and assisting them economically. For instance, the Moynihan Report especially influenced the commitment of the Federal Government to antipoverty programs, e.g. Johnson's War on Poverty in 1964. Drawing on Moynihan's argument that family disintegration was an appropriate subject for national state intervention insofar as it perpetuated social and economic inequality, President Johnson pledged that a primary goal of deferral antipoverty programs was to 'strengthen the family and create conditions under which most parents will stay together.' Family restoration was now seen as vital to the long-term success of antipoverty and welfare programs – a missing, crucial piece in the attempt to 'cut completely the circles of despair and deprivation.'⁶

The goals of family restoration and promotion of family stability were thus addressed initially by Hearth advocates through social welfare policies, directed at families' *material* conditions. Economic deprivation and family disintegration were assumed to be inextricably

Graebner's interpretation, as well as mine, views Moynihan's report as a reflection of Hearth ideology. Notwithstanding Moynihan's negative appraisal of welfare policies as encouraging single-parent families and father absence, his report is more reflective of Hearth, not Soul, ideologies to the extent that it assumed an embedded relationship between the state and the family, requiring the national state to acknowledge its (greater) responsibility in addressing the problems of black families through alternative policies.

⁵ Shirley L. Zimmerman (2001) Family Policy: Constructed Solutions to Family Problems (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE) p. 13.

⁶ The impact of the Moynihan Report was most observable in the commitment of the Federal Government to antipoverty programs in Johnson's War on Poverty in 1964. Drawing on Moynihan's argument that family disintegration perpetuated social and economic inequality, President Johnson pledged that a primary goal of poverty deferral programs was to 'strengthen the family and create conditions under which most parents will stay together'; without family restoration the president asserted that policies 'will never be enough to cut completely the circles of despair and deprivation' [Cited in Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg (1988) Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life (New York: Free Press), p. 213].

linked. The 1970s, for example, witnessed the creation and expansion of government programs to assist families, such as: Title XX social services (1975 Social Security Act), Supplemental Security Income program (consolidating Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Disabled, and Old Age Assistance into a single federal program) and the Earned Income Tax Credit for working poor families.

Soon, however, another approach to family restoration began to rival the initial approach of Democratic liberals. In 1980, the Carter Administration organized a White House Conference on Families (WHCF), sponsored by a coalition of 28 family-related non-profit organizations, comprising of a series of three conferences held in three cities – Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Baltimore. During the conference, divisions among attendees illustrated the emergence of an ideological rift between conservative and progressive advocates of family policies, manifesting marked differences in their conceptions of the appropriate role of government in family life.

For example, in Baltimore, pro-life groups staged walkouts in opposition to proposed policy recommendations supporting choice in abortion and favoring the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), claiming that the Conference had been “rigged” to support more government involvement in family life instead of less.⁷ In Minneapolis, conservative groups similarly staged a walkout and, in turn, one dissenter charged the conservative caucus of being racist, claiming that less government in family life implied less policy assistance for black families. In Los Angeles, the National Pro-Family Coalition asserted that the conference had been skewed by its planners to reflect the views of social work professionals and federal bureaucrats who had vested interests in expanded government involvement and spending.⁸ In the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s conservative agenda of reducing the size of government and

⁷ ‘Family delegates rank issues.’ 1980 July 14, Minneapolis Sunday Tribune p. A8 cited in Zimmerman (2001) “Family Policy,” p. 21.

⁸ Zimmerman (2001) “Family Policy,” p. 21.

getting government “off the backs of families,” similarly aimed at reinstating the conventional public-private distinction in social policy. The policy goals of family restoration or strengthening family bonds at this time thus served as rationales for *contracting* federal programs directed at the family, leaving most family issues to private and local devices.⁹

Since the 1990s however conservative moralists, a key faction espousing the Soul ideology, have re-engaged the national state; now using social policies to *promote* their own (conservative) family goals. The below table (Table 4.1) lists a representative sample of the kinds of diverse initiatives now proposed in congressional bills targeting the family, along with their provisions and name of introducing member. (Bills enacted are noted with an *).

Table 4.1: Selected Policy Proposals Relating to Families

Year	Proposed Law	Bill Sponsor	Proposed Provisions
1980	Family Enterprise Estate and Gift Tax Act	Nelson (D-WI)	Amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide estate and gift tax equity for family enterprises.
1980	Family Farm Development Act	Nolan (D-MN)	Encourages the ownership and development of Family Farms.
1983	Community Volunteer Services Act	Hatch (R-UT)	Authorizes appropriations for programs under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973.
1987	Day Care for Working Families Act	Metzenbaum(D-OH)	Provides comprehensive Federal assistance for daycare.
1987	Federal Employee Family Building Act	Schroeder(D-CO)	Amends U.S. Code to require health plans for Federal employees to provide benefits relating to certain reproduction assisted procedures.
1989	Act for Better Child Care Services	Dodd (D-CT)	Provides for a Federal program for the improvement of child care
1990	Child Labor Act	Metzenbaum(D-OH)	Increases penalties for violations of child labor under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
1991	Worker's Family Protection Act	Jeffords (R-VT)	Requires study on the prevalence of contamination of worker's homes with hazardous chemicals from workplace.
1992	Child Support Assurance Act	Dodd (D-CT)	Creates programs for a system of assured minimum child support payments.
1992	Child Support Recovery Act *	Shelby (D-AL)	Imposes a criminal penalty for flight to avoid payment of arrearages in child support.
1992	Extension of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act	Snyder (D-OK)	Postpones repeal of provisions concerning the debt adjustment of a family farmer with regular annual income.
1993	Family and Medical Leave	Ford (D-MI)	Grants family and temporary medical leave under

⁹ Ibid.

	Act*		certain circumstances.
1993	Family Preservation and Support Act*	Downey (D-NY)	Promotes family preservation and the prevention of foster care with emphasis on families where abuse of alcohol or drugs is present.
1993	Family Privacy Protection Act	Horn (R-CA)	Provides protection for parents' rights / family privacy.
1993	International Parental Kidnapping Act*	Gekas(R-PA)	Amends title 18, United States Code, with respect to parental kidnapping, and for other purposes.
1993	National Child Protection Act*	Schroeder (D-CO)	Establishes procedures for national criminal background checks for child care providers.
1993	Sensible Advertising and Family Education Act	Thurmond (R-SC)	Requires health warnings to be included in alcohol advertisements.
1994	Educate America Act*	Kildee (D-MI)	Amends the Department of Education Organization Act to promote efforts to improve the public education system.
1994	Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act*	Braun (D-IL)	Provides that a State court may not modify an order of another State court requiring the payment of child support.
1994	Health Security Act	Gephardt (D-MO)	Provides health coverage for all Americans, to ensure individual and family security.
1995	Family Medical Savings and Investment Act	Archer (R-TX)	Allows for tax deductions for contributions to a medical savings account for those covered under a catastrophic coverage health plan.
1995	Family Reinforcement Act	Weller (R-IL)	Contract with America Bill: Strengthens the rights of parents.
1995	Parental Choice in Television	Markey (D-MA)	Provides technology for parents to control the viewing of programming they believe is inappropriate for their children.
1996	Defense of Marriage Act*	Barr (R-GA)	Provides that States shall not be required to give effect to acts or proceedings of other States that treat relationships between persons of the same sex as marriages. Defines marriage under Federal law as the legal union between one man and one woman.
1996	Family Pet Protection Act	Fox (R-PA)	Amends the Animal Welfare Act to prevent crime of pet theft.
1996	House Resolution	Smith (R-TX)	Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the major television networks should revive their traditional "Family Hour," reserving the first hour of prime-time broadcasting for family-oriented programming.
1996	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act*	Archer (R-TX)	Restores the American family, enhances support and work opportunities for families with children, reduces out-of-wedlock pregnancies and welfare dependence by requiring work.
1996	Saving our Children: the American Renewal Act	Watts (R-OK)	Amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the designation of renewal communities.
1997	Adoption and Safe Family Act*	Camp (R-MN)	Promotes adoption of children in foster care.
1997	Family Friendly Workplace Act	Ashcroft (R-MO)	Amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide compensatory time for private sector employees.
1997	Working Families Flexibility Act	Ballenger (R-NC)	Amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide compensatory time for private sector employees.
1998	Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act*	McCollum (R-FL)	Amends the United States Code, with respect to violent sex crimes against children.

1998	Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act*	Hyde (R-IL)	Establishes felony violations for the failure to pay legal child support obligations.
1998	Parental Freedom of Information Act	Tiahrt (R-KS)	Amends General Education Provisions Act to allow parents access to certain information.
1998	Visitation Rights Enforcement Act*	Coble (R-NC)	A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, with respect to the enforcement of child custody and visitation orders.
1998	Work Incentives Improvement Act	Jeffords (R-VT)	Provides individuals with disabilities with incentives to become economically self-sufficient.
1999	Fathers Count Act	Johnson (R-CT)	Amends the Social Security Act to provide for grants for projects designed to promote responsible fatherhood.
2000	Family Opportunity Act	Grassley (R-IA)	Amends the Social Security Act to allow families of disabled children to purchase coverage of Medicaid.
2000	Paycheck Fairness Act	Daschle (D-SD)	Provides remedies for sex discrimination in wage levels.
2001	Child Support Distribution Act	Johnson (R-CT)	Provides more child support money to families leaving welfare, to improve the collection of child support and to promote marriage.
2001	Strengthening Working Families Act	Bayh (D-IN)	Amends the Social Security Act to promote the formation and maintenance of married two-parent families and promotes responsible fatherhood.
2002	Maritime Disaster Family Assistance Act	Green (R-WI)	Establishes a program of assistance to families of passengers and crew members involved in maritime disasters.
2003	Family Time Flexibility Act	Biggert (R-IL)	Amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, making provisions for compensatory time for private sector employees.
2003	Keeping Children and Families Safe Act*	Gregg (R-NH)	Amends the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to make improvements to and reauthorize programs.
2006	Older Americans Act Reauthorization*	Tiberi (R-OH)	Expands the family caregiver support program to help older adults caring for adult children and caregivers of individuals with Alzheimer's disease.

Compiled by author from Congressional Hearings Reports (see methods section)

* Enacted

As seen in the Table, a wide variety of family issues are now targeted in numerous policy proposals, engaging the national state and family in many new, previously non-existent, ways. A central development within this new configuration is the programmatic, policy turn towards reinstating the traditional family, extolling its qualities of stable marriage and self-sufficiency as appropriate targets of State attention.¹⁰

Family relations, marriage commitments, parents' responsibilities to their children, and extra-marital sexuality etc. – are now the foci of federal policy initiatives of various kinds.

¹⁰ Jacob Hacker (2004) 'Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States' *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 243- 60.

Regulatory/punitive policies aim at enforcing family responsibilities such as child support payments (e.g. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, 1997; Child Support Recovery Act, 1992); other policies use welfare and other public programs to encourage marital family formation and promote responsible fatherhood and working parenthood (e.g. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 1996, Fathers Count bill, 1997, Child Support Distribution bills of 2000, 2001).¹¹ Still other measures encourage the approximation of traditional families by pressing adoption over foster care (e.g. Family Preservation and Support Act, 1992; Adoption and Safe Family Act, 1997). In sum, the use of federal programs and various kinds of public policies to preserve intact family units and, among other goals, to reinstate responsible parenting, has gained widespread appeal, often cutting across partisan lines.¹²

The progressive impulse contained within the Hearth framework, to address family formation and marital stability through programmatic economic assistance is now pitted against the alternative approach, advocated by Soul proponents, which seeks to promote attitudinal change in family behavior, such as encouraging family self-sufficiency over public programs. Unlike in previous periods including the 1980s, when the protection of family and parental autonomy meant opposing (especially national) state policies in any given area, policies are now routinely proposed, enlisting the national state to promote (not merely preserve) a parent's role in child rearing(see: Family Reinforcement/Contract with America Bill, 1995). Multiple proposals invoke parental involvement, such as stipulations for parental notification/consent for sex education (Parental Freedom of Information, 1998), parental control of television (Parental Choice in Television Act, 1995), protection of parental/family privacy (Family Privacy

¹¹ On policies focused on strengthening marriage and family see: Zimmerman (2001) "Family Policy," pp. 140-161; also Bogenschneider (2003) "Family Policy Matters," pp. 104-107.

¹² For the political and social context in which policies began to focus on absentee fathers in the late 1960s, post-Vietnam era, see Natasha Zaretsky (2007) No Direction Home: the American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press).

Protection bill, 1990), as well as promoting parental choice through school choice and school voucher programs.

At the same time, the progressive policy approach of the Hearth approach, focusing on the national state's welfare function and addressing family issues by improving their economic lives, has not by any means disappeared from the parties' agendas. Instead, new cultural family issues focused on quality of life concerns (not just quantity of life), such as gender equality and opportunities for individual choice are now addressed through family economics, expanding the rationale for support services and provisions relating to work and family life (Flex time employment opportunities, women's wage work), expanded family healthcare (Health Security Bill, 1993), affordable childcare (Daycare for Working Families bill, 1987), creation of jobs paying higher wages and benefits.

The development of family policy ideologies during the contemporary era and the incorporation of cultural ideals into the agenda of the national state have occurred within the context of real-world dramatic changes, in almost every aspect of family life. Writing in 2005 family historian Stephanie Coontz observed that marriage and family had changed more in the last thirty years than in the last five thousand.¹³ In the next section I briefly describe the monumental changes occurring in the family in the last decades of the 20th century, as producing new sets of social and economic issues; alternatively interpreted and addressed by the two ideologies, Hearth and Soul, in their policy responses.

¹³ Stephanie Coontz (2005) Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage (New York: Viking).

§2 – *Late Century Family Changes*

The late 20th century witnessed the unraveling of the nuclear family unit and the emergence of more fluid and amorphous family ties. In 1960 over 70 percent of all American households were made up of dad the breadwinner, mom the homemaker, and their children.¹⁴ Three decades later, such “traditional” nuclear families consisting of a breadwinning father, housewife mother, and dependent children accounted for less than 25 per cent of the nation’s households.¹⁵

In four areas in particular, large-scale family changes have resulted in the transformation of family relations – from those contained within cohesive family units to bonds now dispersed across several households. Decline in married-couple families, marital instability, shifting gender roles, and extra-marital childbearing/ reproduction have, in particular, marked the transformation of family ties.¹⁶ In this section, I briefly review these four developments, outlining how each implies a blurring of previously clear lines of parental rights and responsibilities which has, in turn, raised new issues and made way for new national state policy intervention into the family.

Firstly, families have moved beyond a single household; instead a growing proportion of them extend across several households, causing more children to live in households containing adults *other* than their biological parents.¹⁷ For example, among family households,¹⁸ the

¹⁴ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p. 203.

¹⁵ Ibid.


¹⁶ Judith Stacey (1999) ‘Virtual Social Science and the Politics of Family Values in the United States,’ in Gill Jagger and Caroline Wright (eds.) Changing Family Values, (London, New York: Routledge) pp. 187-199.

¹⁷ Andrew J. Cherlin (1981) Marriage Divorce Remarriage, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press) p. 73; see diagrammatic representation of the complex relationship between contemporary kinship/familial structures and households, Figure 3-2 on p. 86 [Ibid.].

¹⁸ According to the census, a *household* contains one or more people—everyone living in a housing unit makes up a household. One of the people who own or rent the residence is designated as the *householder*. For the purposes of examining family and household composition, two types of households are defined: *family* and *nonfamily*. A *family household* has at least two members related by birth, marriage, or adoption, one of whom is the householder. Family

proportion of married-couple households with children has declined significantly – from 40 percent of all households in 1970 to a mere 23 percent in 2003. In comparison, there has been an increase in single-parent families whose proportion is up from 11 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 2003.¹⁹ These changes in living arrangements find less and less children living in two-parent households (see Figure 4.1, below). Instead, children are more likely to have their biological parents separated, divorced, remarried – now spread over more-than-one household, often sharing them with other, unrelated, step-siblings.

Figure 4.1: Historical Living Arrangement of Children, 1900-2004 (in percentage)



Source: US Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2004 Wave 2: Table 2.
(www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/children.html)

Moreover, marriages are far more unstable than previously. Starting in 1974 divorce has far outpaced death as the more common ending of a marriage. In 1900, 10% of marriages ended

households are maintained by married couples or by a man or woman living with other relatives—children may or may not be present. Family units that do not include the householder are called *subfamilies*. A *nonfamily household* can be either a person living alone or a householder who shares the housing unit only with his or her nonrelatives—for example, boarders or roommates. *Children* include sons and daughters by birth, stepchildren, and adopted children of the householder regardless of the child’s age or marital status. *Own children* are a subset of all children—they identify the householder or a family reference person as a parent in a household, family, or family group. In this report, own children are limited to those children who are never-married and under age 18. [Jason Fields (2004) “America’s Families and Living Arrangements, 2003: Population Characteristics” *Current Population Reports Series 20-553* (Washington D.C.: Department of Commerce) p. 2].

¹⁹ On the growth of households that do not contain a marriage couple as outpacing the growth of husband-wife households, see: Cherlin (1981) “Marriage Divorce,” p. 73-74.

in divorce; the divorce rate continued to rise gradually through the century; however, between 1960 and 1980 the divorce rate doubled, such that 50 % of all first marriages and 60 % of remarriages now end in divorce.²⁰ Yet, Americans are a marrying people,²¹ while divorce rates have increased so have remarriage rates, with ‘higher-order’ marriages – i.e. marriages in which at least one partner has been married at least twice before – becoming more and more common.²² Roughly half of all mothers now remarry within approximately two years of their divorce, resulting in ‘blended’ stepfamilies in which children from previous marriages live in one household or, more often, are dispersed across several households.²³

I should note that remarriage patterns at the beginning and end of the century are vastly different, yielding differences in the nature of resulting stepfamilies. Stepfamilies are now formed mostly by the remarriage of a parent in the aftermath of his or her divorce, unlike previously when they were the result of remarriage following the death of one of the parents. Thus, post-divorce stepfamilies typically *add* rather than *replace* a parent, as was the case previously in post-bereavement stepfamilies. When both parents remarry, and some remarry more than once, then several replacement parents are added, further complicating lines of parental responsibilities.²⁴

In addition, extra-marital fertility is now increasingly common, with many more children being conceived and reared out-of-wedlock. Unlike most of the 20th century, the sequence of marriage, first, and childbearing later is frequently not followed, particularly among African-American women. Violations of this normative family sequence are no longer met with tangible

²⁰ Marilyn Coleman, Lawrence H Ganong and Kelly Warzinik (2007) Family life in 20th-century America, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press) p. 26.

²¹ On remarriage as a popular preference (now even more so) throughout American demographic history, see: Cherlin (1981) “Marriage Divorce,” pp. 29-31, 84.

²² By the end of the 20th century, over 10 percent of all marriages were a third, fourth, or higher order marriage for at last one of the partners. (Coleman et al (2007) “Family Life,” p. 32).

²³ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p. 227.

²⁴ Coleman et al (2007) “Family Life,” p. 32.

sanctions, such as being fired from a job or serious social castigation.²⁵ In the 1930s, 82 percent of first births were conceived after marriage compared to 47 % of first births in the 1990s. From 1930 up to the 1960s, when unmarried women became pregnant 50 to 60 % of them married before the birth of their first child, a number that fell to a low of 29 % by the mid- 1980s, leveling at around 33 % since the 1990s.²⁶

Births to single mothers used to be referred to as ‘illegitimate’ until around the midcentury, and out-of-wedlock children were legally referred to as bastards. Due to strict social and legal sanctions and stigma among the white population, until the 1960s single white women who were pregnant generally did one of the following: most married, some had abortions (illegally till 1973), or else several hid their pregnancy status by staying in institutions for unwed mothers until their babies were born and then put up for adoption.²⁷ In any event, the responsibility for the child either ended or was clearly transferred to another set of parents. However, with the decline in sanctions against unmarried pregnancies, single mothers are less fearful of being fired or expelled from schools and have more programmatic assistance available to them; fewer are likely to hide their pregnancies, or give their babies up for adoption, instead many more raise their children on their own, often with the help of their parents or the baby’s father.²⁸ The child’s unmarried mother is now thus far more likely to build a complicated family network, pooling resources to disperse parenting responsibilities and child-rearing tasks.

Thus, the unraveling of the nuclear family unit into more amorphous family ties has resulted in the blurring of hitherto clearly-understood lines of parental responsibilities –

²⁵ *Ibid* p. 24.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Coleman et al (2007) “*Family Life*,” p. 25.

²⁸ On increasing structural poverty and its impact on mother’s increasing choice not to marry, see: Kathryn Edin (2000) ‘Few Good Men; Why Poor Mothers Don’t Marry or Remarry,’ *American Prospect* 11(4):26-31, Coontz (2005) “*Marriage: A History*,” pp. 288-289.

previously traced through marriage, to the parents of any child in question. Instead, by the turn of the century, marriage is now a much less common marker of family formation or of parental accountability: many parents remain single, or choose to cohabit with one another as an alternative to marriage, many dissolve their marriages through divorces, and several retain ties with their children from previous marriages/relationships while assuming new relationships with the children of their current spouses/partners. Children now serve as less of a deterrent to divorce and less of a reason for marriage, many more are born to unmarried parents, more live in one-parent households and in stepfamilies with numerous ‘replacement parents’ than ever before.

A further development with far-reaching impact on the reconfiguration of parental responsibilities within and beyond a single family unit has been the widespread incorporation of mothers into the workforce. In early part of the 20th century, when production was transferred outside the home and married women lost their “productive” economic roles, the middle-class norm of a separate domestic sphere in which women would concentrate on motherhood and household management became the normative ideal for women.²⁹ In contrast, since the early 1960s, the process of ‘privatizing the role of women’ to the domestic sphere has been reversed with the influx of wives and mothers into the work force.³⁰ Between 1960 and 1990, the percentage of children under age six whose mothers were in the labor force doubled from 30 to 60%.³¹ In contrast to 1948 when only about 17% of married mothers were in the labor force, by 1995 their rate of workforce participation reached 70%, accounting for a large part of the increase in total labor force since World War II.³²

²⁹ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolutions,” p. xix.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Coleman et al (2007) “Family Life,” p. 230.

³² Ibid.; It has also been found that in this past decade the labor force participation of married mothers has leveled off and even decreased; this is especially so in the case of mothers of infants under 12 months [Id.].

The increased participation of mothers in the work force has not only called into question traditional assumptions regarding sexual division of labor between fathers and mothers, it has also limited the capacity of family units to absorb several of their previous functions – such as care of elderly and sick family members and, especially, day-long care of children. Maternal employment, and the continuing pivotal role played by mothers within the family,³³ have thus raised several new issues of work-and-family conflict which were previously non-issues since mothers were previously wholly occupied in the domestic sphere and work and family were two separate domains, clearly divided along gender lines between father and mother.³⁴

In sum, within the last three decades of the 20th century there have been widespread changes in family life: less people live with family members, less couples stay married and live with their biological children, instead more divorce and remarry, form stepfamilies and typically share children across several family households; most wives and mothers of young children now work outside the home, childbearing is less a reason for marriage or a deterrent to divorce, and far fewer children live with both their biological parents.

All of these developments have cumulatively reconfigured the lines of parental responsibilities – taking them from within a cohesive (married) family unit and dispersing them across several units. There is now the need to supervise, coordinate, support, negotiate between, even police, various sets of parents, across many different households – all tasks that were not required previously (at least not to this extent), when children were born and raised within a

³³ Women continue to be primarily responsible for household management and child rearing, by some estimates working mothers in 2000 spent an average of 80 hours a week engaged in parenting and paid employment. In fact, the hours white married mothers spend doing primary care tasks (feeding, cooking, and cleaning etc.) for individual children nearly doubled between the 1920s and 1980s. When families were larger earlier in the century, mothers had less time to interact with children individually than do mothers more recently who are in the labor force but have fewer children. Paid employment thus has not diminished, instead in many cases it has added, to married mothers' responsibilities [Coleman et al (2007) "Family Life," p.148].

³⁴See Bogenschneider (2003) "Family Policy Matters," pp. 102-104 for the consistent prominence of work-and-family issues in family policy debates.

married, two-parent, household. Additionally mothers' participation in the workforce has merged previously separate spheres of work and family and reduced the capacity of the family unit to absorb its previous function of elder and child care. Thus the new amorphous configuration of parental responsibilities and the phenomenon of blending of family units into the workforce have reduced the self-reliance of a single family unit, concomitantly increasing its reliance on external agents – whether extended family networks, social groups, private providers, or State programs.

As in other eras, Hearth proponents approach the national state as a necessary 'partner' to families; while Soul advocates look to society – social and private networks – to perform the new intermediary functions. While both ideologies acknowledge the negative aspects of this decline in family cohesion, Hearth proponents nevertheless embrace some of these developments, pointing to the greater accommodation of choice and freedom (particularly of women) in the establishment and on-going functioning of the family. In contrast, traditionalists espousing the Soul ideology vehemently decry these developments as altogether negative, viewing them either as conditions resulting in the decline of family self-sufficiency or else as symptoms of larger moral decay.

In the next section, we shall see how this reconfiguration of parental responsibilities and the increasing intermediary functions rendered by the unraveling of the nuclear family have been approached by the two competing ideological frameworks in their policy agendas. We see how one set (the traditionalists) approach public policies as vehicles to *reverse* some of these secular trends, restoring the traditional nuclear family as a model of self-sufficiency and/or of highest moral worth. In contrast, we find progressives espousing Hearth ideologies unconcerned with secular reversal but instead approaching public policies more as a means to fill the (new) gaps in a family's ability to perform some of their erstwhile social and parental functions. Conflict over

family policies articulates ideological differences between the two ideologies regarding the direction of the new (enhanced) relationship between the national state and the American family.

§3 - Bi-Furcated Policy Approaches – Hearth and Soul Policy Responses

The recent reconfiguration of parental responsibilities and of family functions, seen in the previous section, has been interpreted differently by Hearth and Soul advocates. Hearth members perceive these changes in secular terms – as an emerging reality, often with positive undertones – warranting enhanced state intervention to support the family in performing its functions. In so doing, they now draw on conventional Hearth principles to highlight the economic reasons underlying family dysfunction, and stress the material resources of families as the primary site for policy redress.

Soul members, on the other hand, view family changes either moralistically, as symptoms of overall social degeneration, or else more neutrally (but still negatively), as conditions reducing family self-sufficiency and increasing its reliance on government. In either case, public policies (state instruments) are seen as the necessary means to *reverse* these secular trends and restore the nuclear family to its previous position as the preferred family form. In so doing, they instead invoke Soul principles and highlight attitudinal (or moral) deprivation underlying family dysfunction, stressing people's attitude and morality as the alternate primary site for policy redress.³⁵

³⁵ For example, Dan Coats (R-IN), remarking on a family witness's successful second marriage: "...so many have the attitude that the family is changing and we just live in a different society; and we just have to accept the trend; but you have reversed the trend, and you fly in the face of statistics. I think you stand as an example of a situation where we say we don't just have to accept the trend. We don't have to accept the way things are going. We can, by incorporating commitments and other elements, reverse those trends' [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, Families, Diversity and Strength of American Families, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p. 18].

For example, a Democratic witness at a fact-finding committee hearing on Work and Family illustrates the Hearth position, outlining the emerging reality of the ‘egalitarian’ family, its positive aspects, and the consequent expanded need for state intervention:

A more egalitarian marriage, in which spouses participate more equally in home and market work, and stay together out of love rather than financial or other needs, is emerging as a reality and as an increasingly valued ideal.

Greater equality within marriage has allowed women to speak out against wife battering, and has inspired social concern as to the extent of spouse and child physical and sexual abuse within the family.

Increasingly numbers are also daring to live in nontraditional family forms, from living together without marriage, to living alone, or collectively, to living with a member of one’s own sex.

However, those seeking more egalitarian families come up against an economy structured to complement the separate spheres marriage. First, to have equal earning power women must have access to male dominated jobs and the pay of female dominated jobs must be raised. Second, since full-time jobs have been structured for workers without child-care responsibilities (traditional men or single women) these jobs need to change in order to accommodate workers who have family responsibilities. Finally, the development of the more egalitarian marriage may be exacerbated the former problem of poverty among female-headed households. Decreased financial dependency and increased desire for love within marriage have brought rising divorce and remarriage rates...

[These] present a challenge to policymakers to ... develop new remedies more consistent with the egalitarian family.³⁶

In contrast we see in the statement of Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), the alternative Soul interpretation of emerging family changes as moral degeneration, the need to recreate the nuclear family and to encourage alternative, private – or ‘natural’ – support systems through public policies.

All reputable historians recognize that the family is the keystone to any strong society. The nuclear family, typically comprised of mother, father, and children, is certainly the core of this strength...A strong influence in its development and stability has come historically from what sociologists term the extended family....

Both the nuclear family and the traditional role and strength of the extended family have weakened drastically...largely because of the growing divorce rate...

Many observers attribute the high divorce rate to the so-called sexual revolution, which has radically altered perceptions in many Americans’ minds of the place of marriage, sexual fidelity, and the responsibility of parenthood in their hierarchy of values. To many Americans sexual permissiveness is now the norm, and marriage is no longer considered a lifelong vocation. Single parents are thus growing in number, as are unmarried parents, and unloved, abandoned, and abused children...

Unfortunately, what might be called the instant self-gratification syndrome, including the sexual revolution, has had an adverse impact on the stability of many American families, as well as on drug abuse, violent crime, and other tragic and expensive social problems.

³⁶ Julie Matthaei, Associate Professor and Chair, Dept of Economics, Wellesley College, Statement in House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Working in America: Implications for Families, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p. 62.

Interpersonal relationships are too often viewed in terms of how quickly they gratify “me” here and now, rather than in terms of the establishment and maintenance of a mutual, long-term sharing and loving, responsible relationship.

...We must begin reordering our priorities. Although we cannot recreate immediately the strength of the nuclear or extended family as they once were, we can ...encourage them where they still exist...we must also avoid further weakening of the other natural support systems our society can provide.³⁷

Indeed, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter, since the last quarter of the 20th century legislators from both parties have been paying great attention to changes in family circumstances, addressing them as problems in need of policy solutions. Members of Congress similarly exhibit differences, reflecting Hearth or Soul ideologies, in their interpretation of those changes and in how they therefore imagine the state should intervene.

Most members of Congress from the Democratic Party now adopt a Hearth view and focus on economic deprivation accompanying family dysfunction. For example, in citing reasons for the creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, in 1983 the Democratic Chair, George Miller (D-CA), emphasized ‘the dramatic and permanent changes in the living situations of families and children’ in which ‘more children [are] born into poverty, more [are] raised in single-parent families,’ and listing family problems as: ‘increased stress, family violence, abuse, family poverty.’³⁸ When in majority, Democrats in Congress have held hearings to focus on the material dimension of family problems, highlighting the enhanced role of the state in alleviating families’ increasing material incapacities:

Patricia Schroeder (D-CO): ‘This committee [Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families] was established, among other reasons, *because members recognized how profoundly social and economic trends are impacting on families and children*. One obvious fundamental change has been that the economics of family life are new: both parents are working now, not just one, while at the same time the costs of housing, food, transportation, health care, and education are rising beyond peoples, [*sic*] means...Economics has as much to do with keeping a family well and together as any other factor...Each of us has watched the fears grow among American families in the last decade that they won’t be secure in

³⁷ Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), opening statement, Senate Subcommittee on Aging, Family, and Human Services, Extended Family: Society’s Forgotten Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, pp. 1-4.

³⁸ House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Children, Youth, and Families: Beginning the Assessment, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 1-2.

the basics – won't be able to buy or rent a house, pay the doctor's bills, or afford to send their children to college.³⁹

In contrast, most congressional Republicans share a Soul view, interpreting family changes as a symptom of prevailing negative trends in cultural attitudes, identified as the 'real' problem rather than families' material inabilities. In so doing, Soul Republicans see the causal direction between economic deprivation and family dysfunction in opposite terms in contrast to the Hearth Democrats. Instead, they claim, the declining cultural value of parental responsibilities and commitment to family have resulted in families' disregard of previous, traditional routes of support (such as marriage, gendered division of labor, extended families), in turn engendering their declining economic fortunes.⁴⁰ They hence call for policy reform promoting changes in family values, encouraging families to attitudinal, not economic, changes:

Dan Coats (R-IN): ... I think too often Congress is tempted to treat the symptoms rather than looking at the cause... we need to look at the causes of the problem. Otherwise, we are always just treating the symptoms and playing catch up. In my particular district, for instance, we had during the decade of the seventies, a great growth in prosperity, yet our increase in one-parent families was nearly twice the national average. We experienced a 130-percent increase in single-parent families between 1970 and 1980 in the Fort Wayne metropolitan area which as you know is not a wide open swinging town. This made me wonder just what

³⁹House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Supporting A Family: Providing the Basics, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁰ For example in a hearing entitled Healthy Marriage: Why we should Promote it? Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) cited the declining value of marriage and its economic significance as the primary rationale for legitimate national state involvement in promoting it: "Marriage is unquestionably one of the fundamental institutions in our society. There was a time when it would have been difficult to imagine that such a pillar of civilization could be threatened. Yet today some say marriage is outdated and unimportant. We hear this from certain academics, the popular media, the secular left....Government should be involved both in supporting and promoting marriage. The Government frequently advances policies to promote the general welfare. For example, we provide incentives for homeownership... there are also tax breaks for educational advancement; and incentives for preventive health care. All of these are examples of Government supporting and promoting a social good. Additionally, Government involvement can be justified because divorce and unwed childbearing create substantial public costs borne by the taxpayers. When both adults and children are members of a family led by a married man and woman, they suffer from lower rates of crime, drug abuse, education failure, chronic illness, child abuse, domestic violence, poverty, and other social problems" [Senate Subcommittee on Children and Families of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Healthy Marriage: Why we should Promote it?: Examining How to Promote a Healthy Marriage, Focusing on the Healthy Marriage Initiative, The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program, and Discouraging Teen Pregnancy, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, pp. 1-2; also see: Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy of the Committee on Finance, Benefits of a Healthy Marriage, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004. On the cost-effectiveness (and therefore desirability) of long-term home care by families of elderly relatives, rather than impersonal institutional care see: Senate Special Committee on Aging, Families Helping Families: Tax Relief Strategies for Elder Care, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, pp. 2-8 (case of Trudy Elliott, Family Caregiver and Home Health Nurse, Coer D'Alene, ID introduced by Larry Craig (R-ID)).

caused that dramatic increase in one-parent families. Obviously, it was not the economy, and it was not the recession...And looking back, I suspect, the increase in one-parent families resulted from a *change in attitudes* on the part of people in terms of what the family unit should be. Additionally the passing in Indiana of a no-fault divorce law has been a major cause of some of our problems with one-parent families.’⁴¹

No doubt, family self-sufficiency is one such crucial attitudinal change, pursued as a goal of traditionalist policies.

Dan Marriott (R-UT): ‘The burden of the testimony presented by the [Democratic] majority seemed to be that Government programs should provide for appropriate nutrition, for medical services, and make infant stimulation programs available to all children. The testimony flowed toward the conclusion that every child has a basic right to be born healthy and to have his or her mind shaped by professionals who know what is most beneficial to subsequent learning and general development. As I review the testimony provided by this distinguished group of scholars I cannot avoid wondering if we are not looking at symptoms, rather than causes.

One does not have to be a specialist in nutrition, education, sociology or psychology, to understand that an unwed teenage girl who finds she is pregnant may not take advantage of those services that are available, for a variety of reasons. I submit that the unwed teenage girl who knows that her family will view her pregnancy as an additional economic burden, who feels that her family will disapprove of her premature associations with the father or who have not been supportive and interested in her welfare or activities in the past, is not likely to seek the most readily available sources of support and help.’⁴²

Indeed, significant differences are found between Republicans and Democrats in their invocation of Soul and Hearth principles, in bill sponsorship and in discussing family case examples during committee hearings.⁴³

⁴¹ House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, “Children, Youth, and Families,” p. 39.

⁴² House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Families in Crisis: The Private Sector Response, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 3-4.

⁴³ For methodology on collection and coding of Bill Sponsorship and Committee Hearings, see pp. 98-100, 133-134. Tests of independence reveal significant differences between the two parties in their use of Hearth or Soul principles when (a) sponsoring bills (Pearson’s Chi-Square = 229.6, $p=.000$) and (b) referring to family examples in committee hearings (Pearson’s Chi-Square = 382.1, $p=.000$).

Table 4.2: Hearth and Soul Bill Sponsorship, Democrats and Republicans (1989-2004)

		Party of Sponsor			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Ideology	Soul*	75	16.3	306	65.1
	Hearth*	386	83.7	164	34.9

Data Compiled by Author from Congressional Record Index

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Table 4.3: Hearth and Soul References in Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans (1980-2004)

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Ideology	Soul*	19	2.8	228	53.4
	Hearth*	651	97.2	199	46.6

Data Compiled by Author from Congressional Committee Hearings, 97th-109th Congress

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

In the next section I create a four-fold framework to classify and further analyze the components and partisan quality of the Hearth and Soul approaches to family policies, as broadly described in this section.

§ 4 -Components of Hearth and Soul Policies

As seen in the previous section, the transformation of family relations in the contemporary era has provoked two alternative approaches to family policy – the Hearth and Soul approaches; differentially construing the normative policy goals as well the intended direction for expanded national state intervention into the Family. In this section I analyze the policy *components* of the two approaches, demonstrating further that the two continue to have coherent differences, seen also in their preferences for certain *kinds* of policies over others.

Additionally, the section illustrates how the recent reconfiguration of state-and-family relations in our current period has engendered specific policy developments. In particular, I show how both Hearth and Soul approaches now use public policies, albeit in different ways, to encourage good ‘parenting.’ The current dispersal of parental responsibilities across amorphous family units is clearly now a consistent policy concern of both regimes, even if addressed in disparate ways.

As seen in previous chapters, typically four main categories of policy solutions have been constructed to address family-related problems through the ages; these are: first, those that seek to enhance families’ economic conditions (welfare policies); second, those that aim at regulating undesirable family behavior (regulation policies); third, those that promote family self-sufficiency (autonomy policies); and finally, those policies which encourage traditional family morality, often based on ascriptive family qualities such as race, gendered differences etc. (morality or ascriptive policies).

Whereas in the middle-century period we saw that Hearth and Soul approaches both concentrated on social welfare policies, thus engendering a decline in the proportion of ascriptive/morality or autonomy policy proposals; the late-century period instead resembles the earlier, Progressive era, insofar as there is a resumption of interest in ascription/morality and autonomy policies. Thus, the data will demonstrate that the Hearth framework continues to champion (i) welfare and (ii) regulation as its preferred policies; in contrast, the Soul framework once again actively invokes (i) autonomy and (ii) morality policies, as better suited to prevailing problems with(in) the family. The data will also demonstrate three broad developments in contemporary social policy that may be seen to mark the current configuration of state-and-family relations more generally. Firstly, autonomy policies now actively compete with the

conventional focus, social welfare policies, to address family issues. Secondly, even welfare and regulation policies, which articulate core Hearth principles, are now routinely directed at instilling and/or encouraging parental responsibilities. Finally, I also find that since the 104th Congress (1995-1996), members of Congress are now more divided by party along Hearth and Soul lines than has ever been the case previously.

We see these developments first in congressional hearings. I code members of congress' references during committee hearings dually, for policy issues and policy goals, when referring to real-life family examples. The assumption is that members will reference issues that are of concern to them, and use family cases as examples of those policy concerns. As mentioned these references are coded twice – first, as referencing a Hearth or Soul family ideology (Soul references are those that stress changes in family attitudes and morals as desirable policy goals and Hearth references are those that emphasize a family's economic capacity as policy end). Secondly, references are also coded separately on the basis of the policy issue addressed – issues of family's morality and biology are coded as ascriptive (or morality) policy issues, those pertaining to family's autonomy are coded as autonomy issues, those relating to family's economic well-being are coded as welfare, and those addressing behavioral aspects of family seen as vital to public/national interest are coded as regulation.

The Soul framework now exhibits a greater concern with morality-based issues and its need for policy redress – for example, when referring to the importance of parental guidance/counsel to address the policy problem of teenage pregnancy. However, (see table 4.4 below) in some instances, morality issues – like teenage pregnancies⁴⁴ – are used to invoke the Hearth principles, for example, when government programs are proposed to provide for and

⁴⁴ Coded as a 'morality' issue, as per my definition of morality or ascriptive issues i.e. those dealing with family sexual reproduction. For the rest of this chapter, I use the term 'morality' (as more apt to the contemporary situation) rather than ascriptive, although the terms are inter-changeable.

inform teens about STDs or contraception, in addition or in lieu of such counsel from their parents or other social networks. Similarly although most welfare family issues – such as housing or child care – are addressed within the Hearth framework, they are sometimes also used in furtherance of Soul goals, for example encouraging reliance on extended family networks as the prescribed solution.

Table 4.4: Policy References in Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, Committee Hearings, 97th-109th Congress (1980-2005)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Policy Category	Ascription*	29	11.7	9	1.1
	Autonomy*	134	54.3	16	1.9
	Welfare*	47	19.0	624	73.4
	Regulation*	37	15.0	201	23.6

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

As seen in Table 4.4 in general, there are distinct policy patterns within the Hearth and Soul approaches. The Hearth approach disproportionately views family problems as welfare and/or regulation issues, while the Soul approach does as much in the form of morality and autonomy policy issues.

Temporal patterns are also evident, as in Figures 4.3a and b: in the 1990s following the Contract with America, Soul principles were primarily articulated through autonomy policies; however, they are now more recently also articulated as ascription or morality-focused policies, particularly those relating to same-sex marriage. Despite the fact that since 2000 welfare policies too have now come to invoke traditional Soul ideals; welfare and regulation continue to mainly articulate Hearth ideals, arguing for enhanced intervention on material – not attitudinal – grounds.

Figure 4.2 (a): Types of Policies Referenced in Soul Family Examples during Committee Hearings, 97th-109th Congress





Figure 4.2 (b): Types of Policies Referenced in Hearth Family Examples during Committee Hearings, 97th-109th Congress



Next turning to partisanship in Table 4.5, I find unmistakable party lines previously much more blurred in the preference of Hearth and Soul policies. In comparison to previous periods,

Democrats are much more unequivocal in their articulation of Hearth, rather than Soul, principles by focusing on welfare and regulation policies in almost 95% of their family cases. In contrast, Republicans, also for the first time, now invoke the Soul ideology in a majority of their cases, emphasizing Soul ideals through autonomy and to a lesser extent morality policy issues. However, we also find that Republicans – like Democrats – continue to highlight welfare issues, articulating a Hearth ideology in a total of 47% of their family cases. This partly suggests that the focus on a family’s economic well-being, the Hearth approach, is still popular (and relevant) among members of *both* parties, despite the dramatic ascendance of traditionalist Soul principles. Even so the partisan rightward turn in family policy preferences is unmistakable, toward more autonomy-based Soul ideals.

Table 4.5: Policy References through Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 1980 - 2005 (percent)

		Democratic		Republican	
		Soul	Hearth	Soul	Hearth
		Column %	Column %	Column %	Column %
Policy Issue Raised	Morality	.1 (1)	1.3 (9)	6.6 (28)	.0 (0)
	Autonomy	.9 (6)	1.5 (10)	30.0 (128)	1.4 (6)
	Welfare	1.6 (11)	71.5 (479)	8.4 (36)	34.0 (145)
	Regulation	.1 (1)	22.8 (153)	8.4 (36)	11.2 (48)
	Total	2.8 (19)	97.2 (651)	53.4 (228)	46.6 (199)


Note: Count in parenthesis (N)

The reconfiguration of state-and-family is also evidenced by data on congressional bills. The analysis of a sample of bills⁴⁵ introduced from the 100th to the 106th Congress (1989-2004) further reveals that the greatest proportion of family bills in fact continue to address Hearth principles, approaching family problems as issues of family economic well-being. However, here too I find that this proportion is declining in relation to bills articulating Soul ideals, instead

⁴⁵ For description of criteria and method used for bill sample selection, see Table 1.5 and text on pages 67-69.

approaching family problems as attitudinal issues of autonomy and morality. (See below Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.3: Bills Introduced in Congress, 1989-2004



The upswing in Soul bills occurred in the 1990s; this trend being more pronounced in the 104th Congress (1995-96), following the historic 1994 election and the Contract with America.

I further coded the bills based on whether they address one of five primary family issues – family (sexual) reproduction, family structure, parenting, family property/wealth and public assistance. The analysis reveals another interesting characteristic of the current focus in national family policy: as we see in Table 4.6, parenting is now a dominant focus of all bills across categories. Even among welfare and regulation bills, a large proportion now addresses family problems as issues of ‘parenting.’ In fact, the single largest proportion of the regulation bills addressed parenting, as the issue of concern. Also perhaps counter-intuitively, the largest proportion of autonomy bills focused not on parenting but on the transference of family wealth and property (such as tax breaks and deductions, repeal of estate taxes, family savings provisions etc.) Thus we find a current preoccupation with responsible parenting and the need to actively promote/encourage it through welfare and regulation policies, policies that in the past were largely focused on need and less concerned with instilling cultural imperatives. Welfare bills

now address other such concerns, like family reproduction and family structure, in contrast to previous periods when their goal was almost entirely to alleviate family economic need.

Table 4.6: Type of Policy Contained in Bills (Percent), 100th-106th Congress, 1989-2004

Family Issue	Welfare	Regulation	Autonomy	Morality
Reproduction	17.0 (78)	6.2 (8)	.4 (1)	27.6 (27)
Structure	16.3 (75)	8.5 (11)	16.0 (39)	51.0 (50)
Parenting	27.7 (127)	50.8 (66)	27.9 (68)	15.3 (15)
Property/Wealth	.9 (4)	15.4 (20)	50.4 (123)	3.1 (3)
Public Assistance	38.1 (175)	19.2 (25)	5.3 (13)	3.1 (3)
Total	100 (459)	100 (130)	100 (244)	100 (98)

Note: Count of bills in parenthesis (N).

The partisan policy preferences of the two approaches seen earlier, is further borne out in the data from congressional bills. Here too I find that Democrats introduced far more bills focusing on family economic welfare and regulation, and Republicans were more prolific in proposing bills which targeted issues of family morality and autonomy (17% of 38% of Republican bills, respectively). However, we also see that bills providing for family economic well-being (welfare) have continued to form a sizeable proportion of all bills introduced by members of *both* parties, Republican and Democratic. As seen in the below Table 4.7 almost 70% of all Democratic bills were welfare bills, versus 34% of Republican.

Table 4.7: Policy Categories of Bills Introduced by Republican and Democratic Members, 100th-106th Congress (1989-2004)

		Party of Sponsor			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Policy Category	Welfare	346	69.3	174	34.1
	Regulation	81	16.2	57	11.2
	Autonomy	58	11.6	192	37.6
	Morality	14	2.8	87	17.1
	Total	499	100.0	510	100.0

Compiled by author, Congressional Record Indexes for the years 1989-2004

The rightward turn of the Republican Party, marked by its majority of autonomy bills, must be noted however as a striking development in contrast to previous periods, when despite some attention to autonomy and/or ascription neither of the parties focused a *majority* of their bills on either category.

In sum, the current configuration of state-and-family relations has certain distinct legislative characteristics. Members of Congress, who espouse Hearth principles and focus on increasing families' economic capacities, address family policies issues as those of welfare and regulation; while traditionalists who focus instead on Soul goals and now promote attitudinal change, do so by a resumption of interest in autonomy and morality policies.

We also see that Soul ideals, particularly those emphasizing family self-sufficiency and autonomy from government, *are* gaining popularity at the expense of more progressive Hearth policy responses. However, the latter still remains the most dominant approach, followed by members of both parties, a large proportion (albeit now a minority) of Republicans continuing to assert the more familiar Hearth solutions and emphasize family's material capacities as the primary site of policy intervention. However, we do see that in the current period the Hearth and Soul ideologies have become increasingly more partisan, Democrats disproportionately now favoring the Hearth family view and Republicans disproportionately favoring the Soul.

A more subterranean development of current state-and-family relations, however, is that even Hearth ideals now are routinely focused on non-economic family matters, especially responsible parenting but also family structure and family reproduction. No doubt, these Hearth advocates continue to address these additional cultural issues *through* their more familiar – economic – route, espousing greater state provision of material resources to promote such

cultural ideals; nevertheless, the new cultural foci of Hearth proponents are illustrative of the growing importance of non-economic, cultural family concerns to national policy.

The contemporary developments in the Hearth and Soul policy approaches to family problems evidence more fundamental ideational developments in the very understanding of family itself. The two respective family ideals of the two regimes although similar to earlier ones discussed in previous chapters, also have been substantially modified to reflect the demographic transformations in family ties. In the next section, I assemble the two ideals of the family – versions of the companionate and patriarchal families – that are at the center of current Hearth and Soul differences over family and social policies.

§ 5 - Modified Companionate and Patriarchal Family Ideals

The unraveling of the nuclear family and the dispersal of parental responsibilities have been accompanied by alterations in how families are conceived and idealized as normative social units. In this section I demonstrate that proponents of the Hearth and Soul ideologies now invoke two ideals of family, commonly in response to the late-century upheavals in family behavior but again diverging in their interpretation of these changes. The modified companionate and rejuvenated patriarchal family ideals of the Hearth and Soul frameworks respectively form the basis of their divergent approaches to policy and of their current conceptions of normative role of the state in family relations.

As George Lakoff has demonstrated, differing family ideals organize cognitive ideation, engendering variation in what we even imagine is possible through policy intervention.⁴⁶ The alternative ideals of patriarchal and companionate Families (similar but not identical to Lakoff's

⁴⁶ George Lakoff (2001) Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think 2nd ed (Chicago: University Press of Chicago).

Strict Father and Nurturing families) centrally frame the ideational impulses of Soul and Hearth members, respectively, to pursue divergent approaches to state-and-family relations. Through this section, however, we also see that both contemporary ideals of family now commonly accommodate an expanded national state, actively working to promote certain cultural aspects of family, previously beyond national policy attention.

The widespread family changes occurring since the 1970s in effect derailed the nuclear family unit as the primary mechanism of social organization, and even of family formation. As seen previously, families are now often dispersed across several units and marriage no longer serves as an indicator of parental, especially paternal, responsibilities. Family ties are now instead amorphous and highly dependent on the subjective preferences of the couple.

Hearth advocates argue that the cost of family stability following the decline of the nuclear family is offset by gains in personal freedom, especially for women. Increase in individual satisfaction is now seen as possible since marriage and family formation have become optional and people are now able to choose for themselves whether or not to form, and/or retain, family ties. Stephanie Coontz – a foremost family historian and recurrent witness at committee hearings – writing on the history of marriage, celebrates the recent ‘triumph of love over marriage.’ She argues,

‘Marriage has become more joyful, more loving, and more satisfying for many couples than ever before in history. At the same time it has become optional and more brittle. These two strands of change cannot be disentangled.’⁴⁷

For Soul advocates however, the recent family changes are altogether a serious negative development, with no silver lining whatsoever. For them the decline of the nuclear family model

⁴⁷ Coontz (2005) “Marriage, A History,” p. 306.

is especially troubling insofar as it marks the diminishing significance of marital family units as the primary source of cultural reproduction. Family units, especially fathers, have been seen as crucial to the transmission of desirable character (Soul) traits such as self-reliance and competence, reproducing a 'way of life' that is claimed to be more beneficial to individuals and to society at large. David Blankenhorn, the founder of the Institute for American Values and a foremost proponent of traditional families, writes in his influential book, *Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Urgent Social Problem*:

More than providing for their material needs, or shielding them from danger, or even taking care of them and showing them affection, paternal sponsorship means cultural transmission – endowing children with competence and character by showing them how to live a certain kind of life...Teaching children right from wrong. Embodying and passing on a way of life. Preparing children for the future. Encouraging their competence and success in the larger society.⁴⁸

Thus advocates of Hearth and Soul ideologies respectively view recent family developments either sanguinely or despondently; each in turn proffering two alternative family ideals.

The current Hearth ideal of family in which individual satisfaction is key, has deep roots in the companionate ideal. As discussed in detail in Chapter two, the original form of the companionate family ideal emerged in the early 20th century, in which 'spouses would be friends and lovers and parents and children would be pals.'⁴⁹ The ideal challenged the traditional conception of marriage as a sacred obligation and instead stressed the importance of each individual's sexual satisfaction, companionship, and emotional support. Relations within the family were recast, from being based on dependence and patriarchal authority to being grounded in affection and mutual interest.⁵⁰ The current Hearth family ideal, privileging affection and self-fulfillment over family stability, is thus merely the logical end to the original companionate family. Coontz writes,

⁴⁸ David Blankenhorn (1995) *Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Urgent Social Problem* (New York, NY: Basic Books) p. 218, 221.

⁴⁹ Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "*Domestic Revolutions*," p. xvi.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

[Once] Europeans and Americans beg[a]n to see marriage as a personal...relationship that should fulfill their emotional and sexual desires...free choice became the societal norm for mate selection, love became the main reason for marriage, and a successful marriage came to be defined as one that met the needs of its members. But each of these changes had negative as well as positive implications for the stability of marriage as an institution. No sooner did the ideal of marrying for love triumph than its most enthusiastic supporters started demanding the right to divorce if love died...And when people started thinking that the quality of the relationship was more important... some men and women argued that the committed love of two unmarried individuals, including those of the same sex, deserved at least as much social respect as formal marriage.’⁵¹

In the modern version of the companionate family ideal, earlier gendered-spheres of companionship and parental guidance (seen, for e.g. in the postwar period and the inordinate emphasis on the mother in child-rearing) have now given way to greater emphasis on gender equality, as more effectively nurturing individual autonomy and self-fulfillment within the family.⁵² The goals of the contemporary Hearth family however remain similar to the objects of the original companionate family: to nurture a family member’s potential by stressing openness, diversity of experience, empathy, and reflection, so to raise a self-nurturing child and, ultimately, a self- fulfilled adult, who would then form his/her own companionate family (see Fig 1.1, Introduction Chapter of this dissertation).⁵³

In contrast, the Soul ideal of the hierarchical, patriarchal family continues to privilege gendered parenting with strong fathers, emphasizing parent-child hierarchies, individual sacrifice and tough love.⁵⁴ Family stability and the maintenance of clear lines of parental responsibilities

⁵¹ Coontz (2005) “Marriage: A History,” pp. 306-307.

⁵² On the alteration of gendered sexual spheres, women’s wage work and personal satisfaction and the transformation of gender roles within marriage, family, and living arrangements see Coontz (2005) “Marriage: A History,” pp. 266-272.

⁵³ Lakoff calls this the ‘Nurturant Parent Family’ ideal, whose underlying ‘primal experience...is one of being cared for and cared about, having one’s desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care’ [Lakoff (2001) “Moral Politics,” pp. 108-110].

⁵⁴ This family ideal is termed by Lakoff as the “Strict Father Family,” which he describes as a ‘traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall family policy...children must never be coddled, lest they become spoiled; a spoiled child will be dependent for life and will not learn proper morals. The mother has day-to-day responsibility for the case of the house, raising the children, and upholding the father’s authority. Children must respect and obey their parents, partly for their own safety and partly because by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-

continue to be seen as indispensable to social success.⁵⁵ In direct contrast to Hearth's companionate families, self-reliance is emphasized over self-fulfillment and the role played by strong fathers continues to be fundamental, qualitatively different from that of nurturing mothers.

A crucial difference between the Hearth and Soul family ideals thus lies in the conception of parental, particularly paternal, authority. Within Soul families, fathers are idealized as playing crucial and gender-distinct roles of instilling character traits of self-reliance and independence.⁵⁶ However within Hearth families, parental authority is gender-neutral and parental expertise is not privileged, instead parental wisdom must often rely on and, in some cases, be superseded by outside professionals.⁵⁷ The vision of a strong domestic patriarch, as the central moral/disciplining force to the exclusion of *both* mothers and outside professionals, most marks the patriarchal character of the Soul family ideal.⁵⁸ I should also note, however, that the Soul regime's father is now far more benign than his earlier counterpart, accommodating (albeit to a limited extent) changes in gender relations and in women's status in families – from subservience to a more equal, but separate, partnership.⁵⁹

reliance...self-discipline, self-reliance and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial things that a child must learn. [Lakoff (2001) "Moral Politics," pp. 65-66].

⁵⁵ Blankenhorn writes, 'Our essential goal must be the rediscovery in modern society of the fatherhood idea. Malinowski called it the 'principle of legitimacy.' For every child, a legally and morally responsible adult male...[i.e.] married fatherhood' [Blankenhorn (1995) "Fatherless America," p. 223].

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ As seen in previous chapters as well, the companionate family ideal, from its original conception in the early 20th century (1900-1930), has always placed great significance on external-professional (rather than internal or local) expertise. Parents, particularly wives/mothers, are encouraged to read child-rearing and domestic manuals and seek professional advice on how to be 'companions', 'wives' and 'mothers' to their spouses and children. For the role of professional expertise in shaping companionate families in the Progressive Era, see Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions," pp. 120-131; and in the Postwar Era (1950s) Ibid pp. 186-190).

⁵⁸ Ibid pp. 53-55.

⁵⁹ The Good Family Man is [not] a resurgent Old Father...he wields authority. He believes that he is doing men's work in his family. He assumes that his fatherhood is necessary and irreplaceable. At the same time, he knows that his wife also wields authority. He knows that her work in the family, while not identical to his, is equally important and also irreplaceable. He aspires to ideals of paternal tenderness and companionate marriage. He believes that men who lead are men who serve. [Blankenhorn (1995) "Fatherless America," p. 202].

Members of Congress refer to these ideals of the companionate and patriarchal families when discussing social problems and their alternative preferences for Hearth or Soul policies respectively. A majority of Democrats adopt the companionate family ideal and a majority of Republicans espouse the patriarchal ideal. During committee and sub-committee hearings, legislators from both parties cite the cases of several real-life families (sometimes their own), as illustrative of the virtues or pathologies of policies and their impact on family life. In so doing, they proffer their vision of a family ideal, as a goal to be reached by policy proposals. Within policy debate in Congress, especially through reference to actual family cases, we therefore find mention of the companionate and patriarchal families as ideals to be pursued by Hearth and Soul policies respectively. In either case, however, both sets of advocates now attribute an expanded role to the national state in realizing these alternative family ideals.

For example in an early hearing on allocating state funds to promote Fatherhood Initiatives we find Republican and Democratic members, both from California, speak about why responsible fatherhood is a legitimate subject for national state intervention; in so doing the two members alternatively make reference to the goals of patriarchal and companionate families.

Frank Riggs (R-CA): ‘...for every person this message (of responsible fatherhood) reaches, the result is a child likely to receive better education, more likely to avoid drugs and crime, and *more likely to earn a good living as a prosperous, successful adult.*’⁶⁰

Marty Martinez (D-CA): ‘The question today is how we as responsible leaders can create an environment where all men, throughout our nation, can learn the responsibility of fatherhood, *so that our children can be nurtured with love, and they can grow up to be all they can be.*’⁶¹

Much like Blankenhorn’s ‘Good Family Man’ in the patriarchal family ideal, Republican Riggs’s ideal of a responsible father is gendered, one who instills core character traits in children

⁶⁰ House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce (1998) Hearing on the fatherhood initiative, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, p.2 (emphasis added).

⁶¹ Ibid p.3 (emphasis added).

thus raising self-reliant and successful adults.⁶² Democratic Martinez however, invokes the gender-neutral companionate family ideal, by conceiving good fathers much like good mothers: those who nurture and love their children, thereby raising self-nurturing and fulfilled adults.

An active national state is especially important to the companionate ideal insofar as it is vested with the responsibility of creating enabling standard conditions, for parents to nurture their children. For example, Vicki Flamand, a 30-year old single-mother and former TANF-recipient from Ft. Walton Beach, Florida was invited by the Democratic subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy to speak at a hearing entitled ‘Child Care: *Supporting Working Families*.’ The testimony of Vicki Flamand illustrates the Democratic conception of the inextricable relationship between government and parent in realizing the companionate family ideal of nurturance. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced her as “...the proud mother of a beautiful 2-year-old daughter... [who] works extremely hard to provide a nurturing environment for her family.’⁶³ In her testimony, Vicki Flamand, stressed the need for State programs so that she could attend college and work while also ensuring outside care of her daughter.

Vicki Flamand: ‘I work hard to provide a safe and stable environment for myself and my child, while struggling to work and to go college. I strongly believe in the importance of consistency within my daughter’s environment in order to provide her with a sense of security and love. To this end, I have struggled to keep my child with the same child care provider for the majority of her short life. The obstacles to fulfilling this goal include...changing jobs in order to meet my provider’s new hours...Now I am confronted with a new obstacle...As I have said, I am a hard worker and I go to work every day. Until recently, I received transitional child care assistance...which helped pay my child care fees. However, my transitional child care benefit ended...this year....I have been told by many agencies that the only way I can obtain assistance with my child care expense is to quit my job and apply for cash assistance.’⁶⁴

⁶² Blankenhorn asserts that unlike maternal sponsorship which is nurturing and ‘devotes special attention to the children’s present physical and emotional needs.’ In contrast, ‘fathers are likely to devote special attention to character traits necessary for the future, especially qualities such as independence, self-reliance, and the willingness to test limits and take risks...paternal sponsorship tends to focus especially on preparation for the future and on children’s success in the larger society’ [Blankenhorn (1995) “Fatherless America,” p. 219]. For a historical exegesis of this paternal ideal, see Mintz & Kellogg (1988) “Domestic Revolution,” pp.55-56.

⁶³ Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy of the Committee on Finance & Senate Subcommittee on Children and Families of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Child care : Supporting Working Families, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 2002, p. 25.

⁶⁴ Ibid p.29.

In contrast, patriarchal families are described as operating best when left alone.⁶⁵ Republicans espouse such a patriarchal ideal by emphasizing the importance of the inviolate nature of parental authority/counsel to children's success. A parent (particularly a father) is assumed to know and decide best for his children, more so than any outside agency. Public policies and programs that mistakenly circumvent the family hierarchy, focusing directly at the base (child) level are assumed to be counter-productive, crippling parental responsibility and family cohesion more generally. We see this for instance, in discussions regarding policies targeting adolescent sexuality and teenage pregnancies.

Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL): '...Over the past 10 years the Federal Government has spent one and a half billion dollars on family planning through title X of the Public Health Services Act...[o]riginally...to pay for services to low-income women who might not have access to a birth control method. Over time, the shape of the program was changed by those in the Congress who accepted the tenets of the family planning advocates with regard to adolescent sexuality... Congress decided to codify an approach to minors that not only stressed the need to provide contraceptives to teens but, moreover, would do so without the knowledge or consent of their parents. This policy was justified on the grounds that sexually active teens need protection against the dangers of unwanted pregnancy more than they need the preachments of parents or society....There is a serious question about the efficacy and wisdom of federally supported organizations providing contraceptives and medical advice to unemancipated children without their parent's knowledge and thereby, further isolating teens from family during a time when parental counsel is most needed.'⁶⁶

Thus within the patriarchal family ideal articulated by Republicans, parental authority and government economic intervention are viewed in antagonistic terms. The Soul regime instead now enlists the national state to promote cultural change (such as married fatherhood) rather than economic assistance. On the other hand, the Hearth approach's companionate family exists in a more comfortable, organic relation to government and its success is conditional on its

⁶⁵ Historically, of course, the original patriarchal families were founded on the very principle of the absolute character of a patriarch's sovereign right to rule his household, one that could not be impinged on by outside, state and local, authorities. The widest respect for this ideal in America, and its instantiation in law, goes back to the seventeenth century colonial family and continued in a less absolute form through the nineteenth and early twentieth century [Mintz & Kellogg (1988) "Domestic Revolutions," p. 54].

⁶⁶ Senate Subcommittee on Aging, Families, and Human Services of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Oversight on Family Planning Programs under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p.2.

economics; the ‘Hearth’ aspect of the ideology emphasizing both the nurturing warmth of home as well as the materiality of the hearth, as an instrument to keep a family warm, both crucial to family survival. For example, in discussing youth violence, Republican and Democratic members view the cause of youth violence as either absence of parental counsel, a moral problem reflected in families willfully failing their children; or else as economic deprivation, an economic problem retarding otherwise-competent families.

Dan Coats (R-IN), as committee chairman, opening statement during a hearing on *Youth Violence*: ‘What is driving this rage? ...“violence is symptomatic of a deeper moral and spiritual void in our Nation”. To understand the moral dimension of juvenile crime...we should not ask why a small but dangerous number of people commit violent crimes, but why most people do not...Most of us do not break the law most of the time, not simply because we worry about taking even a small chance of getting caught, but also because our conscience forbids our doing what is wrong... “If a people composed of 100 million citizens is guarded by 100 million inner policemen – that is, by 100 million self-governing consciences – then the number of policemen on the streets may be few....” The best developers of those “inner policemen” are strong, healthy families. Strong families are America’s strongest line of defense. Mothers and fathers teach the difference between right and wrong better than any police department or court system....They have clear advantages over Government – moral values, tough love, true compassion.’⁶⁷

Christopher Dodd (D-CT), chairman of committee in another congress, opening statement on *Violence and America’s Youth*: ‘These...are America’s children of war, those who commit or suffer acts of violence and those who lie in a shadow of fear. What places them at such risk? Many factors and individual characteristics contribute to an act of violence...Yet, one factor stands out, one factor more than anything else...that factor is poverty. Violence is more likely to occur in low-income communities, as frustration, deprivation, and raw desperation all bubble to the surface...Violence is, therefore, squarely among a host of social ills – lack of jobs, poor housing, substance abuse, crumbling families.’⁶⁸

We see in the above that youth violence for Republican Dan Coats is a manifestation of ‘rage’ and the lack of a moral conscience, and dysfunctional families are characterized in Soul family terms, as those unable to teach their children right from wrong. In contrast, for Democrat

⁶⁷ Senate Subcommittee on Children and Families of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, *Youth Violence: on Examining the Role of the Federal Government and Non-Government Organizations in Establishing Solutions for Combating Juvenile Crime*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, p. 3.

⁶⁸ Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources (1992) *Children of War: Violence and America's Youth*, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1992, p. 2.

Christopher Dodd,⁶⁹ youth violence is the outgrowth of ‘frustration’, ‘deprivation’ and ‘raw desperation’ (not ‘rage’) all of which result from poverty or economic disadvantage. For Dodd, economic deprivation prevents families from being companionable instead allowing violence, as a form of desperation, to ‘bubble to the surface.’⁷⁰

Further reflecting the patriarchal family conception Republican Soul advocates tend to emphasize tough love and discipline. This contrasts with the emphasis on affection and caring stressed by Democratic Hearth members, reflecting instead their espousal of the companionate family ideal. An example of this appeared in hearings on school safety following Columbine and the spate of school shootings that ensued across the country. Jim DeMint (R-SC) and Tim Roemer (D-IN) both expressed their sympathy as parents of school-going children, presenting different ideas on the type of policy interventions needed to address this problem. DeMint embodied, so to speak, the strict father concerned with authority structures and lessons of discipline taught to his children and Roemer the nurturing father worried about the overall (physical and emotional) wellbeing of his children.

Jim DeMint(R-SC): ‘...I am new in Congress and I have to say that this (Safe and Drug Free Schools Act) is probably one of the most important things that we have done....One of the things that concerns me most about legislation in Washington is the unintended consequences of things that are very often well motivated. I think that appears to be very much the case with the discipline in schools...I have four children, two are in college and two started back to high school

⁶⁹ From my dataset of family cases referenced during committee hearings on family policy for the years 1989 to 2005, Christopher Dodd (D-CT) is indeed a leading, if not foremost, protagonist in that he referred to 134 of the total of 829 narrated family cases (16% of all family cases); among a total of 475 Democratic family cases. He was the sponsor of most number of narrated family cases among all members of Congress for this period.

⁷⁰ A narrative frequently told by Democrat Marty Martinez (D-CA) in numerous hearings similarly illustrates the importance of economic environments conducive to nurturing the healthy development of a child, without which children are assumed to be forced into unfortunate circumstances, such as a life of crime: ‘I’m reminded of a situation where I was visiting the Job Corps in Los Angeles, and was being given a tour by a young man who I asked if he happened to be one of the dropouts, and his response to me was, “I wasn’t a dropout; I was a force-out....my life situation forced me out of the mainstream of society into a world of drugs and crime and disruptive behavior” [House Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary & House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce Administration’s Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Initiative, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, p. 8]. In contrast, traditionalists of the Soul regime stress reverse causality, arguing that cultural, attitudinal change towards married, traditional family values will stem economic deprivation – rather than the other way around.

this week...*I am concerned about schools having the authority, the means and the resources to create an orderly and disciplined environment.* I have seen the frustration that builds in my children when they are in a classroom or other school setting where it is out of control and a few students seem to be controlling that situation and the teachers seem hesitant to respond...I see the need to turn *more responsibility as well as the authority over to teachers and principals...*when they implement common sense disciplinary procedures.⁷¹

Tim Roemer (D-IN): ‘As a father of three children, and as a representative that represents thousands of children in my home State of Indiana. I worry when my children go to school with a cold. I worry when my children get called a name on the playground. I worry if my children miss a couple of days of school and fall behind in their academics. It is almost unfathomable to me to have to begin to worry – as some of our parents are across the country – about the impact of safety for our children simply surviving in school.’⁷²

In both cases, the state is imagined to further companionate or patriarchal family concerns – either by providing schools with the ‘means and resources to create an orderly and disciplined environment,’ or to ensure school safety through other programmatic means.

Finally, Republican members disproportionately reference the patriarchal family model in their preference for policies promoting prescriptive parenting, exhorting families (particularly fathers) to instill moral absolutes. They tend to eschew open-ended parenting aimed at promoting a child’s self-determination, long found in the companionate family ideal and advocated more consistently by their Democratic counterparts in the Hearth ideological camp. An example of the clash between these two distinct ideas of good parenting (supportive v. prescriptive) can be seen in discussions, again, regarding adolescent sexuality.

⁷¹ House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce, School safety, Discipline, and IDEA, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, p.4 For a similar emphasis on family as the primary instiller of moral values and discipline see testimony of teen witness Christopher Lyle, sophomore at Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado, invited by the Republican committee to testify on school violence: ‘It all begins in the home. Parents have to be able to learn to raise their kids with respect for life and with a decent set of values that we can live in this society...and it has to begin there. And then it has to carry on through into the school system...My mother, when I went to junior high, the first day of registration, she talked to my homeroom teacher, and I will give you an example of what a brief early detection and intervention and counseling session was like. She told my homeroom teacher with me sitting there with her, a conference, she said I expect Lyle to behave in school, like he does as I expect at home. And if he misbehaves, gives you problems, you have the right to punish him. And you call me, and when he comes home, I will punish him [House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce, School Violence: Views of Students and The Community, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, p.76].

⁷²House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce of Representatives Understanding Violent Children, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1998, p.8.

In this instance, the Democratic professional witness, a doctor who was testifying on health care reform insofar as it impacted adolescents, narrated the example of a 16-year-old boy in New York City who was treated for a sexually-transmitted disease but for lack of an insurance card, which was in his mother's name, was unable to fill the prescription and obtain medication for treatment. The clash between the Democratic witnesses' emphasis on the health and bodily safety of the child and the child's ability to make his own decisions even those regarding sexual activity stands in glaring contrast with the Republican member obvious aghast at perceived lack of moral responsibility and direction, provided by the child's permissive mother.

Dr. Johnson (Democratic witness): 'The 16-year-old boy I told you about who didn't get his doxycyclin because he couldn't get his card from his mother, has a very good relationship with his mother and his father, but he didn't want them to know. Although the parents – his mother puts condoms in his underwear drawer once a week and she very well knows he is sexually active, he didn't want her to know that he had this disease. And because of that, he went a week without receiving treatment for it....

Jim Walsh (R-NY): That is a very unusual situation that you just described and I just think there is a real communication breakdown there, and perhaps further, even a moral breakdown there, in my mind.

....A mother who puts condoms in the top drawer for her 16 year old son on a weekly basis I think is making a tragic mistake.

Dr. Johnson: Well, I disagree with you. I think it indicates that the mother has communicated with her son, realizes what her son is involved in and wants her son to be protected. It is something that many, many parents in America do. Many parents recognize the fact that their children are sexually active. At 16 in this country, 60 percent of boys are sexually active.

Jim Walsh (R-NY): And they are not willing to show the courage to stand up to their own child, that could be fatal mistake for them.⁷³

As is suggested from the above, good parents in patriarchal families are authoritarian figures who enforce moral absolutes, such as abstinence, rather than adapt to their children's self-exploration; tough love *is* true love. This is again evinced in the words of Pat Fitton, a witness from South Haven, Michigan, invited by a Republican committee to testify at a hearing on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act:

⁷³ House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Health Care Reform: How do Women, Children, and Teens Fare? 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1992, pp. 125-126.

'I believe children should be loved enough to be taught how to speak and act respectfully. Children should be put to bed at appropriate times so they'll feel cared for and understand there are limits...These very values: Respect, appropriateness, hard work, selflessness, the setting of realistic boundaries...are the very underpinnings of community safety and peace. *Values need to be deliberately taught.* Parents should sit down literally with pen and paper and make a list of things they want children to know before they wave goodbye at the age of 18.'⁷⁴

Within the patriarchal family ideal, parental authority and deliberate moral direction are crucial to raising a self-reliant child, the definition of family success; in contrast, the companionate family ideal's goal of self-fulfillment requires an open-ended, supportive environment, often imagined as the result of an organic partnership between family and state.

Prior to the 1970s, gendered separate spheres and the centrality of the nuclear married family had ensured the conditions necessary for the existence of the patriarchal family. Clear lines of paternal responsibility within married family structures allowed for families to automatically reproduce this ideal, without outside intervention. At most, as we have seen in Chapter three, problems arose with respect to fathers who would shirk their paternal, breadwinner responsibility, (the 'runaway pappy') the actual fact of biological fatherhood however was clear and undisputed. However, the recent blurring of these boundaries and the dissipation of family ties also meant the endangerment of the biological, patriarchal family.⁷⁵ Soul proponents, previously more laissez faire, therefore view current social conditions as

⁷⁴ House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, pp. 22-23.

⁷⁵ For instance, Blankenhorn stresses the inability of step-families (particularly step-fathers) to approximate the social functions and affective responsibilities of biological families in child rearing: "Among married couples raising children, the growing prevalence of stepfathers is probably the most important transformation of U.S. family life in this generation... many analysts...are quite optimistic about the rapidly growing number of stepfathers in the United States...[concluding that] "There is no reason why stepparents cannot parent just as effectively as biological parents."... these ideas reflect less the actual circumstances of children than the wishful thinking of adults...the truth about step-families is more nearly the opposite of these feel-good descriptions. Step- families comprise the most unstable and volatile family form in our society, They are inherently fraught with bad outcomes for children. More specifically, the great majority of stepfathers are not – cannot ever be – replacement fathers or even extra fathers. In almost of the most important ways, they are not fathers at all" [Blankenhorn (1995) "Fatherless America," pp.188-190].

‘spinning out of control’ and now in need of steering (or reversing).⁷⁶ To this end they now enlist the national state to re-create the conditions necessary for the revival of the traditional, patriarchal family, by turning to policies that engender autonomy and traditional morality. This has implied a somewhat paradoxical, recent development in current state and family relations, namely, that proponents of the Soul regime now seek to promote self-reliance, the end of a patriarchal family, by turning to the state.

On the other hand, Hearth advocates have been far more consistent in their approach to the state. They now view current family developments as secular and, in many cases, the outcome of economic limitations. Family affection and self-fulfillment, the goals of companionate families that they continue to seek, can be achieved regardless of family form but not without economic stability. The dispersal of parental responsibilities for Hearth advocates has instead meant greater economic hardship for many (often female-headed) families, endangering their capacity to nurture. They have thus turned to the state to recreate the economic conditions conducive to the generation of affection within the family, regardless of its form. In so doing, they prefer welfare policies which enhance a family’s economic well-being or, at the very least, maintain basic economic conditions. Additionally, since the Progressive era, they have been less likely to view parents as sacrosanct and more likely to openly solicit assistance

⁷⁶ For instance, Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL): “Government can make a very real difference by prompting and supporting marriage...I do not believe that we have to continue down the same path that Europe is precisely on. It is not inevitable that we will have 60 percent of our children born to unmarried parents as they are in Denmark. We do not have to allow other countries or our own activist courts to tell us that traditional marriage is outdated. It is not...In fact we will serve our Nation if we...take steps to reverse the trends and prove that marriage of one man and one woman is and will always be the most ideal framework for a family” [Senate Subcommittee on Children and Families, “Healthy Marriage,” p. 2]. Also, Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA): “What can government do and what can organizations who are in support of traditional marriage do to make a positive impact on community? We want to see what those experiences are...and what government can do to promot[e] marriage.”... Julie Baumgardner, witness, Executive Director, First Things First, Chattanooga, Tennessee: “...I want to address today is the skepticism that nothing can really be done about the breakdown of the family, and those people who think that marriage is an outmoded institution...I want to testify to you about my 7 years of firsthand experience as part of an experiment to see if we could actually stop the epidemic, reverse the trend, and change the divorce culture in our community” [Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, “Benefits of a Healthy Marriage,” p. 2, 3].

from government and other professional ‘experts.’ Proponents of the Hearth ideology are thus more willing to ascribe to regulation policies, such as mandatory policies of child health, safety and protection, which regulate parental and family behavior, when believed to clash with external/professional standards of child welfare. Similarly, as discussed previously, Hearth adherents are more attuned to possible conflict between family success and personal autonomy, particularly with respect to women. They are thus also more apt to propose regulation policies, aimed at protecting individual well-being, even at the expense of family unity/integrity (see Tables 4.2a and b previously).

In this chapter, we have seen how two alternative ideals of the family underpin the Hearth and Soul approaches to public policies. Despite the fact that the two approaches seek to promote divergent family ideals, advocates of both now openly solicit the national state and routinely use public policies to create the conditions necessary for the realization of these ideals. Within the Soul framework, policies enhancing family autonomy and morality are seen as necessary to recreate clear lines of paternal responsibilities, placing family units and fathers at the center of cultural transmission. Within the Hearth framework, policies enhancing family welfare and stressing the regulation of undesirable family behavior (especially by fathers) are instead viewed as crucial to allow family members to find individual self-fulfillment through gender and sexual parity. Cultural, non-economic ideals such as strong fathers or gender equality within family relations now motivate both Hearth and Soul proponents, in their two approaches to public policies.

In the next, final, chapter we see how the evolution of the new party system since the 1980s has accommodated the increasing attention to conservative and liberal cultural values

within parties' agendas. By tracing the regional character of the Hearth and Soul ideational constellations as articulated by Republicans and Democrats in Congress I am able to connect the two ideational models to their Northern and Southern bases, respectively. In so doing, I argue that the prevailing two partisan approaches to state-and-family relations, particularly the recent rightward turn in Soul principles in family policies and the heightened role of cultural family issues in members' agendas, have emerged due to a confluence of Southern-focused regional developments and the parties' inexorable quest to secure electoral majorities.

CHAPTER V

PARTY EVOLUTION, THE SOUTHERNIZATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS & THE SALIENCE OF CULTURAL FAMILY ISSUES

The current alignment of the Republican Party to Soul ideologies was not preordained.¹ Indeed, as we have seen in previous chapters, Republicans pioneered the Hearth ideology in the Progressive era and a significant faction of Democrats (Southern Democrats) espoused Soul principles up to the mid-century, postwar period. Moreover, the postwar period was marked by the high salience of Hearth ideals and the social welfare policies as the dominant axis in American politics. What changed and how did these changes result in the resurgence of the Soul regime (from the Progressive Era), its clear alignment with the Republican Party, and the recent infiltration of cultural family issues into the agendas of both partisan regimes?

I suggest that the Republican Party in its quest to expand its coalitional base, and finally gain majority status, courted a growing base of white, middle-class, evangelical Protestants in the South by invoking Soul family principles. Prior to this in the postwar era, the Party had espoused Soul principles centered on individual rights and free markets in opposition to big government and New Deal programs. As seen in Chapter three, the Soul ideology found among Republican members then was essentially an anti-statist one, focused on *opposing* state (especially national

¹ As we saw in Chapter three, for much of the postwar era, the Republican Party was forced to contract to its skeletal core: those who remained ideologically opposed to active-big government, as represented in the New Deal and its legacy policies of the 1950s and 60s. These fiscal conservatives were often culturally liberal, holding liberal or indifferent attitudes to moral or cultural issues and certainly did not imagine that government had any role to play in encouraging any value system [See: Theodore Lowi (1979) End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, (New York: Norton); also Alan Ware (2006) The Democratic Party Heads North, 1877-1962, (New York: Cambridge University Press) pp. 233-235]. Similarly, prior to the late 1960s and into the 1970s, cultural conservatives, those who held traditional or religious ideals, supported the Democratic Party; nothing inherent in the New Deal Democratic Coalition and its (economic populist) issue concerns were antagonistic to cultural conservatives [Byron Shafer (2003) The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press) p. 23,179].

state) intervention into family practices. This stands in contrast to Republicans' new dynamic Soul ideology, engendered by the accommodation of the new Southern evangelical faction within the GOP tent which is much more at ease with appropriating state mechanisms to instate its cultural ideals. Republican's famed "southern" strategy implied interpreting family changes in the South as elsewhere in cultural terms – stressing the attitudinal, cultural fallout and downplaying economic changes.² The Democratic Party, on the other hand, had to contend with a growing faction of middle-class cultural liberals, less interested in re-distributional policies than organized labor, their mainstay in the preceding, postwar era. These (northern) cultural liberals thus fused liberal cultural principles into the previously acultural, economic-focused Hearth Regime, now espoused by a 'new' politics Democratic Party.

In the following chapter, I first briefly describe the changes within the Republican and Democratic Parties, accommodating new culturally-focused factions into their respective coalitions; following which, the bulk of the chapter uses aggregate data on family cases at committee hearings to identify the Northern and Southern character of Hearth and Soul members of Congress, respectively. In addition to illustrating discursive ideals, real-life family examples referenced by members of Congress during hearings have their residences noted within the transcripts; by analyzing the residential regions of the family examples used to articulate Hearth or Soul principles I am also able to tangibly connect partisan family ideologies to the kinds of families epitomizing these ideals, and correspondingly the places/regions from where they come.

By so doing, I demonstrate that the Soul family ideal now articulated by Republicans contains distinctive conservative cultural characteristics, such as an emphasis on married couple families, religion, and traditional caregiver roles, illustrated by small-town, Southern families; whereas the Hearth family ideal currently articulated by Democrats evokes other culturally

² Kevin Phillips (1969) The Emerging Republican Majority, (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House).

liberal characteristics, such as emphasis on gender equality and personal choice, that they instead depict through stories of highly urban Northern families. This partisan focus on cultural characteristics now extant in the family ideals of the two ideologies is also found to exist alongside the more long-standing partisan attention to (and division over) family economic issues. These dynamics in state-and-family relations are thus found to parallel the larger dynamics within and across the two party systems.

§ 1 – Late-Century Party Developments

Starting in the late 1960s, profound changes occurred in the parties' structure and in their coalitional bases. In the postwar era through the 1950s the two social coalitions characterizing American politics had been organized on class lines.³ The blue-collar coalition aligned with the Democratic Party consisted of working-class and low-income Americans, along with a few religious and ethnic minority groups (notably Jews and Catholics). The smaller white-collar coalition, which was instead aligned with the Republican Party, comprised of middle-class Americans and northern and western farmers.⁴ As seen earlier, the New Deal and its establishment of the welfare state had served to embed social class as the organizing principle of American politics well into the postwar years and social welfare had continued to persist as the dominant substantive concern.

Much of postwar politics pertaining to the family had been dominated by Hearsh advocates attempting to expand on, and fill 'gaps' in, New Deal social welfare programs. The policy successes of the New Deal's social insurance programs worked to ensure the sustained

³ James Sundquist (1973) Dynamics of the Party System, Chapters 10-12.

⁴ Ibid. See also: Everett C. Ladd and Charles D. Hadley (1975) Transformations of the American Party System, (New York: Norton); Shafer (2003) "Two Majorities," Chapter 1.

popular appeal of the Democratic Party and the Hearth approach. Meanwhile, the Soul ideology in the postwar era, although much diminished in its ranks, continued to co-exist alongside its more popular counterpart. While Soul (mostly Republican) advocates accorded a moralistic quality to cherished ‘American goods’, such as individual initiative, freedom, and private enterprise; their core feature in the postwar period was opposition to the expanded national state and to its agenda of central planning and economic redistribution.

The South however, soon pivotal of the new politics to come, remained an anomaly within the class-based party system. In contrast to its working-class support in other regions, Hearth policies were widely supported *across* the board and *across* class lines in the South.⁵ The New Deal had not brought class-based coalitions to the region, and it continued to remain monolithically Democratic, as it had been since the Civil War. Southern Democrats remained indistinguishable by class unlike Democrats elsewhere, giving their representatives in Congress a much more (economic) conservative character than their counterparts from the North; a conservatism that reliably cast them as a dissident faction within the Democratic Party in addition to their unique preference for legal racial segregation and cultural conservatism.⁶

The end of the 1960s marked a reconfiguration of these partisan dynamics. On the one hand, economic concerns continued to be salient.⁷ However, on the other hand, other issues –

⁵ Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 85; the support of welfare policies by Southerners in Congress was however qualified. Southern support long depended on local control of welfare benefits. Local control over welfare benefits allowed them to be used to maintain a system of racial and (class) hierarchical paternalism; allowing white-planter elite control over black and poor white agricultural workers. See: Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie (1999) Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South, 1865-1965 (Boston: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1; also Nicole Mellow (2008) The State of Disunion (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press) pp. 107-109.

⁶ Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 85; On Southern cultural exceptionalism and its accommodation within the New Deal Democratic Party see also: Phillips (1969) “The Emerging Republican Majority” Chapter III. Phillips makes a distinction between the Deep South and the Outer (Border) South, the former’s politics largely pivoting around race issues (‘Negrophobia’) and the later less preoccupied with race but nevertheless culturally conservative and averse to the social engineering agenda of contemporary liberal Democrats.

⁷ Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 87; Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), Figs. 1.2, 1.3 on p. 8, 9.

cultural issues, and secondarily foreign policy issues (mainly Vietnam) – ascended to the forefront of national politics, reorganizing party politics in new ways. At the core of this change lay the shifting coalitional bases of the two parties. Parties moved from being as they were in the postwar era: an amalgam of disparate ideological factions held together by partisan loyalty; to their recent incarnation: two programmatic entities divided on clear ideological lines, operating as networks of issue-oriented ideological political activists, not party loyalists.⁸

The change was most apparent first in the Democratic Party and the coalitional change had wide-ranging effects on the Party's family policy preferences. By the 1960s the Democratic Party had been expanding beyond its postwar traditional (lower- and working-) class base.⁹ Whereas at the end of World War II, despite the necessary core of intellectuals within the Democratic coalition, the share of college graduates within the Party had been minute. Partly thanks to the G.I. Bill, through the 1950s the share of college-educated Americans, and particularly the share of college-educated Democrats, had grown significantly.¹⁰

This change in the mass base of the Democratic Party was matched by a growing presence of self-described 'counterculture' party activists in the mid-1960s. These were university-based political activists, who were heavily influenced by the civil rights movement and adopted their protest tactics to oppose the Vietnam War in particular. They represented a new strain of cultural liberalism more generally, calling for a 'New Politics' focused on 'solving problems rather than dispensing patronage, addressing issues rather than just rallying loyalties, dealing with the quality rather than just the quantity of life.'¹¹ The cultural liberalism represented

⁸ James Q. Wilson (1973) Political Organizations, (New York: Basic Books) Chapters 1-6.

⁹ Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks (1999) Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

¹⁰ Shafer (2003) "Two Majorities," p. 15, 158-160 (see especially Fig 9 on p. 159).

¹¹ *Ibid* p. 161; Also Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash (2009) Dynamics of American Political Parties, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

by these New Politics Democratic party activists emphasized ‘choice rather than constraint and...rights rather than responsibilities’ and resonated (albeit more moderately) with the growing college-educated mass base within the Party.¹² Many of these themes resonated in family issues – women’s sexual and other rights, increasing individual autonomy in building and retaining family relationships, interracial marriage and gender equality within the family, all rose to the fore.¹³

Thus unlike organized labor, the postwar mainstay of the Democratic Party coalition, middle-class college-educated Democrats and their counterpart party activists were less satisfied with the subterranean status of cultural issues in relation to the much stressed re-distributional issues, that had characterized the New Deal Democratic coalition and postwar Hearsh approach. Instead, they were more concerned with social and cultural, ‘quality of life,’ issues and pushed for their greater salience.¹⁴ Importantly, they were motivated in large part by specific causes (such as women’s rights, rights of gays and lesbians, environmental conservation), rather than by loyalty to partisan organizations.¹⁵ Their overall growing partisan presence meant an expansion of the Democratic Party’s policy priorities, adding liberal cultural issues to the party’s policy agenda, hitherto focused only on economic redistribution.¹⁶ Hearsh advocates’ focus on economic, programmatic assistance thus increasingly began to accommodate non-economic, cultural matters within its fold; and issues such as family sexuality, individual autonomy and/or race and gender equality began to be addressed.

¹² Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 161.

¹³ Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 162, 176-178.

¹⁴ James T. Patterson (1996) Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press).

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁶ ‘Expansion’ of priorities is a more accurate way to represent the change occurring in the Democratic Party agenda (as opposed to, say, ‘alteration’) since the middle-class Democrats represented the more liberal elements of the middle-class who continued to highly regard, and support, the social welfare gains of the New Deal. However, these modern liberal Democrats were simultaneously more culturally liberal but less economically liberal than the old-guard Democrats of the New Deal Coalition.

These New (middle-class, college-educated) Democrats ultimately held sway by instituting a series of participatory procedural reforms spearheaded by the McGovern-Fraser Commission and instituted in the wake of the chaotic 1968 Democratic National Convention. The ensuing electoral and congressional reform of the Democratic Caucus rules included: large-scale adoption of presidential primaries by the states, alteration of selection rules for convention delegates (for one, mandating women, blacks and young people proportionate representation), secret ballot voting for committee chairs in Congress, enhanced power of the Speaker of the House over committee leaders, and the ‘Subcommittee Bill of Rights.’ All of this cumulatively decreased the power/autonomy of the old guard in the Party, namely the bloc of Southern conservative Democrats who, through seniority and assured re-election, had suppressed any accommodation of a liberal cultural agenda, thus blocking a more (culturally) liberal policy direction for the Democratic Party.¹⁷ Procedural reform also served to institutionalize issue-activists rather than party-loyalists as key figures in shaping the party’s agenda.¹⁸

While the power of the old guard, especially Southern conservatives, was waning in the Democratic Party, a reactionary social coalition with obvious appeal for Southerners was emerging within the Republican Party. That faction was that of religious conservatives, particularly Evangelical Protestants. Up until the 1970s, they were largely apolitical and traditionally Democratic.¹⁹ Starting in the 1970s, they re-entered politics as the “New Christian Right,” principally motivated by their abhorrence of two political developments. Firstly they were affronted by the moral relativism of the new cultural liberals, seen most clearly in the 1972,

¹⁷ On reforms in Congress in the 1970s instituted by the more liberal, New Politics Democrats see: John H Aldrich & David Rhode (2000) ‘The Logic of Conditional Party Government’ in Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer (eds) Congress Reconsidered 7th ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press) pp. 275-277.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Geoffrey C. Layman (2001) The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American party politics, (New York: Columbia University Press) p. 43.

New Politics, Democratic reformist candidate, George McGovern; and secondly, they decried the seeming institutional quiescence of these trends, most significantly the Supreme Court's decisions that removed school prayer from public schools in the 1960s (*Engel v. Vitale* (370 U.S. 421, 1962); *Abington School District v. Schempp* and *Murray v. Curlett* (374 U.S. 203, 1963)) and legalized abortion in *Roe v. Wade* (410 U.S. 113, 1973) and related cases.²⁰

Evangelicalism had been growing in the South and in the Rocky Mountain States, areas which were also experiencing the greatest economic growth; together, these conditions invigorated the resource base of protestant evangelicals. In addition, a previous rift between mainline and evangelical traditions within Protestantism had spawned the establishment of evangelical seminaries, catering to their own specific theological and organizational needs; by the 1970s, these seminaries were producing a generation of well-trained ministers who were both tied to the growing social base of evangelicalism and who were well-versed with, and capable of responding to, the liberal intellectual trends developing within society.²¹

Not unlike their counterparts (New Politics Democrats), the new generation of evangelical Protestant ministers themselves were, and catered to constituencies who also were, suburban and middle class, rather than rural and working class (as had previously been the case for evangelicals). They were also technologically savvy, aggressively using contemporary technological media, notably television, to serve their ends.

However, mass evangelicals long had strong apolitical tendencies, which made them view the initial efforts of organizations such as the Moral Majority and the Religious Roundtable to mobilize them into politics with wariness and distaste.²² Only by the meticulous

²⁰ Shafer (2003) "Two Majorities," p. 176.

²¹ Layman (2001) "The Great Divide"; Shafer (2003) "Two Majorities."

²² James Guth, John C Green, Corwin Smidt, Lyman Kellstedt and Margaret Poloma (1998) "American Politics - the Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy" American Political Science Review. 92 (3): 707.

organizational efforts and the commitment of large financial resources were leaders of the political Christian Right able to attract large proportions of evangelical Protestants into the Republican Party. In doing this, leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Ed McAteer were aggressively courted by secular Republican conservative strategists, such as Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, and Howard Phillips. In their search for new constituencies to counteract the expanding New Politics Democrats and build a new conservative (Republican) majority, these strategists played a critical role in bringing evangelical Protestant leaders and laity into the Republican fold.²³

Thus by 1980 evangelical Protestants had decisively entered the Republican Party, as a distinct, significant coalitional faction, responding to the deliberate overtures made to their leaders, not least by Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan. Reagan then succeeded Carter's administration (which had built around the cultural liberalism of New Politics Democrats) and faithfully articulated themes of cultural conservatism throughout his tenure.²⁴

Personal salvation and the emphasis on leading a godly life here on earth are signature characteristics of evangelical Protestantism.²⁵ Within these broad themes, the perceived breakdown of the American family and the decline of traditional family values – highlighted by the rising tide of divorce, increasing illegitimacy, and borne out in social disorder and crime – became the clarion call through which evangelical elites were able to mobilize their mass constituency in politics. The unique durability of the “family” as a central concern of culturally conservative evangelicals (and later other religious fundamentalists) is apparent from the

²³ Jerome L. Himmelstein (1983) ‘The New Right,’ in The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation, Robert C. Liebman, Robert Wuthnow, James L. Guth et al (eds), (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Pub. Co.); Duane M. Oldfield (1997) The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right confronts the Republican Party (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield).

²⁴ Shafer (2003) “Two Majorities,” p. 179.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 176.

endurance of family-oriented organizations, such as the Concerned Women of America, Family Research Council and Focus on the Family, which have now outlived the more narrow political bodies, such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, and the Religious Roundtable.²⁶

While the rising tide of evangelicalism has been felt most in the South and Rocky Mountain States, those areas are also experiencing some of the highest levels of family disruption and change, cumulatively marking the so-called disintegration of the nuclear family across the country. These changes, coupled with massive migratory influxes of non-southern populations into the Sunbelt constitute a continuing process of drastic social upheaval in the region, more so than in other regions. The Republicans “Southern Strategy,” formulated with a view to replacing white southerners waning support for the Democratic Party, includes appeals to re-instating marriage and the traditional family ideal and is especially suited for Southerners, who are facing drastic changes in their social composition and more importantly, who continue to possess traditional family attitudes despite their increasingly non-traditional family practices.

Political scientist, Nicole Mellow has argued that the greater appeal of Soul-based cultural policies, such as pro-life abortion policy, to the changing Sunbelt rather than to the North or Pacific regions is a product of the timing of their industrialization:

‘The rhetoric...framed the issue as a choice between tradition and modernization, and the regions responded differently to those options. *In areas with long histories of economic development, like the Pacific Coast and the Northeast, the changes driving the demand for abortion rights and gender equality were welcomed. In areas newly experiencing economic development and widespread change, such as the historically rural South and West, tradition and social stability were prized.*’

As we have seen in the chapter on postwar politics, the value of tradition, religion and social order within Southern culture however existed even before its widespread industrialization; the appeal of Soul policies in the South is therefore not the direct result of its

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

new industrialization and the social upheavals in its wake but, rather, the indirect result of these conditions which have brought to the fore social anxieties that run deep and are especially acute in a tradition-bound society, as in the South.

Scholarship is somewhat divided on the cultural distinctiveness of the modern South. In some ways, the odyssey of the region since World War II ‘from Cotton Belt to Sunbelt’²⁷ marks the regional convergence of the South, integrating its once isolated labor and capital markets with the rest of the nation. Indeed by the 1980s, ‘a new Southern economy [has] prevailed, located in the same geographic space as the old one, but encompassing a very different package of labor, capital, natural resources, and entrepreneurship: *not an advanced version of the old economy, but a new economy.*’²⁸

Regional convergence is also observable in the increasing liberalization of race relations in the South²⁹ and its metamorphosis from a one-Party region, imbued with closed and discriminatory political practices, to a region of high bipartisan competition, practicing a more open and democratic politics.³⁰ As noted by historian Bruce Schulman, the postwar South ‘seemed truly to [have] become an integral piece of the national polity and economy, a part of the main.’³¹ Writing in the early 1970s, contemporary southern commentators, such as John Egerton, remarked on the homogenizing processes making North and South increasingly alike, and thus averred that ‘the South is no longer simply a colony of the nation, an inferior region, a

²⁷ Bruce Schulman (1991) From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press).

²⁸ Gavin Wright (1986) Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, (New York: Basic Books) p. 241 (italics added).

²⁹ Perhaps the greatest indication of the transformation of Southern racial (economic and social) climates is observable from the fact that it changed from a region of widespread out-migration of African Americans to one attracting the in-migration of African Americans back into the region. See, for example, Dan Bilefsky (2011) ‘For New Life, Blacks in City Head to South,’ New York Times June 22, 2011, A1.

³⁰ For the alteration of the South, from a solidly Democratic region to one which is competitive between Republicans and Democrats, apart from the presidential vote, see: Earl Black and Merle Black (2002), The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), Also Dewey Grantham (1994) The South in Modern America: A Region at Odds, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers) p. 308-309.

³¹ Schulman (1991) “From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt,” p. 219.

stepchild; it is now rushing to rejoin the Union, and in the process it is becoming indistinguishable from the North and East and West.’³²

However Southerners as a social and electoral group are consistently found to still share a conservative political identity, whose policy preferences are distinct from Americans from states in the North and Pacific Coast.³³ Election results and survey research data identify racial divisions in southern politics between white and black southerners, but they also suggest marked continuing differences between North and South, with ‘Southerners as a group appear[ing] to be more socially conservative, nationalistic, and religious than nonsoutherners...they also seem to be better satisfied, regardless of class, race, or party, with their states and communities than is true of other Americans (thus more likely to espouse traditionalist than progressive values).’³⁴

Despite widespread economic changes and alterations to the regional population, the South, as a region, is described as inhabiting two worlds: ‘while its material culture has changed substantially since the Second World War, its non-material culture, although altered, still enables Southerners to think and talk of themselves in terms of their regional identity, the inherited codes....Southernness continue[s] to embody an undeniable core of shared meanings, understandings, and ways of doing things.’³⁵ Sociologists and survey data reveal that an attachment to place and to family is a cultural characteristic that continues to make southerners

³² John Egerton (1974) The Americanization of Dixie: The Southernization of America, (New York: Harper’s Magazine Press) p xix.

³³ Ann Markusen (1987) Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield); J.S. Hurlbert (1989) ‘The Southern Region: A test of the Hypothesis of Cultural Distinctiveness,’ Sociological Quarterly, 30: 245-266.

³⁴ Alan Abramowitz (1981) ‘Ideological Realignment and the Nationalization of Southern Politics,’ in Perspectives on the American South: An Annual Review of Society, Politics and Culture, vol.1, ed. Merle Black and John Shelton Reed (New York, NY: Gordon & Breach), pp. 83-106.

³⁵ Richard Gray (1986) Writing the South: Ideas of an American Region (Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, New York: Cambridge University Press) pp. 230-31 cited in Gratham (1994) ‘The South in Modern America,’ p. 312.

distinctive from other Americans; indeed the themes of place, family history, localism and community, have been found to have special meaning for most southerners.³⁶

Soul members of Congress draw on these ideals of family continuity and community ‘rootedness’ in justifying numerous policy preferences, such as those relating to small family businesses and their enduring relationships with local communities. For example, the repeal of estate taxes (a priority of the Republican Contract with America) is often argued for on the grounds that ‘the continuity of a business into the second and third generation of a family is... an important aspect of American society – building something for our children and for their children.’³⁷ ‘Family Rootedness,’ community and localism are evidenced in the significantly higher proportion of family cases used by Republicans to stress civic and social networks, their family examples describe their ties to their local communities far more frequently than do Democratic family examples, who instead more often talk about their social isolation or their links to individual family and friends (See Table 5.1 below). Of the family cases that discussed family’s social connectedness, 58% of Republican cases stressed civic participation in voluntary organizations, versus 36% of Democratic cases. Many more Democratic family cases (17%) mentioned isolation and lack of connectedness to neighbors, communities and extended families than did Republican (7%).

³⁶ John Shelton Reed (1991) “The South: What is it? Where is it?” in the The South for New Southerners, ed Paul D. Escott and David R. Goldfield (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press), pp.18-41; see also John Shelton Reed (1983) Southerners: The Social Psychology of Sectionalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press); Also Grantham (1994) “The South in Modern America,” p. 313; Earl Black and Merle Black(1987) Politics and Society in the South, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) pp. 219-229. Charles P. Roland (1982) uses Southern literary works to identify aspects of Southern culture that remain distinctive to the region. He writes, ‘Southern writers place an unusual emphasis on the very points emphasized in Southern life. These are family, history, race, religion, a sense of place, of concreteness and the imperfectability of man. One would never say of Faulkner what C. Vann Woodward has said of the work of...a nonsouthern writer, Ernest Hemingway: that is, ‘a Hemingway hero with a grandfather is inconceivable.’ [‘The Ever-Vanishing South,’ Journal of Southern History 48 (Feb, 1982): 12.]

³⁷ Jan Meyers (R-NE), House Committee on Small Business, Estate Tax Reform and the Family Business, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, p.1.

Table 5.1: Family Connectedness,¹ Democratic and Republican Family Cases, 97th-109th Congress (1980-2005)

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Social Connectedness of Family	Isolated*	38	17.4	13	7.4
	Friends, Family*	100	45.9	61	34.9
	Civic Participation/ Socially Networked*	80	36.7	101	57.7
	Total	218	100.0	175	100.0

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.


¹ 'Family Connectedness' was coded for all family cases that made mention of the presence or absence of family's relations to larger social or kinship networks (family ties to society); coding for whether the family case referenced 'isolation' from broader social networks, presence of other 'family and friends,' or active 'civic participation' in local organizations.

In keeping with the strain of traditional Southern family values, marriage continues to occupy a central, coveted place within Southern life and culture. For example, census data reveals the comparative universality of marriage among Southern and Western populations, in relation to those from Northeastern and Midwestern regions.³⁸ While all four regions have followed similar marriage trends – registering various marriage cycles of increase and then decline through the 20th century – differences between the two sets of regional populations are more apparent when we consider the *extent* (absolute rate) of marriages practiced in the South and West.³⁹ Through the 20th century, marriage rates in the West and South have far bypassed those in the Northeastern and Midwestern regions (see figure 4.3 below), somewhat converging in the late 1950s and then moving apart once again.

³⁸ Regional Categories used (South, West, Northeast, Midwest) follow Census regional divisions (see: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf).

³⁹ On marriage cycles see: Alexander A Plateris, '100 Years of Marriage and Divorce Statistics, 1867-1967' Vital and Health Statistics Series 21 No. 24. available on the world wide web: www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_024.pdf.

Figure 5.1: Marriage Rates averaged per Decade by Region, 1940-2000



Compiled from Monthly and National Vital Statistics Reports (rates per 1000 population)

In keeping with its marital patterns, studies relying on survey data have found Southerners to place a higher value on marriage and family as social institutions, expressing greater levels of disapproval for cohabitation before marriage and more frequently viewing homosexual, premarital, teenaged and other extramarital sexual relations as always wrong.⁴⁰ Unlike other regions, in the South childbearing continues to be strongly associated with marriage; Southern women with premarital pregnancies being more likely than women from other regions to legitimate the birth, resulting in lower levels of nonmarital fertility in the South than elsewhere.⁴¹

The family case examples referred to by Republicans in committee hearings collectively illustrate this married couple ideal, also expressly mentioning more frequently religion and moral values in their family stories rather than the secular values more depicted in the Democratic

⁴⁰ Robert H Freymeyer and Barbara Johnson (2006) 'Southern Families,' in *Families with Futures: A Survey of Family Studies for the 21st Century*, Meg Wilkes Karakker & Janet R. Grochowski (eds) (New York: Taylor & Francis) pp. 8-9.

⁴¹ Scott J. South (1999) 'Historical Changes and Life Course Variation in the Determinants of Premarital Childbearing,' *Journal of Marriage and Family* 61: 753-763; Scott South & Lloyd, K. M. (1992) 'Marriage markets and nonmarital fertility in the United States' *Demography* 29: 247-264; R. Plotnick (1992) 'The Effects of Attitudes on Teenage Premarital Pregnancy and its Resolution,' *American Sociological Review*, 57, 800-811.

family cases (Tables 5.2 (a) and (b) below). 47% of Republican family cases mentioned values versus 33% of Democratic cases; of which 31% mentioned moral values, and 7% religious values. In contrast 91% of Democratic cases mentioned secular values, with only 7% mentioning moral values and only 1% religious values. We also find that Democratic family examples were drawn from more single-parent, rather than two-parent, families (42% of Democratic cases versus 37% of Republican); all of these differences being statistically significant.⁴²

Table 5.2 (a) : Caregivers and the Values they Impart in Family Cases by Party of Active MC, Committee Hearings 1980-2004

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Caregivers	Single Parent*	280	41.7	152	35.6
	Two Parents*	296	44.1	226	52.9
	Relative	21	3.1	10	2.3
	Adoptive Parents	18	2.7	13	3.0
	Foster Parents	13	1.9	8	1.9
	Adult Children	43	6.4	18	4.2
Values Imparted by Caregivers**	Secular*	202	90.6	118	57.8
	Patriotic	3	1.3	8	3.9
	Moral*	15	6.7	64	31.4
	Religious*	3	1.3	14	6.9

** Chi- Square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances

Table 5.2 (b): Religiosity and Values Mentioned in Family Cases by Party of Active MC, Committee Hearings 1980-2004

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Religiosity Mentioned**	No*	632	93.8	389	90.5
	Yes*	42	6.2	41	9.5
Values Mentioned**	No*	451	66.9	226	52.6
	Yes*	223	33.1	204	47.4

** Chi- Square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

⁴² Chi-square statistic for 'religiosity mentioned' was 4.21, $p = .042$; Chi-square for 'Values Mentioned' = 22.8, $p = .000$; Chi-square for 'Values Imparted' = 61.1, $p = .000$; Chi-square for 'Mention of Abortion' = 15.9, $p = .000$

In addition, Soul proponent's emphasis on authoritarian structures and discipline within its family ideal⁴³ is also reflective of family practices among Southern families. Survey findings document Southern parents' greater preference for corporal punishment as an appropriate form of discipline in contrast to parents from the Northeast. Instilling a sense of order and respect for authority among children has been found to be more important to Southern parents, across socio-demographic groups, surpassing all other regional groups in their support of the use of force to insure appropriate behavior in their children.⁴⁴ Republican Soul members in Congress draw on these ideals of order and discipline to argue for several policies affirming the role of strict punishment as a vital means in the combat against, among other things, rising rates of juvenile delinquency and social disorder.⁴⁵

Southern culture contains a deep-seated Protestant, evangelical religiosity, mirrored in both white and minority churches⁴⁶. 'So pervasive is orthodox religion in the South, so intimate its connection with other elements of life...that it may be [rightly] characterized as 'Culture-Protestantism.'⁴⁷ Evangelical religious themes such as the inherent immorality of the soul, individual salvation and nascent human imperfectability inform Southerners' (Calvinistic)

⁴³ See previous discussion on Discipline and 'tough love' as central aspects of the Soul Regime Family Ideal, pp. 278-279.

⁴⁴ Clifton P Flynn (1994) 'Regional Differences in Attitudes towards Corporal Punishment,' Journal of Marriage and the Family 56:314-324.

⁴⁵ See Jim DeMint (R-SC) statement on pp. 276-277 and accompanying text.

⁴⁶ Grantham (1994) "South in Modern America," p. 315, Also see: Samuel S. Hill (1989) 'Religion,' in Encyclopedia of Southern Culture, Charles Reagan and William Ferris (eds) (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press) pp. 1269-1331. It need be noted that the (evangelical-leaning) religious beliefs and practices of southerners were not much varied from other Americans in previous periods in history. For instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century, through a period described as 'The Second Awakening,' revivalism and evangelical Protestantism flourished in the North, in places such as upstate New York, the so-called 'Burned-over District,' [See Whitney Cross (1982) The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850 (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press)]; during the second half of the century, however, the North moved towards a more pluralistic culture in the wake of massive influxes of immigrants and attendant secularization, while the continuing pervasiveness and intensity of religion in the South now distinguishes it from the North.

⁴⁷ Samuel S. Hill (1962) 'The South's Culture-Protestantism' Christian Century LXXIX (Sept 12, 1962): 1094-96.

skepticism over programs for the improvement of society.⁴⁸ The emphasis on personal morality and individual responsibility in the policy preferences of white Southerners, seen for example in their opposition to the welfare state and support for policies encouraging parental autonomy, thus reflects cherished values within Southern Protestantism.⁴⁹

In its contemporary form, Soul Ideology may thus be said to reflect Southern evangelical values, driving its distinct approach to social policy. The evangelical belief of human suffering and misery as the natural order of human condition and its theme of human imperfectability against which one must continually battle,⁵⁰ recur in Republican family stories which idealize those able to overcome ongoing obstacles through the cultivation of character strengths, such as self-reliance, faith and personal determination. Many of these stories emphasize the continual aspect of difficulties inherent to the family condition which require the development of certain attitudinal qualities, to weather the unending challenges successfully. The family is seen as crucial in reproducing such character traits across generations, ensuring personal success despite ongoing adversity.

One such family mentioned in the hearings was that of Timothy Vann, an unusually-named woman. Along with eight other families, the family of Timothy Vann, African-American, widowed, mother of 10 children from St. Paul, MN was honored in 1983 as a ‘Great American

⁴⁸ Charles P. Roland, ‘Ever-Vanishing South,’ (1982) *Journal of Southern History* 48(1): 3-20, p. 10.

⁴⁹ See: Black & Black (1987) “Politics and Society,” pp. 213-231 as suggesting this; more generally on the link between Southern-based evangelicalism and support for conservative cultural policies see Jeffrey M. Stonecash and Mark D. Brewer (2007) Split: Class and Cultural Divides in American Politics, (Washington, D.C: CQ Press) pp. 153-154. For a discussion of the continuing strain of anti-institutionalism and individualism within the culture of the Sunbelt, despite its otherwise predicted cultural convergence with the non-South, see: John S. Reed (1991) ‘Social orientations. New South or No South? Regional Culture in 2036,’ The South Moves into its Future: Studies in the Analysis and Prediction of Social Change, Joseph S. Himes (ed) (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press).

⁵⁰ Human misery and depravity within evangelical theology is based on the classical Christian doctrine of original sin, wherein sin is a more fundamental human condition than social conditioning or even ignorance. Sin is viewed as second nature to all humans, their first nature being the image of God. The doctrine of sin and inherited depravity is the foundation of evangelical teaching about salvation -- requiring God’s mercy and grace which is received by personal effort, through repentance and faith [see; Roger E. Olson (2004) The Westminster Handbook to Evangelical Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press) pp. 267-268].

Family,’ by Nancy Reagan and the American Family Society, a pro-life, evangelical group. Mrs. Vann was also invited to testify before the Subcommittee on Family and Human Services, her family introduced by Senator Denton (R-AL) as illustrating family strengths, ‘what keeps a family together and ...what makes them joyful.’⁵¹ In telling her story, Timothy Vann repeatedly made reference to ongoing adversity and thus the importance of the cultural values transmitted through family generations to get her family through the trying times,

‘Not all has been smooth, and my family has had the same difficulties that anyone else has had, but we hung in there together. Added to the usual problems of ordinary people, we have, met with racial, education, housing, military and job discrimination. We had serious sicknesses – I had cancer – we lost our loved ones, there were school problems and peer problems... The pains and insults of discrimination were counteracted with constant reminders that they [the children] were made in the image of God, and they were endowed with...potential greatness if they tried the best they could. Sickness and death were recognized as part of our lives. We dealt directly with the school problems, and we worked through the peer pressures...Any of the successes and achievements made by my family can be attributed to my inheritance – my family, my parents, my grandparents, and my friends....we inherited the good Southern tradition of discipline, work, respect for parents and elderly, and all people...the teachings of love and honor for God, respect for my parents, respect and consideration of all people, honesty, industriousness, self-reliance and self-worth were passed to me and then, on to my children. I was also disciplined...I was discouraged from begging and borrowing and stealing, and thrift was a means of survival.’⁵²

As its name suggests, proponents of the Soul ideology look internally – towards character (the Soul) – for family success, external conditions are viewed as somewhat irrelevant and endemically imperfect. Poverty and social inequality are assumed to be natural aspects of society and social policies towards the poor, while justified by compassion for one’s fellow humans, are viewed skeptically in terms of their possible outcome.⁵³ This approach is much at odds with the more Social Gospel approach of Hearth advocates, which sees human and family condition more contextually and circumstantially – as grounded in external economic conditions

⁵¹ Chairman Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), Senate Subcommittee on Family and Human Services of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Forum for Families: Quality of American Family Life, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983., p. 1

⁵² Ibid., pp.61-63.

⁵³ Denton: ‘The Bible tells us that the poor will always be with us;’ Senate Subcommittee on Aging, Family and Human Services of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources (1981) Fighting Poverty: Private Initiatives and Public Assistance, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p.2.

– and accordingly looks to public policies to alter these harmful conditions and so generate family success.⁵⁴

However contemporary Democratic proponents of the Hearth framework are not indifferent to the importance of values and character traits in family life. Democratic members use family cases to highlight some of the same secular and moral themes as illustrated by Republicans through their own, respective family cases; many of which center on parenting, illustrating the qualities of good or bad parents. Indeed, we find that both parties now invoke various cultural messages of parenting when they discuss public policies. Table 5.3 below indicates the comparable high proportions by which Democrats and Republicans used family cases to extol cultural family traits such as involved parents, work ethic, love for family, good parenting, alongside other cases depicting parental irresponsibility and absentee parenting. Evidence from the family cases thus support evidence from bill sponsorship insofar as we find a directed focus of state (policy) attention onto cultural family practices, such as parenting.

⁵⁴ Among others, James Morone has identified the distinction between the Social Gospel and neo-Puritan approaches to public policy; the former focused on reforming the social context and the latter focused on the reformation of the soul of the individual ‘sinner’ [James Morone (2003) Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History, (New Haven: Yale University Press) pp.14-19]. Hearth advocates use the language of Social Gospel when they talk about ‘eradicating’ social problems, such as poverty or disease, exhibiting a faith in public policy as a mechanism for social engineering. For example, see: Ronald Dellums (D-CA): “Poverty is increasing in this country and misery is mounting to an extraordinary level. I think it has reached a point where it is a moral imperative that we eradicate poverty in this country...our society will clearly begin to understand that once you make a commitment to eradicate poverty among children, you cannot stop until you eradicate poverty among all of our citizens” [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Children and Families in Poverty: Beyond the Statistics, 99th Cong. 1st sess., 1985, p.40, 41]. Also George Miller (D-CA): “I hope what will emerge from these a consensus...that we will have the ability to try and conquer this very, very unfortunate disease (SIDS), should we decide to do so [House Subcommittee on Census and Population of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce & House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Joint Hearing, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, p.2].

Table 5.3: Cultural Values Illustrated in Democratic and Republican Family Cases, 1980-2004

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Secular Theme	Involved Parents	55	24.4	39	26.5
	Liberty*	1	.4	7	4.8
	Equality*	53	23.6	3	2.0
	Justice	7	3.1	4	2.7
	Work Ethic	47	20.9	37	25.2
	Family privacy*	27	12.0	38	25.9
	Irresponsible Parent	35	15.6	19	12.9
	Total	225	100.0	147	100.0
Moral Theme	Thrift/Savings	8	7.3	13	10.5
	Charity	3	2.7	6	4.8
	Sexual Abstinence	0	.0	3	2.4
	Love for Family	28	25.5	19	15.3
	Parenting	39	35.5	47	37.9
	Gender roles	2	1.8	8	6.5
	Promiscuity	2	1.8	5	4.0
	Absentee parent	28	25.5	23	18.5
	Total	110	100.0	124	100.0

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Alongside the common focus on parental traits we also find that Democrats used family cases in significantly higher proportions to highlight equality, as a secular theme; while Republicans used significantly larger proportions of family cases to stress family privacy (above Table 5.3). 24% of Democratic cases emphasized equality in contrast with 2% of Republican cases; and 26% of Republican cases stressed family privacy versus 12% of Democratic ones. Reflecting postmaterial concerns, the data on family cases during committee hearings suggest that Democratic emphasis on equality, as a secular value, now significantly extends to *gender* equality, in addition to its long-standing commitment to class equality.

Women's increasing inclusion into the workforce, as previously discussed, has been a central feature of shifting familial relations and practices, bringing the public and private spheres of work and family into closer contact than ever before. Democratic members of Congress

repeatedly highlight this aspect, preferring public policy proposals which create an equal playing field between fathers and mothers in pursuing both work and family. Such Hearth proponents now see an enhanced role of the state to provide the support services to allow women to be *both*, effective workers *and* nurturing mothers. Unlike many Soul proponents, those espousing Hearth principles view mother's work outside of the home in neutral terms, as an economic necessity for most families, the result of postindustrial economic restructuring and the decline of family wages for many male workers. Women's choice of career or family is thus viewed as a specious one since, for most mothers, participation in the workforce is presented as a necessity rather than choice. Given this, the new role of the national state is to remove hindrances which prevent women from working outside of the home, such as lack of child care facilities, seen to effect mothers across all social strata.

We see this in an exchange between Chairman George Miller (D-CA) and Rebecca Henson, a separated, single mother of four from Fairfax, VA.

Chairman Miller. Ms. Rhones, you mentioned that you had turned down a pay increase so that you could keep your eligibility for child care....you have done that once or more than once?

Ms. Rhones. More than once.

Chairman Miller. Yes, more than once – the ultimate private subsidy. Will you have to continue that?

Ms Rhones. Until the baby is no longer eligible for day care or until I feel reasonably comfortable that she can come home by herself I will....It comes to a point where it is career versus children, and the raises, even though they look good, if you really add up through the year it is less than what it would actually cost if I have to find somebody to take care of the children, and it is easier because you know the child is in a setting that you feel secure with and you can trust these people rather than put them with a babysitter part time that you do not know what is going on.

Chairman Miller. This is an interesting piece of information. Other studies have shown that some do not enter the work force because receiving public assistance allows them to retain Medicaid and other benefits. Your testimony adds another dimension. Someone with a good salary, with four children who must make that same kind of logical economic calculation, but this time its to refuse advancement.

You are making the determination that all policymakers want you to make, and that is that you children are the most important individuals in your life. And when you pick your children over your career you are also telling us that you are picking quality care over that career.

Certainly all the members of this committee want parents who feel this way about their children.

But if you make that choice, you are going to be penalized for putting your children first. And again from studies we have seen concerning women on public assistance, that same determination is made and the same penalty is paid for making the choice of children over work.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Child Care: Beginning a National Initiative, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p.65.

Additionally and certainly in contrast to previous periods such as the postwar era, women's participation in the workforce is also seen more positively by Hearth members, as a means of personal satisfaction and individual growth for women (in addition to being an economic necessity); and the policy rationale is thus also to create opportunities for mothers to fulfill their own, individual, as well as familial needs.⁵⁶ The sensitivity to the importance of individual satisfaction within the family directly follows from the companionate family ideal in which individual happiness is viewed as central to the overall success of the family unit.⁵⁷ Indeed, Democrats when discussing family cases addressed the gender dimension in policy debate, highlighting the impact of various policies on women, in significantly greater proportion than did Republicans, who were instead more prone to stress traditional gender roles within family units, exhorting mothers to remain in the home (See Table 4.9 below). 8% of Democratic cases expressly mentioned women's issue in their family description (versus 1% of Republican cases) and no Democratic case mentioned traditional gender arrangements in the family, in contrast to 1.6% of Republican cases that did.

⁵⁶ See statement of Julie Matthaui, Democratic Witness on note 36 (p. 255) and accompanying text.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Pat Moynihan (D-NY) in discussing the provision of medicaid to all children, regardless of mother's working status: 'You know, I have watched my wife raise three children in the course of 33 years or so, and what do mothers do? Mothers are said to do a lot of things, but in my personal experience, mothers look after sick children. There is always somebody who has just fallen down stairs, cut himself, got chicken pox, etcetera; and that is the life of a mother, as a custom, looking after the health of the children. To lose health insurance – you know, *to get out of the house and on with your own life* – is sort of to ask yourself: Do I care more about me or do I care more about my children? And that is a dumb position to put a woman in...' [Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy of the Committee on Finance, Welfare Reform or Replacement? [Child Support Enforcement], 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1989, p. 109 [emphasis added]].

Table 5.4: Issues Raised through Family Case Examples, Democrats and Republicans, 1980-2004

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Issue Raised	Health/Living Conditions*	188	28.1	72	17.0
	Education*	20	3.0	50	11.8
	Housing	18	2.7	6	1.4
	Public Assistance*	34	5.1	9	2.1
	Morality/Reproduction*	14	2.1	19	4.5
	Marriage/Fatherhood*	8	1.2	23	5.4
	Jobs	52	7.8	26	6.1
	Property/Wealth	14	2.1	16	3.8
	Elder Care/Aging	32	4.8	29	6.9
	Veterans	0	.0	11	2.6
	Child Care	51	7.6	26	6.1
	Adoption	14	2.1	13	3.1
	Child Protection*	113	16.9	39	9.2
	Child Support	7	1.0	3	.7
	Juvenile Delinquency	30	4.5	17	4.0
	Women*	53	7.9	4	.9
	Traditional Gender Relations	0	.0	6	1.4
	Parental Rights/Responsibilities*	5	.7	27	6.4
	Race	14	2.1	3	.7
	Immigration	3	.4	3	.7
	Limited Government	0	.0	21	5.0
	Total	670	100.0	423	100.0

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Cultural liberals espousing Hearth principles thus now look to public policies to create various programs and services in order to enhance individual's choices; consistently emphasizing the value of choice over tradition or biology in family life, including family formation. In addition to child care services and public assistance, when discussing federal funding of domestic violence shelters and even research into alternative reproductive technologies, personal choice – primarily women's choice – is invoked as a key focus of the contemporary Hearth approach to social policies.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ For example, on reproductive choice, in vitro fertilization, blurred parental boundaries, and the falsity of a distinction between biological and nurturing parenthood, see Bruce Morrison's (D-CT) remarks while questioning witness, Richard Doreflinger, Asst Director, Office for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops.: '... you talked about a problem of this child having all these parents... if there is a problem at all – I happen to be adopted myself so I speak with some experience on this question - isn't it the same circumstance, the

The Hearth ideology's contemporary reconfiguration of state-and-family relations to now include the pursuit of culturally liberal values (such as choice, gender equality, and diversity) through policy intervention coexists with its more conventional, class-based, approach, inherited from previous eras. Two of these themes, in particular, are now as robust as ever before: first, reliance on external, professional knowledge rather than local family knowledge and, second, economic determinism, i.e. viewing economics as foundational base and cultural values as superstructure. Both of these ideational themes within the Hearth framework persist as sites of primary disagreement with the Soul one, which continues to privilege local family knowledge and view cultural values as base, over and above family economics, the superstructure.

Hearth member's reliance on external professional knowledge permeates their discussion of almost all types of social policies, ranging from day care to teenage suicide prevention, to maternal and child health. Programmatic assistance through knowledgeable social workers and through programs, such as Head Start, continues to be asserted on grounds of educating otherwise-ignorant parents on better practices of child rearing. Whereas Democratic family stories repeatedly affirm the positive, educative and ameliorative effect of external programs; Republican members instead use other family cases to illustrate their distrust of such external agents, in favor of more homegrown, local (and private) family involvement.⁵⁹

separation of biological parenthood from nurturing parenthood?...Isn't that a false issue that you're raising...that having different biological parenthood is an insurmountable barrier? [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Alternative Reproductive Technologies: Implications for Children and Families, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 50]. Also see the example of Herb and Ginger Davis, Sliver Spring, MD, as a successful blended (step) family also devoted to the 'idea of a family,' illustrating that marital choice leading to non-traditional arrangements can be just as successful for child rearing than traditional choices, House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, The Diversity and Strength of American Families, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, pp. 6-11; and, the statement of Laurie Dixon, student, Walter Johnson High School, Bethesda, MD, testifying 'I am now thankful that my parents did divorce. If my parents were together, I would have a terrible home situation...Divorce itself is not the true problem for kids today. Bad marriages which continue or end and lack of communication pose much more substantial threats to the healthy upbringing of a child [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Divorce: The Impact on Children and Families, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p. 6.

⁵⁹ For example, the case of Stephen Juan King, African-American former Head Start student from Auburn, Alabama, who testified to 'Head Start as [being] the first step in a series of steps toward [his] complete integration

Also, Hearth proponent's recent preoccupation with (liberal) cultural family issues is fitted within their larger, more conventional, focus on family economics. Democratic members of congress often describe 'post'-material, quality-of-life issues as inseparable from a family's material circumstances. For instance, numerous hearings on rising unemployment during the 1980s and early 1990s now emphasize the effects of joblessness on the family's quality of life, highlighting the stress, anguish and depression caused by long term unemployment on the family. Family problems such as alcoholism, substance abuse, domestic violence and child abuse are all tied to the diminishing quality of life found in families faced with economic instability and hardship. In the postwar era, Hearth advocates had newly begun to include a family's emotional needs, in addition to its material ones, then considered important in the light of postwar and Cold War uncertainty. Contemporary Hearth proponents following the legacy of

in American life', inculcating the 'feeling that I am not an outsider' and teaching him and his family how to overcome racial segregation and manage conflict, affording him the opportunity to go on to join the Peace Corps and earn a doctorate degree from the University of Florida [Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Head Start Reauthorization, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, pp. 111-113; for other successful families arising from their Head Start participation, see *Ibid.*, pp. 91-93, 97, 105-106, 108-109. In contrast we see cases such as the family of Polly Porter, Mother, from Metter GA, who testified that 'when we talk about crisis in America with children,...one of the crises – and don not get me around because I enjoy teaching and I enjoy getting out of the house for a while, but I think one of the crises is that we mothers are not spending either quantity or quality time with out children. *We are a lot of times looking for other institutions or other people to provide the love and time that we need to be providing for them ...too often parents buy things to entertain their children instead of spending time with them* [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Children and Families in the South: Trends in Health Care, Family Services, and the Rural Economy, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p 85, 86 (emphasis added)].

Child-care policy debates are especially illustrative of the differences in the Hearth and Soul positions regarding external versus family agents, their appropriate roles and legitimate relationship. Democrats and their witnesses often view 'supervised, structured' day care facilities as better than unsupervised time with grandparents, or other informal arrangements. [See Statement of Joan Rhones, Parent, Washington D.C., House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Child Care: Beginning a National Initiative, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 51-54 and Statement of Cecilia Tolles, from Toledo, Ohio, Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Day Care for Working Families Act of 1987, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 11]. In contrast, Republicans emphasize flex-time work options, allowing parents to split child care between themselves and stressing private, family-based (often relatives) child care over institutionalized, culturally liberal institutions such as public programs [See: Dan Coats (R-IN): 'I was just trying to come up with a way that there could be some incentive ...for those that take the initiative to solve those problems and keep the child within the context of the family, have it raised in an environment that they probably are much more comfortable with that someone down the street or even in a licensed child care facility' [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Child Care: Key to Employment in a Changing Economy, 100th Cong., 1st sess., p. 42]; also Frank Wolf's (R-VA) remarks regarding flexi-time, shard jobs, and mothers working from home in House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, "Child Care: Beginning a National Initiative," p. 50.

their predecessors, continue to advocate for such programmatic assistance to reduce the stress, mental anguish and other negative quality-of-life concerns now associated with a postindustrial society.⁶⁰

For example in a hearing on the ‘New Unemployed,’ before the Democratic Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, John Morris a former unemployed auto worker from Dearborn, MI, a participant coach at Ford/UAW National Retraining Center, described the family circumstances of unemployed auto workers, emphasizing the mental anguish joblessness brings:

At UAW, local 600, the problems of displaced auto workers [is] met head on...The greatest impact of job loss, particularly for those who are long-term unemployed, is a loss of confidence and feeling of usefulness.

The financial stress of mortgage payments that cannot be met, automobiles being repossessed, and the pressure of not being able to provide the basic necessities of life, brings on the pressures that many times result in alcohol or substance abuse.

Personality changes and violent behavior are not uncommon. The loss of economic freedom and the lack of skills required to reenter the labor market are barriers that are extremely difficult to overcome.⁶¹

Whereas in the Hearth framework, family ailments, such as domestic violence and child abuse, are tied to the stressful effects of economic instability, similar problems are instead approached more attitudinally – as the outcome of increasing sexual permissiveness,

⁶⁰ On postmaterial psychological values privileging choice and self-expression, as replacing previous materialist concerns over purely economic and material security in advanced industrial Western democracies see Ronald Inglehart (1997) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

⁶¹ House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, The New Unemployed: Long-term Consequences for their Families, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 10; on the importance of parent-child open communication and crises management services in the face of the current ‘success-oriented’ society where ‘a lot of children ...struggl[e] to deal with th[e] striving for success’ see the testimony of Elaine DiFigilia, from Plano, Texas, describing the conditions that led her son, Scott, to commit suicide [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Teenagers in Crisis: Issues and Programs, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 48-51. On the Hearth position of poverty as an ‘environmental pressure’ in terms of ‘inadequate housing or small housing...[creating] the tensions of many people living together under the same roof ...and ‘the isolation of poor (urban) families,’ without opportunities to diffuse family tensions, see: George Miller (D-CA) and witness testimony, House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, “Children and Families in Poverty,” p. 37; Also on unemployment causing alcoholism which, in turn, is a stressor for abusers, see Lindy Boggs (D-LA): ...we learned that problem drinking increased with unemployment. Problem drinking and unemployment in turn caused an increase in spouse abuse, child abuse and in the numbers of teenagers who ran away from home or the so-called throwaway children who were thrown out by parents who could no longer cope. This tragic progression of events was described by a witness from Detroit, MI, as well as a witness from Ames, IA, the heart of America’s farmland’ [House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Alcohol Abuse and Its Implications for Families, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, p.9].

commercialized sexualization of youth, and widespread availability of pornography, enticing people to abusive behavior.⁶² The persisting divide between the Hearth and Soul ideologies thus lies in their approach to family problems as primarily structural or innate, a question of economics or one of moral values. In contrast to the postwar period but resembling the Progressive, Republican and Democratic family ideation includes class differences, seen in differing income levels of family cases referenced by Republican and Democratic members of Congress. As seen in Table 5.5. (b) Democratic members disproportionately now draw on lower income family cases in significantly greater proportions than Republicans (54% of Democratic versus 32% of Republican cases cited families from lower-income groups). Tables 5.5 (a) and (b) below show that unlike certain ascriptive factors such as race or parent's country of origin, economic status is a dividing line between the parties in formulating family policy ideas.

Significant differences are found to exist in the economic characteristics of the family examples referenced by Republican and Democratic members, including differences in income status, the employment statuses of fathers and of mothers.⁶³ Democratic members use more unemployed and part-time employed fathers to illustrate their policy concerns, whereas Republicans draw more on self-employed fathers and mothers. 22% of Democratic cases that mentioned father's employment status described the case of unemployed fathers and 5% that of part-time employed fathers; this is in contrast to 9% of Republicans that mentioned unemployed fathers and less than 1% that discussed fathers who were only partially employed.

⁶² See Dan Marriott (R-UT), House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Violence and Abuse in American Families, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p.3; Frank Wolf (R-VA), House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Child Victims of Exploitation, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985 p. 44 and also his remarks in contrast to Hearth advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) in House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Women, Violence and the Law, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, pp. 105-106.

⁶³ The Chi-square statistic for Income and Party is 24.03, p=.000; chi-square for Father's Employment and Party = 19.4, p=.000; and Chi-Square for Mother's Employment and Party = 22.8, p =.000

Table 5.5 (a): Ascriptive Characteristics of Family Cases by Party of Active MC, Committee Hearings 1980-2004

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Parents' Nativity	Native Born	652	96.7	419	97.4
	Foreign Born	22	3.3	11	2.6
	Total	674	100.0	430	100.0
Number of Children	One	260	44.6	185	51.0
	Two	141	24.2	72	19.8
	Three	182	31.2	106	29.2
	Total	583	100.0	363	100.0
Family Race	White	60	32.8	51	42.1
	African American	72	39.3	47	38.8
	Other	51	27.9	23	19.0
	Total	183	100.0	121	100.0

Table 5.5(b): Economic Characteristics of Family Cases by Party of Active MC, Committee Hearings 1980-2004

		Party Sponsor of Family			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Income Status**	Lower Income*	285	54.1	124	37.2
	Middle Income*	187	35.5	154	46.2
	Upper Income*	55	10.4	55	16.5
	Total	527	100.0	333	100.0
Father's Employment**	Unemployed*	47	21.8	13	9.2
	Part-time Employed*	11	5.1	1	.7
	Employed	132	61.1	96	67.6
	Self-Employed*	26	12.0	32	22.5
	Total	216	100.0	142	100.0
Mother's Employment**	Unemployed	57	19.0	33	19.0
	Part-time Employed	34	11.3	11	6.3
	Employed	196	65.3	101	58.0
	Self-Employed*	13	4.3	29	16.7
	Total	300	100.0	174	100.0
Housing Status	Public Housing	82	38.5	28	27.5
	Private Assistance	24	11.3	18	17.6
	Rent	24	11.3	7	6.9
	Homeowners	83	39.0	49	48.0
	Total	213	100.0	102	100.0

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Thus, Democratic Hearth social policy is focused on certain types of families, with economic characteristics (income, employment, family structure, gendered relations) that are significantly different from the families who are at the heart of Republican Soul social policy. And yet, as we have also seen through analysis of family anecdotes, cultural qualities of families are now highlighted by both parties in their policy discourse, alternatively highlighting liberal or conservative family ideals. Democratic family cases illustrate qualities such as gender equality, non-traditional families, personal choice and quality of life rooted in economic circumstance; and Republican families epitomize other qualities, such as traditional gender relations, married couple ideals, and tradition-based, religious, cultural values. As suggested earlier, the cultural themes resonating within the Republicans' Soul approach to social policy are markedly Southern; correspondingly the liberal cultural themes emphasized within the Democratic Hearth approach also have a perceptible regional character, traceable to families in the postindustrial North.

§ 2 – Regional Character of Republican and Democratic Family Ideals

Regional variations are borne out in the family cases used by Republicans and Democrats. As we see in Table 5.6, the largest proportions of families referred to by Democrats hail from Northern states (East of the Mississippi), while the largest proportions of Republican family cases instead reside in the South; the differences in proportions being statistically significant.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Coding of Regions aggregates Census divisions: where North = Census Divisions of New England, Middle Atlantic and East North Central; South = Whole of Census Region of South i.e. Divisions of South Atlantic, East and West South Central; West = Mountain and West North Central Divisions; and Pacific = Pacific Division [See: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf] For a similar aggregation also analyzing the significance of

Table 5.6: Region of Democratic and Republican Family Case Examples, 1980-2005

		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Region of Family	North*	284	42.2	142	35.7
Residence**	South*	215	31.9	177	41.3
	West	84	12.5	62	14.5
	Pacific	90	13.4	48	11.2
	Total	673	100.0	429	100.0

** Chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.


42% of Democratic family cases resided in the North, with 32% from the South. In contrast, a smaller proportion (36%) of Republican cases hailed from the North and a larger proportion (41%) resided in the South.

The recent reconfiguration of State-and-Family relations by both, Hearth and Soul, partisan approaches in which cultural family issues have gained resurging prominence, is also illustrated in the increasing count of family stories from the South and from the Rocky Mountain West, referenced by members of both parties in recent Congresses. In contrast the number of family stories stressing mainly the declining economic condition of families in the older industrial regions of the North and the Pacific Coast has declined precipitously since the 1990s. The so-called “Southernization” of American Politics, extending policy discourse to cultural interests in the case of family-related social policies, is especially noticeable after the 104th Congress and its Contract with America.

Region to Partisan Development, albeit without the inclusion of DC, HI or AK, see Mellow (2008) “The State of Disunion,” p. 26-27. The Pearson’s Chi-Square Statistic of “Family Region” with “Party” was 13.8, $p = .003$. Further significance tests reveal that a significantly larger proportion of Republican positive, rather than negative, case examples came from the Rocky Mountain Western States, whereas for those Republican family cases from the North a significantly larger proportion were used as negative, rather than positive, cases; illustrating pathologies for policy to correct rather than affirming virtues for policy to encourage. Interestingly, Democrats appear to use family cases from all regions more evenly -as both, positive and negative illustrations of policy concerns; no significant differences were found between positive and negative cases for Democrats, for family cases from any of the four regions.

The figure below indicates that the trends in the regional distribution of family examples used to guide public policy match the shifting locus of power between the two Parties. Reagan Republicans, such as Senator Denton from Alabama, approached social policies through the cultural and economic ideals most salient among Southern families; this is reflected in the large count of Southern family case examples in the early 1980s (97th-99th Congress). Again, at the height of Republican strength, when Republicans dominated both Houses in Congress (104-106th Congress, 1996- 2002), families from the South and the Mountain West i.e. the so-called red states, were again increasingly referenced in policy debates, indicating their enhanced political value. In contrast in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, when Democrats and Republicans battled for control over the two branches in Congress, family examples from the blue states of the North and Pacific Coast were evenly referenced alongside those from the red, Southern and Mountain, states.

Figure 5.2: Region of Families Referenced in Hearings, 97th-109th Congress (1980-2005)



In addition to region, I also find some differences in the Parties' use of families based on sizes of towns in which they reside. As seen in Figures 5.3 (a) and (b), there is no statistical difference observable between Republicans and Democrats in the median population size of towns, for the

Northern and Pacific family cases. However, in the South Republicans rely on families from significantly smaller-sized towns than do Democrats. A larger proportion of Democratic family cases hailed from Southern cities such as Atlanta (GA), Baltimore (MD) and New Orleans (LA); while Republican Southern family cases were more scattered across smaller cities such as Mobile (AL), Charlottesville (VA) and Plano (TX). In contrast, a large proportion of Republican family cases from the West were drawn from higher population cities such as Salt Lake City (UT) and Phoenix (AZ) than were Democratic family cases.

Figure 5.3 (a): Distribution of Median Populations in Democratic Family Examples by Region, Committee Hearings 1980-2004





Figure 5.3 (b): Distribution of Median Populations in Republican Family Examples by Region, Committee Hearings 1980-2004



In sum, I find significant differences in the regional bases of the two partisan family ideals driving the Hearth and Soul ideological constellations and policy approaches. Whereas the cultural-liberal family values of gender equality, individual choice in family relations and quality-of-life now pursued actively by Hearth members are constructed around the concerns and practices of more urban Northern families. More conservative family values, such as the married-couple ideal, evangelical-based religious themes of sin, as well as emphasis on strong paternal figures which have re-engaged Soul members, resonate more deeply among Southern families. Collectively, the contemporary ‘culturization’ of family policy discourse is observable in members’ increasing reliance on red-state families mostly from the South to illustrate their policy concerns and preferences, indicating both the region’s rising political value to both parties as well as the shift in the ideational character and normative goals of family policy.

Conclusion

The findings of the chapter have at least two sets of implications, one regarding the development of the welfare State and the other related to partisan polarization within American Politics. First, I find that accompanying the so-called culture wars, cultural issues have now risen to the fore of family policy discourse, catapulting what was earlier a subterranean cultural politics into current prominence. However, unlike what is conventionally portrayed in well-known scholarly and popular works (McCarty et al, Stonecash et al, Miller and Schofield, Thomas Frank etc.), I find that the current attention to family cultural issues does not replace or compete with previous political divisions over class or economic interests. In contrast, I show how both parties now fit their concern with cultural issues *onto* their persisting differences over economic ones; the amalgamation resulting in new, transformed, ideologies – resembling, but in many ways distinct from their inherited legacies. Whereas the two approaches (Hearth and Soul) have continued to remain divided over the relative political value ascribed to economics over culture or vice versa, the chapter’s discursive investigation into policy debates has assembled how the two dimensions of culture and economics are now conjoined in each of the two approaches to family policy; coexisting in partisan policy ideation in a deeply entwined, imbricated way. This contemporary ideological configuration within both frameworks is distinctive to the contemporary period, marking the current character of the American Welfare State.

As critical literature on the Welfare State has rightly noted, progressives’ engagement with the family during previous periods (such as the Progressive or Postwar Eras) was by no means acultural; instead intervention into family economics often also implied the accompanying

imposition of a racist, classist and gendered social-cultural system on immigrant, ethnic and other minority families.⁶⁵ Similarly we have seen that in the postwar era the ideological battle over social welfare by Hearth and Soul proponents also contained ideational contests over different sets of cultural ideals. Nevertheless up until the 1970s, the progressive family frame of the Hearth framework had legitimated national state intervention into families' lives by stressing the economic qualities of families' conditions, cultural issues remaining deliberately muted. Traditionalists advocating Soul ideologies were previously content with the mechanism of localistic control of Federal economic programs to preserve their cultural ideals. However responding to the new (electoral and ideational) configuration among Hearth advocates and the heightened salience of (liberal) cultural issues, they have altered their prior narrow policy approach, now enlisting the national state in active pursuit of traditionalist, Soul cultural ideals. Whether a companionable Big Brother or a sterner Strong Father, the (federal) state is now legitimately in the business of addressing cultural family matters through public policy. A central goal of the Chapter has been to demonstrate how the two approaches have accommodated this new development, marking the contemporary configuration of state-and-family relations and of the current Welfare State.

Secondly, the picture of intersectionality of the two frames, cultural and economic, also has implications in how we approach and understand party polarization. Relying on committee hearings as sources of discursive investigation, I find that the picture gleaned from roll call

⁶⁵ For example, feminist scholars have highlighted the gendered, racial and cultural qualities of social policies instituted during the Progressive Era; see: Gwendolyn Mink (1995) Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the welfare state, 1917-1942, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press), also (1990) "The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare State," in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press) ; Mimi Abramovitz (1988) Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present (Boston: South End Press); Barbara Nelson (1990) "The Gender, Race, and Class Origins of Early Welfare Policy and the Welfare State: A Comparison of Workmen's Compensation and Mother's Aid," 413-35 in Women, Politics, and Change, ed. Louise A. Tilly and Patricia Gurin (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).

analysis, identifying the centrality of ideological differences over economic redistribution to legislators' policy preferences is incomplete. Instead the chapter has sought to demonstrate that partisan divisions in our current period have not occurred along the economic dimension alone, but that partisan ideation is also divided over *how* the two – economic or cultural dimensions – intersect, if at all. This has further implications for how we understand American politics. Instead of viewing politics as comprising of separate, competing, dimensions such as culture or economics, the data presented here suggest a conception of politics as a complex, layered tapestry of inter-weaving frames in which polarization and convergence can occur simultaneously on both levels. The task is thus not to determine 'which one' but 'how' the intersection of the two axes have developed over time. By taking such an approach we open the door to uncovering new ways of conceptualizing the development of the Welfare State, as well as re-focusing investigation into developments in party politics.

CONCLUSION

Social policy is more than an aggregation of legislators' electoral calculations; it is not even the result of mere party competition, reflecting the two parties' dueling legislative agendas, or their preferences for liberal or conservative economic ideologies. This dissertation has tried to demonstrate that, at its core, social policy is a vision of society, pivoting on a particular family ideal, containing a related ideal of state. The Hearth and Soul family ideologies that have endured across the 20th century have served as durable, competing ideational templates through which the two political parties have formulated their policy responses to changes within American society. In so doing, Hearth and Soul ideologies have long articulated divergent visions of the American family and idealized differing societal relations, legitimating competing sets of public policies in furtherance of those ends.

In the Progressive era such structural changes extended to the social dislocations felt by families during industrialization and urbanization; in the postwar period, war, demobilization, suburbanization and the re-creation of a postwar economy similarly disrupted erstwhile family relations; and in the late 20th century, postindustrialization, migration, and liberalized race and gender relations not only strained previous family norms but also effectively unseated the two-parent, nuclear family as the dominant family form. Each period thus engendered a discourse of family crisis and in each era distinct partisan factions articulated a Hearth or Soul family policy ideology, alternatively privileging a materialist or attitudinal conception of family.

Long before the late 20th century 'culture wars,' Hearth advocates have been stressing the economic underpinnings necessary for successful family life and have assigned political value to the provision of resources and services to families; in so doing, they have clashed with Soul

proponents who have emphasized moral values and family attitudes as central to family success, alternatively privileging character goods and moral qualities over material ones.

Beginning with the Progressive era, the two policy frameworks have thus pursued divergent family models that have endured till today, their roots also belying their regional character. The Hearth ideology has drawn on the companionate family ideal, which emerged from the industrial, urban, North; and the Soul ideology has articulated a more hierarchical, self-regulating family ideal which was long prevalent in the white South, having previously underpinned its slave economy.

These contrasting family ideals have also invoked competing ideals of state. In the Hearth framework, companionate, egalitarian family relations within an urban society, with increasing economic pressures and growing family isolation, has elicited an interventionist state, valiantly entering into an active partnership with families to assist them in their struggle to meet their needs. Within the Soul framework, on the other hand, the self-regulating family with clear (paternal) authority structures, contained within a small town society in which trust and cooperation organically occur within households, simultaneously evokes a distinct conception of the state as, at best, a night watchman (guarding and upholding independent social relations) or, at worst, as a potential threat or destroyer of social harmony.

Legislators' preference for active state intervention through social welfare or regulatory policies is thus not merely an indication of their preference for a liberal, redistributionist, economic agenda but it is also the outgrowth of their policy vision of a companionate family whose success is predicated on its economic condition. Similarly conservative legislators' preference for limited state intervention and opposition to social welfare, for example, are not only the results of their ideological preference for free enterprise or limited government they are

also the outcome of their conception of families as self-regulating, whose success is tied to their character and moral condition rather than to their economic circumstances. The dissertation has chiefly tried to demonstrate that family ideals are thus deeply imbricated within ideals of state and economy, conjointly shaping legislator's social policy preferences and legislative agendas.

Whereas this dynamic has endured through the past century, it has acquired its greatest policy significance in the past three decades. As the Democratic Party has moved northward and the Republican Party southward (and westward), cultural differences have assumed a political salience that had been previously muted. Contrary to previous periods when partisan ideals of state and economy had subsumed an underlying ideal of family, in modern American politics the ideal of family has been elevated above its previously subterranean status, now serving to frame the other two ideals, of state and economy. Central to this story is the realignment of the South and the movement of southern members of Congress from the Democratic Party to the Republican.

Southern legislators have been the staunchest, most consistent, adherents of Soul family ideologies, exhibiting a marked preference for self-regulating families in which moral values and character are cherished above most else. As seen throughout the dissertation, from the Progressive era, through the postwar, and now to the contemporary period, Southern legislators have consistently articulated a Soul ideology in policy debates; their position being tempered only by their support for social welfare policies. Yet even in this regard Southern members vehemently opposed an interventionist national state and continued to champion local control and self-regulating families over those more closely embedded with public agencies. In its high levels of marriage, early and more frequent childbearing, the modern South has continued to be

different from other parts of the country. Moreover in the wake of its increasing, cross-class evangelicalism the importance of a self-regulating (religious) family has become re-embedded in the South, re-affirming its long-cherished values of paternal authority structures and gendered hierarchies. The recent economic prosperity and salience of the South has also meant its diminishing reliance on national funding for social welfare. All of these developments have made southern legislators more ‘Soul’ than ever before, such that their new accommodation within the Republican Party has served to metamorphose that party’s political ideology: from one preoccupied with limiting government to now favoring increasing national state involvement in the promotion of traditional cultural ideals.

Thus the current 30-year period of Republican political dominance since Reagan is strongly aligned with the increasing accommodation of the evangelical South (and West) into the Republican fold. In turn this has meant the metamorphosis of Republican ideology that now fits the southern preoccupation with traditional family morality onto its longer-term anti-statist agenda and support for individualism and free enterprise. In the upcoming 2012 presidential elections, despite facing a possible insurgency in its ranks from factions aligned with the Tea Party movement and their re-emphasis on limited government and economic (rather than social) conservatism, the Republican Party is unlikely to alter this strategy. The 2012 Republican platform will thus continue to reaffirm its ideological commitment to both traditional family values as well as anti-statist individualism/free enterprise, perhaps even going to some lengths to address the deep ideological connections between the two sets of themes (economic and cultural) as did their 1980 platform and stressing family and local institutions as alternatives to big government. Republicans in their 2012 platform will hence continue to emphasize Soul family ideals in policy planks pertaining to education choice, traditional marriage, tax reform, flex-time

allowing parents to work from home, family religious autonomy, abortion, and law and order; the proportion of paragraphs and planks addressing the family will thus remain almost identical to its 2008 version.

On its part, the modern Democratic Party since the 1970s has also assigned greater political value to cultural policies, instead privileging liberal, not traditional, cultural agendas alongside its more longstanding support for economic redistribution and social welfare. Companionate family (cultural) ideals, stressing egalitarian gender and race relations and diverse family forms, now frame and impel Democratic liberal economic agendas more than ever. This too is likely to be unchanged in the 2012 Democratic national platform. In that platform the Party will continue to highlight Hearth family themes, addressing the family (particularly ‘working families’) in planks on jobs, housing, health care, economic revitalization, college loans etc.; here too the proportion of planks addressing the family will remain unchanged from 2008.

In this way divergence over family ideals is now a prominent cleavage, marking the current party system between northern-based Democrats and southern-based Republicans. Finally it bears noting that the current partisan configuration is more stable than in previous periods when Soul Southern legislators were accommodated within the otherwise wholly Hearth, northern Democratic fold. In contrast, non-Southern contemporary Republicans although more culturally liberal than their Southern counterparts, share with them the common Soul ideal of self-regulating families that binds them more closely than ever. This partisan arrangement over cultural ideals and the heightened salience of Soul family ideologies are hence likely to continue to undergird American politics, subsuming and framing all other partisan policy differences; the struggle in national party politics being now, more than ever, a battle between its Hearth and its Soul.

APPENDIX

Table i: Policy Issue by Party of Active MC, 56th-66th Congress


		Party of Active MC			
		Democratic		Republican	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column N%
Family Case Issue	Limited Government	13	9.0	0	.0
	Health/Living Conditions	11	7.6	47	17.0
	Education	8	5.6	15	5.4
	Juvenile Institutions	3	2.1	17	6.1
	Child Labor	20	13.9	61	22.0
	Labor Conditions	1	.7	2	.7
	Wages	8	5.6	11	4.0
	Property/Wealth	3	2.1	15	5.4
	Immigration	0	.0	10	3.6
	Americanization	1	.7	12	4.3
	Women's Equality	0	.0	19	6.9
	Sexuality/Reproduction	18	12.5	2	.7
	Uniform Marriage/Divorce	0	.0	10	3.6
	Liquor/Gambling	4	2.8	13	4.7
	Law and Order	0	.0	23	8.3
	Parental Rights	12	8.3	1	.4
	Family Lineage	19	13.2	3	1.1
	Race	13	9.0	2	.7
	Traditional Gender/ Protectionism	7	4.9	0	.0
	Housing	0	.0	9	3.2
	Veterans' Pensions	3	2.1	5	1.8
	Total	144	100.0	277	100.0

Source: Compiled by Author, Committee Hearings, 56th-66th Congress (1900-1920) [Note: unit of analysis = family case]

**Table ii: Regional and Party Distribution of Sponsors of Bills providing for
Programs for Immigrant Families, Female Wage Earners, Mothers, and Family
Housing - 56th - 66th Congress (1899-1920)**


Bill			Party of Bill Sponsor		Total
			Democratic	Republican	
Immigrant Families	Region of Bill Sponsor	Northeast	2	7	9
		Midwest	2	3	5
		West	1	1	2
	Total		5	11	16
Female Wage Earners	Region of Bill Sponsor	Northeast	1	3	4
		Midwest	4	4	8
		South	1	0	1
	Total		6	7	13
Mothers	Region of Bill Sponsor	Northeast	2	8	10
		Midwest	1	6	7
		South	5	0	5
		West	1	4	5
	Total		9	18	27
Family Housing	Region of Bill Sponsor	Midwest	2	0	2
		South	1	0	1
		West	0	3	3
	Total		3	3	6

Figure 1: Proportion of Married and Widowed, 15 years and above by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920



Source: Based on Table 8, Percent Distribution of Marital Condition of the Population by Sex, By Divisions, and States, 1920, 1910, 1920 in "Chapter IV: Marital Condition", 1920 Census Report, U.S. Bureau of Census, p 358

Figure 2: Proportion of Single and Divorced, 15 years and above by Regional Divisions, 1900, 1910, 1920



Source: Based on Table 8, Percent Distribution of Marital Condition of the Population by Sex, By Divisions, and States, 1920, 1910, 1920 in "Chapter IV: Marital Condition", 1920 Census Report, U.S. Bureau of Census, p 358

Table iii: Policy Concerns illustrated by Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Family Case Issue	Maternal & Child Welfare*	3	3.0	48	11.3
	Child Health*	2	2.0	69	16.2
	Poverty*	4	4.0	71	16.7
	Education*	19	19.2	6	1.4
	Child Labor*	3	3.0	1	.2
	Child Institutions	0	.0	15	3.5
	Wages	2	2.0	6	1.4
	Family Wealth*	2	2.0	1	.2
	Immigration	0	.0	27	6.4
	Women's Equality	0	.0	12	2.8
	Sex*	36	36.4	15	3.5
	Day Care	0	.0	5	1.2
	Juvenile Delinquency*	18	18.2	15	3.5
	Child Neglect	6	6.1	16	3.8
	Parental Rights	2	2.0	0	.0
	Race Relations	0	.0	3	.7
	Housing Conditions	1	1.0	14	3.3
	Veterans Benefits/Housing	0	.0	7	1.6
	Father Desertion	0	.0	16	3.8
	State's Rights	0	.0	4	.9
	Cost of Living*	1	1.0	33	7.8
	Health	0	.0	41	9.6
	Total	99	100.0	425	100.0

Data compiled by author, committee hearings 1945-1956.

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

Table iv: Policy Concerns illustrated by Hearth and Soul Family Case Examples, 79th-84th Congress (1945-1956)

		Family Ideology			
		Soul		Hearth	
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %
Policy Category	Ascription	0	.0	0	.0
	Autonomy*	25	25.3	8	1.9
	Welfare*	30	30.3	269	63.3
	Regulation	44	44.4	148	34.8

Data compiled by author, committee hearings 1945-1956.

* Values in the same row are significantly different for Soul and Hearth cases at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.

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